Co‐evolutionary dynamics between public good producers and cheats in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa

The production of beneficial public goods is common in the microbial world, and so is cheating – the exploitation of public goods by nonproducing mutants. Here, we examine co‐evolutionary dynamics between cooperators and cheats and ask whether cooperators can evolve strategies to reduce the burden of exploitation, and whether cheats in turn can improve their exploitation abilities. We evolved cooperators of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, producing the shareable iron‐scavenging siderophore pyoverdine, together with cheats, defective in pyoverdine production but proficient in uptake. We found that cooperators managed to co‐exist with cheats in 56% of all replicates over approximately 150 generations of experimental evolution. Growth and competition assays revealed that co‐existence was fostered by a combination of general adaptions to the media and specific adaptions to the co‐evolving opponent. Phenotypic screening and whole‐genome resequencing of evolved clones confirmed this pattern, and suggest that cooperators became less exploitable by cheats because they significantly reduced their pyoverdine investment. Cheats, meanwhile, improved exploitation efficiency through mutations blocking the costly pyoverdine‐signalling pathway. Moreover, cooperators and cheats evolved reduced motility, a pattern that likely represents adaptation to laboratory conditions, but at the same time also affects social interactions by reducing strain mixing and pyoverdine sharing. Overall, we observed parallel evolution, where co‐existence of cooperators and cheats was enabled by a combination of adaptations to the abiotic and social environment and their interactions.     

The co‐evolution of social institutions,demography, and large‐scale human cooperation

Human cooperation is typically coordinated by institutions, which determine the outcome structure of the social interactions individuals engage in. Explaining the Neolithic transition from small‐ to large‐scale societies involves understanding how these institutions co‐evolve with demography. We study this using a demographically explicit model of institution formation in a patch‐structured population. Each patch supports both social and asocial niches. Social individuals create an institution, at a cost to themselves, by negotiating how much of the costly public good provided by cooperators is invested into sanctioning defectors. The remainder of their public good is invested in technology that increases carrying capacity, such as irrigation systems. We show that social individuals can invade a population of asocials, and form institutions that support high levels of cooperation. We then demonstrate conditions where the co‐evolution of cooperation, institutions, and demographic carrying capacity creates a transition from small‐ to large‐scale social groups.     

The coevolution of long‐term pair bonds and cooperation

The evolution of social traits may not only depend on but also change the social structure of the population. In particular, the evolution of pairwise cooperation, such as biparental care, depends on the pair‐matching distribution of the population, and the latter often emerges as a collective outcome of individual pair‐bonding traits, which are also under selection. Here, we develop an analytical model and individual‐based simulations to study the coevolution of long‐term pair bonds and cooperation in parental care, where partners play a Snowdrift game in each breeding season. We illustrate that long‐term pair bonds may coevolve with cooperation when bonding cost is below a threshold. As long‐term pair bonds lead to assortative interactions through pair‐matching dynamics, they may promote the prevalence of cooperation. In addition to the pay‐off matrix of a single game, the evolutionarily stable equilibrium also depends on bonding cost and accidental divorce rate, and it is determined by a form of balancing selection because the benefit from pair‐bond maintenance diminishes as the frequency of cooperators increases. Our findings highlight the importance of ecological factors affecting social bonding cost and stability in understanding the coevolution of social behaviour and social structures, which may lead to the diversity of biological social systems.     

Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: Prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games

The evolution of cooperation is an enduring conundrum in biology and the social sciences. Two social dilemmas, the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game have emerged as the most promising mathematical metaphors to study cooperation. Spatial structure with limited local interactions has long been identified as a potent promoter of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma but in the spatial snowdrift game, space may actually enhance or inhibit cooperation. Here we investigate and link the microscopic interaction between individuals to the characteristics of the emerging macroscopic patterns generated by the spatial invasion process of cooperators in a world of defectors. In our simulations, individuals are located on a square lattice with Moore neighborhood and update their strategies by probabilistically imitating the strategies of better performing neighbors. Under sufficiently benign conditions, cooperators can survive in both games. After rapid local equilibration, cooperators expand quadratically until global saturation is reached. Under favorable conditions, cooperators expand as a large contiguous cluster in both games with minor differences concerning the shape of embedded defectors. Under less favorable conditions, however, distinct differences arise. In the prisoner's dilemma, cooperators break up into isolated, compact clusters. The compact clustering reduces exploitation and leads to positive assortment, such that cooperators interact more frequently with other cooperators than with defectors. In contrast, in the snowdrift game, cooperators form small, dendritic clusters, which results in negative assortment and cooperators interact more frequently with defectors than with other cooperators. In order to characterize and quantify the emerging spatial patterns, we introduce a measure for the cluster shape and demonstrate that the macroscopic patterns can be used to determine the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.     

