Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic

The evolution of cooperation is possible with a simple model of a population of agents that can move between groups. The agents play public good games within their group. The relative fitness of individuals within the whole population affects their number of offspring. Groups of cooperators evolve but over time are invaded by defectors which eventually results in the group's extinction. However, for small levels of migration and mutation, high levels of cooperation evolve at the population level. Thus, evolution of cooperation based on individual fitness without kin selection, indirect or direct reciprocity is possible. We provide an analysis of the parameters that affect cooperation, and describe the dynamics and distribution of population sizes over time.     

The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent findings suggest that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism maintaining cooperation among humans. We experimentally explore the boundaries of altruistic punishment to maintain cooperation by varying both the cost and the impact of punishment, using an exceptionally extensive subject pool. Our results show that cooperation is only maintained if conditions for altruistic punishment are relatively favourable: low cost for the punisher and high impact on the punished. Our results indicate that punishment is strongly governed by its cost-to-impact ratio and that its effect on cooperation can be pinned down to one single variable: the threshold level of free-riding that goes unpunished. Additionally, actual pay-offs are the lowest when altruistic punishment maintains cooperation, because the pay-off destroyed through punishment exceeds the gains from increased cooperation. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that punishment decisions come from an amalgam of emotional response and cognitive cost-impact analysis and suggest that altruistic punishment alone can hardly maintain cooperation under multi-level natural selection. Uncovering the workings of altruistic punishment as has been done here is important because it helps predicting under which conditions altruistic punishment is expected to maintain cooperation.     

Group selection, kin selection, altruism and cooperation: When inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong

Group selection theory has a history of controversy. After a period of being in disrepute, models of group selection have regained some ground, but not without a renewed debate over their importance as a theoretical tool. In this paper I offer a simple framework for models of the evolution of altruism and cooperation that allows us to see how and to what extent both a classification with and one without group selection terminology are insightful ways of looking at the same models. Apart from this dualistic view, this paper contains a result that states that inclusive fitness correctly predicts the direction of selection for one class of models, represented by linear public goods games. Equally important is that this result has a flip side: there is a more general, but still very realistic class of models, including models with synergies, for which it is not possible to summarize their predictions on the basis of an evaluation of inclusive fitness.     

Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation

The evolution of cooperation is one of the great puzzles in evolutionary biology. Punishment has been suggested as one solution to this problem. Here punishment is generally defined as incurring a cost to inflict harm on a wrong-doer. In the presence of punishers, cooperators can gain higher payoffs than non-cooperators. Therefore cooperation may evolve as long as punishment is prevalent in the population. Theoretical models have revealed that spatial structure can favor the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation, by allowing individuals to only play and compete with those in their immediate neighborhood. However, those models have usually assumed that punishment is always targeted at non-cooperators. In light of recent empirical evidence of punishment targeted at cooperators, we relax this assumption and study the effect of so-called ‘anti-social punishment’. We find that evolution can favor anti-social punishment, and that when anti-social punishment is possible costly punishment no longer promotes cooperation. As there is no reason to assume that cooperators cannot be the target of punishment during evolution, our results demonstrate serious restrictions on the ability of costly punishment to allow the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations. Our results also help to make sense of the empirical observation that defectors will sometimes pay to punish cooperators.     

Evolution of altruistic cooperation among nascent multicellular organisms

Cooperation is a classic solution to hostile environments that limit individual survival. In extreme cases this may lead to the evolution of new types of biological individuals (e.g., eusocial super‐organisms). We examined the potential for interindividual cooperation to evolve via experimental evolution, challenging nascent multicellular “snowflake yeast” with an environment in which solitary multicellular clusters experienced low survival. In response, snowflake yeast evolved to form cooperative groups composed of thousands of multicellular clusters that typically survive selection. Group formation occurred through the creation of protein aggregates, only arising in strains with high (>2%) rates of cell death. Nonetheless, it was adaptive and repeatable, although ultimately evolutionarily unstable. Extracellular protein aggregates act as a common good, as they can be exploited by cheats that do not contribute to aggregate production. These results highlight the importance of group formation as a mechanism for surviving environmental stress, and underscore the remarkable ease with which even simple multicellular entities may evolve—and lose—novel social traits.     

