Models of parent-offspring conflict. V. Effects of the behaviour of the two parents

In the absence of any parent-offspring conflict, the total parental investment per offspring should be less when two parents collaborate in caring for the offspring than when only one parent invests. This does not necessarily mean that offspring fare less well when both parents invest. The ‘ideal’ amount of parental investment for an offspring to take is always greater than is ‘ideal’ for the parent to allocate (Trivers 1974). The offspring's optimum is higher if the offspring's action affects the reproductive success of only one parent and lower if both parents are affected (e.g. two-parent investment, or lifelong monogamy). The difference between the parental optimum and the offspring optimum depends on the mating system and on the form of conflict (between successive broods, or within broods), and prescribes a ‘conflict range’. The extent of conflict cannot be deduced solely from a knowledge of the average relatedness between siblings. The conflict is likely to be resolved by an ESS in which intermediate (compromise) levels of investment are paid out to offspring, which nevertheless continue to make costly demands for yet more investment. The degree of conflict can be measured by the extent to which offspring subject their parents to aggressive demands for extra investment, and is likely to be greater when two parents collaborate equally over investment than when only one parent invests. When only one parent invests, conflict is higher if sibling-competition is between siblings in the same broods (intra-brood) than when it is between progeny in successive broods (inter-brood). However, the reverse will tend to be the case when both parents invest equally.     

Investment in attending to cues and the evolution of amplifiers

Signals and cues are extensively used in social interactions across diverse communication systems. Here, we extend an existing theoretical framework to explore investment by emitters and perceivers in the fidelity with which cues and signals associated with the former are detected by the latter. Traits of the emitter that improve cue or signal fidelity without adding information are termed ‘amplifiers’. We assume that each party can invest in improving fidelity but that it is increasingly costly the more fidelity is improved. Our model predicts that evolution of amplifier traits of a pre‐existing cue occurs over a broader range of circumstances than evolution of signalling in situations where the emitter offered no pre‐existing cue to the perceiver. It further predicts that the greater the intrinsic informational value of a cue, the more likely it is that the perceiver (and not the emitter) will invest in the fidelity of detecting that cue. A consequence of this predicted asymmetry is that true communication with reciprocal adaptations in emitters and perceivers to improve signal fidelity is likely to occur predominantly for traits of intermediate reliability. The corollary is that uncertainty of the perceiver will then be a key feature of communication. Uncertainty can arise because perceivers misinterpret signals or do not perceive them correctly, but here we argue that uncertainty is more fundamentally at the root of communication because traits that are intrinsically highly informative will induce only the perceiver and not the emitter to invest in improved fidelity of perception of that trait.     

Models of parent-offspring conflict. IV. Suppression: Evolutionary retaliation by the parent

We have earlier analysed ESSs for the amount of parental investment (PI) that offspring are expected to solicit from their parents, given that parents acquiesce to offspring demands. The present paper considers evolutionary retaliation by the parent for species where only one parent provides PI. Two genetic loci are envisaged: one (the ‘conflictor’ locus) determines the extent of offspring solicitation; the other (the ‘suppressor’ locus) determines how parents retaliate. Solicitation is assumed to carry a cost which may affect a particular offspring uniquely if time and energy are the major costs, or may affect all offspring in a brood equally if the main cost is predation risk. Two kinds of parental retaliation are possible. Parents may supply PI in proportion to offspring demands, or may ignore solicitation altogether and give a fixed PI. Analytical models of conflict in which the parent supplies PI in proportion to solicitation yield pure ESSs with PI at a compromise level between parent and offspring interests. These are termed ‘pro rata’ ESSs. Where solicitation costs are high, an ‘offspring wins’ ESS (offspring get all they ‘want’) is possible especially for forms of conflict that affect future sibs, and a ‘parent wins’ ESS (parent supplies its optimum) is possible especially for conflict that affects contemporary sibs. When parental retaliation takes the form of ignoring offspring solicitation, this can lead to a ‘parent wins’ ESS if costs of ignoring solicitation are negligible, but where parental insensitivity carries costs, the result is an unresolvable evolutionary chase with cycling frequencies of alleles coding for parent and offspring strategies. ‘Pro rata’ ESSs cannot be invaded by ‘ignore solicitation’ mutants but ‘pro rata’ mutants can often invade at certain stages in ‘ignore solicitation’ limit cycles. We therefore conclude that the probable evolutionary end product for most species will be the ‘pro rata’ ESS in which the parent supplies more PI than would be optimal in the absence of conflict, but less PI than would be an ESS for the offspring in the absence of parental retaliation. Such ESSs will be characterized by solicitation costs; offspring will ‘ask’ for more PI than they get. In nature, under similar conditions, highest conflict will occur when both parents sustain equally the effects of conflict, or when conflict affects contemporary rather than future sibs.     

