Models of parent-offspring conflict. V. Effects of the behaviour of the two parents

In the absence of any parent-offspring conflict, the total parental investment per offspring should be less when two parents collaborate in caring for the offspring than when only one parent invests. This does not necessarily mean that offspring fare less well when both parents invest. The ‘ideal’ amount of parental investment for an offspring to take is always greater than is ‘ideal’ for the parent to allocate (Trivers 1974). The offspring's optimum is higher if the offspring's action affects the reproductive success of only one parent and lower if both parents are affected (e.g. two-parent investment, or lifelong monogamy). The difference between the parental optimum and the offspring optimum depends on the mating system and on the form of conflict (between successive broods, or within broods), and prescribes a ‘conflict range’. The extent of conflict cannot be deduced solely from a knowledge of the average relatedness between siblings. The conflict is likely to be resolved by an ESS in which intermediate (compromise) levels of investment are paid out to offspring, which nevertheless continue to make costly demands for yet more investment. The degree of conflict can be measured by the extent to which offspring subject their parents to aggressive demands for extra investment, and is likely to be greater when two parents collaborate equally over investment than when only one parent invests. When only one parent invests, conflict is higher if sibling-competition is between siblings in the same broods (intra-brood) than when it is between progeny in successive broods (inter-brood). However, the reverse will tend to be the case when both parents invest equally.     

Investment in attending to cues and the evolution of amplifiers

Signals and cues are extensively used in social interactions across diverse communication systems. Here, we extend an existing theoretical framework to explore investment by emitters and perceivers in the fidelity with which cues and signals associated with the former are detected by the latter. Traits of the emitter that improve cue or signal fidelity without adding information are termed ‘amplifiers’. We assume that each party can invest in improving fidelity but that it is increasingly costly the more fidelity is improved. Our model predicts that evolution of amplifier traits of a pre‐existing cue occurs over a broader range of circumstances than evolution of signalling in situations where the emitter offered no pre‐existing cue to the perceiver. It further predicts that the greater the intrinsic informational value of a cue, the more likely it is that the perceiver (and not the emitter) will invest in the fidelity of detecting that cue. A consequence of this predicted asymmetry is that true communication with reciprocal adaptations in emitters and perceivers to improve signal fidelity is likely to occur predominantly for traits of intermediate reliability. The corollary is that uncertainty of the perceiver will then be a key feature of communication. Uncertainty can arise because perceivers misinterpret signals or do not perceive them correctly, but here we argue that uncertainty is more fundamentally at the root of communication because traits that are intrinsically highly informative will induce only the perceiver and not the emitter to invest in improved fidelity of perception of that trait.     

Models of parent-offspring conflict. IV. Suppression: Evolutionary retaliation by the parent

We have earlier analysed ESSs for the amount of parental investment (PI) that offspring are expected to solicit from their parents, given that parents acquiesce to offspring demands. The present paper considers evolutionary retaliation by the parent for species where only one parent provides PI. Two genetic loci are envisaged: one (the ‘conflictor’ locus) determines the extent of offspring solicitation; the other (the ‘suppressor’ locus) determines how parents retaliate. Solicitation is assumed to carry a cost which may affect a particular offspring uniquely if time and energy are the major costs, or may affect all offspring in a brood equally if the main cost is predation risk. Two kinds of parental retaliation are possible. Parents may supply PI in proportion to offspring demands, or may ignore solicitation altogether and give a fixed PI. Analytical models of conflict in which the parent supplies PI in proportion to solicitation yield pure ESSs with PI at a compromise level between parent and offspring interests. These are termed ‘pro rata’ ESSs. Where solicitation costs are high, an ‘offspring wins’ ESS (offspring get all they ‘want’) is possible especially for forms of conflict that affect future sibs, and a ‘parent wins’ ESS (parent supplies its optimum) is possible especially for conflict that affects contemporary sibs. When parental retaliation takes the form of ignoring offspring solicitation, this can lead to a ‘parent wins’ ESS if costs of ignoring solicitation are negligible, but where parental insensitivity carries costs, the result is an unresolvable evolutionary chase with cycling frequencies of alleles coding for parent and offspring strategies. ‘Pro rata’ ESSs cannot be invaded by ‘ignore solicitation’ mutants but ‘pro rata’ mutants can often invade at certain stages in ‘ignore solicitation’ limit cycles. We therefore conclude that the probable evolutionary end product for most species will be the ‘pro rata’ ESS in which the parent supplies more PI than would be optimal in the absence of conflict, but less PI than would be an ESS for the offspring in the absence of parental retaliation. Such ESSs will be characterized by solicitation costs; offspring will ‘ask’ for more PI than they get. In nature, under similar conditions, highest conflict will occur when both parents sustain equally the effects of conflict, or when conflict affects contemporary rather than future sibs.     

