What risks should be permissible in controlled human infection model studies?

Controlled human infection model (CHIM) studies involve the intentional exposure of healthy research volunteers to infectious agents. These studies contribute to knowledge about the cause or development of disease and to the advancement of vaccine research. But they also raise ethical questions about the kinds of risks that should be permissible and whether limits should be imposed on research risks in CHIM studies. Two possible risk thresholds have been considered for CHIM studies. The first suggests constraining ethically permissible risks according to a minimal risk threshold and the second endorses a higher risk threshold that excludes irreversible or fatal infections. I argue that neither of these thresholds is persuasive and situate questions about risk thresholds in CHIM studies within a broader debate about permissible risks in research. I argue that risks in CHIM studies should be constrained according to limits on research risks that do not offer corresponding benefits in all studies rather than developing a unique risk threshold for CHIM studies. I then propose five recommendations for the ethical assessment of risk in CHIM studies.     

Against Harmful Research on Non‐Agreeing Children

The Code of Federal Regulations permits harmful research on children who have not agreed to participate, but I will argue that it should be no more permissive of harmful research on such children than of harmful research on adults who have not agreed to participate. Of course, the Code permits harmful research on adults. Such research is not morally problematic, however, because adults must agree to participate. And, of course, the Code also permits beneficial research on children without needing their explicit agreement. This sort of research is also not problematic, this time because paternalism towards children may be justifiable. The moral problem at the center of this paper arises from the combination of two potential properties of pediatric research, first that it might be harmful and second that its subjects might not agree to participate. In Section 2 of this article I explain how the Code permits harmful research on non‐agreeing children. Section 3 contains my argument that we should no more permit harmful research on non‐agreeing children than on non‐agreeing adults. In Section 4, I argue that my thesis does not presuppose that pediatric assent has the same moral force that adult consent does. In Section 5, I argue that the distinction between non‐voluntary and involuntary research is irrelevant to my thesis. In Section 6, I rebut an objection based on the power of parental permission. In Section 7 I suggest how the Code of Federal Regulations might be changed.     

Human Research Ethics Committees: Examining their Roles and Practices

considerable time and resources are invested in the ethics review process. We present qualitative data on how human research ethics committee members and health researchers perceive the role and function of the committee. The findings are based on interviews with 34 Australian ethics committee members and 54 health researchers. Although all participants agreed that the primary role of the ethics committee was to protect participants, there was disagreement regarding the additional roles undertaken by committees. Of particular concern were the perceptions from some ethics committee members and researchers that ethics committees were working to protect the institution's interests, as well as being overprotective toward research participants. This has the potential to lead to poor relations and mistrust between ethics committees and researchers.     

Why IRBs should protect bystanders in human research

Many types of human research activities present risks and burdens to third parties (e.g., bystanders). Few human protection policies directly address the protection of research bystanders, though some address it in passing. In what follows, I re-iterate reasons why bystanders are entitled to protections. I also argue that Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are in the best position to signal to researchers and sponsors that bystanders should be protected in research. In some cases, IRB review would consist of evaluating bystander protection strategies directly; in other cases, this might entail merely certifying that another institutions, like a drug regulator, has taken adequate measures to protect the welfare of research bystanders.     

Research participation and the right to withdraw

Most ethics committees which review research protocols insist that potential research participants reserve unconditional or absolute 'right' of withdrawal at any time and without giving any reason. In this paper, I examine what consent means for research participation and a sense of commitment in relation to this right to withdraw. I suggest that, once consent has been given (and here I am excluding incompetent minors and adults), participants should not necessarily have unconditional or absolute rights to withdraw. This does not imply that there should be a complete absence of rights, or, indeed, an abandonment of the right to withdraw. The point of this paper is to show that the supposed unconditional or absolute nature of these rights may be self-defeating and so fail to respect the autonomy of participants. In addition, and on a more positive note, I suggest that, attaching certain conditions on the right to withdraw, may better respect the autonomy of these participants by underlining the idea that autonomy is more than mere whim or indifference to the fate of others. On the contrary, research staff are currently unable to 'push' participants, who may merely have logistical difficulties unrelated to the research itself, but who really want to stay the course, for fear of coercing them. Furthermore, researchers now try to 'screen out' people they think may be unreliable to protect the science of the study and so groups at risk of dropping out may be unfairly denied access to research treatments. I conclude that on-going negotiation between the relevant parties could be on balance the only truly acceptable way forward but concede certain important limitations to take into account.     

