It’s Not My Fault: Postdictive Modulation of Intentional Binding by Monetary Gains and Losses

Sense of agency refers to the feeling that one’s voluntary actions caused external events. Past studies have shown that compression of the subjective temporal interval between actions and external events, called intentional binding, is closely linked to the experience of agency. Current theories postulate that the experience of agency is constructed via predictive and postdictive pathways. One remaining problem is the source of human causality bias; people often make misjudgments on the causality of voluntary actions and external events depending on their rewarding or punishing outcomes. Although human causality bias implies that sense of agency can be modified by post-action information, convincing empirical findings for this issue are lacking. Here, we hypothesized that sense of agency would be modified by affective valences of action outcomes. To examine this issue, we investigated how rewarding and punishing outcomes following voluntary action modulate behavioral measures of agency using intentional binding paradigm and classical conditioning procedures. In the acquisition phase, auditory stimuli were paired with positive, neutral or negative monetary outcomes. Tone-reward associations were evaluated using reaction times and preference ratings. In the experimental session, participants performed a variant of intentional binding task, where participants made timing judgments for onsets of actions and sensory outcomes while playing simple slot games. Our results showed that temporal binding was modified by affective valences of action outcomes. Specifically, intentional binding was attenuated when negative outcome occurred, consistent with self-serving bias. Our study not only provides evidence for postdictive modification of agency, but also proposes a possible mechanism of human causality bias.     

Whodunnit? Electrophysiological Correlates of Agency Judgements

Sense of agency refers to the feeling that "I" am responsible for those external events that are directly produced by one's own voluntary actions. Recent theories distinguish between a non-conceptual "feeling" of agency linked to changes in the processing of self-generated sensory events, and a higher-order judgement of agency, which attributes sensory events to the self. In the current study we explore the neural correlates of the judgement of agency by means of electrophysiology. We measured event-related potentials to tones that were either perceived or not perceived as triggered by participants' voluntary actions and related these potentials to later judgements of agency over the tones. Replicating earlier findings on predictive sensory attenuation, we found that the N1 component was attenuated for congruent tones that corresponded to the learned action-effect mapping as opposed to incongruent tones that did not correspond to the previously acquired associations between actions and tones. The P3a component, but not the N1, directly reflected the judgement of agency: deflections in this component were greater for tones judged as self-generated than for tones judged as externally produced. The fact that the outcome of the later agency judgement was predictable based on the P3a component demonstrates that agency judgements incorporate early information processing components and are not purely reconstructive, post-hoc evaluations generated at time of judgement.     

When Passive Feels Active - Delusion-Proneness Alters Self-Recognition in the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion

Psychotic patients have problems with bodily self-recognition such as the experience of self-produced actions (sense of agency) and the perception of the body as their own (sense of ownership). While it has been shown that such impairments in psychotic patients can be explained by hypersalient processing of external sensory input it has also been suggested that they lack normal efference copy in voluntary action. However, it is not known how problems with motor predictions like efference copy contribute to impaired sense of agency and ownership in psychosis or psychosis-related states. We used a rubber hand illusion based on finger movements and measured sense of agency and ownership to compute a bodily self-recognition score in delusion-proneness (indexed by Peters’ Delusion Inventory - PDI). A group of healthy subjects (n=71) experienced active movements (involving motor predictions) or passive movements (lacking motor predictions). We observed a highly significant correlation between delusion-proneness and self-recognition in the passive conditions, while no such effect was observed in the active conditions. This was seen for both ownership and agency scores. The result suggests that delusion-proneness is associated with hypersalient external input in passive conditions, resulting in an abnormal experience of the illusion. We hypothesize that this effect is not present in the active condition because deficient motor predictions counteract hypersalience in psychosis proneness.     

