Oxytocin and cooperation under conditions of uncertainty: The modulating role of incentives and social information

The neuropeptide Oxytocin (OT) has been implicated in many aspects of mammalian social behavior. This study investigates how OT interacts with two well-studied determinants of cooperative behavior: incentives and social information. Participants received OT or a placebo and played two economic games: a Coordination Game (with strong incentives to cooperate) and a Prisoner's Dilemma (with weak cooperative incentives). OT enhanced cooperation only when social information was present, and this effect was significantly more pronounced in the Coordination Game. When social information was lacking, OT surprisingly decreased cooperation. Consistent with the well-established role of OT in trust-building and in social cognition, social information appears to be crucial for OT to boost cooperative expectations in an interdependent social interaction that provides incentives to cooperate. When these cues are absent, OT appears to instead elicit a risk-averse strategy.     

Public goods games with reward in finite populations

Public goods games paraphrase the problem of cooperation in game theoretical terms. Cooperators contribute to a public good and thereby increase the welfare of others at a cost to themselves. Defectors consume the public good but do not pay its cost and therefore outperform cooperators. Hence, according to genetic or cultural evolution, defectors should be favored and the public good disappear – despite the fact that groups of cooperators are better off than groups of defectors. The maximization of short term individual profits causes the demise of the common resource to the detriment of all. This outcome can be averted by introducing incentives to cooperate. Negative incentives based on the punishment of defectors efficiently stabilize cooperation once established but cannot initiate cooperation. Here we consider the complementary case of positive incentives created by allowing individuals to reward those that contribute to the public good. The finite-population stochastic dynamics of the public goods game with reward demonstrate that reward initiates cooperation by providing an escape hatch out of states of mutual defection. However, in contrast to punishment, reward is unable to stabilize cooperation but, instead, gives rise to a persistent minority of cooperators.     

Exit,Punishment and Rewards in Commons Dilemmas: An Experimental Study

Commons dilemmas are interaction situations where a common good is provided or exploited by a group of individuals so that optimal collective outcomes clash with private interests. Although in these situations, social norms and institutions exist that might help individuals to cooperate, little is known about the interaction effects between positive and negative incentives and exit options by individuals. We performed a modified public good game experiment to examine the effect of exit, rewards and punishment, as well as the interplay between exit and rewards and punishment. We found that punishment had a stronger effect than rewards on cooperation if considered by itself, whereas rewards had a stronger effect when combined with voluntary participation. This can be explained in terms of the ‘framing effect’, i.e., as the combination of exit and rewards might induce people to attach higher expected payoffs to cooperative strategies and expect better behaviour from others.     

Bacteriocins, spite and virulence

There has been much interest in using social evolution theory to predict the damage to a host from parasite infection, termed parasite virulence. Most of this work has focused on how high kinship between the parasites infecting a host can select for more prudent exploitation of the host, leading to a negative relationship between virulence and parasite kinship. However, it has also been shown that if parasites can cooperate to overcome the host, then high parasite kinship within hosts can select for greater cooperation and higher growth rates, hence leading to a positive relationship between virulence and parasite kinship. We examine the impact of a spiteful behaviour, chemical (bacteriocin) warfare between microbes, on the evolution of virulence, and find a new relationship: virulence is maximized when the frequency of kin among parasites' social partners is low or high, and is minimized at intermediate values. This emphasizes how biological details can fundamentally alter the qualitative nature of theoretical predictions made by models of parasite virulence.     

The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation

Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players’ incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.     

