How the Polls Can Be Both Spot On and Dead Wrong: Using Choice Blindness to Shift Political Attitudes and Voter Intentions

Political candidates often believe they must focus their campaign efforts on a small number of swing voters open for ideological change. Based on the wisdom of opinion polls, this might seem like a good idea. But do most voters really hold their political attitudes so firmly that they are unreceptive to persuasion? We tested this premise during the most recent general election in Sweden, in which a left- and a right-wing coalition were locked in a close race. We asked our participants to state their voter intention, and presented them with a political survey of wedge issues between the two coalitions. Using a sleight-of-hand we then altered their replies to place them in the opposite political camp, and invited them to reason about their attitudes on the manipulated issues. Finally, we summarized their survey score, and asked for their voter intention again. The results showed that no more than 22% of the manipulated replies were detected, and that a full 92% of the participants accepted and endorsed our altered political survey score. Furthermore, the final voter intention question indicated that as many as 48% (±9.2%) were willing to consider a left-right coalition shift. This can be contrasted with the established polls tracking the Swedish election, which registered maximally 10% voters open for a swing. Our results indicate that political attitudes and partisan divisions can be far more flexible than what is assumed by the polls, and that people can reason about the factual issues of the campaign with considerable openness to change.     

Wrongness,Responsibility, and Conscientious Refusals in Health Care

In this article, I address what kinds of claims are of the right kind to ground conscientious refusals. Specifically, I investigate what conceptions of moral responsibility and moral wrongness can be permissibly presumed by conscientious objectors. I argue that we must permit HCPs to come to their own subjective conclusions about what they take to be morally wrong and what they take themselves to be morally responsible for. However, these subjective assessments of wrongness and responsibility must be constrained in several important ways: they cannot involve empirical falsehoods, objectionably discriminatory attitudes, or unreasonable normative beliefs. I argue that the sources of these constraints are the basic epistemic, relational, and normative competencies needed to function as a minimally decent health‐care professional. Finally, I consider practical implications for my framework, and argue that it shows us that the objection raised by the plaintiffs in Zubik v. Burwell is of the wrong sort.     

The evolution of moral progress and biomedical moral enhancement

In The Evolution of Moral Progress Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell advance an evolutionary explanation of moral progress by morality becoming more ‘inclusivist’. We are prepared to accept this explanation as far as it goes, but argue that it fails to explain how morality can become inclusivist in the fuller sense they intend. In fact, it even rules out inclusivism in their intended sense of moral progress, since they believe that human altruism and prosocial attitudes are essentially parochial. We also respond to their charge that the possibility of moral enhancement by biomedical means that we have defended in numerous publications assumes that moral attitudes are biologically hard‐wired to an extent that implies that they are resilient to the influence of cognitive or cultural factors. Quite the contrary, we think they are more open to such influence than they seem to do.     

Markets and Morals: An Experimental Survey Study

Most societies prohibit some market transactions based on moral concerns, even when the exchanges would benefit the parties involved and would not create negative externalities. A prominent example is given by payments for human organs for transplantation, banned virtually everywhere despite long waiting lists and many deaths of patients who cannot find a donor. Recent research, however, has shown that individuals significantly increase their stated support for a regulated market for human organs when provided with information about the organ shortage and the potential beneficial effects a price mechanism. In this study we focused on payments for human organs and on another “repugnant” transaction, indoor prostitution, to address two questions: (A) Does providing general information on the welfare properties of prices and markets modify attitudes toward repugnant trades? (B) Does additional knowledge on the benefits of a price mechanism in a specific context affect attitudes toward price-based transactions in another context? By answering these questions, we can assess whether eliciting a market-oriented approach may lead to a relaxation of moral opposition to markets, and whether there is a cross-effect of information, in particular for morally controversial activities that, although different, share a reference to the “commercialization” of the human body. Relying on an online survey experiment with 5,324 U.S. residents, we found no effect of general information about market efficiency, consistent with morally controversial markets being accepted only when they are seen as a solution to a specific problem. We also found some cross-effects of information about a transaction on the acceptance of the other; however, the responses were mediated by the gender and (to a lesser extent) religiosity of the respondent—in particular, women exposed to information about legalizing prostitution reduced their stated support for regulated organ payments. We relate these findings to prior research and discuss implications for public policy.     