Disrupting the experience of control in the human brain: pre-supplementary motor area contributes to the sense of agency

The feeling of controlling events through one''s actions is fundamental to human experience, but its neural basis remains unclear. This ‘sense of agency’ (SoA) can be measured quantitatively as a temporal linkage between voluntary actions and their external effects. We investigated the brain areas underlying this aspect of action awareness by using theta-burst stimulation to locally and reversibly disrupt human brain function. Disruption of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), a key structure for preparation and initiation of a voluntary action, was shown to reduce the temporal linkage between a voluntary key-press action and a subsequent electrocutaneous stimulus. In contrast, disruption of the sensorimotor cortex, which processes signals more directly related to action execution and sensory feedback, had no significant effect. Our results provide the first direct evidence of a pre-SMA contribution to SoA.     

Do Implicit and Explicit Measures of the Sense of Agency Measure the Same Thing?

The sense of agency (SoA) refers to perceived causality of the self, i.e. the feeling of causing something to happen. The SoA has been probed using a variety of explicit and implicit measures. Explicit measures include rating scales and questionnaires. Implicit measures, which include sensory attenuation and temporal binding, use perceptual differences between self- and externally generated stimuli as measures of the SoA. In the present study, we investigated whether the different measures tap into the same self-attribution processes by determining whether individual differences on implicit and explicit measures of SoA are correlated. Participants performed tasks in which they triggered tones via key presses (operant condition) or passively listened to tones triggered by a computer (observational condition). We replicated previously reported effects of sensory attenuation and temporal binding. Surprisingly the two implicit measures of SoA were not significantly correlated with each other, nor did they correlate with the explicit measures of SoA. Our results suggest that some explicit and implicit measures of the SoA may tap into different processes.     

Disturbances in body ownership in schizophrenia: evidence from the rubber hand illusion and case study of a spontaneous out-of-body experience

Background

A weakened sense of self may contribute to psychotic experiences. Body ownership, one component of self-awareness, can be studied with the rubber hand illusion (RHI). Watching a rubber hand being stroked while one''s unseen hand is stroked synchronously can lead to a sense of ownership over the rubber hand, a shift in perceived position of the real hand, and a limb-specific drop in stimulated hand temperature. We aimed to assess the RHI in schizophrenia using quantifiable measures: proprioceptive drift and stimulation-dependent changes in hand temperature.

Methods

The RHI was elicited in 24 schizophrenia patients and 21 matched controls by placing their unseen hand adjacent to a visible rubber hand and brushing real and rubber hands synchronously or asynchronously. Perceived finger location was measured before and after stimulation. Hand temperature was taken before and during stimulation. Subjective strength of the illusion was assessed by a questionnaire.

Results

Across groups, the RHI was stronger during synchronous stimulation, indicated by self-report and proprioceptive drift. Patients reported a stronger RHI than controls. Self-reported strength of RHI was associated with schizotypy in controls Proprioceptive drift was larger in patients, but only following synchronous stimulation. Further, we observed stimulation-dependent changes in skin temperature. During right hand stimulation, temperature dropped in the stimulated hand and rose in the unstimulated hand. Interestingly, induction of RHI led to an out-of-body experience in one patient, linking body disownership and psychotic experiences.

Conclusions

The RHI is quantitatively and qualitatively stronger in schizophrenia. These findings suggest that patients have a more flexible body representation and weakened sense of self, and potentially indicate abnormalities in temporo-parietal networks implicated in body ownership. Further, results suggest that these body ownership disturbances might be at the heart of a subset of the pathognomonic delusions of passivity.     

Losing One's Hand: Visual-Proprioceptive Conflict Affects Touch Perception

Background

While the sense of bodily ownership has now been widely investigated through the rubber hand illusion (RHI), very little is known about the sense of disownership. It has been hypothesized that the RHI also affects the ownership feelings towards the participant''s own hand, as if the rubber hand replaced the participant''s actual hand. Somatosensory changes observed in the participants'' hand while experiencing the RHI have been taken as evidence for disownership of their real hand. Here we propose a theoretical framework to disambiguate whether such somatosensory changes are to be ascribed to the disownership of the real hand or rather to the anomalous visuo-proprioceptive conflict experienced by the participant during the RHI.

