Transmission coupling mechanisms: cultural group selection

The application of phylogenetic methods to cultural variation raises questions about how cultural adaption works and how it is coupled to cultural transmission. Cultural group selection is of particular interest in this context because it depends on the same kinds of mechanisms that lead to tree-like patterns of cultural variation. Here, we review ideas about cultural group selection relevant to cultural phylogenetics. We discuss why group selection among multiple equilibria is not subject to the usual criticisms directed at group selection, why multiple equilibria are a common phenomena, and why selection among multiple equilibria is not likely to be an important force in genetic evolution. We also discuss three forms of group competition and the processes that cause populations to shift from one equilibrium to another and create a mutation-like process at the group level.     

Developments of the Price equation and natural selection under uncertainty

Many approaches to the study of adaptation, following Darwin, centre on the number of offspring of individuals. Population genetics theory makes clear that predicting gene frequency changes requires more detailed knowledge, for example of linkage and linkage disequilibrium and mating systems. Because gene frequency changes underlie adaptation, this can lead to a suspicion that approaches ignoring these sophistications are approximate or tentative or wrong. Stochastic environments and sexual selection are two topics in which there are widespread views that focusing on number of offspring of individuals is not enough, and that proper treatments require the introduction of further details, namely variability in offspring number and linkage disequilibrium, respectively. However, the bulk of empirical research on adaptation and a great deal of theoretical work continue to employ these approaches. Here, a new theoretical development arising from the Price equation provides a formal justification in very general circumstances for focusing on the arithmetic average of the relative number of offspring of individuals.     

Natural selection. IV. The Price equation

The Price equation partitions total evolutionary change into two components. The first component provides an abstract expression of natural selection. The second component subsumes all other evolutionary processes, including changes during transmission. The natural selection component is often used in applications. Those applications attract widespread interest for their simplicity of expression and ease of interpretation. Those same applications attract widespread criticism by dropping the second component of evolutionary change and by leaving unspecified the detailed assumptions needed for a complete study of dynamics. Controversies over approximation and dynamics have nothing to do with the Price equation itself, which is simply a mathematical equivalence relation for total evolutionary change expressed in an alternative form. Disagreements about approach have to do with the tension between the relative valuation of abstract versus concrete analyses. The Price equation's greatest value has been on the abstract side, particularly the invariance relations that illuminate the understanding of natural selection. Those abstract insights lay the foundation for applications in terms of kin selection, information theory interpretations of natural selection and partitions of causes by path analysis. I discuss recent critiques of the Price equation by Nowak and van Veelen.     

Evolution of generous cooperative norms by cultural group selection

Evolution of cooperative norms is studied in a population where individual- and group-level selection are both in operation. Individuals play indirect reciprocity game within their group. Individuals are well informed about the previous actions and reputations, and follow second-order norms. Individuals are norm-followers, and imitate their successful group mates. In contrast to previous models where norms classify actions deterministically, we assume that norms determine only the probabilities of actions, and mutants can differ in these probabilities. The central question is how a selective cooperative norm can emerge in a population where initially only non-cooperative norms were present. It is shown that evolution leads to a cooperative state if generous cooperative strategies are dominant, although the “always defecting” and the “always cooperating”-like strategies remain stably present. The characteristics of these generous cooperative strategies and the presence of always defecting and always cooperating strategies are in concordance with experimental observations.     

Coevolution of honest signaling and cooperative norms by cultural group selection