Sibling negotiation

Current discussions of offspring begging typically assume eitherthat it is a signal directed at parents or that it representsa form of scramble competition to gain access to them. However,offspring might also display to inform nest mates that theywill contest the next food item to be delivered; in other words,begging (possibly in the absence of parents) might serve purelyas a form of negotiation among siblings. Here, we develop agame-theoretical model of this possibility. We assume that offspringvary in their need for food, which influences how intenselythey compete for access to parents. Before parental arrival,however, young may exchange signals informing each other oftheir state, and these signals may influence their subsequentcompetitive behavior. We focus on the possibility that a costlydisplay during the "negotiation" phase can serve to inform rivalsof a chick's need for resources and thereby deter them fromcompeting intensely when the parent arrives. We show that thisform of negotiation is more likely to prove stable when thefood delivered by parents is indivisible, and when it is hardfor one chick to monopolize access to resources. Investmentin negotiation (as opposed to competition) is predicted to increasewith nestling relatedness; in addition, all other things beingequal, hungrier chicks are expected to invest relatively moreeffort in displaying to their rivals, whereas weaker or smallerchicks are expected to invest less.     

Mouth colour components of begging are dynamic signals of quality in European starling nestlings

Offspring solicit food from their parents through begging signals. Nestling skin and flange coloration are begging signals that appear to convey information about nestling need or condition, and several experiments have shown that modifications of nestling coloration affect parental allocation decisions. However, it is important to examine the short‐term changes in these signalling components in response to food constraints since such dynamic changes are required for signals to indicate condition or need. Using a food deprivation experiment, we tested whether flange and skin reflectance in European starling Sturnus vulgaris nestlings change after a three‐hour interval. We investigated whether flange and skin reflectance changed according to the predictions arising from the ‘signal of quality’ or ‘signal of need’ hypotheses on the function of begging signals. We found that flange carotenoid and UV reflectance changed according to the signal of quality hypothesis with nestlings in good condition increasing their signal expression in response to the food deprivation, whereas those in poor condition decreased their signal expression. With the use of vision modelling, we show that changes in flange reflectance are detectable by starling parents. In contrast, we found a correlation going in the opposite direction for changes in skin UV reflectance. Nestlings with low lipid reserves increased their reflectance compared to nestlings with high reserves. However, vision modelling showed that short‐term changes in skin UV reflectance are not large enough to be detectable by the parents. Our study shows that flange carotenoid and UV reflectance are dynamic components of begging with short‐term variations that can be used by parents as signals of nestling quality.     

Signalling among relatives. I. Is costly signalling too costly?

Zahavi''s handicap principle,originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection ofelaborate male traits, suggests that a sufficient cost to dishonest signals can outweigh the rewards of deception and allow individuals to communicate honestly. Maynard Smith (1991) and Johnstone and Grafen (1992) introduce the Sir Philip Sidney game in order to extend the handicap principle to interactions among related individuals, and to demonstrate that stable costly signalling systems can exist among relatives.In this paper we demonstrate that despite the benefits associated with honest information transfer, the costs incurred in a stable costly signalling system may leave all participants worse off than they would be in a system with no signalling at all. In both the discrete and continuous forms of the Sir Philip Sidney game, there exist conditions under which costly signalling among relatives, while stable, is so costly that it is disadvantageous compared with no signalling at all. We determine the factors which dictate signal cost and signal benefit in a generalized version of this game, and explain how signal cost can exceed signal value. Such results raise concerns about theevolutionary pathways which could have led to the existence of signalling equilibria in nature. The paper stresses the importance of comparing signalling equilibria with other possible strategies, beforedrawing conclusions regarding the optimality of signalling.     

