GENETIC TIES: ARE THEY MORALLY BINDING?

Does genetic relatedness define who is a mother or father and who incurs obligations towards or entitlements over children? While once the answer to this question may have been obvious, advances in reproductive technologies have complicated our understanding of what makes a parent. In a recent publication Bayne and Kolers argue for a pluralistic account of parenthood on the basis that genetic derivation, gestation, extended custody and sometimes intention to parent are sufficient (but not necessary) grounds for parenthood. ¹ 1 Bayne, T. & Kolers, A. . Toward A Pluralist Account of Parenthood . Bioethics 2003 ; 17 : 221 – 242 .
Bayne and Kolers further suggest that definitions of parenthood are underpinned by the assumption that ‘being causally implicated in the creation of a child is the key basis for being its parent’. ² 2 Ibid. p. 241.
This paper examines the claim that genetic relatedness is sufficient grounds for parenthood based on a causal connection between genetic parents and their offspring. I argue that parental obligations are about moral responsibility and not causal responsibility because we are not morally accountable for every consequence to which we causally contribute. My account includes the conditions generally held to apply to moral responsibility, i.e. freedom and foreseeability. I argue that parental responsibilities are generated whenever the birth of a child is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of voluntary actions. I consider the implications of this account for third parties involved in reproductive technologies. I argue that under some conditions the obligations generated by freely and foreseeably causing a child to exist can be justifiably transferred to others.     

Genetic parenthood and causation: An objection to Douglas and Devolder’s modified direct proportionate genetic descent account

In a recent publication Tom Douglas and Katrien Devolder have proposed a new account of genetic parenthood, building on the work of Heidi Mertes. Douglas and Devolder’s account aims to solve, among other things, the question of who are the genetic parents of an individual created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (i.e. cloning): (a) the nuclear DNA provider or (b) the progenitors of the nuclear DNA provider. Such a question cannot be answered by simply appealing to the folk account of genetic parenthood, according to which the genetic parents of an individual are those individuals who produced the egg and sperm, respectively, which fused to create the embryo. It cannot be so as in cloning there is no fertilization as such. In this article I critically examine Douglas and Devolder’s new account of genetic parenthood and demonstrate that it is vulnerable to counterexamples that exploit the lack of a condition specifying that genetic parents should cause a child’s coming into existence.     

CLONING, PARENTHOOD, AND GENETIC RELATEDNESS

In this paper I examine what I take to be the best case for reproductive human cloning, as a medical procedure designed to overcome infertility, and argue that it founders on an irresolvable tension in the attitude towards the importance of being ‘genetically related’ to our children implied in the desire to clone. Except in the case where couples are cloning a child they have previously conceived naturally, cloning is unable to establish the right sort of genetic relation to make couples the parents of their cloned child. If anybody is the genetic parent of a cloned child it is the natural parent(s) of the DNA donor. Paradoxically, in order to resist the claims of the parents of the donor to the cloned child, the argument for human reproductive cloning must place more weight on the intention to parent a child, than we do in cases of ordinary reproduction. It must insist that the parental relation is established by the intentions of the couple who bring a clone into the world and not by their genetic relation to the child. The emphasis placed on intention as establishing the parental relationship works to undermine the justification for cloning in the first place. For cloning to play a useful role as a reproductive technology, it must allow couples to become parents who could do so no other way. However, to the extent that intention is sufficient to establish parenthood, adoption or surrogacy, which are existing alternatives to cloning, will serve equally well to allow couples to become parents.     

Causal parenthood and the ethics of gamete donation

According to the causal theory of parenthood, people incur parental obligations by causing children to exist. Proponents of the causal theory often argue that gamete donors have special obligations to their genetic offspring. In response, many defenders of current gamete donation practices would reject the causal theory. In particular, they may invoke the ‘too many parents problem’: many people who causally contribute to the existence of children – for instance, fertility doctors – do not thereby incur parental obligations. This article argues that the conclusions commonly drawn by causal theorists, and by their critics, are premature. Causal theorists have a promising response to the too many parents problem. This response, however, defuses the moral concern that many causal theorists have raised about gamete donation. A similar point, it is argued, applies to Rivka Weinberg's ‘Hazmat Theory’.     

