Beyond the Sterility of a Distinct African Bioethics: Addressing the Conceptual Bioethics Lag in Africa

In the current debate on the future of bioethics in Africa, several authors have argued for a distinct communitarian African bioethics that can counter the dominancy of Western atomistic principlism in contemporary bioethics. In this article I examine this rather contentious argument and evaluate its validity and viability. Firstly, I trace the contextual origins of contemporary bioethics and highlight the rise and dominance of principlism. I particularly note that principlism was premised on a content‐thin notion of the common morality that is in need of enrichment. I also contend that bioethics is essentially two‐dimensional, being both conceptual and empirical, and indicate the lag in Africa with regard to conceptual bioethics. I then appeal for authentic engagement by 1) African health care professionals, 2) African health care training institutions, 3) Africa's bioethics development partners, and 4) African bioethicists and philosophers, towards addressing this critical lag. I underline the need to maintain the essential universality of bioethics as a discipline. I particularly argue against the pursuit of a distinct African bioethics, as it appears to be rooted in sterile African ethno‐philosophy. Rather, African bioethicists and philosophers would do well to elucidate the universalisability of insights from traditional African thought, for the benefit of bioethics as a whole. Thus we must engage beyond the sterility of a distinct African bioethics ‐ authentically reflecting on the essentially universal contemporary bioethical concerns ‐ to effectively articulate a viable trajectory for bioethics in Africa.     

Lessons from Queer Bioethics: A Response to Timothy F. Murphy

‘Bioethics still has important work to do in helping to secure status equality for LGBT people’ writes Timothy F. Murphy in a recent Bioethics editorial. The focus of his piece, however, is much narrower than human rights, medical care for LGBT people, or ending the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Rather, he is primarily concerned with sexuality and gender identity, and the medical intersections thereof (i.e. DSM diagnosis; access to SrS or ARTs). It is the objective of this response to provide an alternate account of bioethics from a Queer perspective. I will situate Queer bioethics within Queer studies, and offer three ‘lessons’ that bioethics can derive from this perspective. These are not definitive rules for Queer bioethics, since it is a field which fundamentally opposes categorizations, favoring pastiche over principles. These lessons are exploratory examples, which both complement and contradict LGBT bioethics. My latter two lessons – on environmental bioethics and disability – overlap with some of Murphy's concerns, as well as other conceptions of LGBT bioethics. However, the first lesson takes an antithetical stance to Murphy's primary focus by resisting all forms of heteroconformity and disavowing reproduction as consonant with Queer objectives and theory. The first lesson, which doubles as a primer in Queer theory, does heavy philosophical lifting for the remainder of the essay. This response to Timothy F. Murphy, whose work is certainly a legacy in bioethics, reveals the multiplicity of discourses in LGBT/Queer studies, many of which are advantageous – even essential – to other disciplines like bioethics.     

A method of Reflexive Balancing in a Pragmatic,Interdisciplinary and Reflexive Bioethics

In recent years there has been a wealth of literature arguing the need for empirical and interdisciplinary approaches to bioethics, based on the premise that an empirically informed ethical analysis is more grounded, contextually sensitive and therefore more relevant to clinical practice than an ‘abstract’ philosophical analysis. Bioethics has (arguably) always been an interdisciplinary field, and the rise of ‘empirical’ (bio)ethics need not be seen as an attempt to give a new name to the longstanding practice of interdisciplinary collaboration, but can perhaps best be understood as a substantive attempt to engage with the nature of that interdisciplinarity and to articulate the relationship between the many different disciplines (some of them empirical) that contribute to the field. It can also be described as an endeavour to explain how different disciplinary approaches can be integrated to effectively answer normative questions in bioethics, and fundamental to that endeavour is the need to think about how a robust methodology can be articulated that successfully marries apparently divergent epistemological and metaethical perspectives with method. This paper proposes ‘Reflexive Bioethics’ (RB) as a methodology for interdisciplinary and empirical bioethics, which utilizes a method of ‘Reflexive Balancing’ (RBL). RBL has been developed in response to criticisms of various forms of reflective equilibrium, and is built upon a pragmatic characterization of Bioethics and a ‘quasi‐moral foundationalism’, which allows RBL to avoid some of the difficulties associated with RE and yet retain the flexible egalitarianism that makes it intuitively appealing to many.     