Unintended Consequences of Incentive Provision for Behaviour Change and Maintenance around Childbirth

Financial (positive or negative) and non-financial incentives or rewards are increasingly used in attempts to influence health behaviours. While unintended consequences of incentive provision are discussed in the literature, evidence syntheses did not identify any primary research with the aim of investigating unintended consequences of incentive interventions for lifestyle behaviour change. Our objective was to investigate perceived positive and negative unintended consequences of incentive provision for a shortlist of seven promising incentive strategies for smoking cessation in pregnancy and breastfeeding. A multi-disciplinary, mixed-methods approach included involving two service-user mother and baby groups from disadvantaged areas with experience of the target behaviours as study co-investigators. Systematic reviews informed the shortlist of incentive strategies. Qualitative semi-structured interviews and a web-based survey of health professionals asked open questions on positive and negative consequences of incentives. The participants from three UK regions were a diverse sample with and without direct experience of incentive interventions: 88 pregnant women/recent mothers/partners/family members; 53 service providers; 24 experts/decision makers and interactive discussions with 63 conference attendees. Maternity and early years health professionals (n = 497) including doctors, midwives, health visitors, public health and related staff participated in the survey. Qualitative analysis identified ethical, political, cultural, social and psychological implications of incentive delivery at population and individual levels. Four key themes emerged: how incentives can address or create inequalities; enhance or diminish intrinsic motivation and wellbeing; have a positive or negative effect on relationships with others within personal networks or health providers; and can impact on health systems and resources by raising awareness and directing service delivery, but may be detrimental to other health care areas. Financial incentives are controversial and generated emotive and oppositional responses. The planning, design and delivery of future incentive interventions should evaluate unexpected consequences to inform the evidence for effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and future implementation.     

Dissociable influences of reward and punishment on adaptive cognitive control

To invest effort into any cognitive task, people must be sufficiently motivated. Whereas prior research has focused primarily on how the cognitive control required to complete these tasks is motivated by the potential rewards for success, it is also known that control investment can be equally motivated by the potential negative consequence for failure. Previous theoretical and experimental work has yet to examine how positive and negative incentives differentially influence the manner and intensity with which people allocate control. Here, we develop and test a normative model of control allocation under conditions of varying positive and negative performance incentives. Our model predicts, and our empirical findings confirm, that rewards for success and punishment for failure should differentially influence adjustments to the evidence accumulation rate versus response threshold, respectively. This dissociation further enabled us to infer how motivated a given person was by the consequences of success versus failure.     

RNA editing by the host ADAR system affects the molecular evolution of the Zika virus

Zika virus (ZIKV) is a mosquito‐transmitted flavivirus, linked to microcephaly and fetal death in humans. Here, we investigate whether host‐mediated RNA editing of adenosines (ADAR) plays a role in the molecular evolution of ZIKV. Using complete coding sequences for the ZIKV polyprotein, we show that potential ADAR substitutions are underrepresented at the ADAR‐resistant GA dinucleotides of both the positive and negative strands, that these changes are spatially and temporally clustered (as expected of ADAR editing) for three branches of the viral phylogeny, and that ADAR mutagenesis can be linked to its codon usage. Furthermore, resistant GA dinucleotides are enriched on the positive (but not negative) strand, indicating that the former is under stronger purifying selection than the latter. ADAR editing also affects the evolution of the rhabdovirus sigma. Our study now documents that host ADAR editing is a mutation and evolutionary force of positive‐ as well as negative‐strand RNA viruses.     

On the advantages of information sharing

During the evolution of life, there have been several transitions in which individuals began to cooperate, forming higher levels of organization, and sometimes losing their independent reproductive identity For example, multicellularity and insect societies evolved independently multiple times. Several factors that confer evolutionary advantages on higher levels of organization have been proposed. In this paper we highlight one additional factor: the sharing of information between individuals. Information sharing is not subject to the intrinsic conservation laws that characterize the sharing of physical resources. A simple model will illustrate how information sharing can result in aggregates in which the individuals both receive more information about their environment and pay less for it. This may have played a role in the evolution of higher levels of organization.     

