Multilevel modeling analysis of dyadic network data with an application to Ye'kwana food sharing

Behavioral ecologists have recently begun using multilevel modeling for the analysis of social behavior. We present a multilevel modeling formulation of the Social Relations Model that is well suited for the analysis of dyadic network data. This model, which we adapt for count data and small datasets, can be fitted using standard multilevel modeling software packages. We illustrate this model with an analysis of meal sharing among Ye'kwana horticulturalists in Venezuela. In this setting, meal sharing among households is predicted by an association index, which reflects the amount of time that members of the households are interacting. This result replicates recent findings that interhousehold food sharing is especially prevalent among households that interact and cooperate in multiple ways. We discuss opportunities for human behavioral ecologists to expand their focus to the multiple currencies and cooperative behaviors that characterize interpersonal relationships in preindustrial societies. We discuss possible extensions to this statistical modeling approach and applications to research by human behavioral ecologists and primatologists. Am J Phys Anthropol 157:507–512, 2015. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Co‐evolutionary dynamics between public good producers and cheats in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa

The production of beneficial public goods is common in the microbial world, and so is cheating – the exploitation of public goods by nonproducing mutants. Here, we examine co‐evolutionary dynamics between cooperators and cheats and ask whether cooperators can evolve strategies to reduce the burden of exploitation, and whether cheats in turn can improve their exploitation abilities. We evolved cooperators of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, producing the shareable iron‐scavenging siderophore pyoverdine, together with cheats, defective in pyoverdine production but proficient in uptake. We found that cooperators managed to co‐exist with cheats in 56% of all replicates over approximately 150 generations of experimental evolution. Growth and competition assays revealed that co‐existence was fostered by a combination of general adaptions to the media and specific adaptions to the co‐evolving opponent. Phenotypic screening and whole‐genome resequencing of evolved clones confirmed this pattern, and suggest that cooperators became less exploitable by cheats because they significantly reduced their pyoverdine investment. Cheats, meanwhile, improved exploitation efficiency through mutations blocking the costly pyoverdine‐signalling pathway. Moreover, cooperators and cheats evolved reduced motility, a pattern that likely represents adaptation to laboratory conditions, but at the same time also affects social interactions by reducing strain mixing and pyoverdine sharing. Overall, we observed parallel evolution, where co‐existence of cooperators and cheats was enabled by a combination of adaptations to the abiotic and social environment and their interactions.     

Experimental peripheral administration of oxytocin elevates a suite of cooperative behaviours in a wild social mammal

The evolution and expression of different forms of cooperative behaviour (e.g. feeding, guarding, sentinel duties, etc.) are usually studied independently, with few studies considering them as a single syndrome. However, studies investigating individuals' investment across a suite of different behaviours reveal that they are correlated, suggesting a single mechanism determining the evolution and expression of cooperative behaviours. A hormonal mechanism could achieve this, and one possibility is oxytocin (OT), which affects several prosocial or alloparental behaviours independently. We show, using a double-blind experiment, that peripheral administration of OT to social, free-living meerkats Suricata suricatta elevates a suite of cooperative behaviours. Treated individuals increase their contributions to communal, cooperative activities (digging, guarding, pup-feeding and associating with pups) and decrease initiation of aggressive interactions, compared with a saline control. This suggests that different forms of cooperative behaviour form a single syndrome with a common causal basis. If our peripherally administered OT acts in the same way as the naturally released hormone, then a general tendency to prosociality may be modulated by this hormonal system. Therefore, it may be difficult for an individual to decouple expression of cooperative behaviours that provide the practitioner with benefits from those that provide the recipient with benefits. It may also explain why social species typically exhibit a suite of cooperative behaviours, without having to invoke independent evolution of each.     

How within-group behavioural variation and task efficiency enhance fitness in a social group

How task specialization, individual task performance and within-group behavioural variation affects fitness is a longstanding and unresolved problem in our understanding of animal societies. In the temperate social spider, Anelosimus studiosus, colony members exhibit a behavioural polymorphism; females either exhibit an aggressive 'asocial' or docile 'social' phenotype. We assessed individual prey-capture success for both phenotypes, and the role of phenotypic composition on group-level prey-capture success for three prey size classes. We then estimated the effect of group phenotypic composition on fitness in a common garden, as inferred from individual egg-case masses. On average, asocial females were more successful than social females at capturing large prey, and colony-level prey-capture success was positively associated with the frequency of the asocial phenotype. Asocial colony members were also more likely to engage in prey-capture behaviour in group-foraging situations. Interestingly, our fitness estimates indicate females of both phenotypes experience increased fitness when occupying colonies containing unlike individuals. These results imply a reciprocal fitness benefit of within-colony behavioural variation, and perhaps division of labour in a spider society.     