Cooperation‐mediated plasticity in dispersal and colonization

Kin selection theory predicts that costly cooperative behaviors evolve most readily when directed toward kin. Dispersal plays a controversial role in the evolution of cooperation: dispersal decreases local population relatedness and thus opposes the evolution of cooperation, but limited dispersal increases kin competition and can negate the benefits of cooperation. Theoretical work has suggested that plasticity of dispersal, where individuals can adjust their dispersal decisions according to the social context, might help resolve this paradox and promote the evolution of cooperation. Here, we experimentally tested the hypothesis that conditional dispersal decisions are mediated by a cooperative strategy: we quantified the density‐dependent dispersal decisions and subsequent colonization efficiency from single cells or groups of cells among six genetic strains of the unicellular Tetrahymena thermophila that differ in their aggregation level (high, medium, and low), a behavior associated with cooperation strategy. We found that the plastic reaction norms of dispersal rate relative to density differed according to aggregation level: highly aggregative genotypes showed negative density‐dependent dispersal, whereas low‐aggregation genotypes showed maximum dispersal rates at intermediate density, and medium‐aggregation genotypes showed density‐independent dispersal with intermediate dispersal rate. Dispersers from highly aggregative genotypes had specialized long‐distance dispersal phenotypes, contrary to low‐aggregation genotypes; medium‐aggregation genotypes showing intermediate dispersal phenotype. Moreover, highly aggregation genotypes showed evidence for beneficial kin‐cooperation during dispersal. Our experimental results should help to resolve the evolutionary conflict between cooperation and dispersal: cooperative individuals are expected to avoid kin‐competition by dispersing long distances, but maintain the benefits of cooperation by dispersing in small groups.     

Facing the crowd: intruder pressure,within‐group competition,and the resolution of conflicts over group‐membership

Recent theory in social evolution has been mainly concerned with competition and cooperation within social groups of animals and their impact on the stability of those groups. Much less attention has been paid to conflicts arising as a result of solitary floaters (outsiders) attempting to join groups of established residents (insiders). We model such conflicts over group‐membership using a demographically explicit approach in which the rates of births and deaths in a population determine the availability of group‐vacancies and the number of floaters competing over these vacancies. We find that the outcome of within‐group competition, reflected in the partitioning of reproduction among group members, exerts surprisingly little influence on the resolution of insider‐outsider conflict. The outcome of such conflict is also largely unaffected by differences in resource holding potential between insiders and outsiders. By contrast, whether or not groups form is mainly determined by demographic factors (variation in vital rates such as fecundity and mortality) and the resulting population dynamics. In particular, at high floater densities territory defense becomes too costly, and groups form because insiders give in to the intruder pressure imposed on them by outsiders. We emphasize the importance of insider‐outsider conflicts in social evolution theory and highlight avenues for future research.     

Human cooperation in social dilemmas: comparing the Snowdrift game with the Prisoner's Dilemma

Explaining the evolution of cooperation among non-relatives is one of the major challenges for evolutionary biology. In this study, we experimentally examined human cooperation in the iterated Snowdrift game (ISD), which has received little attention so far, and compared it with human cooperation in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), which has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation. We show that iteration in the ISD leads to consistently higher levels of cooperation than in the IPD. We further demonstrate that the most successful strategies known for the IPD (generous Tit-for-Tat and Pavlov) were also successfully used in the ISD. Interestingly, we found that female players cooperated significantly more often than male players in the IPD but not in the ISD. Moreover, female players in the IPD applied Tit-for-Tat-like or Pavlovian strategies significantly more often than male players, thereby achieving significantly higher pay-offs than male players did. These data demonstrate that the willingness to cooperate does not only depend on the type of the social dilemma, but also on the class of individuals involved. Altogether, our study shows that the ISD can potentially explain high levels of cooperation among non-relatives in humans. In addition, the ISD seems to reflect the social dilemma more realistically than the IPD because individuals obtain immediate direct benefits from the cooperative acts they perform and costs of cooperation are shared between cooperators.     

