Conjecture and explanation: A reply to Reydon

Reydon (2012) comments on my account of how-possibly explanation (Forber, 2010). I distinguish between three types of explanation (global how-possibly, local how-possibly, and how actually) and argue that these distinctions track various roles explanations play in evolutionary biology. While Reydon accepts the distinctions, he questions whether the two different types of how-possibly explanation count as genuine explanations. He summarizes his analysis with a slogan: “global how-possibly explanations are explanations but not how-possibly; local explanations are how-possibly but not explanations.” Reydon’s commentary raises a number of insightful points, and I will not be able to address them all. Instead, after clarifying certain points in my original paper (4 1), I will respond to Reydon’s slogan by addressing whether global how-possibly explanations should count as explaining how possible (4 2), and what (so-called) local how-possibly explanations are, if not explanations (4 3).     

How-possibly explanations as genuine explanations and helpful heuristics: A comment on Forber

Recently, Forber introduced a distinction between two kinds of how-possibly explanation, global and local how-possibly explanation, and argued that both play genuinely explanatory roles in evolutionary biology. In this paper I examine the nature of these two kinds of how-possibly explanations, focusing on the question whether they indeed constitute genuine explanations. I will conclude that one of Forber's kinds of how-possibly explanation may be thought of as a kind of genuine explanation but not as a kind of how-possibly explanation, while the other kind plays a heuristic role and should not be conceived of as a kind of explanation at all.     

Darwin as a student of behavior

In The Expression of the Emotions, Charles Darwin documents evolutionary continuity between animals and humans, emphasizing the universality of expressions in man. Most of the book addresses human behavior, and its influence on the study of animal behavior has been weak. The issue of natural selection is remarkably absent from this book, which relies on the inheritance of acquired characters rather than on a genuine Darwinian logic. Yet Konrad Lorenz considered Darwin to be a forerunner of behavioral biology. The reason was to be found in The Descent of Man and chapter VIII of The Origin of Species, where Darwin provides an explanation of behavior through selection, stating that the same mechanisms explaining morphological changes also account for gradual improvements in instincts. He assessed the accuracy of his evolutionary theory by directly studying animal behavior, hence laying the foundations of behavioral research for the next century.     

Organisms as natural purposes: the contemporary evolutionary perspective

Kant's conception of organisms as natural purposes raises a challenge to the adequacy of mechanistic explanation in biology. Certain features of organisms appear to be inexplicable by appeal to mechanical law alone. Some biological phenomena, it seems, can only be accounted for teleologically. Contemporary evolutionary biology has by and large ignored this challenge. It is widely held that Darwin's theory of natural selection gives us an adequate, wholly mechanical account of the nature of organisms. In contemporary biology, the category of the organism plays virtually no explanatory role. Contemporary evolutionary biology is a science of sub-organismal entities-replicators. I argue that recent advances in developmental biology demonstrate the inadequacy of sub-organismal mechanism. The category of the organism, construed as a 'natural purpose' should play an ineliminable role in explaining ontogenetic development and adaptive evolution. According to Kant the natural purposiveness of organisms cannot be demonstrated to be an objective principle in nature, nor can purposiveness figure in genuine explain. I attempt to argue, by appeal to recent work on self-organization, that the purposiveness of organisms is a natural phenomenon, and, by appeal to the apparatus of invariance explanation, that biological purposiveness provides genuine, ineliminable biological explanations.     

What mechanisms can’t do: Explanatory frameworks and the function of the p53 gene in molecular oncology

What has been called the new mechanistic philosophy conceives of mechanisms as the main providers of biological explanation. We draw on the characterization of the p53 gene in molecular oncology, to show that explaining a biological phenomenon (cancer, in our case) implies instead a dynamic interaction between the mechanistic level—rendered at the appropriate degree of ontological resolution—and far more general explanatory tools that perform a fundamental epistemic role in the provision of biological explanations. We call such tools “explanatory frameworks”. They are called frameworks to stress their higher level of generality with respect to bare mechanisms; on the other hand, they are called explanatory because, as we show in this paper, their importance in explaining biological phenomena is not secondary with respect to mechanisms. We illustrate how explanatory frameworks establish selective and local criteria of causal relevance that drive the search for, characterisation and usage of biological mechanisms. Furthermore, we show that explanatory frameworks allow for changes of scientific perspective on the causal relevance of mechanisms going beyond the account provided by the new mechanistic philosophy.     

