RETRACING LIBERALISM AND REMAKING NATURE: DESIGNER CHILDREN,RESEARCH EMBRYOS,AND FEATHERLESS CHICKENS

Liberal theory seeks to achieve toleration, civil peace, and mutual respect in pluralistic societies by making public policy without reference to arguments arising from within formative ideals about what gives value to human life. Does it make sense to set aside such conceptions of the good when it comes to controversies about stem cell research and the genetic engineering of people or animals? Whether it is reasonable to bracket our worldviews in such cases depends on how we answer the moral questions that the use of these biotechnologies presuppose. I argue that the moral language of liberal justice – of rights and duties, interests and opportunities, freedom and consent, equality and fairness – cannot speak to these underlying concerns about what the human embryo is, why the natural lottery matters to us, and whether ‘animal nature’ is worth preserving. I conclude that liberal theory is incapable of furnishing a coherent or desirable account to govern the way we use our emerging powers of biotechnology.     

Does human genome editing reinforce or violate human dignity?

Germline genome editing is often disapproved of at the international policy level because of its possible threats to human dignity. However, from a critical perspective the relationship between this emerging technology and human dignity is relatively understudied. We explore the main principles that are referred to when ‘human dignity' is invoked in this context; namely, the link with eugenics, the idea of a common genetic heritage, the principle of equal birth and broader equality and justice concerns. Yet the concept is also used in favour of germline genome editing as it might improve the overall well-being of future generations. We conclude that dignity concerns do not justify a complete ban on safe heritable genome editing but should inform the implementation of side constraints to ensure that the value judgements about human traits that are inherent in this practice do not result in a diminished basic respect for those people affected by them.     

HEALTH,VITAL GOALS,AND CENTRAL HUMAN CAPABILITIES

I argue for a conception of health as a person's ability to achieve or exercise a cluster of basic human activities. These basic activities are in turn specified through free‐standing ethical reasoning about what constitutes a minimal conception of a human life with equal human dignity in the modern world. I arrive at this conception of health by closely following and modifying Lennart Nordenfelt's theory of health which presents health as the ability to achieve vital goals. Despite its strengths I transform Nordenfelt's argument in order to overcome three significant drawbacks. Nordenfelt makes vital goals relative to each community or context and significantly reflective of personal preferences. By doing so, Nordenfelt's conception of health faces problems with both socially relative concepts of health and subjectively defined wellbeing. Moreover, Nordenfelt does not ever explicitly specify a set of vital goals. The theory of health advanced here replaces Nordenfelt's (seemingly) empty set of preferences and society‐relative vital goals with a human species‐wide conception of basic vital goals, or ‘central human capabilities and functionings’. These central human capabilities come out of the capabilities approach (CA) now familiar in political philosophy and economics, and particularly reflect the work of Martha Nussbaum. As a result, the health of an individual should be understood as the ability to achieve a basic cluster of beings and doings—or having the overarching capability, a meta‐capability, to achieve a set of central or vital inter‐related capabilities and functionings.     

Gender context of personalism in bioethics

Personalism is one of the philosophical perspectives which hold that the reality in person and the human person has the highest intrinsic value. This paper makes reference to Louis Janssens' eight criteria in adequate consideration of the human person but further argues that there is need to consider people as situated agents especially within gender relational perspectives. The paper identifies gender as an important social construction that shapes the consideration of the human persons within socio-spatial spheres. The main crux of the paper is that there is a gender context of personalism and this has profound implications for bioethical agendas. Gender is part of the human condition, especially when we philosophically or sociologically engage the notion of equity and equality within the social system, because social realities in the relational perspective are not impartial, impersonal and equal. Gender does not determine morality but it plays a role in morality and expectations from moral agents. Women have been categorised as a sociological group because their integrity, freedom/autonomy and dignity (which are basic concerns of bioethics) are capable of being threatened. A gender perspective provides important incentives for moral theory which searches for possible conceptual imbalances or blind spots in ethical reflections. The paper refers to Sen's faces of gender inequality and expands on the notion that natality inequality is one of the fundamental levels of gender inequality, which in turn is the primary starting agenda in bioethics. The paper avers that the recognition of the fundamental importance of gender to the organization of social reality and the development of personal identities have important practical implications for bioethics.     

生态环境保护与福祉

结合能力框架探讨了福祉的内涵,界定了生态系统服务及其功能对人类福祉的内涵,指人类在生态系统生产和利用中的自由选择和能力,而贫穷指能力和发展的受限即福祉的下降.生态系统的退化和破坏将严重威胁人类福祉(尤其是穷人的福祉),生物多样性作为生态系统的核心,生物多样性的保护将促进生态系统服务的保护,进而提高人类福祉.关注强烈依赖于生态系统服务的贫困人群的福祉,并科学有效地实施生态补偿将可能实现生态保护和人类福祉改善的双赢.     