A critique of the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’, grounded in African thought

I give an account how the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’ dominates the field of bioethics, and how it came to triumph over its competitors, ‘respect for persons’ and ‘respect for free power of choice’. I argue that ‘respect for autonomy’ is unsatisfactory as a basic principle of bioethics because it is grounded in too individualistic a worldview, citing concerns of African theorists and other communitarians who claim that the principle fails to acknowledge the fundamental importance of understanding persons within the nexus of their communal relationships. I defend the claim that ‘respect for persons’ is a more appropriate principle, as it is able to acknowledge both individual decision making and the essential relationality of persons. I acknowledge that my preference for ‘respect for persons’ is problematic because of the important debate around the definition of ‘personhood’ in bioethics discourse. Relying on Thaddeus Metz's conception of moral status, I propose a relational definition of personhood that distinguishes between persons with agency and persons without agency, arguing that we have different moral obligations to these distinct categories of persons. I claim that this conception of personhood is better able to accommodate our moral intuitions than conventional approaches, and that it is able to do so without being speciesist or question‐begging.     

GENDER AND ETHICS COMMITTEES: WHERE’S THE ‘DIFFERENT VOICE’?

Prominent international and national ethics commissions such as the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee rarely achieve anything remotely resembling gender equality, although local research and clinical ethics committees are somewhat more egalitarian. Under‐representation of women is particularly troubling when the subject matter of modern bioethics so disproportionately concerns women’s bodies, and when such committees claim to derive ‘universal’ standards. Are women missing from many ethics committees because of relatively straightforward, if discriminatory, demographic factors? Or are the methods of analysis and styles of ethics to which these bodies are committed somehow ‘anti‐female’? It has been argued, for example, that there is a ‘different voice’ in ethical reasoning, not confined to women but more representative of female experience. Similarly, some feminist writers, such as Evelyn Fox Keller and Donna Haraway, have asked difficult epistemological questions about the dominant ‘masculine paradigm’ in science. Perhaps the dominant paradigm in ethics committee deliberation is similarly gendered? This article provides a preliminary survey of women’s representation on ethics committees in eastern and western Europe, a critical analysis of the supposed ‘masculinism’ of the principlist approach, and a case example in which a ‘different voice’ did indeed make a difference.     

Research ethics capacity development in Africa: exploring a model for individual success

The Johns Hopkins-Fogarty African Bioethics Training Program (FABTP) has offered a fully-funded, one-year, non-degree training opportunity in research ethics to health professionals, ethics committee members, scholars, journalists and scientists from countries across sub-Saharan Africa. In the first 9 years of operation, 28 trainees from 13 African countries have trained with FABTP. Any capacity building investment requires periodic critical evaluation of the impact that training dollars produce. In this paper we describe and evaluate FABTP and the efforts of its trainees. Our data show that since 2001, the 28 former FABTP trainees have authored or co-authored 105 new bioethics-related publications; were awarded 33 bioethics-related grants; played key roles on 78 bioethics-related research studies; and participated in 198 bioethics workshops or conferences. Over the past nine years, trainees have collectively taught 48 separate courses related to bioethics and have given 170 presentations on various topics in the field. Many former trainees have pursued and completed doctoral degrees in bioethics; some have become editorial board members for bioethics journals. Female trainees were, on average, less experienced at matriculation and produced fewer post-training outputs than their male counterparts. More comprehensive studies are needed to determine the relationships between age, sex, previous experience and training program outputs.     