Evolution of contingent altruism when cooperation is expensive

The ubiquity of cooperation has motivated a major research program over the last 50 years to discover ever more minimal conditions for the evolution of altruism. One important line of work is based on favoritism toward those who appear to be close relatives. Another important line is based on continuing interactions, whether between individuals (e.g., reciprocity) or between lines of descent in a viscous population. Here, we use an agent-based model to demonstrate a new mechanism that combines both lines of work to show when and how favoritism toward apparently similar others can evolve in the first place. The mechanism is the joint operation of viscosity and of tags (heritable, observable, and initially arbitrary characteristics), which serve as weak and potentially deceptive indicators of relatedness. Although tags are insufficient to support cooperation alone, we show that this joint mechanism vastly increases the range of environments in which contingent altruism can evolve in viscous populations. Even though our model is quite simple, the subtle dynamics underlying our results are not tractable using formal analytic tools (such as analysis of evolutionarily stable strategies), but are amenable to agent-based simulation.     

The natural selection of altruistic traits

Proponents of the standard evolutionary biology paradigm explain human “altruism” in terms of either nepotism or strict reciprocity. On that basis our underlying nature is reduced to a function of inclusive fitness: human nature has to be totally selfish or nepotistic. Proposed here are three possible paths to giving costly aid to nonrelatives, paths that are controversial because they involve assumed pleiotropic effects or group selection. One path is pleiotropic subsidies that help to extend nepotistic helping behavior from close family to nonrelatives. Another is “warfare”—if and only if warfare recurred in the Paleolithic. The third and most plausible hypothesis is based on the morally based egalitarian syndrome of prehistoric hunter-gatherers, which reduced phenotypic variation at the within-group level, increased it at the between-group level, and drastically curtailed the advantages of free riders. In an analysis consistent with the fundamental tenets of evolutionary biology, these three paths are evaluated as explanations for the evolutionary development of a rather complicated human social nature. This paper (in a series of drafts) has profited from comments by Michael Boehm, Donald T. Campbell, Bruce Knauft, Jane Lancaster, Martin Muller, Peter J. Richerson, Gary Seaman, Craig Stanford, George Williams, Edward O. Wilson, David Sloan Wilson, and two reviewers for Human Nature. Christopher Boehm is a professor of anthropology and the director of the Jane Goodall Research Center, University of Southern California. His research interests in political anthropology concern egalitarianism, feuding, warfare, and conflict resolution (humans and chimpanzees). In biosocial anthropology he is interested in altruism, group selection, and decisions.     

Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation

As one of the mechanisms that are supposed to explain the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals, costly punishment, in which altruistic individuals privately bear the cost to punish defection, suffers from such drawbacks as decreasing individuals’ welfare, inducing second-order free riding, the difficulty of catching defection, and the possibility of triggering retaliation. To improve this promising mechanism, here we propose an extended Public Goods game with rare but severe concerted punishment, in which once a defector is caught punishment is triggered and the cost of punishment is equally shared among the remainder of the group. Analytical results show that, when the probability for concerted punishment is above a threshold, cooperating is, while defecting is not, an evolutionarily stable strategy in finite populations, and that this way of punishment can considerably decrease the total cost of inhibiting defection, especially in large populations.     