GENETIC ENGINEERING TO AVOID GENETIC NEGLECT: FROM CHANCE TO RESPONSIBILITY

Currently our assessment of whether someone is a good parent depends on the environmental inputs (or lack of such inputs) they give their children. But new genetic intervention technologies, to which we may soon have access, mean that how good a parent is will depend also on the genetic inputs they give their children. Each new piece of available technology threatens to open up another way that we can neglect our children. Our obligations to our children and our susceptibilities to corresponding legal and moral sanctions may be about to explosively increase. In this paper I argue that we should treat conventional neglect and ‘genetic neglect’– failing to use genetic intervention technologies to prevent serious diseases and disabilities – morally consistently. I conclude that in a range of cases parents will have a moral obligation to use genetic treatments to prevent serious disabilities in their children. My particular focus is on prenatal interventions and their impact of the bodily integrity of expectant mothers. I conclude that although bodily integrity constrains moral obligations, it is outweighed in a range of cases.     

Toward a pluralistic account of parenthood

What is it that makes someone a parent? Many writers – call them ‘monists’– claim that parenthood is grounded solely in one essential feature that is both necessary and sufficient for someone's being a parent. We reject not only monism but also ‘necessity’ views, in which some specific feature is necessary but not also sufficient for parenthood. Our argument supports what we call ‘pluralism’, the view that any one of several kinds of relationship is sufficient for parenthood. We begin by challenging monistic versions of gestationalism, the view that gestation uniquely grounds parenthood. Monistic and necessity gestationalism are implausible. First, we raise the ‘paternity problem’– necessity gestationalists lack an adequate account of how men become fathers. Second, the positive arguments that necessity gestationalists give are not compelling. However, although gestation may not be a necessary condition for parenthood, there is good reason to think that it is sufficient. After further rebutting an ‘intentionalist’ account of parenthood, in which having and acting on intentions to procreate and rear is necessary for parenthood, we end by sketching a pluralist picture of the nature of parenthood, rooted in causation, on which gestation, direct genetic derivation, extended custody, and even, sometimes, intentions, may be individually sufficient for parenthood.     

Ectogenesis,abortion and a right to the death of the fetus

Many people believe that the abortion debate will end when at some point in the future it will be possible for fetuses to develop outside the womb. Ectogenesis, as this technology is called, would make possible to reconcile pro‐life and pro‐choice positions. That is because it is commonly believed that there is no right to the death of the fetus if it can be detached alive and gestated in an artificial womb. Recently Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis defended this position, by arguing against three common arguments for a right to the death of the fetus. I claim that their arguments are mistaken. I argue that there is a right to the death of the fetus because gestating a fetus in an artificial womb when genetic parents refuse it violates their rights not to become a biological parent, their rights to genetic privacy and their property rights. The right to the death of the fetus, however, is not a woman's right but genetic parents’ collective right which only can be used together.     

A conception of genetic parenthood

We seek to develop a plausible conception of genetic parenthood, taking a recent discussion by Heidi Mertes as our point of departure. Mertes considers two conceptions of genetic parenthood—one invoking genetic resemblance and the other genetic inheritance—and presents counter‐examples to both conceptions. We revise Mertes’ second conception so as to avoid these and related counter‐examples.     

Sperm,Clinics, and Parenthood

In this article I examine a recent approach to regulating assisted reproduction, whereby use of some kind of medical intervention ‘triggers’ laws governing legal parenthood that are more favourable to intending parents and sperm providers. I argue that although perhaps an improvement on the previous legal framework, these laws are problematic for three important reasons. First, they are prone to violating parental rights and unjustly imposing substantial burdens on individuals. Second, they are discriminatory. Third, even if we take a pragmatic approach to the question of parenthood in these cases, these laws fail to properly consider the welfare interests of children. Finally, I conclude by showing that my argument does not entail adopting a laissez‐fair attitude to conception using third‐party sperm.     

A lost cause? Fundamental problems for causal theories of parenthood

In this paper, I offer a critique of (actual and possible) causal theories of parenthood. I do not offer a competing account of who incurs parental obligations and why; rather, I aim to show that there are fundamental problems for any account of who acquires parental obligations and why by appeal to causal responsibility for a child’s existence. I outline and justify three criteria that any plausible causal account of parental obligation must meet, and demonstrate that attempting to fulfil all three criteria simultaneously will give rise to one or both of two potentially insurmountable dilemmas.     

