The excitability of plant cells: With a special emphasis on characean internodal cells

This review describes the basic principles of electrophysiology using the generation of an action potential in characean internodal cells as a pedagogical tool. Electrophysiology has proven to be a powerful tool in understanding animal physiology and development, yet it has been virtually neglected in the study of plant physiology and development. This review is, in essence, a written account of my personal journey over the past five years to understand the basic principles of electrophysiology so that I can apply them to the study of plant physiology and development. My formal background is in classical botany and cell biology. I have learned electrophysiology by reading many books on physics written for the lay person and by talking informally with many patient biophysicists. I have written this review for the botanist who is unfamiliar with the basics of membrane biology but would like to know that she or he can become familiar with the latest information without much effort. I also wrote it for the neurophysiologist who is proficient in membrane biology but knows little about plant biology (but may want to teach one lecture on “plant action potentials”). And lastly, I wrote this for people interested in the history of science and how the studies of electrical and chemical communication in physiology and development progressed in the botanical and zoological disciplines.     

When Your Sources Talk Back: Toward a Multimodal Approach to Scientific Biography

Interviewing offers the biographer unique opportunities for gathering data. I offer three examples. The emphatic bacterial geneticist Norton Zinder confronted me with an interpretation of Barbara McClintock’s science that was as surprising as it proved to be robust. The relaxed setting of the human geneticist Walter Nance’s rural summer home contributed to an unusually improvisational oral history that produced insights into his experimental and thinking style. And “embedding” myself with the biochemical geneticist Charles Scriver in his home, workplace, and city enabled me to experience the social networks that drive the practical events of his career, which in turn helped me explain the theoretical basis of his science. Face-to-face interaction and multisensory experience will shape each biographer’s experience uniquely. Recent developments in sensory physiology suggest that the experience of integrating sense data encourages different patterns of observation and reflection. It is reasonable, then, to think that biography based on face-to-face interviews will, for a given author, have a different character than one based entirely on documents. I reflect on how interviewing shapes my own writing and I encourage the reader to do the same.     

Again,What the Philosophy of Biology is not

There are many things that philosophy of biology might be. But, given the existence of a professional philosophy of biology that is arguably a progressive research program and, as such, unrivaled, it makes sense to define philosophy of biology more narrowly than the totality of intersecting concerns biologists and philosophers (let alone other scholars) might have. The reasons for the success of the “new” philosophy of biology remain poorly understood. I reflect on what Dutch and Flemish, and, more generally, European philosophers of biology could do to improve the situation of their discipline locally, regionally, and internationally, paying particular attention to the lessons to be learned from the “Science Wars.” This paper grew out of my contribution to the symposium Philosophy of Biology in the Netherlands and Flanders organized by Thomas Reydon and Sabina Leonelli in Amsterdam in February 2004. It is a rather personal reaction to many of the opinions voiced in the quite heated atmosphere of the Symposium. My main concern is to convey an idea of what, according to me, is required to turn “our” philosophy of biology into a more successful enterprise than it currently is. This is motivated by a disconcerting discovery I made at the Symposium: Contrary to my expectations, a sensitivity for the sorts of things that make possible philosophy of biology of the best kind available today seems to be largely lacking in our part of the world. I wish to stress from the outset that although I will be quite polemical at times, this is always intended in the spirit of constructive dialogue.     

The crucial experiment of Wilhelm Johannsen

I call an experiment “crucial” when it makes possible a decisive choice between conflicting hypotheses. Joharmsen's selection for size and weight within pure lines of beans played a central role in the controversy over continuity or discontinuity in hereditary change, often known as the Biometrician-Mendelian controversy. The “crucial” effect of this experiment was not an instantaneous event, but an extended process of repeating similar experiments and discussing possible objections. It took years before Johannsen's claim about the genetic stability of pure lines was accepted as conclusively demonstrated by the community of geneticists. The paper also argues that crucial experiments thus interpreted contradict certain ideas about the underdetermination of theories by facts and the theory-ladenness of facts which have been influential in recent history and sociology of science. The acceptance of stability in the pure lines did not rest on prior preference for continuity or discontinuity. And this fact permitted a final choice between the two theories. When such choice is characterized as “decisive” or “final”, this is not meant in an absolute philosophical sense. What we achive in these cases is highly reliable empirical knowledge. The philosophical possibility of drawing (almost) any conclusion in doubt should be distinguished from reasonable doubt in empirical science.     