Altruism, sex, and inbreeding when the genotype-phenotype map is additive

Recently published theoretical results suggest that, in a sexual population, when genotypes code for phenotypes in a complex manner, it is possible for altruistic genotypes to spread through a metapopulation (i.e. through a collection of subpopulations). This spread tends to occur during periods when the environment deteriorates throughout the metapopulation. By contrast, under asexual reproduction, non-altruistic genotypes seem to be favoured, at least when subpopulations are substantial in size. The most relevant previous study makes use of Kauffman and Levin's "NK model" as a way to relate genotypes to fitness. Unfortunately, there are both conceptual and technical problems with the application of the NK model to populations that contain many different genotypes (e.g. polymorphic diploid populations with more than a few loci under selection). The present study presents a more tractable and biologically plausible model to study the causal relationship between sexual reproduction and altruism. In particular, phenotypes are determined by additive interactions among alleles at different loci in a diploid genome, with up to 200 loci under selection. In addition, subpopulations are substantially larger than those considered in the most relevant previous work. The results show that, so long as there are multiple "fitness peaks" in "phenotype space", the additive genotype-phenotype map leads to results that are similar to those from the NK model. Various parameters are manipulated in an effort to discover the determinants of altruistic and non-altruistic outcomes. The findings should facilitate further investigations, and they should help to establish the plausibility of the suggested relationship between sexual reproduction and altruism. The results also suggest that inbreeding can lead to a similar result as asexuality. That is, inbreeding seems to enhance the probability that altruistic phenotypes will be eliminated.     

Evolution of cooperation: cooperation defeats defection in the cornfield model

"Cooperation" defines any behavior that enhances the fitness of a group (e.g. a community or species), but which, by its nature, can be exploited by selfish individuals, meaning, firstly, that selfish individuals derive an advantage from exploitation which is greater than the average advantage that accrues to unselfish individuals. Secondly, exploitation has no intrinsic fitness value except in the presence of the "cooperative behavior". The mathematics is described by the simple Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). It has previously been shown that koinophilia (the avoidance of sexual mates displaying unusual or atypical phenotypic features, such as mutations) stabilizes any inherited strategy in the simple or iterated PDG, meaning that it cannot be displaced by rare forms of alternative behavior which arise through mutation or occasional migration. In the present model equal numbers of cooperators and defectors (in the simple PDG) were randomly spread in a two-dimensional "cornfield" with uniformly distributed resources. Every individual was koinophilic, and interacted (sexually and in the PDG tournaments) only with individuals from within its immediate neighborhood. This model therefore tested whether cooperation can outcompete defection or selfishness in a straight, initially equally matched, evolutionary battle. The results show that in the absence of koinophilia cooperation was rapidly driven to extinction. With koinophilia there was a very rapid loss of cooperators in the first few generations, but thereafter cooperation slowly spread, ultimately eliminating defection completely. This result was critically dependent on sampling effects of neighborhoods. Small samples (resulting from low population densities or small neighborhood sizes) increase the probability that a chance neighborhood comes to consist predominantly of cooperators. A sexual preference for the most common phenotype in the neighborhood then makes that phenotype more common still. Once this occurs cooperation's spread becomes almost inevitable.     

The co-evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping and cultural transmission under random group formation

Limited migration results in kin selective pressure on helping behaviors under a wide range of ecological, demographic and life-history situations. However, such genetically determined altruistic helping can evolve only when migration is not too strong and group size is not too large. Cultural inheritance of helping behaviors may allow altruistic helping to evolve in groups of larger size because cultural transmission has the potential to markedly decrease the variance within groups and augment the variance between groups. Here, we study the co-evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping behaviors and two alternative cultural transmission rules for such behaviors. We find that conformist transmission, where individuals within groups tend to copy prevalent cultural variants (e.g., beliefs or values), has a strong adverse effect on the evolution of culturally inherited helping traits. This finding is at variance with the commonly held view that conformist transmission is a crucial factor favoring the evolution of altruistic helping in humans. By contrast, we find that under one-to-many transmission, where individuals within groups tend to copy a “leader” (or teacher), altruistic helping can evolve in groups of any size, although the cultural transmission rule itself hitchhikes rather weakly with a selected helping trait. Our results suggest that culturally determined helping behaviors are more likely to be driven by “leaders” than by popularity, but the emergence and stability of the cultural transmission rules themselves should be driven by some extrinsic factors.     