Methodology/Principal Findings

In experiment 1, reaction times (RTs) to tactile stimuli delivered to the participants'' hand slowed down following the establishment of the RHI. In experiment 2, the misalignment of visual and proprioceptive inputs was obtained via prismatic displacement, a situation in which ownership of the seen hand was doubtless. This condition slowed down the participants'' tactile RTs. Thus, similar effects on touch perception emerged following RHI and prismatic displacement. Both manipulations also induced a proprioceptive drift, toward the fake hand in the first experiment and toward the visual position of the participants'' hand in the second experiment.

Conclusions/Significance

These findings reveal that somatosensory alterations in the experimental hand resulting from the RHI result from cross-modal mismatch between the seen and felt position of the hand. As such, they are not necessarily a signature of disownership.     

The Sense of the Body in Individuals with Spinal Cord Injury

Increasing evidence suggests that the basic foundations of the self lie in the brain systems that represent the body. Specific sensorimotor stimulation has been shown to alter the bodily self. However, little is known about how disconnection of the brain from the body affects the phenomenological sense of the body and the self. Spinal cord injury (SCI) patients who exhibit massively reduced somatomotor processes below the lesion in the absence of brain damage are suitable for testing the influence of body signals on two important components of the self–the sense of disembodiment and body ownership. We recruited 30 SCI patients and 16 healthy participants, and evaluated the following parameters: (i) depersonalization symptoms, using the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS), and (ii) measures of body ownership, as quantified by the rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm. We found higher CDS scores in SCI patients, which show increased detachment from their body and internal bodily sensations and decreasing global body ownership with higher lesion level. The RHI paradigm reveals no alterations in the illusory ownership of the hand between SCI patients and controls. Yet, there was no typical proprioceptive drift in SCI patients with intact tactile sensation on the hand, which might be related to cortical reorganization in these patients. These results suggest that disconnection of somatomotor inputs to the brain due to spinal cord lesions resulted in a disturbed sense of an embodied self. Furthermore, plasticity-related cortical changes might influence the dynamics of the bodily self.     

The sense of agency is action–effect causality perception based on cross-modal grouping

Sense of agency, the experience of controlling external events through one''s actions, stems from contiguity between action- and effect-related signals. Here we show that human observers link their action- and effect-related signals using a computational principle common to cross-modal sensory grouping. We first report that the detection of a delay between tactile and visual stimuli is enhanced when both stimuli are synchronized with separate auditory stimuli (experiment 1). This occurs because the synchronized auditory stimuli hinder the potential grouping between tactile and visual stimuli. We subsequently demonstrate an analogous effect on observers'' key press as an action and a sensory event. This change is associated with a modulation in sense of agency; namely, sense of agency, as evaluated by apparent compressions of action–effect intervals (intentional binding) or subjective causality ratings, is impaired when both participant''s action and its putative visual effect events are synchronized with auditory tones (experiments 2 and 3). Moreover, a similar role of action–effect grouping in determining sense of agency is demonstrated when the additional signal is presented in the modality identical to an effect event (experiment 4). These results are consistent with the view that sense of agency is the result of general processes of causal perception and that cross-modal grouping plays a central role in these processes.     

Perceived Loudness of Self-Generated Sounds Is Differentially Modified by Expected Sound Intensity

Performing actions with sensory consequences modifies physiological and behavioral responses relative to otherwise identical sensory input perceived in a passive manner. It is assumed that such modifications occur through an efference copy sent from motor cortex to sensory regions during performance of voluntary actions. In the auditory domain most behavioral studies report attenuated perceived loudness of self-generated auditory action-consequences. However, several recent behavioral and physiological studies report enhanced responses to such consequences. Here we manipulated the intensity of self-generated and externally-generated sounds and examined the type of perceptual modification (enhancement vs. attenuation) reported by healthy human subjects. We found that when the intensity of self-generated sounds was low, perceived loudness is enhanced. Conversely, when the intensity of self-generated sounds was high, perceived loudness is attenuated. These results might reconcile some of the apparent discrepancies in the reported literature and suggest that efference copies can adapt perception according to the differential sensory context of voluntary actions.     