High-school students in university research labs? Implementing an outreach model based on the ‘science as inquiry’ approach

In this study we designed, implemented, and evaluated an outreach programme for high-school biology students rooted in the ‘science as inquiry’ approach. Accordingly, students learn about science from experts in the field, as well as through in-class exposure to the history and philosophy of science. Our sample consisted of 11th graders (n?=?497), ages 16–17, attending advanced biology classes. Our goal was to determine whether this programme had a significant effect on students’ understanding of the ‘nature of science’ (NOS) and on their attitudes towards science. Using a controlled pre-post research design, we asked participants to complete a Likert-like questionnaire. Also, we conducted post-programme semi-structured interviews with 35 of the participants. Results show that completion of the programme significantly enhanced participants’ NOS understanding and improved their attitudes towards science. Participants expressed a deep level of NOS understanding and explicitly stated that the field visits to experts’ labs had changed their attitude towards science. We believe that our outreach programme can be adapted for teaching other sciences and for societies worldwide, as long as there is access to university laboratories and researchers willing to interact with young citizens and potential future scientists.     

Moving beyond bioethics: history and the search for medical humanism

From both within and without bioethics, growing criticism of the predominant methods and practices of the field can be heard. These critiques tend to lament an emphasis on logically derived rules and philosophical theories that inadequately capture how and why people have the moral attitudes they do, and they urge the use of more empirically grounded social sciences--history, sociology, and anthropology--to draw attention to the complex factors behind such attitudes. However, these critiques do not go far enough, as they do not question why debate over ethical categories should have such a central role in voicing concerns about medicine. The importance of using other forms of inquiry, especially that of history, to examine aspects of medical practice and the emergence of bioethics itself is not simply to refine bioethical moral analysis. Instead, history can be employed to counter the preoccupation with translating concerns about medicine into moral terms and to move towards what is more sorely needed: a true medical humanism.     

WHAT IS IT TO BE A DAUGHTER? IDENTITIES UNDER PRESSURE IN DEMENTIA CARE

This article concentrates on the care for people who suffer from progressive dementia. Dementia has a great impact on a person’s well‐being as well as on his or her social environment. Dealing with dementia raises moral issues and challenges for participants, especially for family members. One of the moral issues in the care for people with dementia is centred on responsibilities; how do people conceive and determine their responsibilities towards one another? To investigate this issue we use the theoretical perspective of Margaret Walker. She states that ideas about identity play a crucial role in patterns of normative expectations with regard to the distribution of responsibilities in daily practices of care. The results of this study show how the identity of a family‐member is put under pressure and changes during her loved one’s illness that leads to difficulties and misunderstandings concerning the issue of responsibility. These results offer an insight into the complexities of actual practices of responsibility and highlight the importance for those caring for people with dementia of attending carefully to how they see themselves and how they see other people involved (Who am I? Who do I want to be for the other?). Answers to such questions show what people expect from themselves and from one another, and how they, at any rate, are distributing responsibilities in a given situation. Professional caregivers should take into account that family members might have different ideas about who they are and consequently about what their responsibilities are.     

Medical experimentation, informed consent and using people

In this paper we argue that the standard focus on problems of informed consent in debates about the ethics of human experimentation is inadequate because it fails to capture a more fundamental way in which such experiments may be wrong. Taking clinical trials as our case in point, we suggest that it is the moral offence of using people as mere means which better characterizes what is wrong with violations of personal autonomy in certain kinds of clinical trials. This account also helps bring out another important way in which the autonomy of the participants in clinical trials my be violated, even in cases where they have given informed consent to their involvement. Where relevant information about the trial is framed in such a way as to induce a patient's participation by appeal to their nonrational preferences, this is also a violation of their autonomy, and one which is distinct from a failure of informed consent. The underlying wrongness of both kinds of violations, we argue, is plausibly captured by the moral offence of using people as mere means.     

