Are Animals Just Noisy Machines?: Louis Boutan and the Co-invention of Animal and Child Psychology in the French Third Republic

Historians of science have only just begun to sample the wealth of different approaches to the study of animal behavior undertaken in the twentieth century. To date, more attention has been given to Lorenzian ethology and American behaviorism than to other work and traditions, but different approaches are equally worthy of the historian’s attention, reflecting not only the broader range of questions that could be asked about animal behavior and the “animal mind” but also the different contexts in which these questions were important. One such approach is that represented by the work of the French zoologist Louis Boutan (1859–1934). This paper explores the intellectual and cultural history of Boutan’s work on animal language and the animal mind, and contextualizes the place of animal behavior studies within late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century French biology. I explore the ways in which Boutan addressed the philosophical issue of whether language was necessary for abstract thought and show how he shifted from the idea that animals were endowed with a purely affective language to the notion that of they were capable of “rudimentary” reasoning. I argue that the scientific and broader socio-cultural contexts in which Boutan operated played a role in this transition. Then I show how Boutan’s linguistic and psychological experiments with a gibbon and children provide insights into his conception of “naturalness.” Although Boutan reared his gibbon at home and studied it in the controlled environment of his laboratory, he continued to identify its behavior as “natural.” I specifically demonstrate the importance of the milieu of the French Third Republic in shaping Boutan’s understanding not only of animal intelligence and child education, but also his definition of nature. Finally, I argue that Boutan’s studies on the primate mind provide us with a lens through which we can examine the co-invention of animal and child psychology in early-twentieth-century France.     

Don C. Ohadike: The Man, his Intellectual Legacy and African Historiography

It is difficult to completely understand the life history of an intellectual excluding an understanding of his family upbringing and formative years. Family upbringing and childhood environment, often the less known part of a life history, play crucial roles in shaping the ideas and values individuals espouse in their adult life. Notwithstanding, this paper is not concerned with Don C. Ohadike’s childhood. It rather focuses on the professional career of our able historian – that is the part of his life as revealed by his most outstanding published writings. Ohadike’s published works contain a wellspring of idioms that tell much about his values, quality of mind, and his mission as an African historian. Ohadike was a humanist, an African patriot, and a nationalist crusader. His entire philosophy centered on safeguarding his African identity in an emergent world of cultural imperialism. The funds for this research were provided by a NEH-funded fellowship at the Schomburg Center, New York in the Spring of 2007. I owe a lot of gratitude to Professor John McLeod and Dean Blaine Hudson for granting me the extra incentives to pursue my research in New York. While all errors and misinterpretations are mine, I wish to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for Journal of Dialectical Anthropology for their perspective comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Maynard Smith on the levels of selection question

The levels of selection problem was central to Maynard Smith’s work throughout his career. This paper traces Maynard Smith’s views on the levels of selection, from his objections to group selection in the 1960s to his concern with the major evolutionary transitions in the 1990s. The relations between Maynard Smith’s position and those of Hamilton and G.C. Williams are explored, as is Maynard Smith’s dislike of the Price equation approach to multi-level selection. Maynard Smith’s account of the ‘core Darwinian principles’ is discussed, as is his debate with Sober and Wilson (1998) over the status of trait-group models, and his attitude to the currently fashionable concept of pluralism about the levels of selection.     

A Tribute to Thomas A. Sebeok

According to the approach developed by Thomas A. Sebeok (1921–2001) and his ‘global semiotics,’ semiosis and life converge. This leads to his cardinal axiom: ‘semiosis is the criterial attribute of life.’ His global approach to sign life presupposes his critique of anthropocentrism and glottocentrism. Global semiotics is open to zoosemiotics, indeed, even more broadly, biosemiotics which extends its gaze to semiosis in the whole living universe to include the realms of macro- and microorganisms. In Sebeok’s conception, the sign science is not only the study of communication in culture, but of communicative behaviour from a biosemiotic perspective.     

Coleridge's “Theory of Life”

Coleridge has been seen by some not so much as a poet spoiled by philosophy, but as a philosopher who was also a poet. It could be argued that his major endeavor was an attempt to save the life sciences form the mechanistic interpretation which he saw as the outcome of Lockean “mechanico-corpuscularian” philosophy. This contribution describes that endeavour. It shows its connection to the social circumstances of the time. It discussess its relationship to the poetic sensibility of the “Lake poets” and to the German thought which Coleridge absorbed during and after his sojourn in Gottingen in 1798--99. It describes the nature of his “Theory of Life” as seen not only from the posthumous publication itself, but also from the numerous hints and struggles recorded in his voluminous notebooks, letters and lecture notes. It is concluded that, although never adequately assembled, it forms the only serious attempt to construct a profound alternative to the ultimately mechanistic biology of Charles Darwin and the physiologists of the second half of the century. As such it strongly influenced the young Richard Owen and, as is well known, was eventually overwhelmed by the Darwin-Huxley synthesis of the 1860s. Nevertheless, insofar as Coleridge's concept of life ultimately derived from his ambition to find a way of healing the Cartesian divide, we may wonder whether the recent upsurge in consciousness studies may cause us to look again at his panentheistic ideas and, discarding the obsolete and fanciful metaphysics, recast them into a more acceptable form. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Controlling Life: From Jacques Loeb to Regenerative Medicine