Research ethics committees: differences and moral judgement

Many people argue that disagreements and inconsistencies between Research Ethics Committees are morally problematic and there has been much effort to 'harmonise' their judgements. Some inconsistencies are bad because they are due to irrationality, or carelessness, or the operation of conflicting interests, an so should be reduced or removed. Other inconsistencies, we argue, are not bad and should be left or even encouraged. In this paper we examine three arguments to reject the view that we should strive for complete consistency between committees. The first argument is that differences in judgement are not necessarily incompatible with ideas of justice for patients who are potential participants of research reviewed by different committees. We call this 'the justice argument.' The second argument is that such committees do not have access to a single moral truth, to which their judgement is supposed to correspond. We call this the 'moral pluralism argument.' The third argument is that the process of ethics committee review is also morally relevant and not solely the outcome. We call this the 'due process argument.' While we fall short of establishing exactly how much variation and on what substantive issues would ethical permissible, we show that it is largely inevitable and that a certain amount of variation could be seen as a desirable part of the institution of medical research.     

What is wrong with ethics review,the impact on teaching anthropology,and how to fix it: results of an empirical study

There is no empirical evidence that ethics review protects anthropologists’ research participants, but there is ample evidence that it is stifling research agendas and reshaping how we teach anthropological research methods, entrenching a positivist, clinical model of what constitutes research. This paper examines the impact of ethics review on student research in Australia, based on interviews conducted at 14 Australian universities. The data clearly show that the risks posed by student research are minor, and vastly overestimated by ethics committees. To avoid problems with ethics committees, we shepherd students into undertaking low‐risk, and consequently low‐impact, research. Many departments are abandoning research‐led teaching altogether because of the obstacle of ethics review. One solution would be to locate ethics discussions in disciplines and departments, radically restructuring the encounter to reconceptualise it as collegial debate about ethics dilemmas rather than ‘ethics review’.     

PROFITS AND PLAGIARISM: THE CASE OF MEDICAL GHOSTWRITING

This paper focuses on medical ghostwriting in the United States. I argue that medical ghostwriting often involves plagiarism and, in those cases, can be treated as an act of research misconduct by both the federal government and research institutions. I also propose several anti‐ghostwriting measures, including: 1) journals should implement guarantor policies so that researchers may be better held accountable for their work; 2) research institutions and the federal government should explicitly prohibit medical ghostwriting and outline appropriate penalties; and 3) a publicly available database should be created to record researchers' ethics violations.     

ON THE MORALITY OF GUINEA‐PIG RECRUITMENT

Can it be wrong to conduct medical research on human subjects even with their informed consent and even when the transaction between the subjects and researchers is expected to be mutually beneficial? This question is especially pressing today in light of the rise of a semi‐professional class of ‘guinea pigs’– human research subjects that sell researchers a right of access to their bodies in exchange for money. Can these exchanges be morally problematic even when they are consensual and mutually beneficial? I argue that there are two general kinds of concern one can have about such transactions – concerns about the nature of what is sold and concerns about the conditions in which the selling occurs. The former involves worries about degradation and the possible wrongness of selling a right of access to one's body. These worries, I argue, are not very serious. The latter involves worries about coercion, exploitation, and undue influence – about how, by virtue of their ignorance, impulsiveness, or desperation, guinea pigs can be taken advantage of by medical researchers. These worries are quite serious but I argue that, at least in cases where the exchange between guinea pigs and researchers is consensual and mutually beneficial, they do not raise insurmountable moral problems.     

Publication: an ethical imperative.

Publication of medical research is both a monitor of the researcher''s ethics and an audit of the local or regional ethics committee that approved it. Selectivity of publication or of the intention to publish lessens this audit. Opinions differ about what is ethically allowable in clinical and benchtop medical research. Ethical permission and ethical monitoring of medical research are subject to a hierarchy of pyramidal controls, starting in hospital and ending with the local, institutional, or regional ethics committee. Currently, such committees function with widely varying degrees of efficiency and quality of output, and with differing viewpoints on many ethical issues. Without an a priori insistence by institutional ethics committees that there be an intention to publish all medical research involving human subjects, ethics committees cannot routinely be subject to the scrutiny or audit which they themselves demand of researchers.     