Assessing Youth Perceptions and Knowledge of Ethics at 4-H Horse Shows in Louisiana

Due to the increased awareness of animal welfare issues and sensitized attitudes throughout society, youth animal projects provide a unique opportunity to assess and impact youth understanding and attitudes regarding animal welfare. Animal ethics training is not an uncommon requirement for participants in 4-H livestock programs. However, participants in 4-H horse projects are not universally held to the same standard. The purpose of this study was to assess youth knowledge, attitudes, and confidence in understanding of equine welfare at the 4-H state horse show, as well as to determine the beliefs and observations of unethical practices, and if differences exist between those parameters in youth competitors. The results suggest that 4-H competitors are interested in ethics and believe that unethical behavior rarely occurs within the state 4-H horse project. However, youth report observing common unethical behaviors at the show, suggesting a disconnect between what they believe is unethical and what they actually observe. Educational opportunities exist within these animal projects and should be enhanced to address the gap in understanding.     

Equity or equality? Moral judgments follow the money

Previous research emphasizes people''s dispositions as a source of differences in moral views. We investigate another source of moral disagreement, self-interest. In three experiments, participants played a simple economic game in which one player divides money with a partner according to the principle of equality (same payoffs) or the principle of equity (payoffs proportional to effort expended). We find, first, that people''s moral judgment of an allocation rule depends on their role in the game. People not only prefer the rule that most benefits them but also judge it to be more fair and moral. Second, we find that participants'' views about equality and equity change in a matter of minutes as they learn where their interests lie. Finally, we find limits to self-interest: when the justification for equity is removed, participants no longer show strategic advocacy of the unequal division. We discuss implications for understanding moral debate and disagreement.     

The Effect of Conservation Knowledge on Attitudes and Stated Behaviors toward Arthropods of Urban and Suburban Elementary School Students

Arthropods provide ecosystem services upon which humans depend, yet are declining across the globe. Arthropods are neglected from conservation efforts due to many factors that include a lack of understanding of their roles and conservation need. Knowledge gain of arthropod roles could therefore increase support for their conservation, albeit indirectly through attitude changes. Evidence suggests knowledge and attitudes are more highly correlated in children and that environmental attitudes are shaped before age 12 years. Differences in the connection between knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors toward arthropods may also be different in children from different cultures or from urban versus rural locations due to varying experiences with arthropods. We sought to understand if different types of knowledge increased positive attitudes and stated conservation-based behaviors toward insects in children in both urban and suburban schools. We conducted either a basic biology lesson or a conservation lesson on ecosystem services in both urban and suburban 4th and 5th grade classes, and used pre- and post-questionnaires to detect changes in knowledge, attitudes, and stated behavior toward arthropods. We found that urban students had significantly lower knowledge of, less positive attitudes toward, and fewer stated conservation behaviors toward arthropods but also exhibited the greatest positive changes when presented the conservation-based lesson. In addition, we found that being able to identify the type of arthropod correctly was related to more positive attitudes and stated behaviors. Finally, we found that while attitudes did not change toward some species, stated conservation behaviors did increase with knowledge of the arthropod’s role in the ecosystem. Education in urban schools, with a focus on both distinguishing arthropods as well as ecosystem services, provides the most change per effort for conservation. Arthropod lessons could be done by local professors and undergraduate students in urban classrooms or local green spaces.     

