感潮河网区环境合作博弈模型及实证

区域决策者往往要选择合适的排污策略,使自己的经济和环境收益最大。当多个决策者进行策略选择时,就形成了区域环境博弈格局。针对感潮河网区排污行为与环境质量具有互相影响的特点,考虑了税收收益、治理成本和环境损失等因素,建立了河网区环境非合作博弈模型和合作博弈模型。非合作博弈的Nash均衡表明,在非合作局面下,区域决策者仅仅考虑最大化自己的收益,选择的排污策略与其他参与者无关。在合作博弈分析中,对大联盟、子联盟博弈进行了分析求解。通过计算所有可能联盟博弈的特征函数,使用常用的Shapley值法进行合作收益公平分配。研究表明,在大联盟合作局面下,区域决策者的策略选择考虑了全局收益的最大化,选择的排污策略与所有参与者的环境损失参数、环境影响参数有关。结合感潮河网区案例对模型进行了验证,研究了3个区域非合作博弈状态和合作博弈状态下的排放量和收益,并使用Shapley值法对合作收益进行分配。对比非合作博弈与合作博弈,合作后3个区域排污量分别比合作前减少了17.98%、15.36%、5.55%。合作收益分别增加了2.17%、3.21%、1.25%。环境质量分别提高了14.24%、13.33%、10.52%。这说明合作局面有利于降低污染排放,分配后的环境合作收益大于非合作收益,河网区环境合作是多赢的。

The cooperative environmental game model in the Tidal River Network Regions and its empirical research

Decision-makers always have incentives to choose proper emission strategies to maximize their individual economic and environmental benefits and the regional environmental game thus occurs when multiple decision-makers are involved in selecting the emission strategies. In this paper, environmental non-cooperative game model and cooperative game model were established for tidal network regions based on (1) sewage emission and its impact on environmental quality and (2) economic considerations, including tax benefits, pollution abatement costs and environmental losses. The Nash equilibrium of non-cooperative game indicated that, in the case of non-cooperation, no relations existed among the pollutant emission strategies chosen as each regional decision maker made its selection independently of others. On the other hand, in the presence of decision maker cooperation, the model was further divided into grand coalition game and sub-coalition game and the solutions to them were obtained. The characteristic function values were computed for all possible coalitions and the Shapley values were used to allocate the total payoff among all the participants with consideration of fairness. The results showed that, in the grand coalition game, the selection of the emission strategies was made by considering maximal global gains and the thus-selected emission strategies were well related with both the environmental loss coefficient and the environmental impact coefficient of all the participants. A case study of three tidal river network regions was conducted to verify the models, with the emissions and payoff being investigated under non-cooperative game and cooperative game situations. Compared with the non-cooperative game, in the cooperative game, the pollutant emissions were reduced by 17.98%, 15.36% and 5.55%, the payoff was increased by 2.17%, 3.21% and 1.25%, and the environment quality was increased by 14.24%, 13.33% and 10.52%, for three regions respectively. These results showed that a win-win outcome can be obtained in the tidal river network regions in cooperative game.