Evolution of cooperative norms is studied in a population where individual and group level selection are both in operation. Individuals play indirect reciprocity game within their group and follow second order norms. Individuals are norm-followers, and imitate their successful group mates. Aside from direct observation individuals can be informed about the previous actions and reputations by information transferred by others. A potential donor estimates the reputation of a potential receiver either by her own observation or by the opinion of the majority of others (indirect observation). Following a previous study (Scheuring, 2009) we assume that norms determine only the probabilities of actions, and mutants can differ in these probabilities. Similarly, we assume that individuals follow a stochastic information transfer strategy. The central question is whether cooperative norm and honest social information transfer can emerge in a population where initially only non-cooperative norms were present, and the transferred information was not sufficiently honest.It is shown that evolution can lead to a cooperative state where information transferred in a reliable manner, where generous cooperative strategies are dominant. This cooperative state emerges along a sharp transition of norms. We studied the characteristics of actions and strategies in this transition by classifying the stochastic norms, and found that a series of more and more judging strategies invade each other before the stabilization of the so-called generous judging strategy. Numerical experiments on the coevolution of social parameters (e.g. probability of direct observation and the number of indirect observers) reveal that it is advantageous to lean on indirect observation even if information transfer is much noisier than for direct observation, which is because to follow the majorities’ opinion suppresses information noise meaningfully.     

Kin selection and ethnic group selection

Ethnicity looks something like kinship on a larger scale. The same math can be used to measure genetic similarity within ethnic/racial groups and relatedness within families. For example, members of the same continental race are about as related (r = 0.18–0.26) as half-siblings (r = 0.25). However (contrary to some claims) the theory of kin selection does not apply straightforwardly to ethnicity, because inclusive fitness calculations based on Hamilton's rule break down when there are complicated social interactions within groups, and/or groups are large and long-lasting. A more promising approach is a theory of ethnic group selection, a special case of cultural group selection. An elementary model shows that the genetic assimilation of a socially enforced cultural regime can promote group solidarity and lead to the regulation of recruitment to groups, and to altruism between groups, based on genetic similarity – in short, to ethnic nepotism. Several lines of evidence, from historical population genetics and political psychology, are relevant here.     

Laboratory models,causal explanation and group selection

We develop an account of laboratory models, which have been central to the group selection controversy. We compare arguments for group selection in nature with Darwin's arguments for natural selection to argue that laboratory models provide important grounds for causal claims about selection. Biologists get information about causes and cause-effect relationships in the laboratory because of the special role their own causal agency plays there. They can also get information about patterns of effects and antecedent conditions in nature. But to argue that some cause is actually responsible in nature, they require an inference from knowledge of causes in the laboratory context and of effects in the natural context. This process, cause detection, forms the core of an analogical argument for group selection. We discuss the differing roles of mathematical and laboratory models in constructing selective explanations at the group level and apply our discussion to the units of selection controversy to distinguish between the related problems of cause determination and evaluation of evidence. Because laboratory models are at the intersection of the two problems, their study is crucial for framing a coherent theory of explanation for evolutionary biology.     

On the use of the Price equation

This paper distinguishes two categories of questions that the Price equation can help us answer. The two different types of questions require two different disciplines that are related, but nonetheless move in opposite directions. These disciplines are probability theory on the one hand and statistical inference on the other. In the literature on the Price equation this distinction is not made. As a result of this, questions that require a probability model are regularly approached with statistical tools. In this paper, we examine the possibilities of the Price equation for answering questions of either type. By spending extra attention on mathematical formalities, we avoid the two disciplines to get mixed up. After that, we look at some examples, both from kin selection and from group selection, that show how the inappropriate use of statistical terminology can put us on the wrong track. Statements that are 'derived' with the help of the Price equation are, therefore, in many cases not the answers they seem to be. Going through the derivations in reverse can, however, be helpful as a guide how to build proper (probabilistic) models that do give answers.     

Why male butterflies are non-mimetic: natural selection,sexual selection,group selection,modification and sieving*

