随机进化稳定性研究进展

在过去的三十多年, 演化博弈理论及其进化稳定对策的概念不仅被广泛地应用于解释动物行为的进化, 而且也被成功地应用于分子生物学、经济学、政治学和社会学等诸多学科。然而, 在随机波动环境中演化博弈动态的随机动力学性质始终没有被清晰地认识, 并且这是一个极具挑战性的理论问题。本文简单介绍了我们最近所提出的随机进化稳定性(stochastic evolutionary stability, SES)的概念。随机进化稳定性不仅是经典进化稳定对策(evolutionarily stably strategy, ESS)概念在随机环境下的自然扩展, 而且为揭示在随机环境中动物行为的演化动态提供一个基本的理论框架。

Introduction of stochastic evolutionary stability

Over the past 30 years, evolutionary game theory and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) have been not only extensively developed and successfully applied to explain the evolution of animal behaviors, but also widely used in molecular biology, economics, politics and social sciences. However, the stochastic dynamical properties of evolutionary games in randomly fluctuating environments are still unclear. In this paper, we briefly introduce the concept of stochastic evolutionary stability (SES) that we recently proposed. The stochastic evolutionary stability not only extends the classic concept of the evolutionarily stably strategy but also provides a fundamental theoretical framework for understanding the evolutionary dynamics of animal behavior in a stochastic environment.