A different kind of quarterback

I am not big on celebrations, nor do I accept many invitations to receive awards. There is much work to be done, and the reward is in the doing. I learned this lesson early from my parents, Martha and Robert Guyden. However, I am humbled that anyone would even mention my name in association with E. E. Just. I, like he, was born into a segregated America, and somehow we both found biology. I think Just's life story instigates a discussion on diversity in science, as well it should. However, after reading Tyrone Hayes' (2010 E. E. Just Award recipient) essay from last year, "Diversifying the Biological Sciences: Past Efforts and Future Challenges" (Hayes, 2010), I have little to add on the subject. His words gave voice to my thoughts. That being said, I would like to use these pages to describe my journey into the "Cell" and the people who "hoed the row ahead of me."     

A mechanism and its metaphysics: An evolutionary account of the social and conceptual development of science

The claim that conceptual systems change is a platitude. That our conceptual systems are theory-laden is no less platitudinous. Given evolutionary theory, biologists are led to divide up the living world into genes, organisms, species, etc. in a particular way. No theory-neutral individuation of individuals or partitioning of these individuals into natural kinds is possible. Parallel observations should hold for philosophical theories about scientific theories. In this paper I summarize a theory of scientific change which I set out in considerable detail in a book that I shall publish in the near future. Just as few scientists were willing to entertain the view that species evolve in the absence of a mechanism capable of explaining this change, so philosophers should be just as reticent about accepting a parallel view of conceptual systems in science evolving in the absence of a mechanism to explain this evolution. In this paper I set out such a mechanism. One reason that this task has seemed so formidable in the past is that we have all construed conceptual systems inappropriately. If we are to understand the evolution of conceptual systems in science, we must interpret them as forming lineages related by descent. In my theory, the notion of a family resemblance is taken literally, not metaphorically. In my book, I set out data to show that the mechanism which I propose is actually operative. In this paper, such data is assumed.I wish to thank both Michael Ruse and Ronald Giere for suggesting improvements in an early draft of this paper. This paper is an abstract of a very long book. The number of people who helped me in developing the ideas set out in this book is extremely large, so large that I decided to defer expressing my gratitude to them until its appearance.     

Against reduction

In Molecular Models: Philosophical Papers on Molecular Biology, Sahotra Sarkar presents a historical and philosophical analysis of four important themes in philosophy of science that have been influenced by discoveries in molecular biology. These are: reduction, function, information and directed mutation. I argue that there is an important difference between the cases of function and information and the more complex case of scientific reduction. In the former cases it makes sense to taxonomise important variations in scientific and philosophical usage of the terms “function” and “information”. However, the variety of usage of “reduction” across scientific disciplines (and across philosophy of science) makes such taxonomy inappropriate. Sarkar presents reduction as a set of facts about the world that science has discovered, but the facts in question are remarkably disparate; variously semantic, epistemic and ontological. I argue that the more natural conclusion of Sarkar’s analysis is eliminativism about reduction as a scientific concept.     

Looking back on a life of unacknowledged privilege and a call to action

The year 2020 provided a wake-up call about the role systemic racism plays in shaping our nation and shaping science. While hard work and great mentors helped bring me a long way from a farm in Minnesota, it’s become much clearer that the privilege of being white and male and the accumulated advantages that began there played powerful roles. It’s time for white scientists like me to listen, think, and take action.

We all have personal stories that we use to describe our trajectory in life and science. For the past five decades the narrative I told myself was a simple one of good luck, hard work, support from my community, and mentors at pivotal times. However, in many important ways, this was just a small part of the truth, ignoring the role unperceived privilege played. The many underlying injustices that were laid bare in our nation this past year began to open my eyes, prompting me to look back at the roles hidden privilege played in my career and the power that these have given me. This challenged me to use the power of that privilege to speak and act to try to change the system in which engrained advantages benefit some but not all. I am telling my story in hopes it will encourage my white colleagues to examine their own.     

The advantages and disadvantages of being introduced

Introduced species, those dispersed outside their natural ranges by humans, now cause almost all biological invasions, i.e., entry of organisms into habitats with negative effects on organisms already there. Knowing whether introduction tends to give organisms specific ecological advantages or disadvantages in their new habitats could help understand and control invasions. Even if no specific species traits are associated with introduction, introduced species might out-compete native ones just because the pool of introduced species is very large (“global competition hypothesis”). Especially in the case of intentional introduction, high initial propagule pressure might further increase the chance of establishment, and repeated introductions from different source populations might increase the fitness of introduced species through hybridization. Intentional introduction screens species for usefulness to humans and so might select for rapid growth and reproduction or carry species to suitable habitats, all which could promote invasiveness. However, trade offs between growth and tolerance might make introduced species vulnerable to extreme climatic events and cause some invasions to be transient (“reckless invader hypothesis”). Unintentional introduction may screen for species associated with human-disturbed habitats, and human disturbance of their new habitats may make these species more invasive. Introduction and natural long-distance dispersal both imply that species have neither undergone adaptation in their new habitats nor been adapted to by other species there. These two characteristics are the basis for many well-known hypotheses about invasion, including the “biotic resistance”, “enemy release”, “evolution of increased competitive ability” and “novel weapon” hypotheses, each of which has been shown to help explain some invasions. To the extent that biotic resistance depends upon local adaption by native species, altering selection pressures could reduce resistance and promote invasion (“local adaptation hypothesis”), and restoring natural regimes could reverse this effect.     