Who should Decide for the Unrepresented?

Unrepresented patients lack the capacity to make medical decisions for themselves, have no clear documentation of preferences for medical treatment, and have no surrogate decision maker or obvious candidate for that role. There is no consensus about who should serve as the decision maker for these patients, particularly regarding whether to continue or to limit life‐sustaining treatment. Several authors have argued that ethics committees should play this role rather than the patient's treating physician, a common current default. We argue that concerns about the adequacy of physicians as surrogates are either empirically unfounded or apply equally to ethics committees. We suggest that physicians should be the primary decision maker for the unrepresented because of their fiduciary duties toward their patients. As part of the process of fulfilling these duties, they should seek the advice of third parties such as ethic committees; but final end‐of‐life decision‐making for the unrepresented should rest with the treating physician.     

IS PAYMENT A BENEFIT?

What I call ‘the standard view’ claims that IRBs should not regard financial payment as a benefit to subjects for the purpose of risk/benefit assessment. Although the standard view is universally accepted, there is little defense of that view in the canonical documents of research ethics or the scholarly literature. This paper claims that insofar as IRBs should be concerned with the interests and autonomy of research subjects, they should reject the standard view and adopt ‘the incorporation view.’ The incorporation view is more consistent with the underlying soft‐paternalist justification for risk‐benefit assessment and demonstrates respect for the autonomy of prospective subjects. Adoption of the standard view precludes protocols that advance the interests of subjects, investigators, and society. After considering several objections to the argument, I consider several arguments for the standard view that do not appeal to the interests and autonomy of research subjects.     

Addressing the challenge for expedient ethical review of research in disasters and disease outbreaks

Guideline 20 of the updated International Ethics Guidelines for Health‐related Research Involving Humans (2016) by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) provides guidance on research in disasters and disease outbreaks against the background of the need to generate knowledge quickly, overcome practical impediments to implementing such research, and the need to maintain public trust. The guideline recommends that research ethics committees could pre‐screen study protocols to expedite ethical reviews in a situation of crisis, that pre‐arrangements be made regarding data sharing and biomedical sample sharing, and that sponsors and research ethics committees seek to minimize risk to researchers conducting research during a disaster. This paper critiques these recommendations against the background of the findings of a survey of public health officials and chairs of research ethics committees in the Caribbean during 2016, which sought to determine the best template for the expeditious ethical review of research proposals in emergency and epidemic situations in the Caribbean, and whose findings can serve as a model for other low‐ and middle‐income countries.     

Randomised Placebo-controlled trials and HIV-infected Pregnant Women in Developing Countries. Ethical Imperialism or Unethical Exploitation

The maternal-fetal HIV transmission trials, conducted in developing countries in the 1990s, undoubtedly generated one of the most intense, high profile controversies in international research ethics. They sparked off a prolonged acrimonious and public debate and deeply divided the scientific community. They also provided an impetus for the revision of the Declaration of Helsinki – the most widely known guideline for international research. In this paper, I provide a brief summary of the context, outline the arguments for and against the controversial use of placebo controls, and focus on particular areas that I believe merit further discussion or clarification. On balance, I argue that the researchers failed in their duties to protect the best interests of their research subjects, and to promote distributive justice. I discuss the difficulties of obtaining valid consent in this research context, and argue that it is unethical to inform women of their HIV status without at least offering them prophylactic treatment for their unborn children. A global view of justice, which endorses international equity, cannot be squared with international research guidelines that allow 'local conditions' to define the scope of duty to the control group. Finally, I suggest that the heated debate reflects a tension, if not an outright war, between two conflicting meta-ethical systems, or incommensurable paradigms, that underpin scientific research involving human subjects.     

Bystanders,risks, and consent

This paper considers the moral status of bystanders affected by medical research trials. Recent proposals advocate a very low threshold of permissible risk imposition upon bystanders that is insensitive to the prospective benefits of the trial, in part because we typically lack bystanders' consent. I argue that the correct threshold of permissible risk will be sensitive to the prospective gains of the trial. I further argue that one does not always need a person's consent to expose her to significant risks of even serious harm for the sake of others. That we typically need the consent of participants is explained by the fact that trials risk harmfully using participants, which is very hard to justify without consent. Bystanders, in contrast, are harmed as a side-effect, which is easier to justify. I then consider whether the degree of risk that a trial may impose on a bystander is sensitive to whether she is a prospective beneficiary of that trial.     