On the need to redress an inadequacy in animal welfare science: toward an internally coherent framework

The time is ripe for a greater interrogation of assumptions and commitments underlying an emerging common ground on the ethics of animal research as well on the 3 R (replacement, refinement, reduction) approach that parallels, and perhaps even further shapes, it. Recurring pressures to re-evaluate the moral status of some animals in research comes as much from within the relevant sciences as without. It seems incredible, in the light of what we now know of such animals as chimpanzees, to deny that these animals are properly accorded high moral status. Barring the requirement that they be human, it is difficult to see what more animals such as chimpanzees would have to possess to acquire it. If the grounds for ascribing high moral status are to be non-arbitrary and responsive to our best knowledge of those individuals who possess the relevant features, we should expect that a sound ethical experimental science will periodically reassess the moral status of their research subjects as the relevant knowledge demands. We already can observe this reassessment as scientists committed to humane experimental science incorporate discoveries of enrichment tools and techniques into their housing and use of captive research animals. No less should this reassessment include a critical reflection on the possible elevation of moral status of certain research animals in light of what is discovered regarding their morally significant properties, characteristics or capacities, or so I will argue. To do anything short of this threatens the social and moral legitimacy of animal research.     

Respecting Autonomy Over Time: Policy and Empirical Evidence on Re‐Consent in Longitudinal Biomedical Research

Re‐consent in research, the asking for a new consent if there is a change in protocol or to confirm the expectations of participants in case of change, is an under‐explored issue. There is little clarity as to what changes should trigger re‐consent and what impact a re‐consent exercise has on participants and the research project. This article examines applicable policy statements and literature for the prevailing arguments for and against re‐consent in relation to longitudinal cohort studies, tissue banks and biobanks. Examples of re‐consent exercises are presented, triggers and non‐triggers for re‐consent discussed and the conflicting attitudes of commentators, participants and researchers highlighted. We acknowledge current practice and argue for a greater emphasis on ‘responsive autonomy,’ that goes beyond a one‐time consent and encourages greater communication between the parties involved. A balance is needed between respecting participants' wishes on how they want their data and samples used and enabling effective research to proceed.     

Autism,theory of mind,and the reactive attitudes

Whether to treat autism as exculpatory in any given circumstance appears to be influenced both by models of autism and by theories of moral responsibility. This article looks at one particular combination of theories: autism as theory of mind challenges and moral responsibility as requiring appropriate experience of the reactive attitudes. In pursuing this particular combination of ideas, we do not intend to endorse them. Our goal is, instead, to explore the implications of this combination of especially prominent ideas about autism and about moral responsibility. These implications can be quite serious and practical for autists and those who interact directly with autists, as well as for broader communities as they attend to the fair, compassionate, and respectful treatment of increasing numbers of autistic adults. We find that these theories point to a limited range of situations in which autists should not be blamed for transgressive actions for which neurotypical individuals should be blamed. We build on what others have written on these issues by bringing in a recent cognitive model of the role theory of mind plays in empathy, by discussing the social implications of the theoretical findings, and by raising questions about the compatibility of reactive attitude theories of moral responsibility with the neurodiversity approach to autism.     

Freedom of Choice About Incidental Findings Can Frustrate Participants' True Preferences

Ethicists, regulators and researchers have struggled with the question of whether incidental findings in genomics studies should be disclosed to participants. In the ethical debate, a general consensus is that disclosed information should benefit participants. However, there is no agreement that genetic information will benefit participants, rather it may cause problems such as anxiety. One could get past this disagreement about disclosure of incidental findings by letting participants express their preferences in the consent form. We argue that this freedom of choice is problematic. In transferring the decision to participants, it is assumed that participants will understand what they decide about and that they will express what they truly want. However, psychological findings about people's reaction to probabilities and risk have been shown to involve both cognitive and emotional challenges. People change their attitude to risk depending on what is at stake. Their mood affects judgments and choices, and they over‐ and underestimate probabilities depending on whether they are low or high. Moreover, different framing of the options can steer people to a specific choice. Although it seems attractive to let participants express their preferences to incidental findings in the consent form, it is uncertain if this choice enables people to express what they truly prefer. In order to better understand the participants' preferences, we argue that future empirical work needs to confront the participant with the complexity of the uncertainty and the trade‐offs that are connected with the uncertain predictive value of genetic risk information.     

Synaesthesia in the normal limb.