A role for the alpha-chain connecting peptide motif in mediating TCR-CD8 cooperation

To generate peripheral T cells that are both self-MHC restricted and self-MHC tolerant, thymocytes are subjected to positive and negative selection. How the TCR discriminates between positive and negative selection ligands is not well understood, although there is substantial evidence that the CD4 and CD8 coreceptors play an important role in this cell fate decision. We have previously identified an evolutionarily conserved motif in the TCR, the alpha-chain connecting peptide motif (alpha-CPM), which allows the TCR to deliver positive selection signals. Thymocytes expressing alpha-CPM-deficient receptors do not undergo positive selection, whereas their negative selection is not impaired. In this work we studied the ligand binding and receptor function of alpha-CPM-deficient TCRs by generating T cell hybridomas expressing wild-type or alpha-CPM-deficient forms of the T1 TCR. This K(d)-restricted TCR is specific for a photoreactive derivative of the Plasmodium berghei circumsporozoite peptide(252-260) IASA-YIPSAEK(ABA)I and is therefore amenable to TCR photoaffinity labeling. The experiments presented in this work show that alpha-CPM-deficient TCRs fail to cooperate with CD8 to enhance ligand binding and functional responses.     

Joyful by nature: approaches to investigate the evolution and function of joy in non-human animals

The nature and evolution of positive emotion is a major question remaining unanswered in science and philosophy. The study of feelings and emotions in humans and animals is dominated by discussion of affective states that have negative valence. Given the clinical and social significance of negative affect, such as depression, it is unsurprising that these emotions have received more attention from scientists. Compared to negative emotions, such as fear that leads to fleeing or avoidance, positive emotions are less likely to result in specific, identifiable, behaviours being expressed by an animal. This makes it particularly challenging to quantify and study positive affect. However, bursts of intense positive emotion (joy) are more likely to be accompanied by externally visible markers, like vocalisations or movement patterns, which make it more amenable to scientific study and more resilient to concerns about anthropomorphism. We define joy as intense, brief, and event-driven (i.e. a response to something), which permits investigation into how animals react to a variety of situations that would provoke joy in humans. This means that behavioural correlates of joy are measurable, either through newly discovered ‘laughter’ vocalisations, increases in play behaviour, or reactions to cognitive bias tests that can be used across species. There are a range of potential situations that cause joy in humans that have not been studied in other animals, such as whether animals feel joy on sunny days, when they accomplish a difficult feat, or when they are reunited with a familiar companion after a prolonged absence. Observations of species-specific calls and play behaviour can be combined with biometric markers and reactions to ambiguous stimuli in order to enable comparisons of affect between phylogenetically distant taxonomic groups. Identifying positive affect is also important for animal welfare because knowledge of positive emotional states would allow us to monitor animal well-being better. Additionally, measuring if phylogenetically and ecologically distant animals play more, laugh more, or act more optimistically after certain kinds of experiences will also provide insight into the mechanisms underlying the evolution of joy and other positive emotions, and potentially even into the evolution of consciousness.     

Maternal effect genes and the evolution of sociality in haplo-diploid organisms

Maternal care and female-biased sex ratios are considered by many to be essential prerequisites for the evolution of eusocial behaviors among the hymenoptera. Using population genetic models, I investigate the evolution of genes that have positive maternal effects but negative, direct effects on offspring fitness. I find that, under many conditions, such genes evolve more easily in haplo-diploids than in diplo-diploids. In fact, the conditions are less restrictive than those of kin selection theory, which postulate genes with negative direct effects but positive sib-social effects. For example, the conditions permitting the evolution of maternal effect genes are not affected if females mate multiply, whereas multiple mating reduces the efficacy of kin selection by reducing genetic relatedness within colonies. Inbreeding also differentially facilitates evolution of maternal effect genes in haplo-diploids relative to diplo-diploids, although it does not differentially affect the evolution of sib-altruism genes. Furthermore, when the direct, deleterious pleiotropic effect is restricted to sons, a maternal effect gene can evolve when the beneficial maternal effect is less than half (with inbreeding, much less) of the deleterious effect on sons. For kin selection, however, the sib-social benefits must always exceed the direct costs because genetic relatedness is always less than or equal to 1.0. The results suggest that haplo-diploidy facilitates (1) the evolution of maternal care, and (2) the evolution of maternal effect genes with antagonistic pleiotropic effects on sons. The latter effect may help explain the tendency toward female-biased sex ratios in haplo-diploids, especially those with inbreeding. I conclude that haplo-diploidy not only facilitates the evolution of sister-sister altruism by kin selection but also facilitates the evolution of maternal care and female-biased sex ratios, two prerequisites for eusociality.     