Consent and confidentiality in the light of recent demands for data sharing

Many attempts have been made to formalize ethical requirements for research. Among the most prominent mechanisms are informed consent requirements and data protection regimes. These mechanisms, however, sometimes appear as obstacles to research. In this opinion paper, we critically discuss conventional approaches to research ethics that emphasize consent and data protection. Several recent debates have highlighted other important ethical issues and underlined the need for greater openness in order to uphold the integrity of health‐related research. Some of these measures, such as the sharing of individual‐level data, pose problems for standard understandings of consent and privacy. Here, we argue that these interpretations tend to be overdemanding: They do not really protect research subjects and they hinder the research process. Accordingly, we suggest another way of framing these requirements. Individual consent must be situated alongside the wider distribution of knowledge created when the actions, commitments, and procedures of researchers and their institutions are opened to scrutiny. And instead of simply emphasizing privacy or data protection, we should understand confidentiality as a principle that facilitates the sharing of information while upholding important safeguards. Consent and confidentiality belong to a broader set of safeguards and procedures to uphold the integrity of the research process.     

Professional Hubris and its Consequences: Why Organizations of Health‐Care Professions Should Not Adopt Ethically Controversial Positions

In this article, I argue that professional healthcare organizations such as the AMA and ANA ought not to take controversial stances on professional ethics. I address the best putative arguments in favor of taking such stances, and argue that none are convincing. I then argue that the sort of stance‐taking at issue has pernicious consequences: it stands to curb critical thought in social, political, and legal debates, increase moral distress among clinicians, and alienate clinicians from their professional societies. Thus, because there are no good arguments in favor of stance‐taking and at least some risks in doing so, professional organizations should refrain from adopting the sort of ethically controversial positions at issue.     

Justifying the risks of COVID-19 challenge trials: The analogy with organ donation

In the beginning of the COVID pandemic, researchers and bioethicists called for human challenge trials to hasten the development of a vaccine for COVID. However, the fact that we lacked a specific, highly effective treatment for COVID led many to argue that a COVID challenge trial would be unethical and we ought to pursue traditional phase III testing instead. These ethical objections to challenge trials may have slowed the progress of a COVID vaccine, so it is important to evaluate their merit. One common way of doing so is to make an analogy to other social practices that are relevantly similar and which we currently sanction. We submit that non-directed live organ donation (NDLOD) is a promising analogy. After arguing that the risks to volunteers for each activity appear similar, we explore potential disanalogies that would undermine the comparison. We note that there are differences in both the kind and certainty of benefit secured by NDLOD compared to challenge trials. We conclude these differences are insufficient to make NDLOD permissible and challenge trials impermissible. Ultimately, if we think the risks associated with NDLOD are ethically permissible, then we should think the same of the risks associated with COVID challenge trials.     

A new approach to regulating the use of animals in science

Anderson was a member of the writing group for the recent revision of Australia's national Code of Practice for the use of animals in scientific research. Here he outlines the major features of the Code. These deal with animal experimentation ethics committees, with levels of pain and distress in subjects, with standards of care, and with the delineation of responsibilities among researchers, institutions, ethics committees, and caretakers. Anderson also describes how the Code is updated, and discusses its legal status, scientists' concerns, and the Code's future.     

Consent’s dominion: Dementia and prior consent to sexual relations

In this paper, I answer the following question: suppose that two individuals, C and D, have been in a long‐term committed relationship, and D now has dementia, while C is competent; if D agrees to have sex with C, is it permissible for C to have sex with D? Ultimately, I defend the view that, under certain conditions, D can give valid consent to sex with C, rendering sex between them permissible. Specifically, I argue that there is compelling reason to endorse the Prior Consent Thesis, which states the following: D, when competent, can give valid prior consent to sex with her competent partner (C) that will take place after she has dementia, assuming that D is the same person as she was when she gave prior consent, meaning that, if D, when competent, gave prior consent to sex with C, then C may permissibly have sex with D. In Section 2, I explain both the background and the existing literature on this issue. In Section 3, I outline relevant stipulations about the kinds of cases I will be examining. In Section 4, I defend the Prior Consent Thesis. And, in Section 5, I address objections to the Prior Consent Thesis.