Similar preferences for ornamentation in opposite‐ and same‐sex choice experiments

Selection due to social interactions comprises competition over matings (sexual selection stricto sensu) plus other forms of social competition and cooperation. Sexual selection explains sex differences in ornamentation and in various other phenotypes, but does not easily explain cases where those phenotypes are similar in males and females. Understanding such similarities requires knowing how phenotypes influence nonsexual social interactions as well, which can be very important in gregarious animals, but whose role for phenotypic evolution has been overlooked. For example, ‘mate choice’ experiments often found preferences for ornamentation, but have not assessed whether those are strictly sexual or are general social preferences. Using choice experiments with a gregarious and mutually ornamented finch, the common waxbill (Estrilda astrild), we show that preferences for ornamentation in the opposite‐sex also extend to same‐sex interactions. Waxbills discriminated between opposite‐ and same‐sex individuals, but most preferences for colour traits were similar when interacting with either sex. Similar preferences in sexual and nonsexual associations may be widespread in nature, either as social adaptations or as by‐product of mate preferences. In either case, such preferences may set the stage for the evolution of mutual ornamentation and of various other similarities between the sexes.     

Spatial Patterns of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in Metapopulations

Because to defect is the evolutionary stable strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG), understanding the mechanism generating and maintaining cooperation in PDG, i.e. the paradox of cooperation, has intrinsic significance for understanding social altruism behaviors. Spatial structure serves as the key to this dilemma. Here, we build the model of spatial PDG under a metapopulation framework: the sub-populations of cooperators and defectors obey the rules in spatial PDG as well as the colonization–extinction process of metapopulations. Using the mean-field approximation and the pair approximation, we obtain the differential equations for the dynamics of occupancy and spatial correlation. Cellular automaton is also built to simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics of the spatial PDG in metapopulations. Join-count statistics are used to measure the spatial correlation as well as the spatial association of the metapopulation. Simulation results show that the distribution is self-organized and that it converges to a static boundary due to the boycotting of cooperators to defectors. Metapopulations can survive even when the colonization rate is lower than the extinction rate due to the compensation of cooperation rewards for extinction debt. With a change of parameters in the model, a metapopulation can consist of pure cooperators, pure defectors, or cooperator–defector coexistence. The necessary condition of cooperation evolution is the local colonization of a metapopulation. The spatial correlation between the cooperators tends to be weaker with the increase in the temptation to defect and the habitat connectivity; yet the spatial correlation between defectors becomes stronger. The relationship between spatial structure and the colonization rate is complicated, especially for cooperators. The metapopulation may undergo a temporary period of prosperity just before the extinction, even while the colonization rate is declining. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Evolution of Cooperation on Stochastic Dynamical Networks

Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by natural selection only in the presence of an additional mechanism. One such mechanism is based on population structure, which can lead to clustering of cooperating agents. Recently, the focus has turned to complex dynamical population structures such as social networks, where the nodes represent individuals and links represent social relationships. We investigate how the dynamics of a social network can change the level of cooperation in the network. Individuals either update their strategies by imitating their partners or adjust their social ties. For the dynamics of the network structure, a random link is selected and breaks with a probability determined by the adjacent individuals. Once it is broken, a new one is established. This linking dynamics can be conveniently characterized by a Markov chain in the configuration space of an ever-changing network of interacting agents. Our model can be analytically solved provided the dynamics of links proceeds much faster than the dynamics of strategies. This leads to a simple rule for the evolution of cooperation: The more fragile links between cooperating players and non-cooperating players are (or the more robust links between cooperators are), the more likely cooperation prevails. Our approach may pave the way for analytically investigating coevolution of strategy and structure.     

Microbial expansion–collision dynamics promote cooperation and coexistence on surfaces

Microbes colonizing a surface often experience colony growth dynamics characterized by an initial phase of spatial clonal expansion followed by collision between neighboring colonies to form potentially genetically heterogeneous boundaries. For species with life cycles consisting of repeated surface colonization and dispersal, these spatially explicit “expansion‐collision dynamics” generate periodic transitions between two distinct selective regimes, “expansion competition” and “boundary competition,” each one favoring a different growth strategy. We hypothesized that this dynamic could promote stable coexistence of expansion‐ and boundary‐competition specialists by generating time‐varying, negative frequency‐dependent selection that insulates both types from extinction. We tested this experimentally in budding yeast by competing an exoenzyme secreting “cooperator” strain (expansion–competition specialists) against nonsecreting “defectors” (boundary–competition specialists). As predicted, we observed cooperator–defector coexistence or cooperator dominance with expansion–collision dynamics, but only defector dominance otherwise. Also as predicted, the steady‐state frequency of cooperators was determined by colonization density (the average initial cell–cell distance) and cost of cooperation. Lattice‐based spatial simulations give good qualitative agreement with experiments, supporting our hypothesis that expansion–collision dynamics with costly public goods production is sufficient to generate stable cooperator–defector coexistence. This mechanism may be important for maintaining public–goods cooperation and conflict in microbial pioneer species living on surfaces.     