A Reminiscence

Leslie Orgel and Francis Crick with Gobind Khorana in Madison, Wisconsin (December 1965). I first met Leslie at the Endicott House (MIT) in February 1964. Leslie was then spending a period of time at MIT and the occasion was a party for him. During our conversation, Leslie talked about starting some experimental work. He seemed to be particularly interested in polyphosphates and the chemical activation of small molecules (building blocks).Shortly after his move to the Salk Institute in the Fall of 1964 I visited him in January 1965. He already had a lab going. I remember meeting Jim Ferris, in particular, and John Sulston sometime later. That particular time was exciting for my research as well. We had the first results on the Genetic Code using the chemical-biochemical approach that my lab had developed. Francis Crick was also at the Salk Institute during the time of my visit. Both Leslie and Francis were very excited by my results and they began to ask a lot of questions and gave me a whole lot of suggestions about further experiments. In fact, my thinking and planning of things that we were doing were so scrutinized and clarified during these discussions that, it seemed to me, my own group had only to turn out all the experiments that were needed. These interactions with Francis and Leslie continued intensively throughout that year and later. In fact, both Leslie and Francis accepted my invitation to Madison in December 1965 for more discussions.Since those early days of the Salk Institute, I have made numerous visits over the years to Leslie and his research group. It has always been very exciting to learn about the many discoveries bearing on chemical evolution that have unfolded from Leslie's research group. In addition, I have always benefitted from the insightful comments that Leslie invariably provided on my own research. I look forward to our continued interactions and friendship in the future.Leslie, A Happy Birthday!     

The discovery of state transitions in photosynthesis 40 years ago

In the late 1960s, I identified an aspect of the kinetics of chlorophyll fluorescence in algal cells that I was unable to explain in terms of photochemical quenching. I proposed a novel regulatory mechanism for the distribution of light energy to photosystems I and II, which is now known by the term of “state transitions.” I also examined the “cation-dependent redistribution of light energy” to photosystems I and II and the “energy-dependent quenching” of chlorophyll fluorescence. At that time, financial constraints prevented me from measuring the emission and action spectra of chlorophyll fluorescence at liquid-nitrogen temperature and the light quality-dependent changes in the yield of chlorophyll fluorescence at room temperature. The financial problems were solved by constructing several pieces of electronic equipment using skills obtained by repairing radios when I was a high-school and college student.     

Don’t Call it “Darwinism”

Evolutionary biology owes much to Charles Darwin, whose discussions of common descent and natural selection provide the foundations of the discipline. But evolutionary biology has expanded well beyond its foundations to encompass many theories and concepts unknown in the 19th century. The term “Darwinism” is, therefore, ambiguous and misleading. Compounding the problem of “Darwinism” is the hijacking of the term by creationists to portray evolution as a dangerous ideology—an “ism”—that has no place in the science classroom. When scientists and teachers use “Darwinism” as synonymous with evolutionary biology, it reinforces such a misleading portrayal and hinders efforts to present the scientific standing of evolution accurately. Accordingly, the term “Darwinism” should be abandoned as a synonym for evolutionary biology.     

How Willing Are You to Accept Sexual Requests from Slightly Unattractive to Exceptionally Attractive Imagined Requestors?

In their classic study of differences in mating strategies, Clark and Hatfield (1989, Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality, 2, 39–54) found that men and women demonstrated a striking difference in interest in casual sex. The current study examined the role of an imagined requestor’s physical attractiveness (slightly unattractive, moderately attractive, and exceptionally attractive) on men’s and women’s willingness to accept three different requests (go out, come to apartment, go to bed) as reflected in answers to a questionnaire. We tested two hypotheses with a sample of 427 men and 443 women from three countries. Hypothesis 1 states that men, relative to women, will demonstrate a greater willingness to accept the “come to apartment” and “go to bed” requests but not the “go out” request for all three levels of requestor attractiveness. This hypothesis reflects Clark and Hatfield’s main findings. Hypothesis 2 states that the physical attractiveness of a potential partner will have a greater effect on women’s than on men’s willingness to accept all three requests, and particularly for the explicit request for casual sex. The results partially supported Hypothesis 1 and fully supported Hypothesis 2. The discussion highlights limitations of the current research and presents directions for future research.     

