Dynamic games and field experiments examining intra- and intersexual conflict: explaining counterintuitive mating behavior in a Mediterranean wrasse, Symphodus ocellatus

Intersexual conflict and intrasexual competition are widelyrecognized as playing critical roles in determining mating systems.Although they occur simultaneously in populations, these processesare usually treated independently. In reality, the fitness ofreproductive strategies will depend on the outcome of both within-and between-sex conflicts. Using a modeling approach based onmultiple, linked, dynamic state variable models, we examined thereproductive behavior of a Mediterranean wrasse, Symphodus ocellatus.We compared the predictions of models that examine only a singleconflict interaction with those that consider multiple within-and between-sex conflicts simultaneously. The observed distributionof sneaker males and females among nests was compared with thosepredicted by the models. We found that the closest fit withempirical observations and experiments is given by the modelthat examines conflict between females, sneakers, and nestingmales simultaneously. Removal of successful nests indicatedthat females join nests with few or no sneakers present, whereassneakers join these nests only later, even though this leadsto lower sneaker mating success. This behavior can be explainedby observing that although sneakers would have higher fitnessat nests where the spawning rate is greater, females would notbe willing to spawn at these nests in the presence of sneakers. Presumably,once the nests have achieved high past success, females are willingto spawn in the presence of sneakers because of the associated decreasedchance of nesting male desertion.  

Sex ratio schedules in a dynamic game: the effect of competitive asymmetry by male emergence order

Studies of sex allocation have provided some of the most successfultests of theory in behavioral and evolutionary ecology. Forinstance, local mate competition (LMC) theory has explainedvariation in sex allocation across numerous species. However,some patterns of sex ratio variation remain unexplained by existingtheory. Most existing models have ignored variation in malecompetitive ability and assumed all males have equal opportunitiesto mate within a patch. However, in some species experiencingLMC, males often fight fiercely for mates, such that male matingsuccess varies with male fighting ability. Here, we examinethe effect of competitive ability on optimal sex allocationschedules using a dynamic programming approach. This model assumesan asymmetric competitive ability derived from different mortalitiesaccording to the timing of male emergence. If the mortalityof newly emerging males is larger than that of already emergedmales, our model predicts a more female-biased sex ratio thanexpected under traditional LMC models. In addition, femalesare predicted to produce new males constantly at a low rateover the offspring emergence period. We show that our modelsuccessfully predicts the sex ratios produced by females ofthe parasitoid wasp Melittobia, a genus renowned for its vigorouslyfighting males and lower than expected sex ratios.  

Size-dependent ESS sex allocation in wind-pollinated cosexual plants: fecundity vs. stature effects

To theoretically investigate the single and compound effects of relative fecundity and relative stature of plants on size-dependent sex allocation (SDS) in wind-pollinated cosexual species, we developed a game model and analysed ESS sex allocation of large and small plants having totally or partially different reproductive resources and different pollen and seed dispersal areas in a population. We found that e.g. when both sized plants have large pollen dispersal areas relative to their seed dispersal areas, which plants are male-biased is largely determined by relative fecundity (t) and relative size of seed dispersal area (k) of the large plants to the small plants: If t >k, large plants tend to be more male-biased even if relative size of pollen dispersal area of large to small plants (l) is smaller than k. If t相似文献

Evolutionarily stable strategies in differential and difference equation models

Summary A definition for an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is given which is applicable to a general differential equation population model and two difference equation analogs. With the introduction of a fitnessgenerating function, it is possible to develop necessary conditions for the determination of an ESS for each of these systems. In most situations, an ESS for one system will also be an ESS for the other. Necessary conditions for an ESS are obtained. Under certain restrictions, they are shown to be valid, even under an unstable equilibrium in population density. the results are illustrated with an example which has the same ESS solution whether a continuous or discrete model is used. The behavior of the ESS for the discrete model is then examined under unstable equilibrium conditions in population density.  

Signalling of information that is neither cryptic nor private

It is commonly assumed that in order for animal signals to be advantageous, the information being signalled could not have been obtained otherwise, and is therefore ‘cryptic’ or ‘private’. Here, we suggest a scenario in which individuals can gain an advantage by signalling ‘public’ information that is neither cryptic nor private. In that scenario, signalling increases the efficiency with which that ‘public’ information is transmitted. We formalize our idea with a game in which offspring can signal their condition to their parents. Specifically, we consider a resource‐strapped parent who can only invest in one of its two offspring, and we allow offspring the chance to influence parental investment through a signal. A parent in the game seeks to invest in the higher‐quality offspring, which it could identify either through a publicly available cue, such as body size, or by relying on a signal provided by the offspring. We find that if the signal can convey information about offspring quality more efficiently than cues, then signalling of condition between offspring and parents can be favoured by selection, even though parents could potentially have acquired the same information from the cue. Our results suggest that the biological function of signals may be broader than currently considered, and provide a scenario where low cost signalling can be favoured. More generally, efficiency benefits could explain signalling across a range of biological and economic scenarios.  

