Adaptive dynamics of cooperation may prevent the coexistence of defectors and cooperators and even cause extinction

It has recently been demonstrated that ecological feedback mechanisms can facilitate the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in public goods interactions: the replicator dynamics of defectors and cooperators can result, for example, in the ecological coexistence of cooperators and defectors. Here we show that these results change dramatically if cooperation strategy is not fixed but instead is a continuously varying trait under natural selection. For low values of the factor with which the value of resources is multiplied before they are shared among all participants, evolution will always favour lower cooperation strategies until the population falls below an Allee threshold and goes extinct, thus evolutionary suicide occurs. For higher values of the factor, there exists a unique evolutionarily singular strategy, which is convergence stable. Because the fitness function is linear with respect to the strategy of the mutant, this singular strategy is neutral against mutant invasions. This neutrality disappears if a nonlinear functional response in receiving benefits is assumed. For strictly concave functional responses, singular strategies become uninvadable. Evolutionary branching, which could result in the evolutionary emergence of cooperators and defectors, can occur only with locally convex functional responses, but we illustrate that it can also result in coevolutionary extinction.     

Spatial invasion of cooperation

The evolutionary puzzle of cooperation describes situations where cooperators provide a fitness benefit to other individuals at some cost to themselves. Under Darwinian selection, the evolution of cooperation is a conundrum, whereas non-cooperation (or defection) is not. In the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperators perform poorly and decrease in abundance. Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework to address the problem of cooperation using the prisoner's dilemma. One well-studied possibility to maintain cooperation is to consider structured populations, where each individual interacts only with a limited subset of the population. This enables cooperators to form clusters such that they are more likely to interact with other cooperators instead of being exploited by defectors. Here we present a detailed analysis of how a few cooperators invade and expand in a world of defectors. If the invasion succeeds, the expansion process takes place in two stages: first, cooperators and defectors quickly establish a local equilibrium and then they uniformly expand in space. The second stage provides good estimates for the global equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors. Under hospitable conditions, cooperators typically form a single, ever growing cluster interspersed with specks of defectors, whereas under more hostile conditions, cooperators form isolated, compact clusters that minimize exploitation by defectors. We provide the first quantitative assessment of the way cooperators arrange in space during invasion and find that the macroscopic properties and the emerging spatial patterns reveal information about the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.     

Quorum sensing provides a molecular mechanism for evolution to tune and maintain investment in cooperation

As selection frequently favors noncooperating defectors in mixed populations with cooperators, mechanisms that promote cooperation stability clearly exist. One potential mechanism is bacterial cell-to-cell communication, quorum sensing (QS), which can allow cooperators to prevent invasion by defectors. However, the impact of QS on widespread maintenance of cooperation in well-mixed conditions has not been experimentally demonstrated over extended evolutionary timescales. Here, we use wild-type (WT) Vibrio campbellii that regulates cooperation with QS and an unconditional cooperating (UC) mutant to examine the evolutionary origins and dynamics of novel defectors during a long-term evolution experiment. We found that UC lineages were completely outcompeted by defectors, whereas functioning QS enabled the maintenance of cooperative variants in most WT populations. Sequencing evolved populations revealed multiple luxR mutations that swept the UC lineages. However, the evolution of mutant lineages with reduced levels of bioluminescence (dims) occurred in many WT lineages. These dim variants also decreased other cooperative phenotypes regulated by QS, including protease production, indicating they result from changes to QS regulation. This diminished investment phenotype optimizes a tradeoff between cooperative input and growth output and suggests that decreasing the cost of QS could be a favorable strategy for maintaining the cooperative behaviors it regulates.Subject terms: Bacterial evolution, Microbial ecology, Molecular evolution     

Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas

The emergence and maintenance of cooperation by natural selection is an enduring conundrum in evolutionary biology, which has been studied using a variety of game theoretical models inspired by different biological situations. The most widely studied games are the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Snowdrift game and by-product mutualism for pairwise interactions, as well as Public Goods games in larger groups of interacting individuals. Here, we present a general framework for cooperation in social dilemmas in which all the traditional scenarios can be recovered as special cases. In social dilemmas, cooperators provide a benefit to the group at some cost, while defectors exploit the group by reaping the benefits without bearing the costs of cooperation. Using the concepts of discounting and synergy for describing how benefits accumulate when more than one cooperator is present in a group of interacting individuals, we recover the four basic scenarios of evolutionary dynamics given by (i) dominating defection, (ii) coexistence of defectors and cooperators, (iii) dominating cooperation and (iv) bi-stability, in which cooperators and defectors cannot invade each other. Generically, for groups of three or more interacting individuals further, more complex, dynamics can occur. Our framework provides the first unifying approach to model cooperation in different kinds of social dilemmas.     

Collective Chasing Behavior between Cooperators and Defectors in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma

Cooperation is one of the essential factors for all biological organisms in major evolutionary transitions. Recent studies have investigated the effect of migration for the evolution of cooperation. However, little is known about whether and how an individuals’ cooperativeness coevolves with mobility. One possibility is that mobility enhances cooperation by enabling cooperators to escape from defectors and form clusters; the other possibility is that mobility inhibits cooperation by helping the defectors to catch and exploit the groups of cooperators. In this study we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics by using the prisoner’s dilemma game model on a lattice structure. The computer simulations demonstrate that natural selection maintains cooperation in the form of evolutionary chasing between the cooperators and defectors. First, cooperative groups grow and collectively move in the same direction. Then, mutant defectors emerge and invade the cooperative groups, after which the defectors exploit the cooperators. Then other cooperative groups emerge due to mutation and the cycle is repeated. Here, it is worth noting that, as a result of natural selection, the mobility evolves towards directional migration, but not to random or completely fixed migration. Furthermore, with directional migration, the rate of global population extinction is lower when compared with other cases without the evolution of mobility (i.e., when mobility is preset to random or fixed). These findings illustrate the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and mobility through the directional chasing between cooperators and defectors.     

LIFE AT THE FRONT OF AN EXPANDING POPULATION

Environmental changes have caused episodes of habitat expansions in the evolutionary history of many species. These range changes affect the dynamics of biological evolution in multiple ways. Recent microbial experiments as well as simulations suggest that enhanced genetic drift at the frontier of a two-dimensional range expansion can cause genetic sectoring patterns with fractal domain boundaries. Here, we propose and analyze a simple model of asexual biological evolution at expanding frontiers that explains these neutral patterns and predicts the effect of natural selection. We find that beneficial mutations give rise to sectors with an opening angle that depends sensitively on the selective advantage of the mutants. Deleterious mutations, on the other hand, are not able to establish a sector permanently. They can, however, temporarily "surf" on the population front, and thereby reach unusually high frequencies. As a consequence, expanding frontiers are loaded with a high fraction of mutants at mutation–selection balance. Numerically, we also determine the condition at which the wild type is lost in favor of deleterious mutants (genetic meltdown) at a growing front. Our prediction for this error threshold differs qualitatively from existing well-mixed theories, and sets tight constraints on sustainable mutation rates for populations that undergo frequent range expansions.     

Defectors Can Create Conditions That Rescue Cooperation

Cooperation based on the production of costly common goods is observed throughout nature. This is puzzling, as cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation by defectors which enjoy a fitness advantage by consuming the common good without contributing fairly. Depletion of the common good can lead to population collapse and the destruction of cooperation. However, population collapse implies small population size, which, in a structured population, is known to favor cooperation. This happens because small population size increases variability in cooperator frequency across different locations. Since individuals in cooperator-dominated locations (which are most likely cooperators) will grow more than those in defector-dominated locations (which are most likely defectors), cooperators can outgrow defectors globally despite defectors outgrowing cooperators in each location. This raises the possibility that defectors can lead to conditions that sometimes rescue cooperation from defector-induced destruction. We demonstrate multiple mechanisms through which this can occur, using an individual-based approach to model stochastic birth, death, migration, and mutation events. First, during defector-induced population collapse, defectors occasionally go extinct before cooperators by chance, which allows cooperators to grow. Second, empty locations, either preexisting or created by defector-induced population extinction, can favor cooperation because they allow cooperator but not defector migrants to grow. These factors lead to the counterintuitive result that the initial presence of defectors sometimes allows better survival of cooperation compared to when defectors are initially absent. Finally, we find that resource limitation, inducible by defectors, can select for mutations adaptive to resource limitation. When these mutations are initially present at low levels or continuously generated at a moderate rate, they can favor cooperation by further reducing local population size. We predict that in a structured population, small population sizes precipitated by defectors provide a “built-in” mechanism for the persistence of cooperation.     