In his 1987 book Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology, Philip Pauly presented his readers with the biologist Jacques Loeb and his role in developing an emphasis on control of life processes. Loeb’s work on artificial parthenogenesis, for example, provided an example of bioengineering at work. This paper revisits Pauly’s study of Loeb and explores the way current research in regenerative medicine reflects the same tradition. A history of regeneration research reveals patterns of thinking and research methods that both echo Loeb’s ideology and point the way to modern studies. Pauly’s work revealed far more than we readers realized at the time of its publication.     

Why Was Thomas A. Sebeok Not a Cognitive Ethologist? From “Animal Mind” to “Semiotic Self”

In the current debates about zoosemiotics its relations with the neighbouring disciplines are a relevant topic. The present article aims to analyse the complex relations between zoosemiotics and cognitive ethology with special attention to their establishers: Thomas A. Sebeok and Donald R. Griffin. It is argued that zoosemiotics and cognitive ethology have common roots in comparative studies of animal communication in the early 1960s. For supporting this claim Sebeok’s works are analysed, the classical and philosophical periods of his zoosemiotic views are distinguished and the changing relations between zoosemiotics and cognitive ethology are described. The animal language controversy can be interpreted as the explicit point of divergence of the two paradigms, which, however, is a mere symptom of a deeper cleavage. The analysis brings out later critical differences between Sebeok’s and Griffin’s views on animal cognition and language. This disagreement has been the main reason for the critical reception and later neglect of Sebeok’s works in cognitive ethology. Sebeok’s position in this debate remains, however, paradigmatic, i.e. it proceeds from understanding of the contextualisation of semiotic processes that do not allow treating the animal mind as a distinct entity. As a peculiar parallel to Griffin’s metaphor of “animal mind”, Sebeok develops his understanding of “semiotic self” as a layered structure, characterised by an ability to make distinctions, foremost between itself and the surrounding environment. It appears that the history of zoosemiotics has two layers: in addition to the chronological history starting in 1963, when Sebeok proposed a name for the field, zoosemiotics is also philosophically rooted in Peircean semiotics and German biological philosophy. It is argued that the confrontation between zoosemiotics and cognitive ethology is related to different epistemological approaches and at least partly induced by underlying philosophical traditions.     

Evolution of ageing since Darwin

In the late 19th century, the evolutionary approach to the problem of ageing was initiated by August Weismann, who argued that natural selection was more important for ageing than any physiological mechanism. In the mid-twentieth century, J. B. S. Haldane, P. B. Medawar and G. C. Williams informally argued that the force of natural selection falls with adult age. In 1966, W. D. Hamilton published formal equations that showed mathematically that two’ forces of natural selection’ do indeed decline with age, though his analysis was not genetically explicit. Brian Charlesworth then developed the required mathematical population genetics for the evolution of ageing in the 1970’s. In the 1980’s, experiments using Drosophila showed that the rate of ageing evolves as predicted by Hamilton’s’ forces of natural selection’. The discovery of the cessation of ageing late in life in the 1990’s was followed by its explanation in terms of evolutionary theory based on Hamilton’s forces. Recently, it has been shown that the cessation of ageing can also be manipulated experimentally using Hamilton’s’ forces of natural selection’. Despite the success of evolutionary research on ageing, mainstream gerontological research has largely ignored both this work and the opportunity that it provides for effective intervention in ageing.     

A Life More Ordinary: The Dull Life but Interesting Times of Joseph Dalton Hooker

The life of Joseph Dalton Hooker (1817–1911) provides an invaluable lens through which to view mid-Victorian science. A biographical approach makes it clear that some well-established narratives about this period need revising. For example, Hooker’s career cannot be considered an example of the professionalisation of the sciences, given the doubtful respectability of being paid to do science and his reliance on unpaid collectors with pretensions to equal scientific and/or social status. Nor was Hooker’s response to Darwin’s theories either straightforward or contradictory; it only makes sense as carefully crafted equivocation when seen in the context of his life and career. However, the importance of Hooker’s life is ultimately its typicality; what was true of Hooker was true of many other Victorian men of science.     