The other cooperation problem: generating benefit

Understanding how cooperation evolves is central to explaining some core features of our biological world. Many important evolutionary events, such as the arrival of multicellularity or the origins of eusociality, are cooperative ventures between formerly solitary individuals. Explanations of the evolution of cooperation have primarily involved showing how cooperation can be maintained in the face of free-riding individuals whose success gradually undermines cooperation. In this paper I argue that there is a second, distinct, and less well explored, problem of cooperation that I call the generation of benefit. Focusing on how benefit is generated within a group poses a different problem: how is it that individuals in a group can (at least in principle) do better than those who remain solitary? I present several different ways that benefit may be generated, each with different implications for how cooperation might be initiated, how it might further evolve, and how it might interact with different ways of maintaining cooperation. I argue that in some cases of cooperation, the most important underlying “problem” of cooperation may be how to generate benefit, rather than how to reduce conflict or prevent free-riding.     

Evolution of Clupeine Z,a Probable Crossover Product

BLACK and Dixon¹ have presented an interesting and provocative view of the possible evolutionary history of three protamines of the Pacific herring, Clupea pallasi, the clupeines YI, YII and Z beginning with an archetypal pentapeptide. I wish to propose an alternative explanation.     

The many faces of biological individuality

Biological individuality is a major topic of discussion in biology and philosophy of biology. Recently, several objections have been raised against traditional accounts of biological individuality, including the objections of monism (the tendency to focus on a single individuality criterion and/or a single biological field), theory-centrism (the tendency to discuss only theory-based individuation), ahistoricity (the tendency to neglect what biologists of the past and historians of biology have said about biological individuality), disciplinary isolationism (the tendency to isolate biological individuality from other scientific and philosophical domains that have investigated individuality), and the multiplication of conceptual uncertainties (the lack of a precise definition of “biological individual” and related terms). In this introduction, I will examine the current philosophical landscape about biological individuality, and show how the contributions gathered in this special issue address these five objections. Overall, the aim of this issue is to offer a more diverse, unifying, and scientifically informed conception of what a biological individual is.     

Finalism in Darwinian and Lamarckian Evolution: Lessons from Epigenetics and Developmental Biology

Finalist (teleological) implications have been described for both Darwinian and Lamarckian theories, even though finalism appears to be more commonly associated with Lamarckism. Biologists have focused on finding final causes to explain evolutionary novelties through, for example, applying the ??what for??? question to address experimental observations. Now epigenetics, together with developmental biology, may allow us to focus on the efficient causes leading to evolutionary change, asking the ??how??? question, considering environmental influences as inducers of genomic change. This is a whole under-studied dimension in evolutionary studies. In this paper, I discuss how epigenetics and developmental biology can help integrate two important ways in which the environment affects evolution: through inducing or through restricting the emergence of new phenotypes. I also discuss which aspects of both theories should be reconsidered in the face of current knowledge in epigenetics and where the emphasis of evolutionary experiments should be placed. Important goals of evolution related epigenetic studies should be: (i) to experimentally consider the separation among the origin of characters in a lineage and its further fixation, in order to address these processes in a proper dimension, (ii) to build the cause-effect relation between the factors inducing epigenetic changes and consequent changes in population parameters, and (iii) to consider that the arising of new characters is modulated by physiological and developmental constraints, and that this process is not related to a purpose or focused to solve an ecological, physiological or evolutionary challenge.     

What is an organism? An immunological answer

The question, "What is an organism?," formerly considered as essential in biology, has now been increasingly replaced by a larger question, "What is a biological individual?" On the grounds that i) individuation is theory-dependent, and ii) physiology does not offer a theory, biologists and philosophers of biology have claimed that it is the theory of evolution by natural selection that tells us what counts as a biological individual. Here I show that one physiological field, immunology, offers a theory that makes possible a biological individuation based on physiological grounds. I give a new answer to the question of the individuation of an organism by linking together the evolutionary and the immunological approaches to biological individuation.     

Evolutionary morphology and Evo-devo: Hierarchy and novelty

Although the role of morphology in evolutionary theory remains a subject of debate, assessing the contributions of morphological investigation to evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-devo) is a more circumscribed issue of direct relevance to ongoing research. Historical studies of morphologically oriented researchers and the formation of the Modern Synthesis in the Anglo-American context identify a recurring theme: the synthetic theory of evolution did not capture multiple levels of biological organization. When this feature is incorporated into a philosophical framework for explaining the origin of evolutionary innovations and novelties (a core domain of inquiry in Evo-devo) two specific roles for morphology can be described: (1) the conceptualization and operational identification of the targets of explanation; and (2) the elucidation of causal interactions at higher levels of organization during ontogeny and through evolutionary time. These roles are critical components of any adequate explanation of innovation and novelty though not exhaustive of the parts played by morphology in evolutionary investigation. They also invite reflection on what counts as an evolutionary cause in contemporary evolutionary biology.     