Deleterious mutations can surf to high densities on the wave front of an expanding population

There is an increasing recognition that evolutionary processes play a key role in determining the dynamics of range expansion. Recent work demonstrates that neutral mutations arising near the edge of a range expansion sometimes surf on the expanding front leading them rather than that leads to reach much greater spatial distribution and frequency than expected in stationary populations. Here, we extend this work and examine the surfing behavior of nonneutral mutations. Using an individual-based coupled-map lattice model, we confirm that, regardless of its fitness effects, the probability of survival of a new mutation depends strongly upon where it arises in relation to the expanding wave front. We demonstrate that the surfing effect can lead to deleterious mutations reaching high densities at an expanding front, even when they have substantial negative effects on fitness. Additionally, we highlight that this surfing phenomenon can occur for mutations that impact reproductive rate (i.e., number of offspring produced) as well as mutations that modify juvenile competitive ability. We suggest that these effects are likely to have important consequences for rates of spread and the evolution of spatially expanding populations.     

Evolutionary games on cycles

Traditional evolutionary game theory explores frequency-dependent selection in well-mixed populations without spatial or stochastic effects. But recently there has been much interest in studying the evolutionary game dynamics in spatial settings, on lattices and other graphs. Here, we present an analytic approach for the stochastic evolutionary game dynamics on the simplest possible graph, the cycle. For three different update rules, called 'birth-death' (BD), 'death-birth' (DB) and 'imitation' (IM), we derive exact conditions for natural selection to favour one strategy over another. As specific examples, we consider a coordination game and Prisoner's Dilemma. In the latter case, selection can favour cooperators over defectors for DB and IM updating. We also study the case where the replacement graph of evolutionary updating remains a cycle, but the interaction graph for playing the game is a complete graph. In this setting, all three update rules lead to identical conditions in the limit of weak selection, where we find the '1/3-law' of well-mixed populations.     

On the accumulation of deleterious mutations during range expansions

We investigate the effect of spatial range expansions on the evolution of fitness when beneficial and deleterious mutations cosegregate. We perform individual‐based simulations of 1D and 2D range expansions and complement them with analytical approximations for the evolution of mean fitness at the edge of the expansion. We find that deleterious mutations accumulate steadily on the wave front during range expansions, thus creating an expansion load. Reduced fitness due to the expansion load is not restricted to the wave front, but occurs over a large proportion of newly colonized habitats. The expansion load can persist and represent a major fraction of the total mutation load for thousands of generations after the expansion. The phenomenon of expansion load may explain growing evidence that populations that have recently expanded, including humans, show an excess of deleterious mutations. To test the predictions of our model, we analyse functional genetic diversity in humans and find patterns that are consistent with our model.     

