Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible

Altruistic punishment is suggested to explain observed high levels of cooperation among non-kin related humans. However, laboratory experiments as well as ethnographic evidence suggest that people might retaliate if being punished, and that this reduces the level of cooperation. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment, we explore the consequences of the option of retaliation. We find that cooperation and altruistic punishment does not evolve with larger population levels if the option of retaliation is included.     

Paradoxical persistence through mixed-system dynamics: towards a unified perspective of reversal behaviours in evolutionary ecology

Counterintuitive dynamics of various biological phenomena occur when composite system dynamics differ qualitatively from that of their component systems. Such composite systems typically arise when modelling situations with time-varying biotic or abiotic conditions, and examples range from metapopulation dynamics to population genetic models. These biological, and related physical, phenomena can often be modelled as simple financial games, wherein capital is gained and lost through gambling. Such games have been developed and used as heuristic devices to elucidate the processes at work in generating seemingly paradoxical outcomes across a spectrum of disciplines, albeit in a field-specific, ad hoc fashion. Here, we propose that studying these simple games can provide a much deeper understanding of the fundamental principles governing paradoxical behaviours in models from a diversity of topics in evolution and ecology in which fluctuating environmental effects, whether deterministic or stochastic, are an essential aspect of the phenomenon of interest. Of particular note, we find that, for a broad class of models, the ecological concept of equilibrium reactivity provides an intuitive necessary condition that must be satisfied in order for environmental variability to promote population persistence. We contend that further investigations along these lines promise to unify aspects of the study of a range of topics, bringing questions from genetics, species persistence and coexistence and the evolution of bet-hedging strategies, under a common theoretical purview.     

GROUP FORMATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIALITY

In spite of its intrinsic evolutionary instability, altruistic behavior in social groups is widespread in nature, spanning from organisms endowed with complex cognitive abilities to microbial populations. In this study, we show that if social individuals have an enhanced tendency to form groups and fitness increases with group cohesion, sociality can evolve and be maintained in the absence of actively assortative mechanisms such as kin recognition or nepotism toward other carriers of the social gene. When explicitly taken into account in a game‐theoretical framework, the process of group formation qualitatively changes the evolutionary dynamics with respect to games played in groups of constant size and equal grouping tendencies. The evolutionary consequences of the rules underpinning the group size distribution are discussed for a simple model of microbial aggregation by differential attachment, indicating a way to the evolution of sociality bereft of peer recognition.     

A friend in need is a friend indeed: Need-based sharing,rather than cooperative assortment,predicts experimental resource transfers among Agta hunter-gatherers

Despite much theorizing, the evolutionary reasons why humans cooperate extensively with unrelated individuals are still largely unknown. While reciprocity explains many instances of non-kin cooperation, much remains to be understood. A recent suite of models based upon ‘cooperative assortativity’ suggest that non-kin cooperation can evolve if individuals preferentially assort with certain cooperative phenotypes, such as helping those who help others. Here, we test these assortative hypotheses among the Agta, a population of Filipino hunter-gatherers, using an experimental resource allocation game in which individuals divide resources between themselves and camp-mates. Individuals preferentially shared with less cooperative individuals, arguing against cooperative assortativity as a mechanism sustaining resource transfers in this population. Rather, sharing was often based on the recipient's level of need, in addition to kin-based transfers and reciprocal sharing. Contrary to several recent theoretical accounts, in this real-world setting we find no evidence for cooperative assortativity influencing patterns of cooperation. These results may reflect the demands of living in a foraging ecology characterized by high resource stochasticity, necessitating need-based sharing as a system of long-term reciprocity to mitigate repeated subsistence shortfalls.     