央地两级政府生态治理行动的演化博弈分析——基于财政分权视角

生态环境是人类社会经济发展过程中的重要组成部分,然而由于粗放的经济发展模式,生态系统退化严重,影响人类幸福感和可持续发展。中央政府和地方政府是生态环境的主要治理主体,因此研究两类群体在生态治理过程中的行为互动机制具有较强的现实意义。基于财政分权的背景,从微观主体的收益函数出发,构建央地两级政府生态治理行动的演化博弈模型,探究两类主体的行为特征及其影响因素。根据复制动态方程分析参与主体的演化规律,采用MATLAB仿真工具分析不同情形下演化均衡状态及收敛趋势。研究结果表明,中央政府与地方政府在一定程度上都是"理性经济人",系统稳定均衡策略取决于地方政府"严格执行"生态治理的净收益和中央政府"严格监管"的净收益,其中关键指标包括:地方政府生态治理执行力度和成本、政绩考核体系中生态指标和经济指标的权重系数、中央政府的监管成本、监管力度和惩罚金额。据此提出"财政分权同时创新地方政绩考核机制、发展比较优势、拓宽监管渠道"等对策建议,引导央地两级政府共同促进生态治理工作有效实施。  

跨区域森林生态补偿的演化博弈分析——基于主体功能区的视角

新常态下,我国的森林生态环境承载力已经达到或接近上限,森林资源存在乱砍乱伐现象和林区政府监管乏力问题,究其根源是缺乏森林保护和补偿的驱动机制。在中央政府投入大量物力和财力的同时,其他利益相关主体却存在不同利益诉求和行为导向冲突,跨区域森林生态补偿难以实现,因此利用演化博弈模型厘清森林生态环境保护与补偿行动中保护主体、受益主体和中央政府的关系,有助于突破跨区域森林生态保护补偿困境,形成良好的行动机制。分析主体功能区利益群体逻辑关系的基础上,构建保护地区政府和受益地区政府的演化博弈模型,分别研究未引入"约束-激励"机制和引入"约束-激励"机制下的主体行为特征及其影响因素,剖析不同情形地方政府间的博弈决策行为。研究结果表明,在未引入中央政府"约束-激励"机制的情况下,跨区域生态补偿无法实现,保护地区政府会通过权衡保护森林资源收益和机会成本进行策略选择,当保护森林资源的净收益为正时,即使没有受益地区生态补偿,保护地区政府仍然有足够的激励保护森林资源,当保护森林资源的净收益为负时,两类政府群体容易陷入森林生态治理的"囚徒困境",而"约束-激励"机制的引入可以实现森林生态保护补偿的帕累托改进,通过中央政府惩罚、奖励金额的限制能够实现最优稳定均衡策略。  

模型分析在动物进化生物学研究中的应用

早期的生态学研究往往局限于对野外观察现象的基本描述。随着模型分析方法的引入,可以通过建立数学模型寻找描述性材料中蕴藏的一般性规律,探讨某一现象产生的原因及其制约因素。近年,随着计算机技术的飞速发展和普及,模型分析方法应用越来越广泛。动物行为的进化及其对环境的适应性一直以来都是生态学研究的热点,根据应用不同的理论基础,人们发展了许多不同的建模方法,主要包括种群遗传学模型、最优化模型、博弈模型、基于个体的模拟模型和系统发育对比分析模型等。本文主要介绍了以上5种模型方法,及其在动物进化生物学研究中的应用现状。  

感潮河网区环境合作博弈模型及实证

区域决策者往往要选择合适的排污策略,使自己的经济和环境收益最大。当多个决策者进行策略选择时,就形成了区域环境博弈格局。针对感潮河网区排污行为与环境质量具有互相影响的特点,考虑了税收收益、治理成本和环境损失等因素,建立了河网区环境非合作博弈模型和合作博弈模型。非合作博弈的Nash均衡表明,在非合作局面下,区域决策者仅仅考虑最大化自己的收益,选择的排污策略与其他参与者无关。在合作博弈分析中,对大联盟、子联盟博弈进行了分析求解。通过计算所有可能联盟博弈的特征函数,使用常用的Shapley值法进行合作收益公平分配。研究表明,在大联盟合作局面下,区域决策者的策略选择考虑了全局收益的最大化,选择的排污策略与所有参与者的环境损失参数、环境影响参数有关。结合感潮河网区案例对模型进行了验证,研究了3个区域非合作博弈状态和合作博弈状态下的排放量和收益,并使用Shapley值法对合作收益进行分配。对比非合作博弈与合作博弈,合作后3个区域排污量分别比合作前减少了17.98%、15.36%、5.55%。合作收益分别增加了2.17%、3.21%、1.25%。环境质量分别提高了14.24%、13.33%、10.52%。这说明合作局面有利于降低污染排放,分配后的环境合作收益大于非合作收益,河网区环境合作是多赢的。