The rate of beneficial mutations surfing on the wave of a range expansion

Many theoretical and experimental studies suggest that range expansions can have severe consequences for the gene pool of the expanding population. Due to strongly enhanced genetic drift at the advancing frontier, neutral and weakly deleterious mutations can reach large frequencies in the newly colonized regions, as if they were surfing the front of the range expansion. These findings raise the question of how frequently beneficial mutations successfully surf at shifting range margins, thereby promoting adaptation towards a range-expansion phenotype. Here, we use individual-based simulations to study the surfing statistics of recurrent beneficial mutations on wave-like range expansions in linear habitats. We show that the rate of surfing depends on two strongly antagonistic factors, the probability of surfing given the spatial location of a novel mutation and the rate of occurrence of mutations at that location. The surfing probability strongly increases towards the tip of the wave. Novel mutations are unlikely to surf unless they enjoy a spatial head start compared to the bulk of the population. The needed head start is shown to be proportional to the inverse fitness of the mutant type, and only weakly dependent on the carrying capacity. The precise location dependence of surfing probabilities is derived from the non-extinction probability of a branching process within a moving field of growth rates. The second factor is the mutation occurrence which strongly decreases towards the tip of the wave. Thus, most successful mutations arise at an intermediate position in the front of the wave. We present an analytic theory for the tradeoff between these factors that allows to predict how frequently substitutions by beneficial mutations occur at invasion fronts. We find that small amounts of genetic drift increase the fixation rate of beneficial mutations at the advancing front, and thus could be important for adaptation during species invasions.     

Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation

Reputation formation is a key to understanding indirect reciprocity. In particular, the way to assign reputation to each individual, namely a norm that describes who is good and who is bad, greatly affects the possibility of sustained cooperation in the population. Previously, we have exhaustively studied reputation dynamics that are able to maintain a high level of cooperation at the ESS. However, this analysis examined the stability of monomorphic population and did not investigate polymorphic population where several strategies coexist. Here, we study the evolutionary dynamics of multiple behavioral strategies by replicator dynamics. We exhaustively study all 16 possible norms under which the reputation of a player in the next round is determined by the action of the self and the reputation of the opponent. For each norm, we explore evolutionary dynamics of three strategies: unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators. We find that only three norms, simple-standing, Kandori, and shunning, can make conditional cooperation evolutionarily stable, hence, realize sustained cooperation. The other 13 norms, including scoring, ultimately lead to the invasion by defectors. Also, we study the model in which private reputation errors exist to a small extent. In this case, we find the stable coexistence of unconditional and conditional cooperators under the three norms.     

Replicator dynamics of reward & reputation in public goods games

Public goods games have become the mathematical metaphor for game theoretical investigations of cooperative behavior in groups of interacting individuals. Cooperation is a conundrum because cooperators make a sacrifice to benefit others at some cost to themselves. Exploiters or defectors reap the benefits and forgo costs. Despite the fact that groups of cooperators outperform groups of defectors, Darwinian selection or utilitarian principles based on rational choice should favor defectors. In order to overcome this social dilemma, much effort has been expended for investigations pertaining to punishment and sanctioning measures against defectors. Interestingly, the complementary approach to create positive incentives and to reward cooperation has received considerably less attention—despite being heavily advocated in education and social sciences for increasing productivity or preventing conflicts. Here we show that rewards can indeed stimulate cooperation in interaction groups of arbitrary size but, in contrast to punishment, fail to stabilize it. In both cases, however, reputation is essential. The combination of reward and reputation result in complex dynamics dominated by unpredictable oscillations.     

For whom is it more beneficial to stop interactions with defectors: Cooperators or defectors?

Cooperation is a mysterious evolutionary phenomenon and its mechanisms require elucidation. When cooperators can stop interactions with defectors, the evolution of cooperation becomes possible; this is one mechanism that facilitates the evolution of cooperation. Here, stopping interactions with defectors is beneficial not only for cooperators but also for defectors. The question then arises, for whom is stopping interactions with defectors more beneficial: cooperators or defectors? By utilizing evolutionary game theory, I addressed this question using a two-player game involving four strategies: (1) cooperators who stop the interaction if the current partner is a defector, (2) cooperators who attempt to maintain a relationship with anyone, (3) defectors who stop the interaction if the current partner is a defector, and (4) defectors who attempt to maintain a relationship with anyone. Our results show that, at equilibrium, the ratio of cooperators who stop the interaction if the current partner is a defector to cooperators who attempt to maintain a relationship with anyone is larger than the ratio of defectors who stop the interaction if the current partner is a defector to defectors who attempt to maintain a relationship with anyone. Thus, cooperators rather than defectors are more likely to stop interactions with defectors at equilibrium. This result is consistent with a previous experimental study in which a positive correlation was detected between the degree of individuals’ cooperativeness and how accurately the individuals recognize whether other individuals are cooperators or defectors. Thus, the theoretical work presented in this study provides relevant insights into the natural phenomena of cooperation and recognition.     