A game-theoretic model of interspecific brood parasitism with sequential decisions

The interaction between hosts and parasites in bird populations has been studied extensively. This paper uses game-theoretic methods to model this interaction. This has been done in previous papers but has not been studied taking into account the detailed sequential nature of this game. We introduce a model allowing the host and parasite to make a number of decisions which will depend on various natural factors. The sequence of events begins with the host forming a nest and laying a number of eggs, followed by the possibility that a parasite bird will arrive at the nest; if it does it can choose to destroy some of the host eggs and lay one of its own. A sequence of events follows, which is broken down into two key stages; firstly the interaction between the host and the parasite adult, and secondly that between the host and the parasite chick. The final decision involves the host choosing whether to raise or abandon the chicks that are in the nest. There are certain natural parameters and probabilities which are central to these various decisions; in particular the host is generally uncertain whether parasitism has taken place, but can assess the likelihood of parasitism based upon certain cues (e.g. how many eggs remain in its nest). We then use this methodology to model two real-world interactions, that of the Reed Warbler with the Common Cuckoo and also the Yellow Warbler with the Brown-headed Cowbird. These parasites have different methods in the way they parasitize the nests of their hosts, and the hosts can in turn have different reactions to these parasites. Our model predictions generally match the real results well, and the model also makes predictions of the effect of changes in various key parameters on the type of parasitic interactions that should occur.     

医学科研资源管理中的博弈问题探讨

医学科研资源管理是医学科研的调控手段,涉及医学科研团队和医科管理部门之间的利益损益。基于利益差异的行为冲突就成为了制约医学科研顺利进行的主要因素之一。博弈理论的思想和方法适用于分析存在的互动关系的行为人决策过程及其规律,为解释医学科研进程中的利益冲突、分析医科管理缺陷的形成机理提供了很好的思路和方法。     

Dragonfly larvae and tadpole frog space use games in varied light conditions

Predators and prey often engage in a game where predators attemptto be in areas with higher prey densities and prey attempt tobe in areas with lower predator densities. A few models havepredicted the resulting distributions of predators and prey,but little empirical data exist to test these predictions andto examine how abiotic and biotic factors shape the distributions.Thus, we observed how Anax dragonfly nymphs and Pacific treefrog tadpoles (Pseudacris regilla) either together or separatelydistributed themselves in an arena with a high- and a low-preyresource patch. Trials were conducted in high- and low-lightconditions to manipulate predation risk and to view the effectsof this abiotic factor. Counter to the model predictions, wefound that predators were not more abundant in high-resource(HR) patches, and they thus did not force prey toward beinguniformly distributed. Using a model selection approach to assesswhat factors affected predator and prey patch-switching movement,we found that prey more often left patches that had more predatorspresent, but predators surprisingly more often left patcheswith more prey present. Light levels did not affect predationrisk; however, in the dark with the associated reduction invisual information predators preferred HR patches. This causeda lower coincidence of prey and predators in patches. Predatorsalso switched patches less often when they occupied the samepatch as the other predator. This suggests that predator distributions,and indirectly prey distributions, are affected by the riskof intraguild predation.     

Evolutionary games with variable payoffs

Matrix games, defined by a set of strategies and a corresponding matrix of payoffs, are commonly used to model animal populations because they are both simple and generate meaningful results. It is generally assumed that payoffs are independent of time. However, the timing of contests in real populations may have a marked effect on the value of rewards. We consider matrix games where the payoffs are functions of time. Rules are found which hold in this more general situation, and the complexity of possible behaviour is underlined by demonstrating other conditions which do not hold and an illustrative game.     

Serious Games for Home Based Rehabilitation: Inertial Sensor Energy Consumption

Background

Serious games have recently immerged as a good tool for physical rehabilitation. This new technology can be used at home, to complement a traditional, clinic based, rehabilitation program. To implement a serious game at home, we need to use multiple sensors to record patients' data. Many serious games use visual motion capture techniques, like the Kinect camera, due to their low price and high portability. On the other hand, some other systems use inertial sensors to collect data at a higher degree of accuracy. In previous works, we showed that a serious gaming system could benefit from combining data from different sensors. However, the use of inertial sensors, in a home-based setting, remains a challenge since they need to be supplied by an independent battery source, which could influence the acceptability of such systems.