We explored the degree to which vision may alter kinaesthetic perception by asking participants to view their hand through a prism, introducing different horizontal deviations, while trying to align their fingers above and below a thin table. When the visual image of one hand was displaced this overwhelmed kinaesthetic judgements and participants reliably reported that they felt their limbs were aligned, even when they were laterally mis-aligned by as much as 10 cm. This effect, however, was mediated by ''visual capture'' and when the task was attempted in a darkened room with limb position indicated by an LED taped to the finger, kinaesthesis dominated and participants reported that the LED seemed to become detached from their finger tip. In both light and dark conditions the finger was clearly visible and only the background detail was extinguished. Hence, in perceiving limb position, it appears that we believe in what we see, rather than in what we feel, when the visual background is rich, and in what we feel when the visual background is sparse.     

The Interaction of Economic Rewards and Moral Convictions in Predicting Attitudes toward Resource Use

When people are morally convicted regarding a specific issue, these convictions exert a powerful influence on their attitudes and behavior. In the current research we examined whether there are boundary conditions to the influence of this effect. Specifically, whether in the context of salient economic rewards, moral convictions may become weaker predictors of attitudes regarding resource use. Focusing on the issue of mining we gathered large-scale samples across three different continents (Australia, Chile, and China). We found that moral convictions against mining were related to a reduced acceptance of mining in each country, while perceived economic rewards from mining increased acceptance. These two motivations interacted, however, such that when perceived economic benefit from mining was high, the influence of moral conviction was weaker. The results highlight the importance of understanding the roles of both moral conviction and financial gain in motivating attitudes towards resource use.     

Public Knowledge of,and Attitudes to,Frogs in Colombia

ABSTRACT

People's response to the decline of biodiversity and their support for conservation measures depends on their knowledge of biodiversity and their attitudes to local species. This study is one of the first to investigate public knowledge of, and attitudes to, frogs in South America. We chose two study regions, the semi-urban region of Pensilvania and the rural region of Florencia. In spring 2011, 565 individuals completed a written questionnaire and a subsequent picture test. Overall, the public's attitudes to, and knowledge of frogs, were rather poor. Direct experiences and community elders were the major source of knowledge of frogs for participants in Florencia, whereas electronic media was the main source of knowledge in Pensilvania. Most participants felt that frogs are of high conservation value and important for medical and ecological purposes. The more strongly participants agreed that frogs are useful, of medicinal value, and beautiful, the more strongly they agreed that they should be conserved. Our results indicate that conservation education activities in schools and elsewhere are needed to improve people's knowledge of, and attitudes to, frogs. More positive attitudes toward local amphibian species might lead to an appreciation of their value and willingness to conserve them.     

Do Participants in Genome Sequencing Studies of Psychiatric Disorders Wish to Be Informed of Their Results? A Survey Study

Objective

As large-scale genome sequencing technology advances, concerns surrounding the reporting of individual findings to study volunteers have grown and fueled controversy. This is especially true in mental health research, where the clinical importance of sequencing results is particularly unclear. The ethical, legal, and social issues are being widely debated, but less is known about the attitudes of actual study volunteers toward sequencing studies or what they wish to learn about their DNA sequence and its health implications. This study provides information on psychiatric research volunteers’ attitudes, beliefs, and concerns with respect to participation in DNA sequencing studies and reporting of individual results.

Method

We conducted a pilot study using a questionnaire that we developed to assess what information volunteers in an ongoing family study of bipolar disorder would like to receive if they underwent genome sequencing, what they would do with that information, and what concerns they may have.

Results

Almost all of the respondents were willing to participate in genome sequencing. Most respondents wished to be informed about all their health-related genetic risks, including risks for diseases without known prevention or treatment. However, few respondents felt well informed about the nature of genome sequencing or its implications for their health, insurability, or offspring.

Conclusions

Despite generally positive attitudes toward genome sequencing among study volunteers, most are not fully aware of the special issues raised by genome sequencing. The attitudes of study volunteers should be considered in the debate about the reporting of individual findings from genome sequencing.