Sibling negotiation

Current discussions of offspring begging typically assume eitherthat it is a signal directed at parents or that it representsa form of scramble competition to gain access to them. However,offspring might also display to inform nest mates that theywill contest the next food item to be delivered; in other words,begging (possibly in the absence of parents) might serve purelyas a form of negotiation among siblings. Here, we develop agame-theoretical model of this possibility. We assume that offspringvary in their need for food, which influences how intenselythey compete for access to parents. Before parental arrival,however, young may exchange signals informing each other oftheir state, and these signals may influence their subsequentcompetitive behavior. We focus on the possibility that a costlydisplay during the "negotiation" phase can serve to inform rivalsof a chick's need for resources and thereby deter them fromcompeting intensely when the parent arrives. We show that thisform of negotiation is more likely to prove stable when thefood delivered by parents is indivisible, and when it is hardfor one chick to monopolize access to resources. Investmentin negotiation (as opposed to competition) is predicted to increasewith nestling relatedness; in addition, all other things beingequal, hungrier chicks are expected to invest relatively moreeffort in displaying to their rivals, whereas weaker or smallerchicks are expected to invest less.     

Mouth colour components of begging are dynamic signals of quality in European starling nestlings

Offspring solicit food from their parents through begging signals. Nestling skin and flange coloration are begging signals that appear to convey information about nestling need or condition, and several experiments have shown that modifications of nestling coloration affect parental allocation decisions. However, it is important to examine the short‐term changes in these signalling components in response to food constraints since such dynamic changes are required for signals to indicate condition or need. Using a food deprivation experiment, we tested whether flange and skin reflectance in European starling Sturnus vulgaris nestlings change after a three‐hour interval. We investigated whether flange and skin reflectance changed according to the predictions arising from the ‘signal of quality’ or ‘signal of need’ hypotheses on the function of begging signals. We found that flange carotenoid and UV reflectance changed according to the signal of quality hypothesis with nestlings in good condition increasing their signal expression in response to the food deprivation, whereas those in poor condition decreased their signal expression. With the use of vision modelling, we show that changes in flange reflectance are detectable by starling parents. In contrast, we found a correlation going in the opposite direction for changes in skin UV reflectance. Nestlings with low lipid reserves increased their reflectance compared to nestlings with high reserves. However, vision modelling showed that short‐term changes in skin UV reflectance are not large enough to be detectable by the parents. Our study shows that flange carotenoid and UV reflectance are dynamic components of begging with short‐term variations that can be used by parents as signals of nestling quality.     

Signalling among relatives. I. Is costly signalling too costly?

Zahavi''s handicap principle,originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection ofelaborate male traits, suggests that a sufficient cost to dishonest signals can outweigh the rewards of deception and allow individuals to communicate honestly. Maynard Smith (1991) and Johnstone and Grafen (1992) introduce the Sir Philip Sidney game in order to extend the handicap principle to interactions among related individuals, and to demonstrate that stable costly signalling systems can exist among relatives.In this paper we demonstrate that despite the benefits associated with honest information transfer, the costs incurred in a stable costly signalling system may leave all participants worse off than they would be in a system with no signalling at all. In both the discrete and continuous forms of the Sir Philip Sidney game, there exist conditions under which costly signalling among relatives, while stable, is so costly that it is disadvantageous compared with no signalling at all. We determine the factors which dictate signal cost and signal benefit in a generalized version of this game, and explain how signal cost can exceed signal value. Such results raise concerns about theevolutionary pathways which could have led to the existence of signalling equilibria in nature. The paper stresses the importance of comparing signalling equilibria with other possible strategies, beforedrawing conclusions regarding the optimality of signalling.     

Patch Defence in the Parasitoid Wasp Trissolcus basalis (Insecta: Scelionidae): The Time Structure of Pairwise Contests,and the ‘Waiting Game’

Aggressive defence of host patches has been reported in many parasitoid wasps, but rarely examined in quantitative detail. One aspect of interest is that foraging female parasitoids do not simply consume resource patches, they invest offspring in them. Therefore, patch defence in parasitoids can involve not only resource defence prior to oviposition, but also postoviposition defence of offspring (maternal care). In this paper, the time-structure and sequence of pairwise agonistic contests between females of the parasitoid Trissolcus basalis (Wollaston) (Hymenoptera: Scelionidae) are analysed. Three main periods were evident in contests. In the first period, both females exploited the patch with no aggression. After the initiation of fighting, they entered a ‘contest period’, during which resident and intruder roles became clearly resolved. The resident then usually guarded the patch for up to several hours before leaving. This signalled the beginning of the third period, in which the intruder returned to superparasitise the patch. During the contest period, resident behaviour initially reflected the trade-off between exploiting fresh hosts, and defending those it had already parasitised from the intruder, which persistently returned to the patch to try and oviposit, with some success. However, when the patch became fully parasitised, both resident and intruder switched to a ‘waiting game’, in which they sat motionless for extended periods, the resident on the patch and the intruder at a distance. These stand-offs were punctuated by occasional aggressive patrolling by the resident, and cryptic returns to the palch by the intruder. This waiting game appears to be an informational war of attrition, suggesting a conceptual basis for modelling patch-leaving decisions using evolutionary game theory.     

