Altruism may arise from individual selection

The fact that humans cooperate with non-kin in large groups, or with people they will never meet again, is a long-standing evolutionary puzzle. Altruism, the capacity to perform costly acts that confer benefits on others, is at the core of cooperative behavior. Behavioral experiments show that humans have a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish non-cooperators at personal cost (so-called strong reciprocity) which, according to standard evolutionary game theory arguments, cannot arise from selection acting on individuals. This has led to the suggestion of group and cultural selection as the only mechanisms that can explain the evolutionary origin of human altruism. We introduce an agent-based model inspired on the Ultimatum Game, that allows us to go beyond the limitations of standard evolutionary game theory and show that individual selection can indeed give rise to strong reciprocity. Our results are consistent with the existence of neural correlates of fairness and in good agreement with observations on humans and monkeys.     

Fixation probabilities of random mutants under frequency dependent selection

Evolutionary game dynamics describes frequency dependent selection in asexual, haploid populations. It typically considers predefined strategies and fixed payoff matrices. Mutations occur between these known types only. Here, we consider a situation in which a mutation has produced an entirely new type which is characterized by a random payoff matrix that does not change during the fixation or extinction of the mutant. Based on the probability distribution underlying the payoff values, we address the fixation probability of the new mutant. It turns out that for weak selection, only the first moments of the distribution matter. For strong selection, the probability that a new payoff entry is larger than the wild type's payoff against itself is the crucial quantity.     

Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection

We study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in populations of finite size. Moreover, each individual has a randomly distributed number of interactions with other individuals. Therefore, the payoff of two individuals using the same strategy can be different. The resulting "payoff stochasticity" reduces the intensity of selection and therefore increases the temperature of selection. A simple mean-field approximation is derived that captures the average effect of the payoff stochasticity. Correction terms to the mean-field theory are computed and discussed.     

Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics

Recently, the frequency-dependent Moran process has been introduced in order to describe evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. Here, an alternative to this process is investigated that is based on pairwise comparison between two individuals. We follow a long tradition in the physics community and introduce a temperature (of selection) to account for stochastic effects. We calculate the fixation probabilities and fixation times for any symmetric 2 x 2 game, for any intensity of selection and any initial number of mutants. The temperature can be used to gauge continuously from neutral drift to the extreme selection intensity known as imitation dynamics. For some payoff matrices the distribution of fixation times can become so broad that the average value is no longer very meaningful.     

Evolution of cooperation under -person snowdrift games

In the animal world, performing a given task which is beneficial to an entire group requires the cooperation of several individuals of that group who often share the workload required to perform the task. The mathematical framework to study the dynamics of collective action is game theory. Here we study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperators and defectors in a population in which groups of individuals engage in N-person, non-excludable public goods games. We explore an N-person generalization of the well-known two-person snowdrift game. We discuss both the case of infinite and finite populations, taking explicitly into consideration the possible existence of a threshold above which collective action is materialized. Whereas in infinite populations, an N-person snowdrift game (NSG) leads to a stable coexistence between cooperators and defectors, the introduction of a threshold leads to the appearance of a new interior fixed point associated with a coordination threshold. The fingerprints of the stable and unstable interior fixed points still affect the evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, despite evolution leading the population inexorably to a monomorphic end-state. However, when the group size and population size become comparable, we find that spite sets in, rendering cooperation unfeasible.     

Stochastic fluctuations in frequency-dependent selection: a one-locus, two-allele and two-phenotype model

Stochastic fluctuations in a simple frequency-dependent selection model with one-locus, two-alleles and two-phenotypes are investigated. The steady-state statistics of allele frequencies for an interior stable phenotypic equilibrium are shown to be similar to the stochastic fluctuations in standard evolutionary game dynamics [Tao, Y., Cressman, R., 2007. Stochastic fluctuations through intrinsic noise in evolutionary game dynamics. Bull. Math. Biol. 69, 1377-1399]. On the other hand, for an interior stable phenotypic or genotypic equilibrium, our main results show that the deterministic model cannot be used to predict the expectation of phenotypic frequency. The variance of phenotypic frequency for an interior stable genotypic equilibrium is more sensitive to the expected population size than for an interior stable phenotypic equilibrium. Furthermore, the stochastic fluctuations of allele frequency and phenotypic frequency can be considered approximately independent of each other for these genotypic equilibria, but not for phenotypic.     

Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking

Direct reciprocity relies on repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity in dynamically structured populations. Individuals occupy the vertices of a graph, undergoing repeated interactions with their partners via the edges of the graph. Unlike the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, where individuals meet at random and have no control over the frequency or duration of interactions, we consider a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions. Moreover, once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. Whenever the active dynamics of links is sufficiently fast, population structure leads to a simple transformation of the payoff matrix, effectively changing the game under consideration, and hence paving the way for reciprocators to dominate defectors. We derive analytical conditions for evolutionary stability.     

Fixation probability for a beneficial allele and a mutant strategy in a linear game under weak selection in a finite island model

The effect of population structure on the probability of fixation of a newly introduced mutant under weak selection is studied using a coalescent approach. Wright's island model in a framework of a finite number of demes is assumed and two selection regimes are considered: a beneficial allele model and a linear game among offspring. A first-order approximation of the fixation probability for a single mutant with respect to the intensity of selection is deduced. The approximation requires the calculation of expected coalescence times, under neutrality, for lineages starting from two or three sampled individuals. The results are obtained in a general setting without assumptions on the number of demes, the deme size or the migration rate, which allows for simultaneous coalescence or migration events in the genealogy of the sampled individuals. Comparisons are made with limit cases as the deme size or the number of demes goes to infinity or the migration rate goes to zero for which a diffusion approximation approach is possible. Conditions for selection to favor a mutant strategy replacing a resident strategy in the context of a linear game in a finite island population are addressed.     

A note on frequency dependence and the levels/units of selection

On the basis of distinctions between those properties of entities that can be defined without reference to other entities and those that (in different ways) cannot, this note argues that non-trivial forms of frequency-dependent selection of entities should be interpreted as selection occurring at a level higher than that of those entities. It points out that, except in degenerately simple cases, evolutionary game-theoretic models of selection are not models of individual selection. Similarly, models of genotypic selection such as heterosis cannot be legitimately interpreted as models of genic selection. The analysis presented here supports the views that: (i) selection should be viewed as a multi-level process; (ii) upper-level selection is ubiquitous; (iii) kin selection should be viewed as a type of group selection rather than individual selection; and (iv) inclusive fitness is not an individual property.

植物-微生物互惠共生: 演化机制与生态功能

植物-微生物互惠共生是一种特殊的合作形式, 在整个生命和陆地生态系统的演化历史中起着至关重要的作用。在全球环境变化背景下, 植物和微生物间的互惠共生对生态系统功能的维持具有重要意义。尽管合作/互惠共生如此重要, 在生物学中却存在着对它的历史偏见与忽视。特别地, 尽管互惠共生的理论与建模发展已有较长的历史, 但不同学科分支间仍存在着多种不同的观点。本综述从两个看似对立的视角概述植物-微生物互惠共生的概念框架, 即微生物学家关心的微观机制和生态系统生态学家关注的宏观影响。宏观模型通常从一组过于简单的假设出发, 便于理论分析。但微观机制是开展定量预测的基础, 因此新一代基于过程的宏观模型需嵌入微观机制, 这对预测全球变化下的生态系统响应至关重要。此外, 希望本文也可以吸引更多学者关注合作/互惠的重要作用, 并将这一概念应用于解决其他生态学和社会学问题。     

The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model

The Cannings exchangeable model for a finite population in discrete time is extended to incorporate selection. The probability of fixation of a mutant type is studied under the assumption of weak selection. An exact formula for the derivative of this probability with respect to the intensity of selection is deduced, and developed in the case of a single mutant. This formula is expressed in terms of mean coalescence times under neutrality assuming that the coefficient of selection for the mutant type has a derivative with respect to the intensity of selection that takes a polynomial form with respect to the frequency of the mutant type. An approximation is obtained in the case where this derivative is a continuous function of the mutant frequency and the population size is large. This approximation is consistent with a diffusion approximation under moment conditions on the number of descendants of a single individual in one time step. Applications to evolutionary game theory in finite populations are presented.      