Patch Defence in the Parasitoid Wasp Trissolcus basalis (Insecta: Scelionidae): The Time Structure of Pairwise Contests,and the ‘Waiting Game’

Aggressive defence of host patches has been reported in many parasitoid wasps, but rarely examined in quantitative detail. One aspect of interest is that foraging female parasitoids do not simply consume resource patches, they invest offspring in them. Therefore, patch defence in parasitoids can involve not only resource defence prior to oviposition, but also postoviposition defence of offspring (maternal care). In this paper, the time-structure and sequence of pairwise agonistic contests between females of the parasitoid Trissolcus basalis (Wollaston) (Hymenoptera: Scelionidae) are analysed. Three main periods were evident in contests. In the first period, both females exploited the patch with no aggression. After the initiation of fighting, they entered a ‘contest period’, during which resident and intruder roles became clearly resolved. The resident then usually guarded the patch for up to several hours before leaving. This signalled the beginning of the third period, in which the intruder returned to superparasitise the patch. During the contest period, resident behaviour initially reflected the trade-off between exploiting fresh hosts, and defending those it had already parasitised from the intruder, which persistently returned to the patch to try and oviposit, with some success. However, when the patch became fully parasitised, both resident and intruder switched to a ‘waiting game’, in which they sat motionless for extended periods, the resident on the patch and the intruder at a distance. These stand-offs were punctuated by occasional aggressive patrolling by the resident, and cryptic returns to the palch by the intruder. This waiting game appears to be an informational war of attrition, suggesting a conceptual basis for modelling patch-leaving decisions using evolutionary game theory.     

To call or not to call: parents assess the vulnerability of their young before warning them about predators

Communication about predators can reveal the effects of both conspecific and heterospecific audiences on signalling strategy, providing insight into signal function and animal cognition. In species that alarm call to their young, parents face a fundamental dilemma: calling can silence noisy offspring and so make them less likely to be overheard, but can also alert predators that young are nearby. Parents could resolve this dilemma by being sensitive to the current vulnerability of offspring, and calling only when young are most at risk. Testing whether offspring vulnerability affects parental strategy has proved difficult, however, because more vulnerable broods are often also more valuable. We tested experimentally whether parent white-browed scrubwren, Sericornis frontalis, assessed brood noisiness when alarm calling near nests. When a model predator was nearby, parents gave more alarm calls when playbacks simulated noisy broods, yet brood noisiness did not affect adult calling when only a control model was present. Parents were therefore sensitive to the tradeoff between silencing young and alerting predators to the presence of nests. Our study demonstrates that receiver vulnerability can affect signalling decisions in species other than primates.     

Colour also matters for nocturnal birds: owlet bill coloration advertises quality and influences parental feeding behaviour in little owls

Chromatic signals of offspring quality have been shown to play a role in parent–offspring communication in diurnal birds, but are assumed to be useless in dim light conditions because colour-based discrimination probably requires more light. A major ecological and evolutionary conundrum in this scenario is why the nestlings of some nocturnal owls display colourful beaks. Here, we test the hypothesis that yellow bill coloration of owlets of the nocturnal little owl Athene noctua may function as a chromatic signal revealing to parents aspects of quality of their offspring. In a first step, we examined physical variation in bill coloration and its covariation with owlet quality. Secondly, we studied parental provisioning in relation to an experimental manipulation of bill coloration of owlets. Bills of owlets showed higher within-nest variation in yellow–red chroma than in brightness. Plasma carotenoid concentration and nestling immunological status were not associated with chromatic or achromatic features of the bill. Interestingly, however, heavier owlets displayed more yellow bills than lighter ones. The effect of bill coloration on parental favouritism changed with brood size. Parents holding large broods preferentially fed owlets with enhanced over reduced yellow bill coloration, whereas those with small broods did not significantly bias feeding in relation to owlet bill coloration. Our results, based on integration of objective spectrophotometric assessment of colour and experimental procedures, confirm that parent little owls use bill coloration to reveal information on owlet body mass to adjust their feeding strategies, thus highlighting the importance of considering potential chromatic signals for a full comprehension of parent–offspring communication processes in nocturnal bird species.     