Negative ��GHIs,�� the Right to Health Protection, and Future Generations

The argument has been made that future generations of human beings are being harmed unjustifiably by the actions individuals commit today. This paper addresses what it might mean to harm future generations, whether we might harm them, and what our duties toward future generations might be. After introducing the “Global Health Impact” (GHI) concept as a unit of measurement that evaluates the effects of human actions on the health of all organisms, an incomplete theory of human justice is proposed. Having shown that the negative GHIs of our current generation cause unfair harm to future generations, I argue that each human being must be allocated a fair threshold of negative GHIs that should not be exceeded. By emphasising the need to consider all the GHIs of human actions, the theory of human justice developed here is highly relevant to evaluate human actions that might affect future generations, for example those related to climate change.     

Bioethics and biotechnology

Biotechnology is at the intersection of science and ethics. Technological developments are shaped by an ethical vision, which in turn is shaped by available technology. Much in biotechnology can be celebrated for how it benefits humanity. But technology can have a darker side. Biotechnology can produce unanticipated consequences that cause harm or dehumanise people. The ethical implications of proposed developments must be carefully examined. The ethical assessment of new technologies, including biotechnology, requires a different approach to ethics. Changes are necessary because new technology can have a more profound impact on the world; because of limitations with a rights-based approach to ethics; because of the importance and difficulty of predicting consequences; and because biotechnology now manipulates humans themselves. The ethical questions raised by biotechnology are of a very different nature. Given the potential to profoundly change the future course of humanity, such questions require careful consideration. Rather than focussing on rights and freedoms, wisdom is needed to articulate our responsibilities towards nature and others, including future generations. The power and potential of biotechnology demands caution to ensure ethical progress.     

Medical Need,Equality, and Uncertainty

Many hold that distributing healthcare according to medical need is a requirement of equality. Most egalitarians believe, however, that people ought to be equal on the whole, by some overall measure of well‐being or life‐prospects; it would be a massive coincidence if distributing healthcare according to medical need turned out to be an effective way of promoting equality overall. I argue that distributing healthcare according to medical need is important for reducing individuals' uncertainty surrounding their future medical needs. In other words, distributing healthcare according to medical need is a natural feature of healthcare insurance; it is about indemnity, not equality.     

Confused meanings of life, genes and parents

Questions concerning the moral status of embryos, the validity of new technologies for human reproduction, ownership of one's own genes, gene patenting, privacy and discrimination have all been raised and debated. Although debate is healthy, it is only useful if all participants understand the fundamental biological principles underlying human life, human genes and human parenthood. Many people believe that science can play no role in determining when human life begins. I argue that this false assumption is based on a failure to separate different contradictory meanings of the term ‘human life’. In actuality, science has provided great insight into when and how human life and human beings come into existence. I argue as well that, contrary to our intuitive feelings, there is no physical connection between any father and his son; shared genes represent shared information and nothing more. Nevertheless, the feeling of a physical connection between parent and child is very real and instinctive, no matter how false it may be. These new understandings have profound ramifications for the way we treat issues surrounding human reproduction, including both abortion and assisted reproductive technologies.     

Justice and global care chains: Lessons from Singapore

Growing demand for direct care workers to assist care‐dependent elderly people has created an opening for migrant workers from low‐ income nations to sell their services to middle and high‐income nations. Using Singapore as a case example, we draw on capability theory to make the case that receiving nations that import direct care workers should be held to global justice standards that protect workers’ floor level human capabilities. Specifically, we (1) show that Singapore and other receiving nations fail to protect human capabilities at a threshold level required by dignity; (2) identify specific human capabilities placed at risk; and (3) recommend standards for receiving nations that support central capabilities. As populations in both developed and developing nations are rapidly aging, these concerns could not be timelier.     

The return of the Inseminator: Eutelegenesis in past and contemporary reproductive ethics

Eugenicists in the 1930s and 1940s emphasised our moral responsibilities to future generations and the importance of positively selecting traits that would benefit humanity. In 1935 Herbert Brewer recommended 'Eutelegenesis' (artificial insemination with sperm from specially selected males) so that that future generations are not only protected from hereditary disease but also become more intelligent and fraternal than us. The development of these techniques for human use and animal husbandry was the catalyst for the cross fertilization of moral ideas and the development of a critical procreative morality. While eugenicists argued for a new critical morality, religious critics argued against artificial insemination because of its potential to damage important moral institutions. The tension between critical and conservative procreative morality is a feature of the contemporary debates about reproductive technologies. This and some of the other aspects of the early and contemporary debates about artificial insemination and reproductive technologies are discussed in this article.     

Reproductive justice: Non-interference or non-domination?