Microbial expansion–collision dynamics promote cooperation and coexistence on surfaces

Microbes colonizing a surface often experience colony growth dynamics characterized by an initial phase of spatial clonal expansion followed by collision between neighboring colonies to form potentially genetically heterogeneous boundaries. For species with life cycles consisting of repeated surface colonization and dispersal, these spatially explicit “expansion‐collision dynamics” generate periodic transitions between two distinct selective regimes, “expansion competition” and “boundary competition,” each one favoring a different growth strategy. We hypothesized that this dynamic could promote stable coexistence of expansion‐ and boundary‐competition specialists by generating time‐varying, negative frequency‐dependent selection that insulates both types from extinction. We tested this experimentally in budding yeast by competing an exoenzyme secreting “cooperator” strain (expansion–competition specialists) against nonsecreting “defectors” (boundary–competition specialists). As predicted, we observed cooperator–defector coexistence or cooperator dominance with expansion–collision dynamics, but only defector dominance otherwise. Also as predicted, the steady‐state frequency of cooperators was determined by colonization density (the average initial cell–cell distance) and cost of cooperation. Lattice‐based spatial simulations give good qualitative agreement with experiments, supporting our hypothesis that expansion–collision dynamics with costly public goods production is sufficient to generate stable cooperator–defector coexistence. This mechanism may be important for maintaining public–goods cooperation and conflict in microbial pioneer species living on surfaces.     

Mutation surfing and the evolution of dispersal during range expansions

A growing body of empirical evidence demonstrates that at an expanding front, there can be strong selection for greater dispersal propensity, whereas recent theory indicates that mutations occurring towards the front of a spatially expanding population can sometimes ‘surf’ to high frequency and spatial extent. Here, we consider the potential interplay between these two processes: what role may mutation surfing play in determining the course of dispersal evolution and how might dispersal evolution itself influence mutation surfing? Using an individual‐based coupled‐map lattice model, we first run simulations to determine the fate of dispersal mutants that occur at an expanding front. Our results highlight that mutants that have a slightly higher dispersal propensity than the wild type always have a higher survival probability than those mutants with a dispersal propensity lower than, or very similar to, the wild type. However, it is not always the case that mutants with very high dispersal propensity have the greatest survival probability. When dispersal mortality is high, mutants of intermediate dispersal survive most often. Interestingly, the rate of dispersal that ultimately evolves at an expanding front is often substantially higher than that which confers a novel mutant with the greatest probability of survival. Second, we run a model in which we allow dispersal to evolve over the course of a range expansion and ask how the fate of a neutral or nonneutral mutant depends upon when and where during the expansion it arises. These simulations highlight that the success of a neutral mutant depends upon the dispersal genotypes that it is associated with. An important consequence of this is that novel mutants that arise at the front of an expansion, and survive, typically end up being associated with more dispersive genotypes than the wild type. These results offer some new insights into causes and the consequences of dispersal evolution during range expansions, and the methodology we have employed can be readily extended to explore the evolutionary dynamics of other life history characteristics.     

Ecological public goods games: cooperation and bifurcation

The Public Goods Game is one of the most popular models for studying the origin and maintenance of cooperation. In its simplest form, this evolutionary game has two regimes: defection goes to fixation if the multiplication factor r is smaller than the interaction group size N, whereas cooperation goes to fixation if the multiplication factor r is larger than the interaction group size N. Hauert et al. [Hauert, C., Holmes, M., Doebeli, M., 2006a. Evolutionary games and population dynamics: Maintenance of cooperation in public goods games. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 273, 2565-2570] have introduced the Ecological Public Goods Game by viewing the payoffs from the evolutionary game as birth rates in a population dynamic model. This results in a feedback between ecological and evolutionary dynamics: if defectors are prevalent, birth rates are low and population densities decline, which leads to smaller interaction groups for the Public Goods game, and hence to dominance of cooperators, with a concomitant increase in birth rates and population densities. This feedback can lead to stable co-existence between cooperators and defectors. Here we provide a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the Ecological Public Goods Game, showing that the model exhibits various types of bifurcations, including supercritical Hopf bifurcations, which result in stable limit cycles, and hence in oscillatory co-existence of cooperators and defectors. These results show that including population dynamics in evolutionary games can have important consequences for the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation.     