FURTHERING INJUSTICES AGAINST WOMEN: GENETIC INFORMATION, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, AND GENDER

The purpose of this paper is to show that a decontextualized approach to ethical issues is not just unhelpful for the decision making process of real, situated human beings, but dangerous. This is so, because by neglecting the context in which people make moral decisions we run the risk of reinforcing or furthering injustices against already disadvantaged groups. To show this, I evaluate three moral obligations that our ability to obtain genetic information has made salient: the duty to obtain genetic information about ourselves, the obligation to inform family members about genetic risks and the duty not to reproduce when we know that there is a high risk of transmitting a serious disease or defect. I will argue here that in ignoring the context in which these moral obligations are put into practice, and in particular the situation of women in our society, those who defend these moral duties might be furthering injustices against women.     

What's History Got to Do with It? A Response to Seddon's Definition of Reintroduction

A recent article in Restoration Ecology by Philip Seddon aims at unraveling the definitions of various types of species translocations—from reintroductions to assisted colonization—and points out the slippery slope of misused words. I argue here that defining reintroduction is not as straightforward as Seddon presents it. Commonly used definitions of what constitutes a reintroduction all include some reference to “historical” conditions, but what exactly that encompasses is left open. I examine two parts of the reintroduction confusion: first, how the guidance documents and laws define reintroduction and second, how these definitions might be interpreted when reintroductions are presented in public forums. Rather than moving away from reintroductions toward interventions of other names, I encourage scientists to use a broad definition of reintroduction presented by the IUCN to open up reintroduction as a viable label for bringing a species back to an area regardless of when it was previously there or why it became extinct.     

Differential parental investment in families with both adopted and genetic children

Stepchildren are abused, neglected and murdered at higher rates than those who live with two genetically related parents. Daly and Wilson used kin selection theory to explain this finding and labeled the phenomenon “discriminative parental solicitude.” I examined discriminative parental solicitude in American households composed of both genetic and unrelated adopted children. In these families, kin selection predicts parents should favor their genetic children over adoptees. Rather than looking at cases of abuse, neglect, homicide and other antisocial behavior, I focused on the positive investments parents made in their children as well as the outcomes of each child. The results show that parents invested more in adopted children than in genetically related ones, especially in educational and personal areas. At the same time, adoptees experienced more negative outcomes. They were more likely to have been arrested, to have been on public assistance and to require treatment for drug, alcohol or mental health issues. They also completed fewer years of schooling and were more likely to divorce. In adoptive families, it appears that “the squeaky wheel gets the grease.” Parents invest more in adoptees not because they favor them, but because they are more likely than genetic children to need the help. I conclude that discriminative parental solicitude differs in adoptive and step households because adoptive families generally result from prolonged parenting effort, not mating effort like stepfamilies.     

QUANTITATIVE GENETICS OF SIZE AND PHENOLOGY OF LIFE-HISTORY TRAITS IN CHAMAECRISTA FASCICULATA

Despite numerous adaptive scenarios concerning the evolution of plant life-history phenologies few studies have examined the heritable basis for and genetic correlations among these phenologies. Documentation of genetic variation for and covariation among reproductive phenologies is important because it is this variation/covariation that will determine the potential for response to evolutionary forces. To address this problem, I conducted a breeding experiment to determine narrow-sense heritabilities for and genetic correlations among the phenologies of life-history events and plant size in Chamaecristafasciculata, a temperate summer annual plant species. Paternal families showed no evidence of heritable variation for two estimates of plant size, six measures of reproductive phenology or two fitness components. Similarly, paternal estimates of genetic correlations among these traits were low or zero. In contrast, maternal estimates of heritability suggested the influence of maternal parent on one estimate of plant size and four phenological traits. Likewise, maternal effects influenced maternal estimates of genetic correlations. These maternal effects can arise from three sources: endosperm nuclear, cytoplasmic genetic and/or maternal phenotypic. The degree to which the phenology of one life-history trait acts as a constraint on the evolution of other phenological traits depends on the source of the maternal influence in this species.     

Germ-line engineering,freedom, and future generations

New technologies in germ–line engineering have raised many questions about obligations to future generations. In this article, I focus on the importance of increasing freedom and the equality of freedom for present and future generations, because these two ideals are necessary for a just society and because they are most threatened by the wide–scale privatisation of GLE technologies. However, there are ambiguities in applying these ideals to the issue of genetic technologies. I argue that Amartya Sen's capability theory can be used as a framework to ensure freedom and equality in the use of GLE technology. Capability theory articulates the goal of equalising real freedom by bringing all people up to a threshold of basic human capabilities. Sen's capability theory can clarify the proper moral goal of GLE insofar as this technology could be used to bring people up to certain basic human capabilities, thereby increasing their real freedom. And by increasing the freedom of those who lack basic human capabilities, GLE can aid in decreasing the inequalities of freedom among classes of people.     