Social Responsibility and the State's Duty to provide Healthcare: An Islamic Ethico‐Legal Perspective

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights asserts that governments are morally obliged to promote health and to provide access to quality healthcare, essential medicines and adequate nutrition and water to all members of society. According to UNESCO, this obligation is grounded in a moral commitment to promoting fundamental human rights and emerges from the principle of social responsibility. Yet in an era of ethical pluralism and contentions over the universality of human rights conventions, the extent to which the UNESCO Declaration can motivate behaviors and policies rests, at least in part, upon accepting the moral arguments it makes. In this essay I reflect on a state's moral obligation to provide healthcare from the perspective of Islamic moral theology and law. I examine how Islamic ethico‐legal conceptual analogues for human rights and communal responsibility, ?uqūq al‐’ibād and far? al‐kifāyah and other related constructs might be used to advance a moral argument for healthcare provision by the state. Moving from theory to application, I next illustrate how notions of human rights and social responsibility were used by Muslim stakeholders to buttress moral arguments to support American healthcare reform. In this way, the paper advance discourses on a universal bioethics and common morality by bringing into view the concordances and discordances between Islamic ethico‐legal constructs and moral arguments advanced by transnational health policy advocates. It also provides insight into applied Islamic bioethics by demonstrating how Islamic ethico‐legal values might inform the discursive outputs of Muslim organizations.     

Bioethics in China

Historically, the preconditions for the emergence of bioethics in China. were political reforms and their applications. The Hanzhong Euthanasia Case and the publication of Qiu Ren-zong's academic work Bioethics played a significant role in the development of bioethics in China. Other contributory factors include the establishment of the Chinese Society of Medical Ethics/Chinese Medical Association (C.M.A), the publication of the Journal of Chinese Medical Ethics, and the teaching and education of bioethics in China. Major achievements of bioethics in China include the establishment of ethics committee and ethics review system, active international communication and cooperation among the academic circles, and the successful management of the 8th World Congress of Bioethics in Beijing in 2006. Chinese bioethics focus on native Chinese realities and conditions, absorb the international research achievements in relevant fields, and combine international ideas with traditional Chinese doctrines. Admittedly, there are still some aspects to be improved, yet bioethics has attracted a lot of attention from the core leadership in China and has gained sound financial support, which augers well for its further development. This article also briefly introduces the development of bioethics in Hong Kong and Taiwan, China.     

Biothics in Brazil

In this article the authors briefly sketch the nature of Brazilian bioethics. Bioethics emerged in Brazil later than in other Western countries and the 1990's were the most important period for the spread of the discipline in the country. It is in this period that some structural elements of bioethics were established, such as research groups, regulation of Local Research Ethics Committees (Comitês Locais de Ética em Pesquisa – CEP), the creation of the National Commission of Ethics in Research with Human Beings (Comissão Nacional de Ética em Pesquisa com Seres Humanos – CONEP) and the Brazilian Bioethics Society (Sociedade Brasileira de Bioética – SBB). With regard to theoretical work, Brazilian bioethics is clearly an importer of theories from countries central to the studies of bioethics, or, in another words, countries where bioethics first emerged and was established. The most commonly used theory among Brazilian researchers is principlism     

WHAT PUTS THE ‘YUCK’ IN THE YUCK FACTOR?

The advances in biotechnology have given rise to a discussion concerning the strong emotional reaction expressed by the public towards biotechnological innovations. This reaction has been named the ‘Yuck‐factor’ by several theorists of bioethics. Leon Kass, the former chairman of the President's council on bioethics, has appraised this public reaction as ‘an emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate it’. 1 Similar arguments have been forwarded by the Catholic Church, several Protestant denominations and the Pro‐Life movement. Several bioethicists have, however, opposed the idea of a disgust‐based morality. 2 Recent findings in cognitive science support the view that the strong negative emotions people often experience when faced with biotechnological ideas are not expressions of inner wisdom. The negative emotions may rather be the result of a cognitive violation the biotechnological innovations easily cause. Due to their evolutionary background, people have certain automatic and quick cognitive tendencies routinely used for categorizing and reasoning about nature, usually termed ‘folk biology’. Biotechnological processes like hybridisation and cloning clearly violate several of the cognitive rules people naturally apply for the explanation and categorization of their natural environment. As the cognitive tendencies routinely applied to the explanation of biological world are violated, an emotional response of fear, disgust and of something unnatural being underway is easily provoked. It is suggested in this paper that the reason behind the Yuck‐factor is not a deep inner wisdom, but a violation of natural human cognitive tendencies concerning the biological world.     

