Can the academic background of medical graduates be detected during internship?

Performance ratings were obtained by the clinical supervisors of four graduated classes of McMaster University medical students during internship. The supervisors detected no difference in performance between the graduates who met the "traditional" admissions criteria (both an undergraduate grade point average of 3.1 or greater on a 4-point scale and previous training in biology, general and organic chemistry, and physics) and those who lacked one or both of these prerequisites. These data suggest that medical schools can expand their admissions criteria without fearing that their graduates will perform less well as interns because of a lack of traditional academic preparation for medical school.     

Can microbes be patented?

Native microorganisms in their original form cannot be patented. However, microbes like yeasts, bacteria, protozoa, unicellular algae, fungi, actinomycetes and viruses can be patented if they have been genetically modified. The process and the product obtained can also be patented.     

Was bioethics founded on historical and conceptual mistakes about medical paternalism?

Bioethics has a founding story in which medical paternalism, the interference with the autonomy of patients for their own clinical benefit, was an accepted ethical norm in the history of Western medical ethics and was widespread in clinical practice until bioethics changed the ethical norms and practice of medicine. In this paper I show that the founding story of bioethics misreads major texts in the history of Western medical ethics. I also show that a major source for empirical claims about the widespread practice of medical paternalism has been misread. I then show that that bioethics based on its founding story deprofessionalizes medical ethics. The result leaves the sick exposed to the predatory power of medical practitioners and healthcare organizations with only their autonomy-based rights to non-interference, expressed in contracts, to protect them. The sick are stripped of the protection afforded by a professional, fiduciary relationship of physicians to their patients. Bioethics based on its founding story reverts to the older model of a contractual relationship between the sick and medical practitioners not worthy of intellectual or moral trust (because such trust cannot be generated by what I call 'deprofessionalizing bioethics'). On closer examination, bioethics based on its founding story, ironically, eliminates paternalism as a moral category in bioethics, thus causing bioethics to collapse on itself because it denies one of the necessary conditions for medical paternalism. Bioethics based on its founding story should be abandoned.     

Might there be a medical conscience?

I defend the feasibility of a medical conscience in the following sense: a medical professional can object to the prevailing medical norms because they are incorrect as medical norms. In other words, I provide an account of conscientious objection that makes use of the idea that the conscience can issue true normative claims, but the claims in question are claims about medical norms rather than about general moral norms. I further argue that in order for this line of reasoning to succeed, there needs to be an internal morality of medicine that determines what medical professionals ought to do qua medical professionals. I utilize a constructivist approach to the internal morality of medicine and argue that medical professionals can conscientiously object to providing treatment X, if providing treatment X is not in accordance with norms that would have been constructed, in light of the end of medicine, by the appropriate agents under the appropriate conditions.     

Can a reductionist be a pluralist?

Pluralism is often put forth as a counter-position to reductionism. In this essay, I argue that reductionism and pluralism are in fact consistent. I propose that there are several potential goals for reductions and that the proper form of a reduction should be considered in tandem with the goal that it aims to achieve. This insight provides a basis for clarifying what version(s) of reductionism are currently defended, for explicating the notion of a fundamental level of explanation, and for showing how one can be both a reductionist and a pluralist.