The cancellation effect at the group level

Group selection models combine selection pressure at the individual level with selection pressure at the group level. Cooperation can be costly for individuals, but beneficial for the group, and therefore, if individuals are sufficiently much assorted, and cooperators find themselves in groups with disproportionately many other cooperators, cooperation can evolve. The existing literature on group selection generally assumes that competition between groups takes place in a well-mixed population of groups, where any group competes with any other group equally intensely. Competition between groups however might very well occur locally; groups may compete more intensely with nearby than with far-away groups. We show that if competition between groups is indeed local, then the evolution of cooperation can be hindered significantly by the fact that groups with many cooperators will mostly compete against neighboring groups that are also highly cooperative, and therefore harder to outcompete. The existing empirical method for determining how conducive a group structured population is to the evolution of cooperation also implicitly assumes global between-group competition, and therefore gives (possibly very) biased estimates.     

Cooperation as a volunteer’s dilemma and the strategy of conflict in public goods games

Conflict and cooperation for the exploitation of public goods are usually modelled as an N‐person prisoner’s dilemma. Many social dilemmas, however, would be described more properly as a volunteer’s dilemma, in which a certain number of individuals are necessary to produce a public good. If volunteering is costly, but so is failure to produce the public good, cheaters can invade and form a stable mixed equilibrium with cooperators. The dilemma is that the benefit for the group decreases with group size because the larger the group is, the less likely it is that someone volunteers. This problem persists even in the presence of a high degree of relatedness between group members. This model provides precise, testable predictions for the stability of cooperation. It also suggests a counterintuitive but practical solution for this kind of social dilemmas: increasing the damage resulting from the failure to produce the public good increases the probability that the public good is actually produced. Adopting a strategy that entails a deliberate risk (brinkmanship), therefore, can lead to a benefit for the society without being detrimental for the individual.     

The social evolution of dispersal with public goods cooperation

Selection can favour the evolution of individually costly dispersal if this alleviates competition between relatives. However, conditions that favour altruistic dispersal also mediate selection for other social behaviours, such as public goods cooperation, which in turn is likely to mediate dispersal evolution. Here, we investigate – both experimentally (using bacteria) and theoretically – how social habitat heterogeneity (i.e. the distribution of public goods cooperators and cheats) affects the evolution of dispersal. In addition to recovering the well‐known theoretical result that the optimal level of dispersal increases with genetic relatedness of patch mates, we find both mathematically and experimentally that dispersal is always favoured when average patch occupancy is low, but when average patch occupancy is high, the presence of public goods cheats greatly alters selection for dispersal. Specifically, when public goods cheats are localized to the home patch, higher dispersal rates are favoured, but when cheats are present throughout available patches, lower dispersal rates are favoured. These results highlight the importance of other social traits in driving dispersal evolution.     