More on the genetical theory of multilevel selection

In my article The genetical theory of multilevel selection, I provided a synthesis of the theory of multilevel selection (MLS) and the theory of natural selection in class‐structured populations. I framed this synthesis within Fisher's genetical paradigm, taking a strictly genetical approach to traits and fitness. I showed that this resolves a number of long‐standing conceptual problems that have plagued the MLS literature, including the issues of ‘aggregate’ vs. ‘emergent’ group traits, ‘collective fitness₁’ vs. ‘collective fitness₂’ and ‘MLS1’ vs. ‘MLS2 ‘. In his commentary, Goodnight suggests this theoretical and conceptual synthesis is flawed in several respects. Here, I show this is incorrect, by: reiterating the theoretical and conceptual goals of my synthesis; clarifying that my genetical approach to traits is necessary for a proper analysis of the action of MLS independently of non‐Darwinian factors; emphasizing that the Price–Hamilton approach to MLS provides a consistent, useful and conceptually superior theoretical framework; and explaining the role of reproductive value in the study of natural selection in class‐structured populations. I also show that Goodnight's contextual analysis treatment of MLS in a class‐structured population is mathematically, biologically and conceptually inadequate.     

WHAT ‘EMPIRICAL TURN IN BIOETHICS’?

Uncertainty as to how we should articulate empirical data and normative reasoning seems to underlie most difficulties regarding the ‘empirical turn’ in bioethics. This article examines three different ways in which we could understand ‘empirical turn’. Using real facts in normative reasoning is trivial and would not represent a ‘turn’. Becoming an empirical discipline through a shift to the social and neurosciences would be a turn away from normative thinking, which we should not take. Conducting empirical research to inform normative reasoning is the usual meaning given to the term ‘empirical turn’. In this sense, however, the turn is incomplete. Bioethics has imported methodological tools from empirical disciplines, but too often it has not imported the standards to which researchers in these disciplines are held. Integrating empirical and normative approaches also represents true added difficulties. Addressing these issues from the standpoint of debates on the fact‐value distinction can cloud very real methodological concerns by displacing the debate to a level of abstraction where they need not be apparent. Ideally, empirical research in bioethics should meet standards for empirical and normative validity similar to those used in the source disciplines for these methods, and articulate these aspects clearly and appropriately. More modestly, criteria to ensure that none of these standards are completely left aside would improve the quality of empirical bioethics research and partly clear the air of critiques addressing its theoretical justification, when its rigour in the particularly difficult context of interdisciplinarity is what should be at stake.     

Bioethics and animal research: a personal perspective and a note on the contribution of Fritz Jahr

Reviewing fundamental aspects of bioethics and outlining the work of the Bioethics Program of the Pan American Health Organization, this paper draws attention to the work of a forgotten pioneer- Fritz Jahr- who coined the term bioethics in 1927 and anticipated many of the arguments and discussions now current in biological research involving animals.     