Evolution of cooperation under -person snowdrift games

In the animal world, performing a given task which is beneficial to an entire group requires the cooperation of several individuals of that group who often share the workload required to perform the task. The mathematical framework to study the dynamics of collective action is game theory. Here we study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperators and defectors in a population in which groups of individuals engage in N-person, non-excludable public goods games. We explore an N-person generalization of the well-known two-person snowdrift game. We discuss both the case of infinite and finite populations, taking explicitly into consideration the possible existence of a threshold above which collective action is materialized. Whereas in infinite populations, an N-person snowdrift game (NSG) leads to a stable coexistence between cooperators and defectors, the introduction of a threshold leads to the appearance of a new interior fixed point associated with a coordination threshold. The fingerprints of the stable and unstable interior fixed points still affect the evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, despite evolution leading the population inexorably to a monomorphic end-state. However, when the group size and population size become comparable, we find that spite sets in, rendering cooperation unfeasible.     

Multilevel selection: the evolution of cooperation in non-kin groups

Hamiltons (1964a, 1964b) landmark papers are rightly recognized as the formal basis for our understanding of the evolution of altruistic traits. However, Hamiltons equation as he originally expressed it is simplistic. A genetically oriented approach to studying multilevel selection can provide insights into how the terminology and assumptions used by Hamilton can be generalized. Using contextual analysis I demonstrated that Hamiltons rule actually embodies three distinct processes, group selection, individual selection, and transmission genetics or heritability. Whether an altruistic trait will evolve depends the balance of all of these factors. The genetical approach, and particularly, contextual analysis provides a means of separating these factors and examining them one at a time. Perhaps the greatest issue with Hamiltons equation is the interpretation of r. Hamilton (1964a) interpreted this as relatedness. In this paper I show that what Hamilton called relatedness is more generally interpreted as the proportion for variance among groups, and that many processes in addition to relatedness can increase the variance among groups. I also show that the evolution of an altruistic trait is driven by the ratio of the heritability at the group level to the heritability at the individual level. Under some circumstances this ratio can be greater than 1. In this situation altruism can evolve even if selection favoring selfish behavior is stronger than selection favoring altruism.     

When in Rome,do as the Romans do: the coevolution of altruistic punishment,conformist learning,and cooperation

We model the coevolution of behavioral strategies and social learning rules in the context of a cooperative dilemma, a situation in which individuals must decide whether or not to subordinate their own interests to those of the group. There are two learning rules in our model, conformism and payoff-dependent imitation, which evolve by natural selection, and three behavioral strategies, cooperate, defect, and cooperate, plus punish defectors, which evolve under the influence of the prevailing learning rules. Group and individual level selective pressures drive evolution.We also simulate our model for conditions that approximate those in which early hominids lived. We find that conformism can evolve when the only problem that individuals face is a cooperative dilemma, in which prosocial behavior is always costly to the individual. Furthermore, the presence of conformists dramatically increases the group size for which cooperation can be sustained. The results of our model are robust: they hold even when migration rates are high, and when conflict among groups is infrequent.     

The concurrent evolution of cooperation and the population structures that support it

The evolution of cooperation often depends upon population structure, yet nearly all models of cooperation implicitly assume that this structure remains static. This is a simplifying assumption, because most organisms possess genetic traits that affect their population structure to some degree. These traits, such as a group size preference, affect the relatedness of interacting individuals and hence the opportunity for kin or group selection. We argue that models that do not explicitly consider their evolution cannot provide a satisfactory account of the origin of cooperation, because they cannot explain how the prerequisite population structures arise. Here, we consider the concurrent evolution of genetic traits that affect population structure, with those that affect social behavior. We show that not only does population structure drive social evolution, as in previous models, but that the opportunity for cooperation can in turn drive the creation of population structures that support it. This occurs through the generation of linkage disequilibrium between socio-behavioral and population-structuring traits, such that direct kin selection on social behavior creates indirect selection pressure on population structure. We illustrate our argument with a model of the concurrent evolution of group size preference and social behavior.     

Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment

Punishing defectors is an important means of stabilizing cooperation. When levels of cooperation and punishment are continuous, individuals must employ suitable social standards for defining defectors and for determining punishment levels. Here we investigate the evolution of a social reaction norm, or psychological response function, for determining the punishment level meted out by individuals in dependence on the cooperation level exhibited by their neighbors in a lattice-structured population. We find that (1) cooperation and punishment can undergo runaway selection, with evolution towards enhanced cooperation and an ever more demanding punishment reaction norm mutually reinforcing each other; (2) this mechanism works best when punishment is strict, so that ambiguities in defining defectors are small; (3) when the strictness of punishment can adapt jointly with the threshold and severity of punishment, evolution favors the strict-and-severe punishment of individuals who offer slightly less than average cooperation levels; (4) strict-and-severe punishment naturally evolves and leads to much enhanced cooperation when cooperation without punishment would be weak and neither cooperation nor punishment are too costly; and (5) such evolutionary dynamics enable the bootstrapping of cooperation and punishment, through which defectors who never punish gradually and steadily evolve into cooperators who punish those they define as defectors.     

Evolution of specialized microbial cooperation in dynamic fluids

Here, we study the evolution of specialization using realistic computer simulations of bacteria that secrete two public goods in a dynamic fluid. Through this first‐principles approach, we find physical factors such as diffusion, flow patterns and decay rates are as influential as fitness economics in governing the evolution of community structure, to the extent that when mechanical factors are taken into account, (a) generalist communities can resist becoming specialists despite the invasion fitness of specialization; (b) generalist and specialists can both resist cheaters despite the invasion fitness of free‐riding; and (c) multiple community structures can coexist despite the opposing force of competitive exclusion. Our results emphasize the role of spatial assortment and physical forces on niche partitioning and the evolution of diverse community structures.     

Viscous medium promotes cooperation in the pathogenic bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa

There has been extensive theoretical debate over whether population viscosity (limited dispersal) can favour cooperation. While limited dispersal increases the probability of interactions occurring between relatives, which can favour cooperation, it can also lead to an increase in competition between relatives and this can reduce or completely negate selection for cooperation. Despite much theoretical attention, there is a lack of empirical research investigating these issues. We cultured Pseudomonas aeruginosa bacteria in medium with different degrees of viscosity and examined the fitness consequences for a cooperative trait—the production of iron-scavenging siderophore molecules. We found that increasing viscosity of the growth medium (i) significantly limited bacterial dispersal and the diffusion of siderophore molecules and (ii) increased the fitness of individuals that produced siderophores relative to mutants that did not. We propose that viscosity favours siderophore-producing individuals in this system, because the benefits of siderophore production are more likely to accrue to relatives (i.e. greater indirect benefits), and, at the same time, bacteria are more likely to gain direct fitness benefits by taking up siderophore molecules produced by themselves (i.e. the trait becomes less cooperative). Our results suggest that viscosity of the microbial growth environment is a crucial factor determining the dynamics of wild-type bacteria and siderophore-deficient mutants in natural habitats, such as the viscous mucus in cystic fibrosis lung.     

Estimating evolutionary parameters when viability selection is operating

Some individuals die before a trait is measured or expressed (the invisible fraction), and some relevant traits are not measured in any individual (missing traits). This paper discusses how these concepts can be cast in terms of missing data problems from statistics. Using missing data theory, I show formally the conditions under which a valid evolutionary inference is possible when the invisible fraction and/or missing traits are ignored. These conditions are restrictive and unlikely to be met in even the most comprehensive long-term studies. When these conditions are not met, many selection and quantitative genetic parameters cannot be estimated accurately unless the missing data process is explicitly modelled. Surprisingly, this does not seem to have been attempted in evolutionary biology. In the case of the invisible fraction, viability selection and the missing data process are often intimately linked. In such cases, models used in survival analysis can be extended to provide a flexible and justified model of the missing data mechanism. Although missing traits pose a more difficult problem, important biological parameters can still be estimated without bias when appropriate techniques are used. This is in contrast to current methods which have large biases and poor precision. Generally, the quantitative genetic approach is shown to be superior to phenotypic studies of selection when invisible fractions or missing traits exist because part of the missing information can be recovered from relatives.