No evolution,no heredity,just development—Julius Schaxel and the end of the Evo–Devo agenda in Jena, 1906–1933: a case study

Julius Schaxel is an almost forgotten figure in the history of early twentieth century biology. By focusing on his life and work, I would like to illustrate several central developments in that period of history of biology. Julius Schaxel was an early representative and organizer of theoretical biology, discussing and criticizing both Wilhelm Roux’s mechanism and Hans Driesch’s vitalism. In addition to his theoretical work, Schaxel also did experimental research on developmental issues to support his critique. In this paper, special emphasis is made on the negotiating practice of Schaxel, which he used to establish a new area of biological research and a new audience for that area. In contrast to these new fields, Schaxel can be also portrayed as the endpoint of a research tradition investigating ontogeny and phylogeny together, which today is called Evo–Devo. Following Garland Allen’s dialectical processes that led to the decline of the Evo–Devo research agenda, Schaxel’s example is used to investigate these processes.     

Marvelling at the Marvel: The Supposed Conversion of A.D. Darbishire to Mendelism

The so-called “biometric-Mendelian controversy” has received much attention from science studies scholars. This paper focuses on one scientist involved in this debate, Arthur Dukinfield Darbishire, who performed a series of hybridization experiments with mice beginning in 1901. Previous historical work on Darbishire’s experiments and his later attempt to reconcile Mendelian and biometric views describe Darbishire as eventually being “converted”' to Mendelism. I provide a new analysis of this episode in the context of Darbishire’s experimental results, his underlying epistemology, and his influence on the broader debate surrounding the rediscovery and acceptance of Mendelism. Iinvestigate various historiographical issues raised by this episode in order to reflect on the idea of “conversion” to a scientific theory. Darbishire was an influential figure who resisted strong forces compelling him to convert prematurely due to his requirements that the new theory account for particularly important anomalous facts and answer the most pressing questions in the field. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Brocchi’s Subapennine Fossil Conchology

The Italian geologist Giambattista Brocchi (1771–1826) is presented as a key figure in the historical period preceding young Charles Darwin’s first work on transmutational theory while on the Beagle. The brief biographical account focuses on Brocchi’s writings related to his analogy that species have births and deaths like individuals, and culminates in his most important work, Subapennine Fossil Conchology of 1814. Brocchi’s analogy as an original and fertile way to approach the fossil record was to influence Darwin’s first evolutionary thinking. Relevant passages of the book are presented for the first time in an English translation.     

Brocchi,Darwin, and Transmutation: Phylogenetics and Paleontology at the Dawn of Evolutionary Biology

Giambattista Brocchi’s (1814) monograph (see Dominici, Evo Edu Outreach, this issue, 2010) on the Tertiary fossils of the Subappenines in Italy—and their relation to the living molluscan fauna—contains a theoretical, transmutational perspective (“Brocchian transmutation”). Unlike Lamarck (1809), Brocchi saw species as discrete and fundamentally stable entities. Explicitly analogizing the births and deaths of species with those of individual organisms (“Brocchi’s analogy”), Brocchi proposed that species have inherent longevities, eventually dying of old age unless driven to extinction by external forces. As for individuals, births and deaths of species are understood to have natural causes; sequences of births and deaths of species produce genealogical lineages of descent, and faunas become increasingly modernized through time. Brocchi calculated that over 50% of his fossil species are still alive in the modern fauna. Brocchi’s work was reviewed by Horner (1816) in Edinburgh. Brocchi’s influence as a transmutational thinker is clear in Jameson’s (1827) “geological illustrations” in his fifth edition of his translation of Cuvier’s Theory of the Earth (read by his student Charles Darwin) and in the anonymous essays of 1826 and 1827 published in the Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal—which also carried a notice of Brocchi’s death in 1827. The notion that new species replace older, extinct ones—in what today would be called an explicitly phylogenetic context—permeates these essays. Herschel’s (1830) discussion of temporal replacement of species and the modernization of faunas closely mirrors these prior discussions. His book, dedicated to the search for natural causes of natural phenomena, was read by Charles Darwin while a student at Cambridge. Darwin’s work on HMS Beagle was in large measure an exploration of replacement patterns of “allied forms” of endemic species in time and in space. His earliest discussions of transmutation, in his essay February 1835, as well as the Red Notebook and the early pages of Notebook B (the latter two written in 1837 back in England), contain Brocchi’s analogy, including the idea of inherent species longevities. Darwin’s first theory of the origin of species was explicitly saltational, invoking geographic isolation as the main cause of the abrupt appearance of new species. We conclude that Darwin was testing the predicted patterns of both Brocchian and Lamarckian transmutation as early as 1832 at the outset of his work on the Beagle.     