The evolution of cooperation by the Hankshaw effect

The evolution of cooperation—costly behavior that benefits others—faces one clear obstacle. Namely, cooperators are always at a competitive disadvantage relative to defectors, individuals that reap the benefits, but evade the cost of cooperation. One solution to this problem involves genetic hitchhiking, where the allele encoding cooperation becomes linked to a beneficial mutation, allowing cooperation to rise in abundance. Here, we explore hitchhiking in the context of adaptation to a stressful environment by cooperators and defectors with spatially limited dispersal. Under such conditions, clustered cooperators reach higher local densities, thereby experiencing more mutational opportunities than defectors. Thus, the allele encoding cooperation has a greater probability of hitchhiking with alleles conferring stress adaptation. We label this probabilistic enhancement the “Hankshaw effect” after the character Sissy Hankshaw, whose anomalously large thumbs made her a singularly effective hitchhiker. Using an agent‐based model, we reveal a broad set of conditions that allow the evolution of cooperation through this effect. Additionally, we show that spite, a costly behavior that harms others, can evolve by the Hankshaw effect. While in an unchanging environment these costly social behaviors have transient success, in a dynamic environment, cooperation and spite can persist indefinitely.     

Spatial Patterns of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in Metapopulations

Because to defect is the evolutionary stable strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG), understanding the mechanism generating and maintaining cooperation in PDG, i.e. the paradox of cooperation, has intrinsic significance for understanding social altruism behaviors. Spatial structure serves as the key to this dilemma. Here, we build the model of spatial PDG under a metapopulation framework: the sub-populations of cooperators and defectors obey the rules in spatial PDG as well as the colonization–extinction process of metapopulations. Using the mean-field approximation and the pair approximation, we obtain the differential equations for the dynamics of occupancy and spatial correlation. Cellular automaton is also built to simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics of the spatial PDG in metapopulations. Join-count statistics are used to measure the spatial correlation as well as the spatial association of the metapopulation. Simulation results show that the distribution is self-organized and that it converges to a static boundary due to the boycotting of cooperators to defectors. Metapopulations can survive even when the colonization rate is lower than the extinction rate due to the compensation of cooperation rewards for extinction debt. With a change of parameters in the model, a metapopulation can consist of pure cooperators, pure defectors, or cooperator–defector coexistence. The necessary condition of cooperation evolution is the local colonization of a metapopulation. The spatial correlation between the cooperators tends to be weaker with the increase in the temptation to defect and the habitat connectivity; yet the spatial correlation between defectors becomes stronger. The relationship between spatial structure and the colonization rate is complicated, especially for cooperators. The metapopulation may undergo a temporary period of prosperity just before the extinction, even while the colonization rate is declining. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Emergence of cooperative linkages by random intensity of selection on a network

By assuming the random intensity of selection, the emergence of cooperation on a network is studied. We constructed an evolutionary model in which an individual plays the prisoner's dilemma game, and updates both its strategy and neighbor connections in response to its relative success in the game. The constant (strong or weak) and random intensities of selection are compared. The random intensities of selection are introduced to realize complex environmental effects on the fitness of each individual. Breaking the links on the network is realized according to fixed global parameters. We found that cooperative clusters emerged when cooperators unilaterally broke the link with defectors. The emergent networks under these conditions had a high clustering coefficient and shared some properties with a scale-free network. In addition, after a cooperator with high fitness emerged circumstantially under the random intensity of selection, we observed that the cooperative linkages emerged and spread rapidly through the network. This situation frequently occurred because of the stochastic effect on the fitness of cooperators. Thus, the origin of such phenomena is qualitatively different from the Lotka-Volterra system in which deterministic processes control the system. Cooperative linkages spread more when defectors maintained many links with cooperators.