The different limits of weak selection and the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations

Evolutionary theory often resorts to weak selection, where different individuals have very similar fitness. Here, we relate two ways to introduce weak selection. The first considers evolutionary games described by payoff matrices with similar entries. This approach has recently attracted a lot of interest in the context of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. The second way to introduce weak selection is based on small distances in phenotype space and is a standard approach in kin-selection theory. Whereas both frameworks are interchangeable for constant fitness, frequency-dependent selection shows significant differences between them. We point out the difference between both limits of weak selection and discuss the condition under which the differences vanish. It turns out that this condition is fulfilled by the popular parametrization of the prisoner's dilemma in benefits and costs. However, for general payoff matrices differences between the two frameworks prevail.     

Fixation probability with multiple alleles and projected average allelic effect on selection

The first-order effect of selection on the probability of fixation of an allele, with respect to an intensity of selection s>0 in a diploid population of fixed finite size N, undergoing discrete, non-overlapping generations, is shown to be given by the sum of the average effects of that allele on the coefficient of selection in the current generation and all future generations, given the population state in the current generation. This projected average allelic effect is a weighted sum of average allelic effects in allozygous and autozygous offspring in the initial generation, with weights given in terms of expected coalescence times, under neutrality, for the lineages of two or three gametes chosen at random in the same generation. This is shown in the framework of multiple alleles at one locus, with genotypic values determining either viability or fertility differences, and with either multinomial or exchangeable reproduction schemes. In the limit of weak selection in a large population such that Ns tends to zero, the initial average allelic effects in allozygous offspring and autozygous offspring have the same weight on the fixation probability only in the domain of application of the Kingman coalescent. With frequency-dependent selection in a linear-game-theoretic context with two phenotypes determined by additive gene action, the first-order effect on the fixation probability is a combination of two effects of frequency-independent selection, one in a haploid population, the other in a diploid population. In the domain of application of the Kingman coalescent as the population size goes to infinity and Ns to zero, the first effect is three times more important than the second effect. This explains the one-third law of evolutionary dynamics in this domain, and shows how this law can be extended beyond this domain.     

Survival of the weakest in N-person duels and the maintenance of variation under constant selection

The persistence of extensive variation in nature seems to stand against the most general principle of evolution by natural selection: in antagonistic interactions, the stronger type is expected to replace the weaker. Game theory shows that, however, in contrast to this intuitive expectation for interactions between two players, strategic considerations on fitness maximization in repeated pairwise interactions between three players (truels) or more (N-person duels) lead to what can be dubbed "survival of the weakest": the weakest individual can have the highest fitness. A paradox arises: competitive skills cannot be improved by natural selection, unless we assume mutations with strong effects or unless we assume that interactions are exclusively between two individuals. The paradox disappears, however, with more realistic assumptions (a mixture of duels and truels; the attacked individual backfires; the contest can end without a winner; defensive and offensive skills are correlated; players not directly involved in the contest suffer collateral damage). An unexpected new result emerges: the weaker types can persist in a population in the absence of recurrent mutations, migration, and fluctuating selection. Game theory and the analysis of N-person duels, therefore, help understand one of the most enduring puzzles in evolutionary biology: the maintenance of variation under constant selection.     

Evolutionarily stable sets in the single-locus frequency-dependent model of natural selection

Recent developments in the static theory of evolutionarily stable sets (ESSets) are applied to the single-locus frequency-dependent model of natural selection. Particular emphasis is paid to the ESSet properties of the preimage of an ESS (or ESSet) under the genotype-phenotype map. When an ESS is realized in genetic equilibrium with redundancy in a diploid sexual population, the basic problem in biological terms is whether the corresponding set of allele frequencies is an evolutionarily stable set. The interesting question of the dynamic stability of this preimage is also discussed and a geometric condition developed which implies its evolutionary and dynamic stability.The authors appreciate detailed suggestions for improvement made by the reviewers of the original version of this paper. Financial assistance from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and from the Hungarian National Scientific Research Fund (OTKA Projects T029320 and T037271) is also gratefully acknowledged.