The Handicap Principle: how an erroneous hypothesis became a scientific principle

The most widely cited explanation for the evolution of reliable signals is Zahavi's so‐called Handicap Principle, which proposes that signals are honest because they are costly to produce. Here we provide a critical review of the Handicap Principle and its theoretical development. We explain why this idea is erroneous, and how it nevertheless became widely accepted as the leading explanation for honest signalling. In 1975, Zahavi proposed that elaborate secondary sexual characters impose ‘handicaps’ on male survival, not due to inadvertent signalling trade‐offs, but as a mechanism that functions to demonstrate males' genetic quality to potential mates. His handicap hypothesis received many criticisms, and in response, Zahavi clarified his hypothesis and explained that it assumes that signals are wasteful as well as costly, and that they evolve because wastefulness enforces honesty. He proposed that signals evolve under ‘signal selection’, a non‐Darwinian type of selection that favours waste rather than efficiency. He maintained that the handicap hypothesis provides a general principle to explain the evolution of all types of signalling systems, i.e. the Handicap Principle. In 1977, Zahavi proposed a second hypothesis for honest signalling, which received many different labels and interpretations, although it was assumed to be another example of handicap signalling. In 1990, Grafen published models that he claimed vindicated Zahavi's Handicap Principle. His conclusions were widely accepted and the Handicap Principle subsequently became the dominant paradigm for explaining the evolution of honest signalling in the biological and social sciences. Researchers have subsequently focused on testing predications of the Handicap Principle, such as measuring the absolute costs of honest signals (and using energetic and other proximate costs as proxies for fitness), but very few have attempted to test Grafen's models. We show that Grafen's models do not support the handicap hypothesis, although they do support Zahavi's second hypothesis, which proposes that males adjust their investment into the expression of their sexual signals according to their condition and ability to bear the costs (and risks to their survival). Rather than being wasteful over‐investments, honest signals evolve in this scenario because selection favours efficient and optimal investment into signal expression and minimizes signalling costs. This idea is very different from the handicap hypothesis, but it has been widely misinterpreted and equated to the Handicap Principle. Theoretical studies have since shown that signalling costs paid at the equilibrium are neither sufficient nor necessary to maintain signal honesty, and that honesty can evolve through differential benefits, as well as differential costs. There have been increasing criticisms of the Handicap Principle, but they have focused on the limitations of Grafen's model and overlooked the fact that it is not a handicap model. This model is better understood within a Darwinian framework of adaptive signalling trade‐offs, without the added burden and confusing logic of the Handicap Principle. There is no theoretical or empirical support for the Handicap Principle and the time is long overdue to usher this idea into an ‘honorable retirement’.     

以杜鹃红山茶为母本的优良种间杂交父本筛选

以杜鹃红山茶(Camellia azalea)为母本,‘绿带可娜’、‘红芙蓉’、‘迪朱丽亚’等13个观赏性较强的山茶花品种为父本,采用常规杂交育种方法,共配置13个杂交组合进行杂交试验。以坐果率、结实率、出苗率、单花成苗率作为评价亲和性的指标对杂交父本进行筛选,利用因子分析法对杂交组合亲和力进行综合评价,并采用形态鉴定法比较杂交子代与父母本主要性状差异。结果表明,‘绿带可娜’、‘玛丽费丝’、‘尼丽夫人’、‘花露珍’、‘娃丽娜深’为亲和性高的父本,杜鹃红山茶ב绿带可娜’、杜鹃红山茶ב玛丽费丝’为杂交亲和性较高的组合。杜鹃红山茶种间杂交后代花色、花型表现趋于父本,叶片更接近于母本杜鹃红山茶,杂交后代均遗传母本全年开花的特性。     

The signaller's dilemma: a cost-benefit analysis of public and private communication

Background

Understanding the diversity of animal signals requires knowledge of factors which may influence the different stages of communication, from the production of a signal by the sender up to the detection, identification and final decision-making in the receiver. Yet, many studies on signalling systems focus exclusively on the sender, and often ignore the receiver side and the ecological conditions under which signals evolve.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We study a neotropical katydid which uses airborne sound for long distance communication, but also an alternative form of private signalling through substrate vibration. We quantified the strength of predation by bats which eavesdrop on the airborne sound signal, by analysing insect remains at roosts of a bat family. Males do not arbitrarily use one or the other channel for communication, but spend more time with private signalling under full moon conditions, when the nocturnal rainforest favours predation by visually hunting predators. Measurements of metabolic CO₂-production rate indicate that the energy necessary for signalling increases 3-fold in full moon nights when private signalling is favoured. The background noise level for the airborne sound channel can amount to 70 dB SPL, whereas it is low in the vibration channel in the low frequency range of the vibration signal. The active space of the airborne sound signal varies between 22 and 35 meters, contrasting with about 4 meters with the vibration signal transmitted on the insect''s favourite roost plant. Signal perception was studied using neurophysiological methods under outdoor conditions, which is more reliable for the private mode of communication.

