How to regulate a gene: to repress or to activate?

Gene-expression responses to an input can depend on growth conditions; in this issue, Sasson et al. (2012) show that this dependence is lower when the input results in a high degree of promoter occupancy.     

Disgust sensitivity relates to affective responses to – but not ability to detect – olfactory cues to pathogens

Hundreds of studies have assessed variation in the degree to which people experience disgust toward substances associated with pathogens, but little is known about the mechanistic sources of this variation. The current investigation uses olfactory perception and threshold methods to test whether it is apparent at the cue-detection level, at the cue-interpretation level, or both. It further tests whether relations between disgust sensitivity and olfactory perception are specific to odors associated with pathogens. Two studies (N's = 119 and 160) of individuals sampled from a Dutch university each revealed that pathogen disgust sensitivity relates to valence perceptions of odors found in pathogen sources, but not to valence perceptions of odors not associated with pathogens, nor to intensity perceptions of odors of either type. Study 2, which also assessed olfactory thresholds via a three-alternative forced-choice staircase method, did not reveal a relation between pathogen disgust sensitivity and the ability to detect an odor associated with pathogens, nor an odor not associated with pathogens. In total, results are consistent with the idea that pathogen disgust sensitivity relates to how olfactory pathogen cues are interpreted after detection, but not necessarily to the ability to detect such cues.     

Instructions to Authors

Acta Biochimica et Biophysica Sinica (ABBS) is a scientific journal publishing monthly research papers, short communications and minireviews in biochemistry, molecular biology and biophysics. Research papers and short communications should report original work not published or considered for publication elsewhere. Minireviews should provide a concise introduction to the subject matter to inform the readers of the latest developments in a certain area.     

Instructions to Authors

Acta Biochimica et Biophysica Sinica (ABBS) is a scientific journal publishing monthly research papers, short com-munications and minireviews in biochemistry, molecular biology and biophysics. Research papers and short communi-cations should report original work not published or considered for publication elsewhere. Minireviews should provide     

Ought we to sentence people to psychiatric treatment?

In principle, there seem to be three main ways in which society can react when people commit crimes under influence of mental illness. (1) The standard model. We excuse them. If they are dangerous they are detained in the interest of safety of the rest of the citizens. (2) The Swedish model. We hold them responsible for their criminal offence, we convict them, but we do not sentence them to jail. Instead, we sentence them to psychiatric treatment. (3) My model. We sentence them to jail, but offer them (voluntary) psychiatric treatment. The advantages of my model are obvious. We get a clear delineation of roles. We allow the psychiatrist to be just a doctor, not a warden. We liberate psychiatry of the objective of deciding whether people who were mentally ill when they committed criminal offences 'could have acted otherwise' -- a hopeless task. We allow that psychiatrists live up to their professional ethical code (The Hawaii Declaration). We treat psychically ill persons as 'normal', we allow them to repent their crimes, which renders easier their recovery. However, two objections to my model come to mind. First of all, is it not unfair to sentence people to jail who could not help doing what they did? And, secondly, the question of fairness set to one side, is it not inhumane to sentence mentally ill persons to jail? Is it not inhumane to the mentally ill persons themselves, and does it not mean that they will be a burden to other prisoners? In my paper I show that, if our system of criminal punishment takes a civilised form, neither of these objections carries any weight.