The 'spiteful' origins of human cooperation

We analyse generosity, second-party ('spiteful') punishment (2PP), and third-party ('altruistic') punishment (3PP) in a cross-cultural experimental economics project. We show that smaller societies are less generous in the Dictator Game but no less prone to 2PP in the Ultimatum Game. We might assume people everywhere would be more willing to punish someone who hurt them directly (2PP) than someone who hurt an anonymous third person (3PP). While this is true of small societies, people in large societies are actually more likely to engage in 3PP than 2PP. Strong reciprocity, including generous offers and 3PP, exists mostly in large, complex societies that face numerous challenging collective action problems. We argue that 'spiteful' 2PP, motivated by the basic emotion of anger, is more universal than 3PP and sufficient to explain the origins of human cooperation.     

Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict

Understanding how societies resolve conflicts between individual and common interests remains one of the most fundamental issues across disciplines. The observation that humans readily incur costs to sanction uncooperative individuals without tangible individual benefits has attracted considerable attention as a proximate cause as to why cooperative behaviours might evolve. However, the proliferation of individually costly punishment has been difficult to explain. Several studies over the last decade employing experimental designs with isolated groups have found clear evidence that the costs of punishment often nullify the benefits of increased cooperation, rendering the strong human tendency to punish a thorny evolutionary puzzle. Here, we show that group competition enhances the effectiveness of punishment so that when groups are in direct competition, individuals belonging to a group with punishment opportunity prevail over individuals in a group without this opportunity. In addition to competitive superiority in between-group competition, punishment reduces within-group variation in success, creating circumstances that are highly favourable for the evolution of accompanying group-functional behaviours. We find that the individual willingness to engage in costly punishment increases with tightening competitive pressure between groups. Our results suggest the importance of intergroup conflict behind the emergence of costly punishment and human cooperation.     

Within-host parasite cooperation and the evolution of virulence

Infections by multiple genotypes are common in nature and are known to select for higher levels of virulence for some parasites. When parasites produce public goods (PGs) within the host, such co-infections have been predicted to select for lower levels of virulence. However, this prediction is based on simplifying assumptions regarding epidemiological feedbacks on the multiplicity of infections (MOI). Here, we analyse the case of parasites producing a PG (for example, siderophore-producing bacteria) using a nested model that ties together within-host and epidemiological processes. We find that the prediction that co-infection should select for less virulent strains for PG-producing parasites is only valid if both parasite transmission and virulence are linear functions of parasite density. If there is a trade-off relationship such that virulence increases more rapidly than transmission, or if virulence also depends on the total amount of PGs produced, then more complex relationships between virulence and the MOI are predicted. Our results reveal that explicitly taking into account the distribution of parasite strains among hosts could help better understand the selective pressures faced by parasites at the population level.     

Resolving the iterated prisoner's dilemma: theory and reality

Pairs of unrelated individuals face a prisoner's dilemma if cooperation is the best mutual outcome, but each player does best to defect regardless of his partner's behaviour. Although mutual defection is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in one-shot games, cooperative solutions based on reciprocity can emerge in iterated games. Among the most prominent theoretical solutions are the so-called bookkeeping strategies, such as tit-for-tat, where individuals copy their partner's behaviour in the previous round. However, the lack of empirical data conforming to predicted strategies has prompted the suggestion that the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is neither a useful nor realistic basis for investigating cooperation. Here, we discuss several recent studies where authors have used the IPD framework to interpret their data. We evaluate the validity of their approach and highlight the diversity of proposed solutions. Strategies based on precise accounting are relatively uncommon, perhaps because the full set of assumptions of the IPD model are rarely satisfied. Instead, animals use a diverse array of strategies that apparently promote cooperation, despite the temptation to cheat. These include both positive and negative reciprocity, as well as long-term mutual investments based on 'friendships'. Although there are various gaps in these studies that remain to be filled, we argue that in most cases, individuals could theoretically benefit from cheating and that cooperation cannot therefore be explained with the concept of positive pseudo-reciprocity. We suggest that by incorporating empirical data into the theoretical framework, we may gain fundamental new insights into the evolution of mutual reciprocal investment in nature.