Decreased Peripheral and Central Responses to Acupuncture Stimulation following Modification of Body Ownership

Acupuncture stimulation increases local blood flow around the site of stimulation and induces signal changes in brain regions related to the body matrix. The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm that manipulates important aspects of bodily self-awareness. The present study aimed to investigate how modifications of body ownership using the RHI affect local blood flow and cerebral responses during acupuncture needle stimulation. During the RHI, acupuncture needle stimulation was applied to the real left hand while measuring blood microcirculation with a LASER Doppler imager (Experiment 1, N = 28) and concurrent brain signal changes using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Experiment 2, N = 17). When the body ownership of participants was altered by the RHI, acupuncture stimulation resulted in a significantly lower increase in local blood flow (Experiment 1), and significantly less brain activation was detected in the right insula (Experiment 2). This study found changes in both local blood flow and brain responses during acupuncture needle stimulation following modification of body ownership. These findings suggest that physiological responses during acupuncture stimulation can be influenced by the modification of body ownership.     

Sensory Attenuation Assessed by Sensory Evoked Potentials in Functional Movement Disorders

Background

Functional (psychogenic) movement disorders (FMD) have features associated with voluntary movement (e.g. distractibility) but patients report movements to be out of their control. One explanation for this phenomenon is that sense of agency for movement is impaired. The phenomenon of reduction in the intensity of sensory experience when movement is self-generated and a reduction in sensory evoked potentials (SEPs) amplitude at the onset of self-paced movement (sensory attenuation) have been linked to sense of agency for movement.

Methods

We compared amplitude of SEPs from median nerve stimulation at rest and at the onset of a self-paced movement of the thumb in 17 patients with FMD and 17 healthy controls.

Results

Patients showed lack of attenuation of SEPs at the onset of movement compared to reduction in amplitude of SEPs in controls. FMD patients had significantly different ratios of movement onset to rest SEPs than did healthy controls at each electrode: 0.79 in healthy controls and 1.35 in patients at F3 (t = -4.22, p<0.001), 0.78 in healthy controls and 1.12 at patients C3 (t = -3.15, p = 0.004) and 0.77 in healthy controls and 1.05 at patients P3 (t = -2.88, p = 0.007).

Conclusions

Patients with FMD have reduced sensory attenuation as measured by SEPs at onset of self-paced movement. This finding can be plausibly linked to impairment of sense of agency for movement in these patients.     

Automation technology and sense of control: a window on human agency

Previous studies have shown that the perceived times of voluntary actions and their effects are perceived as shifted towards each other, so that the interval between action and outcome seems shortened. This has been referred to as 'intentional binding' (IB). However, the generality of this effect remains unclear. Here we demonstrate that Intentional Binding also occurs in complex control situations. Using an aircraft supervision task with different autopilot settings, our results first indicated a strong relation between measures of IB and different levels of system automation. Second, measures of IB were related to explicit agency judgement in this applied setting. We discuss the implications for the underlying mechanisms, and for sense of agency in automated environments.     

The neural basis of hallucinations and delusions

Schizophrenia is a biologically based disorder characterised by false perceptions (hallucinations) and false beliefs (delusions). The underlying physiological cause of these mental abnormalities remains unknown. There is increasing evidence that one class of symptom, the 'made experiences' including delusions of alien control and thought insertion, is associated with abnormalities in the mechanism that predicts the outcome of intended actions (the forward model). For these patients active movements feel like passive movements. As a result these patients do not feel in control of their actions. However, comparison with various neurological disorders, such as those associated with parietal lobe lesions, suggest that this abnormal experience is not sufficient to explain the feeling that some other agent is controlling is one's actions. Preliminary evidence suggests that patients with schizophrenia have an exaggerated sense of agency. In combination with the feeling of not being in control, this exaggerated sense of agency could explain delusions of alien control in which the patient attributes his own actions to another agent. Little is yet know about the neural basis of the predictive mechanisms that create the feeling that we are in control of our movements. Such prediction requires integration of information about intended movements generated in frontal cortex with sensory processing in posterior regions of the brain. Measures of functional connectivity suggest that long-range interactions between frontal and posterior regions are abnormally reduced in patients with schizophrenia. Further research is needed to explore the precise involvement of long-range connections in the mechanisms of forward modelling.     