To call or not to call: parents assess the vulnerability of their young before warning them about predators

Communication about predators can reveal the effects of both conspecific and heterospecific audiences on signalling strategy, providing insight into signal function and animal cognition. In species that alarm call to their young, parents face a fundamental dilemma: calling can silence noisy offspring and so make them less likely to be overheard, but can also alert predators that young are nearby. Parents could resolve this dilemma by being sensitive to the current vulnerability of offspring, and calling only when young are most at risk. Testing whether offspring vulnerability affects parental strategy has proved difficult, however, because more vulnerable broods are often also more valuable. We tested experimentally whether parent white-browed scrubwren, Sericornis frontalis, assessed brood noisiness when alarm calling near nests. When a model predator was nearby, parents gave more alarm calls when playbacks simulated noisy broods, yet brood noisiness did not affect adult calling when only a control model was present. Parents were therefore sensitive to the tradeoff between silencing young and alerting predators to the presence of nests. Our study demonstrates that receiver vulnerability can affect signalling decisions in species other than primates.     

Colour also matters for nocturnal birds: owlet bill coloration advertises quality and influences parental feeding behaviour in little owls

Chromatic signals of offspring quality have been shown to play a role in parent–offspring communication in diurnal birds, but are assumed to be useless in dim light conditions because colour-based discrimination probably requires more light. A major ecological and evolutionary conundrum in this scenario is why the nestlings of some nocturnal owls display colourful beaks. Here, we test the hypothesis that yellow bill coloration of owlets of the nocturnal little owl Athene noctua may function as a chromatic signal revealing to parents aspects of quality of their offspring. In a first step, we examined physical variation in bill coloration and its covariation with owlet quality. Secondly, we studied parental provisioning in relation to an experimental manipulation of bill coloration of owlets. Bills of owlets showed higher within-nest variation in yellow–red chroma than in brightness. Plasma carotenoid concentration and nestling immunological status were not associated with chromatic or achromatic features of the bill. Interestingly, however, heavier owlets displayed more yellow bills than lighter ones. The effect of bill coloration on parental favouritism changed with brood size. Parents holding large broods preferentially fed owlets with enhanced over reduced yellow bill coloration, whereas those with small broods did not significantly bias feeding in relation to owlet bill coloration. Our results, based on integration of objective spectrophotometric assessment of colour and experimental procedures, confirm that parent little owls use bill coloration to reveal information on owlet body mass to adjust their feeding strategies, thus highlighting the importance of considering potential chromatic signals for a full comprehension of parent–offspring communication processes in nocturnal bird species.     

The Handicap Principle: how an erroneous hypothesis became a scientific principle

The most widely cited explanation for the evolution of reliable signals is Zahavi's so‐called Handicap Principle, which proposes that signals are honest because they are costly to produce. Here we provide a critical review of the Handicap Principle and its theoretical development. We explain why this idea is erroneous, and how it nevertheless became widely accepted as the leading explanation for honest signalling. In 1975, Zahavi proposed that elaborate secondary sexual characters impose ‘handicaps’ on male survival, not due to inadvertent signalling trade‐offs, but as a mechanism that functions to demonstrate males' genetic quality to potential mates. His handicap hypothesis received many criticisms, and in response, Zahavi clarified his hypothesis and explained that it assumes that signals are wasteful as well as costly, and that they evolve because wastefulness enforces honesty. He proposed that signals evolve under ‘signal selection’, a non‐Darwinian type of selection that favours waste rather than efficiency. He maintained that the handicap hypothesis provides a general principle to explain the evolution of all types of signalling systems, i.e. the Handicap Principle. In 1977, Zahavi proposed a second hypothesis for honest signalling, which received many different labels and interpretations, although it was assumed to be another example of handicap signalling. In 1990, Grafen published models that he claimed vindicated Zahavi's Handicap Principle. His conclusions were widely accepted and the Handicap Principle subsequently became the dominant paradigm for explaining the evolution of honest signalling in the biological and social sciences. Researchers have subsequently focused on testing predications of the Handicap Principle, such as measuring the absolute costs of honest signals (and using energetic and other proximate costs as proxies for fitness), but very few have attempted to test Grafen's models. We show that Grafen's models do not support the handicap hypothesis, although they do support Zahavi's second hypothesis, which proposes that males adjust their investment into the expression of their sexual signals according to their condition and ability to bear the costs (and risks to their survival). Rather than being wasteful over‐investments, honest signals evolve in this scenario because selection favours efficient and optimal investment into signal expression and minimizes signalling costs. This idea is very different from the handicap hypothesis, but it has been widely misinterpreted and equated to the Handicap Principle. Theoretical studies have since shown that signalling costs paid at the equilibrium are neither sufficient nor necessary to maintain signal honesty, and that honesty can evolve through differential benefits, as well as differential costs. There have been increasing criticisms of the Handicap Principle, but they have focused on the limitations of Grafen's model and overlooked the fact that it is not a handicap model. This model is better understood within a Darwinian framework of adaptive signalling trade‐offs, without the added burden and confusing logic of the Handicap Principle. There is no theoretical or empirical support for the Handicap Principle and the time is long overdue to usher this idea into an ‘honorable retirement’.