Cancer,Viruses, and Mass Migration: Paul Berg’s Venture into Eukaryotic Biology and the Advent of Recombinant DNA Research and Technology, 1967–1980

The existing literature on the development of recombinant DNA technology and genetic engineering tends to focus on Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer’s recombinant DNA cloning technology and its commercialization starting in the mid-1970s. Historians of science, however, have pointedly noted that experimental procedures for making recombinant DNA molecules were initially developed by Stanford biochemist Paul Berg and his colleagues, Peter Lobban and A. Dale Kaiser in the early 1970s. This paper, recognizing the uneasy disjuncture between scientific authorship and legal invention in the history of recombinant DNA technology, investigates the development of recombinant DNA technology in its full scientific context. I do so by focusing on Stanford biochemist Berg’s research on the genetic regulation of higher organisms. As I hope to demonstrate, Berg’s new venture reflected a mass migration of biomedical researchers as they shifted from studying prokaryotic organisms like bacteria to studying eukaryotic organisms like mammalian and human cells. It was out of this boundary crossing from prokaryotic to eukaryotic systems through virus model systems that recombinant DNA technology and other significant new research techniques and agendas emerged. Indeed, in their attempt to reconstitute ‹life’ as a research technology, Stanford biochemists’ recombinant DNA research recast genes as a sequence that could be rewritten thorough biochemical operations. The last part of this paper shifts focus from recombinant DNA technology’s academic origins to its transformation into a genetic engineering technology by examining the wide range of experimental hybridizations which occurred as techniques and knowledge circulated between Stanford biochemists and the Bay Area’s experimentalists. Situating their interchange in a dense research network based at Stanford’s biochemistry department, this paper helps to revise the canonized history of genetic engineering’s origins that emerged during the patenting of Cohen–Boyer’s recombinant DNA cloning procedures.     

Current views on the function of the violaxanthin cycle (development of ideas put forward by D.I. Sapozhnikov)

David Iosifovich Sapozhnikov (17.06.1911–23.11.1983), a well-known plant physiologist and evolutionist would have been 100 this year. Sapozhnikov investigated the role of carotenoids in plant life and acquired worldwide recognition for his discovery of the violaxanthin cycle. This review considers the most important Sapozhnikov’s results and hypotheses elaborated by subsequent research, as well as the modern concepts in this area of investigation.     

A general definition of interpretation and its application to origin of life research

We draw on Short’s work on Peirce’s theory of signs to propose a new general definition of interpretation. Short argues that Peirce’s semiotics rests on his naturalised teleology. Our proposal extends Short’s work by modifying his definition of interpretation so as to make it more generally applicable to putatively interpretative processes in biological systems. We use our definition as the basis of an account of different kinds of misinterpretation and we discuss some questions raised by the definition by reference to parallel problems in the field of teleosemantics. We propose that interpretative responses fulfilling the criteria of our definition may be made by relatively simple molecular entities and we suggest two specific empirical applications of the definition to experimental work in the field of origin of life research. Our wider aim is to suggest that a well formulated naturalistic definition of interpretation will allow a re-evaluation of the role of semiotic phenomena in biological systems, including the generation of empirically testable hypotheses.     

Traveller or tourist? Jack Kerouac and the commodification of culture

Jack Kerouac, the author of On The Road, was a central figure of the Beat Generation, a generation which rebelled against middle-class conformity in post–World War II America. Kerouac described himself as “a religious wanderer” (Kerouac 2006: 2), but an examination of his texts and life suggest his travels may also be understood as tourism. Viewed through the prism of tourism, this study will argue, for example, that MacCannell’s notion of the tourist’s quest for reality and authenticity (MacCannell 1989: 3) provides some insight into why Kerouac wrote that just south of Macon, Georgia, he and his travelling companion Neal Cassady stopped and got out of the car, “and suddenly both of us were stoned with joy to realize that in the darkness all around us was fragrant green grass and the smell of fresh manure and warm waters” (Kerouac 1957: 115). As Kerouac rebelled against being, as one of his protagonists in The Dharma Bums put it, “imprisoned in a system of work, produce, consume, work, produce, consume” (Kerouac 2006: 73) he travelled across America on a rapidly improving network of highways, turning “mobility into a retreat” (Holladay and Holton 2009: 42). Kerouac alternately identified himself as a hobo (Kerouac 1973: 181) and “not a real hobo” (Kerouac 1973: 173), but this article asks whether Kerouac’s travels were those of the last in a line of wanderers rebelling against conformity and modernization or a precursor of mobile mass tourism in America.