Health newscasts for increasing influenza vaccination coverage: an inductive reasoning game approach

Both pandemic and seasonal influenza are receiving more attention from mass media than ever before. Topics such as epidemic severity and vaccination are changing the way in which we perceive the utility of disease prevention. Voluntary influenza vaccination has been recently modeled using inductive reasoning games. It has thus been found that severe epidemics may occur because individuals do not vaccinate and, instead, attempt to benefit from the immunity of their peers. Such epidemics could be prevented by voluntary vaccination if incentives were offered. However, a key assumption has been that individuals make vaccination decisions based on whether there was an epidemic each influenza season; no other epidemiological information is available to them. In this work, we relax this assumption and investigate the consequences of making more informed vaccination decisions while no incentives are offered. We obtain three major results. First, individuals will not cooperate enough to constantly prevent influenza epidemics through voluntary vaccination no matter how much they learned about influenza epidemiology. Second, broadcasting epidemiological information richer than whether an epidemic occurred may stabilize the vaccination coverage and suppress severe influenza epidemics. Third, the stable vaccination coverage follows the trend of the perceived benefit of vaccination. However, increasing the amount of epidemiological information released to the public may either increase or decrease the perceived benefit of vaccination. We discuss three scenarios where individuals know, in addition to whether there was an epidemic, (i) the incidence, (ii) the vaccination coverage and (iii) both the incidence and the vaccination coverage, every influenza season. We show that broadcasting both the incidence and the vaccination coverage could yield either better or worse vaccination coverage than broadcasting each piece of information on its own.     

Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective

Common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas distinguish themselves from general public good problems by encompassing both social and physical features. This paper examines how a physical mechanism, namely asymmetric payoff; and a social mechanism, reciprocity; simultaneously affect collective cooperation in theoretical water sharing interactions. We present an iterative N-person game theoretic model to investigate the joint effects of these two mechanisms in a linear fully connected river system under three information assumptions. From a simple evolutionary perspective, this paper quantitatively addresses the conditions for Nash Equilibrium in which collective cooperation might be established. The results suggest that direct reciprocity increases every actor’s motivation to contribute to the collective good of the river system. Meanwhile, various upstream and downstream actors manifest individual disparities as a result of the direct reciprocity and asymmetric payoff mechanisms. More specifically, the downstream actors are less willing to cooperate unless there is a high probability that long-term interactions are ensured; however, a greater level of asymmetries is likely to increase upstream actors’ incentives to cooperate even though the interactions could quickly end. The upstream actors also display weak sensitivity to an increase in the total number of actors, which generally results in a reduction in the other actors’ motivation for cooperation. It is also shown that the indirect reciprocity mechanism relaxes the overall conditions for cooperative Nash Equilibrium.     

Does civil environmental protection force the growth of China's industrial green productivity? Evidence from the perspective of rent-seeking

Based on the decision analysis of heterogeneous enterprise between green technology innovation and rent-seeking, this paper formulates the Hybrid-Luenberger index considering undesirable outputs and studies difference in the response of regional industrial green productivity to civil environmental protection. Empirical study on China's regional industrial data from 1997 to 2011 shows that: (1) Compared with the intensity of environmental pollution and other passive environmental protection incentives, the public are more sensitive to per capita income level, education quality, health concern and other rational environmental protection incentives. (2) The increase in the civil environmental protection effect promotes the industrial green technology innovation, while the rent-seeking activities have a significant negative effect on green productivity. (3) The civil environmental protection of the eastern coastal area has more significant effect on the industrial green productivity compared with that of the central and western inland area. (4) As the quantile of the industrial green productivity increases from the low point to high level, the positive effects of the civil environmental protection on the industrial green productivity turn to be more significant, and the rational environmental protection have positive and negative effects on high and low quantile of the industrial green productivity, respectively, which proves that the “Potter Hypothesis” can only be established on the condition that producers are approaching to the technology frontier.     

ASSORTMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF GENERALIZED RECIPROCITY

Reciprocity is often invoked to explain cooperation. Reciprocity is cognitively demanding, and both direct and indirect reciprocity require that individuals store information about the propensity of their partners to cooperate. By contrast, generalized reciprocity, wherein individuals help on the condition that they received help previously, only relies on whether an individual received help in a previous encounter. Such anonymous information makes generalized reciprocity hard to evolve in a well‐mixed population, as the strategy will lose out to pure defectors. Here we analyze a model for the evolution of generalized reciprocity, incorporating assortment of encounters, to investigate the conditions under which it will evolve. We show that, in a well‐mixed population, generalized reciprocity cannot evolve. However, incorporating assortment of encounters can favor the evolution of generalized reciprocity in which indiscriminate cooperation and defection are both unstable. We show that generalized reciprocity can evolve under both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.     

Kin recognition: evidence that humans can perceive both positive and negative relatedness

The evolution of spite entails actors imposing costs on 'negative' relatives: those who are less likely than chance to share the actor's alleles and therefore more likely to bear rival alleles. Yet, despite a considerable body of research confirming that organisms can recognize positive relatives, little research has shown that organisms can recognize negative relatives. Here, we extend previous work on human phenotype matching by introducing a cue to negative relatedness: negative self-resembling faces, which differ from an average face in the opposite direction to the way an individual's own face differs from the average. Participants made trustworthiness and attractiveness judgements of pairs of opposite-sex positive and negative self-resembling faces. Analyses revealed opposing effects of positive and negative self-resembling faces on trustworthiness and attractiveness judgements. This is the first clear evidence that humans are sensitive to negative relatedness cues, and suggests the potential for the adaptive allocation of spiteful behaviour.     

基于生物适应进化原理论证生物进化的动力

文章从现有主流生物进化理论存在的问题入手, 以生物适应进化原理为认识基础, 讨论生物进化的动力, 以求对生物进化机制有一个新的认识。在薛定谔“生命赖负熵生存”观点的指导下, 提出了“负熵流”包括能量流、物质流和信息流, 以及负熵流是生命生存和发育的动力的观点。作者在原有生物适应进化原理基础上, 修改完善并提出了“DNA、RNA和蛋白质在环境作用下的生物适应进化调控系统”理论, 并根据系统发育是个体发育的“积分”的观点, 推论得出生物与环境的负熵差引起的负熵流也是生命进化的动力, 对生物进化机制作出了新的理解。基于这样的生物进化机制的认识, 提出了“进化是一个子系统在其上一等级系统中, 将自身全部或部分信息遗传给下一代子系统, 并在其适应上一等级系统过程中, 产生一些新质, 终止一些旧质, 从而在其上一等级系统中得以延续的变化过程”的概念, 并探讨了一些与进化有关的其他争议问题。     

When in Rome,do as the Romans do: the coevolution of altruistic punishment,conformist learning,and cooperation

We model the coevolution of behavioral strategies and social learning rules in the context of a cooperative dilemma, a situation in which individuals must decide whether or not to subordinate their own interests to those of the group. There are two learning rules in our model, conformism and payoff-dependent imitation, which evolve by natural selection, and three behavioral strategies, cooperate, defect, and cooperate, plus punish defectors, which evolve under the influence of the prevailing learning rules. Group and individual level selective pressures drive evolution.We also simulate our model for conditions that approximate those in which early hominids lived. We find that conformism can evolve when the only problem that individuals face is a cooperative dilemma, in which prosocial behavior is always costly to the individual. Furthermore, the presence of conformists dramatically increases the group size for which cooperation can be sustained. The results of our model are robust: they hold even when migration rates are high, and when conflict among groups is infrequent.