The Human Touch: Skin Temperature during the Rubber Hand Illusion in Manual and Automated Stroking Procedures

A difference in skin temperature between the hands has been identified as a physiological correlate of the rubber hand illusion (RHI). The RHI is an illusion of body ownership, where participants perceive body ownership over a rubber hand if they see it being stroked in synchrony with their own occluded hand. The current study set out to replicate this result, i.e., psychologically induced cooling of the stimulated hand using an automated stroking paradigm, where stimulation was delivered by a robot arm (PHANToM^TM force-feedback device). After we found no evidence for hand cooling in two experiments using this automated procedure, we reverted to a manual stroking paradigm, which is closer to the one employed in the study that first produced this effect. With this procedure, we observed a relative cooling of the stimulated hand in both the experimental and the control condition. The subjective experience of ownership, as rated by the participants, by contrast, was strictly linked to synchronous stroking in all three experiments. This implies that hand-cooling is not a strict correlate of the subjective feeling of hand ownership in the RHI. Factors associated with the differences between the two designs (differences in pressure of tactile stimulation, presence of another person) that were thus far considered irrelevant to the RHI appear to play a role in bringing about this temperature effect.     

Steady state kinetics and binding of eukaryotic cytochromes c with yeast cytochrome c peroxidase.

1. The steady state kinetics for the oxidation of ferrocytochrome c by yeast cytochrome c peroxidase are biphasic under most conditions. The same biphasic kinetics were observed for yeast iso-1, yeast iso-2, horse, tuna, and cicada cytochromes c. On changing ionic strength, buffer anions, and pH, the apparent Km values for the initial phase (Km1) varied relatively little while the corresponding apparent maximal velocities varied over a much larger range. 2. The highest apparent Vmax1 for horse cytochrome c is attained at relatively low pH (congruent to 6.0) and low ionic strength (congruent to 0.05), while maximal activity for the yeast protein is at higher pH (congruent to 7.0) and higher ionic strength (congruent to 0.2), with some variations depending on the nature of the buffering ions. 3. Direct binding studies showed that cytochrome c binds to two sites on the peroxidase, under conditions that give biphasic kinetics. Under those ionic conditions that yield monophasic kinetics, binding occurred at only one site. At the optimal buffer concentrations for both yeast and horse cytochromes c, the KD1 and KD2 values approximate the Km1 and Km2 values. At ionic strengths below optimal, binding becomes too strong and above optimal, too weak. 4. Under ionic conditions that are optimal and give monophasic kinetics with horse cytochrome c but are suboptimal for the yeast protein, yeast cytochrome c strongly inhibits the reaction of horse cytochrome c with peroxidase, uncompetitively at one site and competitively at a second site. The appearance of the second site under monophasic conditions is interpreted as an allosteric effect of the inhibitor binding to the first site. 5. The simplest model accounting for these observations postulates two kinetically active sites on each molecule of peroxidase, a high affinity and a low affinity site, that may correspond to the free radical and the heme iron (IV) of the oxidized enzyme, respectively. Both oxidizing equivalents may be discharged at either site. Furthermore, the enzyme appears to exist as an equilibrium mixture of a high ionic strength form, EH and a low ionic strength form, EL, the former reacting optimally with yeast cytochrome c, and the latter with horse cytochrome c.     

Re-Examining the Agentic Shift: The Sense of Agency Influences the Effectiveness of (Self)Persuasion

In the present study we investigated whether differences in the sense of agency influenced the effectiveness of both direct persuasion and self-persuasion techniques. By manipulating both the delay and contingency of the outcomes of actions, participants were led to experience either a low or high sense of agency. Participants were subsequently presented with arguments as to why a clean local environment is important (direct persuasion), or were asked to generate those arguments themselves (self-persuasion). Subsequently, participants’ cleanliness attitudes and willingness to participate in a campus cleanup were measured. The results show that techniques of direct persuasion influenced attitudes and volunteering behavior under conditions of low rather than high agency, whereas techniques of self-persuasion were most effective under conditions of high rather than low agency. The present findings therefore show how recent experiences of agency, a state based experience of control, can influence the effectiveness of both external and internal persuasion techniques.     