The reproductive justice movement started by black women’s rights activists made its way into the academic literature as an intersectional approach to women’s reproductive autonomy. While there are many scholars who now employ the term ‘reproductive justice’ in their research, few have taken up the task of explaining what ‘justice’ entails in reproductive justice. In this paper I take up part of this work and attempt to clarify the relevant kind of freedom an adequate theory of reproductive justice would postulate. To do so, I compare two approaches to reproductive freedom: an approach based on freedom as non-interference and an approach based on freedom as non-domination. I then argue that the non-domination approach better fits the ideals of the reproductive justice movement as set forth by its founders and should be treated as one of the necessary conditions in any non-ideal account of reproductive justice. Towards the end, I single out epistemic non-domination as crucial in shaping the narrative around reproductive justice.     

Bioethanol and biodiesel: Alternative liquid fuels for future generations

The global population is expected to increase by approximately 3 billion people by 2050. With this increase in population, industry, transportation the cost of fossil fuels will grow dramatically. New technologies are needed for fuel extraction using feedstocks that do not threaten food security, cause minimal or no loss of natural habitat and soil carbon. At the same time, waste management has to be improved and environmental pollution should be minimized or eliminated. Liquid biofuels such as lignocellulosic‐based ethanol from plant biomass and algal‐based biodiesel are sustainable, alternative biofuels that could stabilize national security and provide clean energy for future generations. Ideally, the technology should also foster recycling of agricultural feedstocks and improve soil fertility and human health. This article provides updated information on the energy potential and breadth of liquid biofuel biotechnology.     

Ethics and genetics in Latin America

Genetic research in human beings poses deep ethical problems, one being the problem of distributive justice. If we suppose that genetic technologies are able to produce visible benefits for the well being of people, and that these benefits are affordable to only a favored portion of society, then the consequence is obvious. We are introducing a new source of inequality. In the first section of this paper, I attempt to justify some concern for the distributive consequences of applying genetics to human beings. This concern transcends a mere preoccupation for material equality. I argue that genetic inequality can undermine the very basis of social cooperation, at least regarding health care. The second section is more practical. My aim is to defend how, at least in some legal and cultural frameworks (such as those clearly apparent in some Latin American countries), the undesired distributive consequences of genetics are more likely to arise and more difficult to avoid.     

Forced expression of Sox2 or Nanog in human bone marrow derived mesenchymal stem cells maintains their expansion and differentiation capabilities

Mesenchymal stem cells (MSCs) derived from human bone marrow have capability to differentiate into cells of mesenchymal lineage. The cells have already been applied in various clinical situations because of their expansion and differentiation capabilities. The cells lose their capabilities after several passages, however. With the aim of conferring higher capability on human bone marrow MSCs, we introduced the Sox2 or Nanog gene into the cells. Sox2 and Nanog are not only essential for pluripotency and self-renewal of embryonic stem cells, but also expressed in somatic stem cells that have superior expansion and differentiation potentials. We found that Sox2-expressing MSCs showed consistent proliferation and osteogenic capability in culture media containing basic fibroblast growth factor (bFGF) compared to control cells. Significantly, in the presence of bFGF in culture media, most of the Sox2-expressing cells were small, whereas the control cells were elongated in shape. We also found that Nanog-expressing cells even in the absence of bFGF had much higher capabilities for expansion and osteogenesis than control cells. These results demonstrate not only an effective way to maintain proliferation and differentiation potentials of MSCs but also an important implication about the function of bFGF for self-renewal of stem cells including MSCs.     

Social Psychological Dimensions of Bioenergy Development and Public Acceptance

The best technology does no good unless people use it. Thus, the future of biofuels depends not only on development of effective and efficient technologies but also on the social, economic, and political climate within which people decide to use or avoid these new fuel sources and technologies. On a social psychological level, individual behaviors are often guided by people’s attitudes toward the behavior or objects involved and by the norms established by others within the social setting. Therefore, understanding technology adoption requires an understanding of how public attitudes and beliefs are formed or changed, as well as the implications of these changes for social norms. We provide an overview of basic social psychology research connecting attitudes and norms to individual behavior, and we describe implications of these social factors for biofuel development and use.     

LIFE-CENTERED ETHICS, AND THE HUMAN FUTURE IN SPACE

In the future, human destiny may depend on our ethics. In particular, biotechnology and expansion in space can transform life, raising profound questions. Guidance may be found in Life‐centered ethics, as biotic ethics that value the basic patterns of organic gene/protein life, and as panbiotic ethics that always seek to expand life. These life‐centered principles can be based on scientific insights into the unique place of life in nature, and the biological unity of all life. Belonging to life then implies a human purpose: to safeguard and propagate life. Expansion in space will advance this purpose but will also raise basic questions. Should we expand all life or only intelligent life? Should we aim to create populations of trillions? Should we seed other solar systems? How far can we change but still preserve the human species, and life itself? The future of all life may be in our hands, and it can depend on our guiding ethics whether life will fulfil its full potentials. Given such profound powers, life‐centered ethics can best secure future generations. Our descendants may then understand nature more deeply, and seek to extend life indefinitely. In that future, our human existence can find a cosmic purpose.