Thomas Belt suggested that the frequent limitation of mimicry in butterflies to the female resulted from sexual selection. Because female butterflies store sperm they can be fully fertile after only one mating; the reproductive success of a male is proportional to the number of times he mates. Sexual selection is therefore much stronger in males than females, with selection coefficients being greater by a small multiple of the number of times a female is courted during her life (long-lived species) or of the reciprocal of the female mortality rate between courtships (short-lived species). As butterflies of both sexes respond to colour when courting, sexual selection resists colour changes especially strongly in males. As a result, genes conferring new mimetic colour patterns can often become established in a butterfly population much more readily if their expression is initially limited to females; when the population size of a Batesian mimic, its model, and its predator fluctuates, such sex-limited genes have an enhanced probability of ultimate fixation in the population, and a reduced chance of loss; this effect is accentuated by the selection of modifiers which improve the mimicry. When the establishment of unimodal mimicry (expressed in both sexes) is favoured in a Batesian mimic, the gene tends to rise to an equilibrium frequency at which modifiers suppressing the expression of the mimicry only in males and'modifiers enhancing the mimicry only in females are favoured. The outcome is female-limited mimicry, or unimodal mimicry with better mimicry in the females, the males either retaining some of their sexual colour or the selective behaviour of the females becoming altered. In a Muellerian mimic there is no such equilibrium and selection ultimately favours expression of mimicry in both sexes and an appropriate alteration in the courtship responses. Hence Muellerian mimicry is seldom female-limited. Exceptional cases appear to result from the sexes flying in separate habitats. The genetical evidence in Papilio and Heliconius favours initial limitation of expression over subsequent modification as the usual basis for female-limited mimicry. Other explanations of female-limited mimicry can be found wanting in various ways; a higher predation rate on females could produce sex-limitation, but is probably not a strong factor. But the greater variability of the female in Lepidoptera may indicate lesser developmental stability, which could result in greater penetrance of mutants in the female, and hence account for the initial female-limitation. At very high densities of a mimetic species which has no non-mimetic form, mimicry tends to deteriorate more rapidly in a unimodal than in an otherwise identical sex-limited species. Although by itself this would equally favour male-limitation, and hence cannot explain the predominance of female-limitation, this effect may over evolutionary time be causing a slight increase in the proportion of sex-limited species among mimics. The stability of some mimetic polymorphisms is investigated by linear approximation: in some instances a stable equilibrium can be changed into an oscillating equilibrium by changes in the population size.     

The selection mutation equation

Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection is extended to the selection mutation model with mutation rates _ij=_ii.e. depending only on the target gene, by constructing a simple Lyapunov function. For other mutation rates stable limit cycles are possible.     

Convergent transformation and selection in cultural evolution

In biology, natural selection is the main explanation of adaptations and it is an attractive idea to think that an analogous force could have the same role in cultural evolution. In support of this idea, all the main ingredients for natural selection have been documented in the cultural domain. However, the changes that occur during cultural transmission typically result in convergent transformation, non-random cultural modifications, casting some doubts on the importance of natural selection in the cultural domain. To progress on this issue more empirical research is needed. Here, using nearly half a million experimental trials performed by a group of baboons (Papio papio), we simulate cultural evolution under various conditions of natural selection and do an additional experiment to tease apart the role of convergent transformation and selection. Our results confirm that transformation strongly constrain the variation available to selection and therefore strongly limit its impact on cultural evolution. Surprisingly, in our study, transformation also enhances the effect of selection by stabilising cultural variation. We conclude that, in culture, selection can change the evolutionary trajectory substantially in some cases, but can only act on the variation provided by (typically biased) transformation.     

The extended Price equation quantifies species selection on mammalian body size across the Palaeocene/Eocene Thermal Maximum

Species selection, covariation of species’ traits with their net diversification rates, is an important component of macroevolution. Most studies have relied on indirect evidence for its operation and have not quantified its strength relative to other macroevolutionary forces. We use an extension of the Price equation to quantify the mechanisms of body size macroevolution in mammals from the latest Palaeocene and earliest Eocene of the Bighorn and Clarks Fork Basins of Wyoming. Dwarfing of mammalian taxa across the Palaeocene/Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM), an intense, brief warming event that occurred at approximately 56 Ma, has been suggested to reflect anagenetic change and the immigration of small bodied-mammals, but might also be attributable to species selection. Using previously reconstructed ancestor–descendant relationships, we partitioned change in mean mammalian body size into three distinct mechanisms: species selection operating on resident mammals, anagenetic change within resident mammalian lineages and change due to immigrants. The remarkable decrease in mean body size across the warming event occurred through anagenetic change and immigration. Species selection also was strong across the PETM but, intriguingly, favoured larger-bodied species, implying some unknown mechanism(s) by which warming events affect macroevolution.     