Conclusions/Significance

Our results demonstrate the complex effects of ecological conditions, such as predation, nocturnal ambient light levels, and masking noise levels on the performance of receivers in detecting mating signals, and that the net advantage or disadvantage of a mode of communication strongly depends on these conditions.     

Cooperation and the common good

In this paper, we draw the attention of biologists to a result from the economic literature, which suggests that when individuals are engaged in a communal activity of benefit to all, selection may favour cooperative sharing of resources even among non-relatives. Provided that group members all invest some resources in the public good, they should refrain from conflict over the division of these resources. The reason is that, given diminishing returns on investment in public and private goods, claiming (or ceding) a greater share of total resources only leads to the actor (or its competitors) investing more in the public good, such that the marginal costs and benefits of investment remain in balance. This cancels out any individual benefits of resource competition. We illustrate how this idea may be applied in the context of biparental care, using a sequential game in which parents first compete with one another over resources, and then choose how to allocate the resources they each obtain to care of their joint young (public good) versus their own survival and future reproductive success (private good). We show that when the two parents both invest in care to some extent, they should refrain from any conflict over the division of resources. The same effect can also support asymmetric outcomes in which one parent competes for resources and invests in care, whereas the other does not invest but refrains from competition. The fact that the caring parent gains higher fitness pay-offs at these equilibria suggests that abandoning a partner is not always to the latter''s detriment, when the potential for resource competition is taken into account, but may instead be of benefit to the ‘abandoned’ mate.     

Negative feedback from maternal signals reduces false alarms by collectively signalling offspring

Within animal groups, individuals can learn of a predator's approach by attending to the behaviour of others. This use of social information increases an individual's perceptual range, but can also lead to the propagation of false alarms. Error copying is especially likely in species that signal collectively, because the coordination required for collective displays relies heavily on social information. Recent evidence suggests that collective behaviour in animals is, in part, regulated by negative feedback. Negative feedback may reduce false alarms by collectively signalling animals, but this possibility has not yet been tested. We tested the hypothesis that negative feedback increases the accuracy of collective signalling by reducing the production of false alarms. In the treehopper Umbonia crassicornis, clustered offspring produce collective signals during predator attacks, advertising the predator's location to the defending mother. Mothers signal after evicting the predator, and we show that this maternal communication reduces false alarms by offspring. We suggest that maternal signals elevate offspring signalling thresholds. This is, to our knowledge, the first study to show that negative feedback can reduce false alarms by collectively behaving groups.     

The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty

Animals often convey useful information, despite a conflict of interest between the signaller and receiver. There are two major explanations for such ‘honest’ signalling, particularly when the size or intensity of signals reliably indicates the underlying quality of the signaller. Costly signalling theory (including the handicap principle) predicts that dishonest signals are too costly to fake, whereas the index hypothesis predicts that dishonest signals cannot be faked. Recent evidence of a highly conserved causal link between individual quality and signal growth appears to bolster the index hypothesis. However, it is not clear that this also diminishes costly signalling theory, as is often suggested. Here, by incorporating a mechanism of signal growth into costly signalling theory, we show that index signals can actually be favoured owing to the cost of dishonesty. We conclude that costly signalling theory provides the ultimate, adaptive rationale for honest signalling, whereas the index hypothesis describes one proximate (and potentially very general) mechanism for achieving honesty.     

Do honest signalling models of offspring solicitation apply to insects?

Honest signalling models predict that the intensity of solicitation by offspring influences the level of provisioning provided by parents and reflects offspring need. The empirical evidence supporting these predictions primarily comes from studies of birds or mammals. Thus, although parental care of altricial offspring is taxonomically widespread, the generality of these models is not well known. To investigate whether honest signalling models apply to insects, we manipulated parent and offspring behaviour in the burying beetle Nicrophorus orbicollis, a species with advanced parental care. First, within biparental care, we manipulated the brood size to alter the parents'' perception of offspring need. We measured the care giving behaviour of male and female parents to examine whether either adjusts its level of care according to offspring need. In the second experiment, because two parents together provision the brood more often than single parents, we manipulated the number of care givers (uniparental and biparental care) and measured offspring solicitation to assess whether offspring change their behaviour in response to need. Our results show that parent behaviour is broadly consistent with the first prediction of the models; both sexes provisioned larger broods more often than smaller broods. Larval solicitation was also consistent with the second prediction; larvae that were provisioned less often begged more. Our results provide evidence that honest signalling models can be applied to insects as well as vertebrates, although there are also subtle differences in care giving behaviour that may be important.     