Samir Okasha: Evolution and the levels of selection

The debate about the levels of selection has been one of the most controversial both in evolutionary biology and in philosophy of science. Okasha’s book makes the sort of contribution that simply will not be able to be ignored by anyone interested in this field for many years to come. However, my interest here is in highlighting some examples of how Okasha goes about discussing his material to suggest that his book is part of an increasingly interesting trend that sees scientists and philosophers coming together to build a broadened concept of “theory” through a combination of standard mathematical treatments and conceptual analyses. Given the often contentious history of the relationship between philosophy and science, such trend cannot but be welcome.     

Fifty-eight years in science--a commentary

After 58 years in science, mostly in pharmacology, one gains perspective. Mine is that there have been important changes over this time, some good and some questionable. In this commentary, I try to reveal how I got to this stage, partially explaining my biases, and possibly helping others learn from my experiences including mistakes. Changing from seeking an M.D. to cellular biology and then to pharmacology early in my career were the best moves I made. The next best move was migration to Canada, away from the McCarthy-McCarran hysteria. Arriving at a time after the end of World War II when science in Canada was expanding was very good luck. I had an excellent opportunity to enjoy both the administration (as Chair of the first independent Department of Pharmacology at the University of Alberta) and the practice of pharmacology (as a practitioner of research on smooth muscle in health and disease). For me, the practice of research has always won over administration when a choice had to be made. Early on, I began to ask questions about educational practices and tried to evaluate them. This led me to initiate changes in laboratories and to seek nondidactic educational approaches such as problem-based learning. I also developed questions about the practice of anonymous peer review. After moving to McMaster in 1975, I was compelled to find a solution for a failed "Pharmacology Program" and eventually developed the first "Smooth Muscle Research Program". Although that was a good solution for the research component, it did not solve the educational needs. This led to the development of "therapeutic problems", which were used to help McMaster medical students educate themselves about applied pharmacology. Now these problems are being used to educate pharmacology honours and graduate students at the University of Alberta. The best part of all these activities is the colleagues and friends that I have interacted with and learned from over the years, and the realization that many of them have collaborated with me again in this volume.     

Distinguished words in data sequences: Analysis and applications to neural coding and other fields

This paper concerns sequences of letters in which certain “distinguished” words are of interest. Such sequences arise as data in numerous fields including genetics and neuroscience. A probability distribution is given for the number of occurrences of a chosen word in a randomized sequence of letters. Such words are considered “favored” if they occur more than expected at random. Favored words have been discovered in nerve impulse trains and may reflect a neural coding scheme. This article is dedicated to my mother, Margaret Oakley Dayhoff, whose enthusiasm encouraged me to pursue research in mathematical biology.     

Correlations between the psychological peculiarities of an individual and the efficacy of a single neurofeedback session (by the EEG characteristics)

Modifications of different EEG rhythms induced by a single neurofeedback session (by the EEG characteristics) directed toward an increase in the ratio of the spectral powers (SPs) of the α vs θ oscillations were compared with the psychological characteristics of the tested subjects (the group included 30 persons). A generally accepted neurofeedback technique was used; the intensity of acoustic white noise served as the feedback signal. EEG potentials were recorded from the C3 and C4 leads. Psychological testing was carried out using Eysenck’s (EPQ), Rusalov’s (OST), and (16 PF) questionnaires. The directions of changes in the SPs of EEG frequency components were found to significantly correlate with some individuality-related peculiarities of the tested subjects. The SP of the δ rhythm correlated with the EPQ scale “neuroticism,” OST scale “social plasticity,” and 16 PF factors H (“parmia”), I (“premsia”), and Q₃ (“self-control of behavior”). The SP of the θ component demonstrated correlations with the OST scales “ergisity,” “plasticity,” and “social temp” and with 16 PF factors M (“autia”), Q₄ (“frustration”), and Q1 (“exvia”). The SP of the α rhythm correlated with 16 PF factors Q₃ (“self-control of behavior”), G (“strength of superEgo”), O (“hypothymia”), L (“protension”), and N (“shrewdness”). The SP of the β rhythm correlated with the OST scale “emotionality,” while that of the γ rhythm showed correlations with the 16 PF indices L (“protension”) and M (“autia”). Changes in the ratio of the α vs θ SPs correlated with the EPQ scale “neuroticism.” Thus, our data confirm the statement that a high individual variability of the results of a single (first in the series) neurofeedback session is to a great extent related to peculiarities of the individual psychological pattern of the subject. Neirofiziologiya/Neurophysiology, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 239–247, May–June, 2006.