The Crossmodal Congruency Task as a Means to Obtain an Objective Behavioral Measure in the Rubber Hand Illusion Paradigm

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a popular experimental paradigm. Participants view touch on an artificial rubber hand while the participants'' own hidden hand is touched. If the viewed and felt touches are given at the same time then this is sufficient to induce the compelling experience that the rubber hand is one''s own hand. The RHI can be used to investigate exactly how the brain constructs distinct body representations for one''s own body. Such representations are crucial for successful interactions with the external world. To obtain a subjective measure of the RHI, researchers typically ask participants to rate statements such as "I felt as if the rubber hand were my hand". Here we demonstrate how the crossmodal congruency task can be used to obtain an objective behavioral measure within this paradigm.The variant of the crossmodal congruency task we employ involves the presentation of tactile targets and visual distractors. Targets and distractors are spatially congruent (i.e. same finger) on some trials and incongruent (i.e. different finger) on others. The difference in performance between incongruent and congruent trials - the crossmodal congruency effect (CCE) - indexes multisensory interactions. Importantly, the CCE is modulated both by viewing a hand as well as the synchrony of viewed and felt touch which are both crucial factors for the RHI.The use of the crossmodal congruency task within the RHI paradigm has several advantages. It is a simple behavioral measure which can be repeated many times and which can be obtained during the illusion while participants view the artificial hand. Furthermore, this measure is not susceptible to observer and experimenter biases. The combination of the RHI paradigm with the crossmodal congruency task allows in particular for the investigation of multisensory processes which are critical for modulations of body representations as in the RHI.     

Intentional binding is driven by the mere presence of an action and not by motor prediction

Intentional binding refers to the fact that when a voluntary action produces a sensory outcome, action and outcome are perceived as being closer together in time. This phenomenon is often attributed, at least partially, to predictive motor mechanisms. However, previous studies failed to unequivocally attribute intentional binding to these mechanisms, since the contrasts that have been used to demonstrate intentional binding covered not only one but two processes: temporal control and motor identity prediction. In the present study we aimed to isolate the respective role of each of these processes in the emergence of intentional binding of action-effects. The results show that motor identity prediction does not modulate intentional binding of action-effects. Our findings cast doubts on the assumption that intentional binding of action effects is linked to internal forward predictive process.     

Diadenosine phosphates and S-adenosylmethionine: novel boron binding biomolecules detected by capillary electrophoresis.

There is evidence that boron has a physiological role in animals and humans, but the search for boron binding biomolecules has been difficult because useful radioactive boron isotopes do not exist. To overcome this limitation we used capillary electrophoresis to identify and quantify boron binding to biomolecules by detecting the negative charge boron imparts to ligands. The effect of molecular structure and proximal electronic charges of adenosine and molecules with adenosine moieties including S-adenosylmethionine (SAM) and diadenosine polyphosphates (Ap(n)A) were compared. The boron affinity of the test species varied with the rank order SAM congruent with Ap(6)A congruent with Ap(5)A>Ap(4)A>Ap(3)A congruent with NAD(+)>Ap(2)A>NADH congruent with 5'ATP>5'ADP>5'AMP>adenosine>3'AMP congruent with 2'AMP congruent with cAMP congruent with adenine. Test species with vicinal cis-diols bound boron; species without those moieties did not. Boron binding affinity increased when proximal cationic moieties were present. Anionic moieties remote from the cis-hydroxyl binding site also positively influenced boron binding affinity. In the Ap(n)A species, cooperative complexing of boron between the terminal ribose moieties apparently occurred. In these species boron affinity greater than expected for two monocomplexes was observed and binding affinities increased as more phosphate groups (beyond three) were present separating the terminal moieties. Our results indicate that Ap(6)A, Ap(5)A, Ap(4)A, Ap(3)A, and SAM have higher affinities for boron than any other currently recognized boron ligand present in animal tissues including NAD(+).