Begging the question: are offspring solicitation behaviours signals of need?

Throughout the animal kingdom, distinctive behaviour by offspring commonly precedes and accompanies their provisioning by parents. Here, we assess empirical support for the recent theory that begging advertises offspring need, that parents provision young in relation to begging intensity, and that the apparently costly nature of begging ensures the reliability of the signal. While there is some support for the predictions of honest signalling models, empirical work has also revealed a host of complexities (such as the use of multiple signals) that existing theoretical analyses have only begun to address.     

An experimental analysis of receiver economics: cost,reliability and uncertainty interact to determine a signal's value

This paper investigates the effect of three important variables on signal use, theoretically and experimentally. We present a simple model and a corresponding experiment that investigates the combined effects of uncertainty about action, signal reliability and signal cost. Our experiment uses techniques drawn from the psychology laboratory to test the behavior of captive blue jays Cyanocitta cristata solving a simple feeding problem. In the experiment, individual jays must choose which of two keys to peck; one key leads to food, but the other does not. In addition, the jays can choose to see a signal that provides information about which key provides a food reward. We find that these three variables interact to determine signal use crudely as our model predicts. Specifically, we find maximal signal use when uncertainty is high, signals are reliable and signal cost is low, but the effects of these variables on signal use do not combine additively. A change in any single variable can abolish signal use. While our results agree qualitatively with our simple model, we also find – in agreement with previous studies – that subjects show a bias against signal use. Specifically, they tend to ignore signals and rely on prior information about the correct action in ‘intermediate’ conditions. These results are important for two reasons. First, they replicate earlier results from our laboratory using a different preparation. Second, they highlight the central interaction between uncertainty and reliability that determines the value of signals for receivers. This is significant because game theoretical models of signaling emphasize the problem of ‘reliability,’ but they pay little attention to the fundamental interaction between reliability and uncertainty.     

Begging and bleating: the evolution of parent-offspring signalling

The evolution of biological signalling in the face of evolutionary conflicts of interest is an active area of evolutionary ecology, and one to which Maynard Smith has made important contributions. We explore the major theoretical challenges in the field, concentrating largely on how offspring signal to their parents when there is the potential for parent-offspring conflict. Costly offspring solicitation (begging etc.) has been interpreted in terms of a Zahavi Grafen honest handicap signal, but this has been challenged on the grounds of' the costs of signalling. We review this controversy and also explore the issue of pooling versus separating signalling equilibrium. An alternative explanation for costly begging is that it is due to sibling competition, and we discuss the relationship between these ideas and signalling models in families with more than one offspring. Finally we consider signal uncertainty, how signalling models can be made dynamic, and briefly how they may be tested experimentally.     

Signalling of hunger when offspring forage by both begging and self-feeding

Studies on vertebrate species in which the offspring obtain food only from their parents have shown that offspring begging conveys information on offspring hunger. It is unclear whether begging can also convey information on hunger in partially begging species, in which the offspring, from hatching, obtain food partly through begging for food from the parents and partly through self-feeding. In partially begging species, offspring hunger state could reflect the amount of food obtained by self-feeding in addition to the amount obtained from the parent, and the offspring could respond to hunger by self-feeding instead of begging. To test whether begging reflected the current hunger state of offspring in the partially begging beetle Nicrophorus vespilloides, we subjected larvae to two deprivation treatments: no access to any food for 2 h (i.e. food-deprived larvae) and no food provided by the parent (i.e. self-feeding larvae). Larvae of both treatments spent more time begging than did control larvae, which had access to food both from the parents and by self-feeding. Furthermore, the amount of begging differed between the treatments, with food-deprived larvae spending more time begging than the self-feeding ones. We conclude that, in partially begging species, food obtained through both foraging strategies, i.e. begging for food from parents and self-feeding, contribute to the offspring's current hunger state, and that begging can convey information about it.