Social systems and life‐history characteristics of mongooses

The diversity of extant carnivores provides valuable opportunities for comparative research to illuminate general patterns of mammalian social evolution. Recent field studies on mongooses (Herpestidae), in particular, have generated detailed behavioural and demographic data allowing tests of assumptions and predictions of theories of social evolution. The first studies of the social systems of their closest relatives, the Malagasy Eupleridae, also have been initiated. The literature on mongooses was last reviewed over 25 years ago. In this review, we summarise the current state of knowledge on the social organisation, mating systems and social structure (especially competition and cooperation) of the two mongoose families. Our second aim is to evaluate the contributions of these studies to a better understanding of mammalian social evolution in general. Based on published reports or anecdotal information, we can classify 16 of the 34 species of Herpestidae as solitary and nine as group‐living; there are insufficient data available for the remainder. There is a strong phylogenetic signal of sociality with permanent complex groups being limited to the genera Crossarchus, Helogale, Liberiictis, Mungos, and Suricata. Our review also indicates that studies of solitary and social mongooses have been conducted within different theoretical frameworks: whereas solitary species and transitions to gregariousness have been mainly investigated in relation to ecological determinants, the study of social patterns of highly social mongooses has instead been based on reproductive skew theory. In some group‐living species, group size and composition were found to determine reproductive competition and cooperative breeding through group augmentation. Infanticide risk and inbreeding avoidance connect social organisation and social structure with reproductive tactics and life histories, but their specific impact on mongoose sociality is still difficult to evaluate. However, the level of reproductive skew in social mongooses is not only determined by the costs and benefits of suppressing each other's breeding attempts, but also influenced by resource abundance. Thus, dispersal, as a consequence of eviction, is also linked to the costs of co‐breeding in the context of food competition. By linking these facts, we show that the socio‐ecological model and reproductive skew theory share some determinants of social patterns. We also conclude that due to their long bio‐geographical isolation and divergent selection pressures, future studies of the social systems of the Eupleridae will be of great value for the elucidation of general patterns in carnivore social evolution.     

Meta-community selection favours reciprocal cooperation but depresses exploitation between competitors

The evolution of cooperation and mutualism has mainly been explored through individual- and group-level processes. However, community-level processes could also impose selection pressure on species interactions. By using a dome-shaped nonmonotonic interaction (DS interaction) with cooperation at low-density and competition at high-density, we studied how cooperation and exploitation are selected at the meta-community level. Our results showed that population densities of species and communities were both significantly associated with the number of DS interactions and the species interaction modes. The more cooperation a species received via DS interactions, the higher its density was. A community with more DS interactions, especially more reciprocal cooperation, showed a higher total population density. Both reciprocal cooperators and exploiters in a local community were more favoured than unidirectional cooperators within a closed community. When facing competition from a community without cooperators (with only competitors), both reciprocal cooperators and exploiters were favoured in a local community, but only reciprocal cooperators were more favoured when facing competition from another community with cooperators. Our results suggest that selection at the meta-community level could be an alternative mechanism for the evolution of cooperation and the depression of exploitation between competitors.     

Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations

Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces.     

Cooperation in two-person evolutionary games with complex personality profiles

We propose a theory of evolution of social systems which generalizes the standard proportional fitness rule of the evolutionary game theory. The formalism is applied to describe the dynamics of two-person one-shot population games. In particular it predicts the non-zero level of cooperation in the long run for the Prisoner's Dilemma games, the increase of the fraction of cooperators for general classes of the Snow-Drift game, and stable nonzero cooperation level for coordination games.     

From local to global dilemmas in social networks

Social networks affect in such a fundamental way the dynamics of the population they support that the global, population-wide behavior that one observes often bears no relation to the individual processes it stems from. Up to now, linking the global networked dynamics to such individual mechanisms has remained elusive. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in networked populations and let individuals interact via a 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma--a characteristic defection dominant social dilemma of cooperation. We show how homogeneous networks transform a Prisoner's Dilemma into a population-wide evolutionary dynamics that promotes the coexistence between cooperators and defectors, while heterogeneous networks promote their coordination. To this end, we define a dynamic variable that allows us to track the self-organization of cooperators when co-evolving with defectors in networked populations. Using the same variable, we show how the global dynamics--and effective dilemma--co-evolves with the motifs of cooperators in the population, the overall emergence of cooperation depending sensitively on this co-evolution.     

Repression of competition favours cooperation: experimental evidence from bacteria

Repression of competition (RC) within social groups has been suggested as a key mechanism driving the evolution of cooperation, because it aligns the individual’s proximate interest with the interest of the group. Despite its enormous potential for explaining cooperation across all levels of biological organization, ranging from fair meiosis, to policing in insect societies, to sanctions in mutualistic interactions between species, there has been no direct experimental test of whether RC favours the spread of cooperators in a well‐mixed population with cheats. To address this, we carried out an experimental evolution study to test the effect of RC upon a cooperative trait – the production of iron‐scavenging siderophore molecules – in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We found that cooperation was favoured when competition between siderophore producers and nonsiderophore‐producing cheats was repressed, but not in a treatment where competition between the two strains was permitted. We further show that RC altered the cost of cooperation, but did not affect the relatedness among interacting individuals. This confirms that RC per se, as opposed to increased relatedness, has driven the observed increase in bacterial cooperation.