Heritability: one word, three concepts

The term 'heritability', which evokes the image of transmission from parents to children, is used in biology to characterize the resemblance of related individuals in terms of a given characteristic, and to analyse the genetic and environmental causes of this resemblance. In fact, there are three definitions of heritability and it is important to distinguish among these carefully in order to avoid misinterpretations. Various techniques for measuring associated parameters are linked to these definitions. A rigorous analysis of the assumptions which permit the interpretation of parameter estimates is necessary to avoid false conclusions.     

Altruistic surrogacy and informed consent

A crucial premise in many recent arguments against the moral permissibility of surrogate motherhood arrangements is the claim that a woman cannot autonomously consent to gestating and relinquishing a child to another couple, because she cannot be fully informed about what her future emotional responses will be to the foetus developing within her, and to the giving up of the newborn infant to its social parents. When conjoined with some moral principle about the justifiable limits on the ways others can be expected to exercise their autonomy on our behalf, this claim is often taken to establish that various forms of surrogate motherhood arrangements are morally wrong. In this paper I want to show that there is a serious non sequitur in this kind of argument. That is, I want to show that even if women cannot in fact have this kind of information about what their future emotional responses to pregnancy and relinquishment will be, nothing follows about the wrongness or otherwise of surrogacy. For, when we consider what counts as informed consent in the context of other important ventures with uncertain consequences, it becomes clear that informed consent does not require having this kind of information about one's future emotional states. In putting these arguments, I also hope to clarify some of the connections which might be thought to hold between informed consent and autonomous decision-making generally.     

Recurrent Herpetic Stromal Keratitis in Mice,a Model for Studying Human HSK

Herpetic eye disease, termed herpetic stromal keratitis (HSK), is a potentially blinding infection of the cornea that results in over 300,000 clinical visits each year for treatment. Between 1 and 2 percent of those patients with clinical disease will experience loss of vision of the infected cornea. The vast majority of these cases are the result of reactivation of a latent infection by herpes simplex type I virus and not due to acute disease. Interestingly, the acute infection is the model most often used to study this disease. However, it was felt that a recurrent model of HSK would be more reflective of what occurs during clinical disease. The recurrent animal models for HSK have employed both rabbits and mice. The advantage of rabbits is that they experience reactivation from latency absent any known stimulus. That said, it is difficult to explore the role that many immunological factors play in recurrent HSK because the rabbit model does not have the immunological and genetic resources that the mouse has. We chose to use the mouse model for recurrent HSK because it has the advantage of there being many resources available and also we know when reactivation will occur because reactivation is induced by exposure to UV-B light. Thus far, this model has allowed those laboratories using it to define several immunological factors that are important to this disease. It has also allowed us to test both therapeutic and vaccine efficacy.     

Mothers,Fathers, Families,and Circumstances: Factors Affecting Children's Adjustment

The burgeoning empirical literature exploring the factors accounting for individual differences in psychological adjustment is reviewed. Many studies have shown that adjustment is largely affected by differences in the quality of parenting and parent–child relationships, the quality of the relationships between the parents, and the richness of the economic and social resources available to the family; more recent research signals the importance of congenital differences as well. Dimensions of family structure—including such factors as divorce, single parenthood, and the parents' sexual orientation—and biological relatedness between parents and children are of little or no predictive importance once the process variables are taken into account, because the same factors explain child adjustment regardless of family structure. These findings have important social and legal implications, especially in relation to decisions regarding foster care and adoption, as well as those concerning children's well-being following family dissolution.     

Heritability of heterozygosity offers a new way of understanding why dominant gene action contributes to additive genetic variance

Whenever allele frequencies are unequal, nonadditive gene action contributes to additive genetic variance and therefore the resemblance between parents and offspring. The reason for this has not been easy to understand. Here, we present a new single‐locus decomposition of additive genetic variance that may give greater intuition about this important result. We show that the contribution of dominant gene action to parent–offspring resemblance only depends on the degree to which the heterozygosity of parents and offspring covary. Thus, dominant gene action only contributes to additive genetic variance when heterozygosity is heritable. Under most circumstances this is the case because individuals with rare alleles are more likely to be heterozygous, and because they pass rare alleles to their offspring they also tend to have heterozygous offspring. When segregating alleles are at equal frequency there are no rare alleles, the heterozygosities of parents and offspring are uncorrelated and dominant gene action does not contribute to additive genetic variance.