Systematics as science: A response to Cronquist

Our reply to the commentary on cladistics presented by Cronquist (1987) is aimed at four issues:

1. the application of scientific principles in systematics;
2. the recognition that the analysis of pattern is a vital precursor to any consideration of evolutionary process. A priori judgements of evolutionary process are unnecessary for the generation of informative systematic hypotheses which are chosen for their ability to explain the patterns of character distributions rather than for compatibility with any particular preconceived ideas about evolution;
3. that phenetic concepts such as overall similarity, grades, gaps, and degree of divergence, if included in methods of phylogenetic inference, will give erroneous results. Paraphyletic and polyphyletic groups must, consequently, be rejected from systematics since they have no rational empirical basis for recognition;
4. the fact that many of the problems of phylogenetic analysis attributed by Cronquist to cladistics are common to all systematic methods but that these can be dealt with by the application of such principles as parsimony, synapomorphy, and strict monophyly.