Mating games: cultural evolution and sexual selection

In this paper, we argue that mating games, a concept that denotes cultural practices characterized by a competitive element and an ornamental character, are essential drivers behind the emergence and maintenance of human cultural practices. In order to substantiate this claim, we sketch out the essential role of the game’s players and audience, as well as the ways in which games can mature and turn into relatively stable cultural practices. After outlining the life phase of mating games – their emergence, rise, maturation, and possible eventual decline – we go on to argue that participation in these games (in each phase) does make sense from an adaptationist point of view. The strong version of our theory which proposes that all cultural practices are, or once were, mating games, allows us to derive a set of testable predictions for the fields of archaeology, economics, and psychology.     

The group selection controversy

Many thought Darwinian natural selection could not explain altruism. This error led Wynne‐Edwards to explain sustainable exploitation in animals by selection against overexploiting groups. Williams riposted that selection among groups rarely overrides within‐group selection. Hamilton showed that altruism can evolve through kin selection. How strongly does group selection influence evolution? Following Price, Hamilton showed how levels of selection interact: group selection prevails if Hamilton’s rule applies. Several showed that group selection drove some major evolutionary transitions. Following Hamilton’s lead, Queller extended Hamilton’s rule, replacing genealogical relatedness by the regression on an actor’s genotypic altruism of interacting neighbours’ phenotypic altruism. Price’s theorem shows the generality of Hamilton’s rule. All instances of group selection can be viewed as increasing inclusive fitness of autosomal genomes. Nonetheless, to grasp fully how cooperation and altruism evolve, most biologists need more concrete concepts like kin selection, group selection and selection among individuals for their common good.     

Helical Biography and the Historical Craft: The Case of Altruism and George Price

The life of George Price (1922–1975), the eccentric polymath genius and father of the Price equation, is used as a prism and counterpoint through which to consider an age-old evolutionary conundrum: the origins of altruism. This biographical project, and biography and history more generally, are considered in terms of the possibility of using form to convey content in particular ways. Closer to an art form than a science, this approach to scholarship presents both a unique challenge and promise.     

Efficient social contracts and group selection

We consider the Stag Hunt in terms of Maynard Smith’s famous Haystack model. In the Stag Hunt, contrary to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a cooperative equilibrium besides the equilibrium where every player defects. This implies that in the Haystack model, where a population is partitioned into groups, groups playing the cooperative equilibrium tend to grow faster than those at the non-cooperative equilibrium. We determine under what conditions this leads to the takeover of the population by cooperators. Moreover, we compare our results to the case of an unstructured population and to the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Finally, we point to some implications our findings have for three distinct ideas: Ken Binmore’s group selection argument in favor of the evolution of efficient social contracts, Sewall Wright’s Shifting Balance theory, and the equilibrium selection problem of game theory.     

Individual and group selection with competition

Summary The response of a randomly mating population which is expected to follow selection of phenotypic units, comprising individuals or groups whose members have an arbitrary degree of relatedness, was formulated using a model which included additive and dominance competition effects. The derivation involved three steps. Twenty-two quadratic components were defined, six describing individual (direct) and neighbor (associate) effects, and 16 describing direct by associate interactions for different loci, for single loci with different alleles, and for identical alleles. Six covariances between pairs of individual phenotypes and three of individuals with their offspring were defined according to whether or not their direct or associate genotypes are common, and expressed in terms of the quadratic components. Finally, variances of selection units of different types and their covariance with their offspring were expressed as compounds of these individual covariances. Explicit formulations for mass, clonal and full-sib selection show that without constraints on the quadratic components, and hence on the magnitude and type of competition operative, no predictions as to the relative efficiencies of these three methods can be made.