The reflective peephole method: Ruralism and awkwardness in the ethnography of rural China

Starting with Arthur Smith’s metaphor of the ‘peephole method’, this article explores the issues of ruralism and awkwardness which underlie much ethnographic fieldwork in rural China. In the first part, the continuing influence of ruralism—the idea that the Chinese countryside represents the ‘real’ China—is discussed. This idea is based on a radical conceptual separation of the countryside and the city, which denies modern everydayness to the countryside. If we accept that the modern everyday is now present in rural China and that ordinary people are aware of ruralism and its opposites (urbanism and modernity), we need to find research methods suitable to address the entanglement and the social uses of ruralist and modernist representations in everyday life. In the second part of the article, I argue that the ‘reflective peephole method’ could be such a method. Starting from the awkwardness I felt in my own fieldwork in south‐western Hubei Province, I argue that the dilemmas of the ‘peephole method’ might be a good starting point for reflecting on the intensified ambiguity of moral discourse and action in contemporary rural China.     

The artist Carl Abrahams and the cosmopolitan work of centring and peripheralizing the self⋆

The article looks at the work and life of Jamaican artist and ‘citizen of the world’ Carl Abrahams. Responding to Gell's argument that art should be thought of as a ‘technology of enchantment’, and to a wider approach that seeks to explain art by reference to cultural context, the article takes Abrahams's own Weltkenntnis, or world‐knowledge, as its focus. The Weltkenntnis of an artist, or indeed any person, is often at odds both with their surrounding cultural situation and the technical means they have to express themselves. It is never entirely possible to reduce a particular form of self‐expression either to the wider worldview or to a particular set of technical effects. The article explores the conceptual tensions involved in Abrahams's claims to be a cosmopolitan artist and his work of centring and peripheralizing himself in colonial and postcolonial Jamaica.     

Relational autonomy,care, and Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany

Drawing from an ethics of care, relational approaches to autonomy have recently emerged in bioethics. Unlike individual autonomy with its emphasis on patients’ rights, choice, and self‐determination which has been the hallmark of bioethics consistent with the ideology of individualism in neoliberal democracies in Western countries, relational autonomy highlights the relatedness, interdependency, and social embeddedness of patients. By examining the mediating role that male Hospital Liaison Committee members in Germany play in facilitating care that supports Jehovah's Witnesses’ refusal of blood transfusions, this article moves beyond ‘dyadic relations’ and contexts of caregiving. It also contributes to a deeper understanding of care and relational conceptualizations of Witness patients’ autonomy globally.     

The Williams' legacy: A critical reappraisal of his nine predictions about the evolution of senescence

Williams' evolutionary theory of senescence based on antagonistic pleiotropy has become a landmark in evolutionary biology, and more recently in biogerontology and evolutionary medicine. In his original article, Williams launched a set of nine “testable deductions” from his theory. Although some of these predictions have been repeatedly discussed, most have been overlooked and no systematic evaluation of the whole set of Williams' original predictions has been performed. For the sixtieth anniversary of the publication of the Williams' article, we provide an updated evaluation of all these predictions. We present the pros and cons of each prediction based on recent accumulation of both theoretical and empirical studies performed in the laboratory and in the wild. From our viewpoint, six predictions are mostly supported by our current knowledge at least under some conditions (although Williams' theory cannot thoroughly explain why for some of them). Three predictions, all involving the timing of senescence, are not supported. Our critical review of Williams' predictions highlights the importance of William's contribution and clearly demonstrates that, 60 years after its publication, his article does not show any sign of senescence.     

什么是生命伦理学？——从历史发展的视角

生命伦理学是20世纪60年代兴起于美国的一门新兴学科,旨在应对生命科学和生物技术的发展或医疗保健的演变使人类面临的种种伦理难题。生命伦理学的兴起有着特殊的社会历史背景。它在发展过程中出现的一些里程碑式的案例,对生命伦理学的发展产生了深远的影响。从其发展特征上看,生命伦理学和医学伦理学紧密联系,有着更为广泛的研究内容和独特的专业特性。生命伦理学要有效回应现代医学和生命科学的发展给人类带来的伦理难题,既要准确地界定伦理问题,又要以适当的方式将伦理学基础理论应用到具体问题当中。对生命伦理学的基本理论进行概述。