Distinguishing ecological from evolutionary approaches to transposable elements

Considerable variation exists not only in the kinds of transposable elements (TEs) occurring within the genomes of different species, but also in their abundance and distribution. Noting a similarity to the assortment of organisms among ecosystems, some researchers have called for an ecological approach to the study of transposon dynamics. However, there are several ways to adopt such an approach, and it is sometimes unclear what an ecological perspective will add to the existing co‐evolutionary framework for explaining transposon‐host interactions. This review aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of transposon ecology in order to evaluate its explanatory prospects. We begin by identifying three unanswered questions regarding the abundance and distribution of TEs that potentially call for an ecological explanation. We then offer an operational distinction between evolutionary and ecological approaches to these questions. By determining the amount of variance in transposon abundance and distribution that is explained by ecological and evolutionary factors, respectively, it is possible empirically to assess the prospects for each of these explanatory frameworks. To illustrate how this methodology applies to a concrete example, we analyzed whole‐genome data for one set of distantly related mammals and another more closely related group of arthropods. Our expectation was that ecological factors are most informative for explaining differences among individual TE lineages, rather than TE families, and for explaining their distribution among closely related as opposed to distantly related host genomes. We found that, in these data sets, ecological factors do in fact explain most of the variation in TE abundance and distribution among TE lineages across less distantly related host organisms. Evolutionary factors were not significant at these levels. However, the explanatory roles of evolution and ecology become inverted at the level of TE families or among more distantly related genomes. Not only does this example demonstrate the utility of our distinction between ecological and evolutionary perspectives, it further suggests an appropriate explanatory domain for the burgeoning discipline of transposon ecology. The fact that ecological processes appear to be impacting TE lineages over relatively short time scales further raises the possibility that transposons might serve as useful model systems for testing more general hypotheses in ecology.     

Race Research and the Ethics of Belief

On most accounts, beliefs are supposed to fit the world rather than change it. But believing can have social consequences, since the beliefs we form underwrite our actions and impact our character. Because our beliefs affect how we live our lives and how we treat other people, it is surprising how little attention is usually given to the moral status of believing apart from its epistemic justification. In what follows, I develop a version of the harm principle that applies to beliefs as well as actions. In doing so, I challenge the often exaggerated distinction between forming beliefs and acting on them.¹ After developing this view, I consider what it might imply about controversial research the goal of which is to yield true beliefs but the outcome of which might include negative social consequences. In particular, I focus on the implications of research into biological differences between racial groups.     

Constraining the adaptationism debate

This contribution to the adaptationism debate elaborates the nature of constraints and their importance in evolutionary explanation and argues that the adaptationism debate should be limited to the issue of how to privilege causes in evolutionary explanation. I argue that adaptationist explanations are deeply conceptually dependent on developmental constraints, and explanations that appeal to constraints are dependant on the results of natural selection. I suggest these explanations should be integrated into the framework of historical causal explanation. Each strategy explicitly appeals to some aspect of the evolutionary process, while implicitly appealing to others. Thus, adaptationists and anti-adaptationists can offer complementary causal explanations of the same explanandum. This eliminates much of the adaptationism debate and explains why its adversaries regularly agree with each other more than they would like. The adaptationism issue that remains is a species of the general issue of how to privilege causes in explanation. I show how a proposed solution to this general problem might be brought to bear on evolutionary explanations, and investigate some difficulties that might arise due to the nature of the evolutionary process.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Lactobacillus plantarum</Emphasis> and Its Probiotic and Food Potentialities

The number of studies claiming probiotic health effects of Lactobacillus plantarum is escalating. Lb. plantarum is a lactic acid bacterium found in diverse ecological niches, highlighting its particular capabilities of adaptation and genome plasticity. Another function that needs to be underlined is the capabilities of Lb. plantarum to produce diverse and potent bacteriocins, which are antimicrobial peptides with possible applications as food preservative or antibiotic complementary agents. Taken together, all these characteristics design Lb. plantarum as a genuine model for academic research and viable biological agent with promising applications. The present review aims at shedding light on the safety of Lb. plantarum and run through the main studies underpinning its beneficial claims. The mechanisms explaining probiotic-related features are discussed.     

Evolutionary origins of the eastern North American–Mesoamerican floristic disjunction: Current status and future prospects

Biogeographic disjunction patterns, where multiple taxa are shared between isolated geographic areas, represent excellent systems for investigating the historical assembly of modern biotas and fundamental biological processes such as speciation, diversification, niche evolution, and evolutionary responses to climate change. Studies on plant genera disjunct across the northern hemisphere, particularly between eastern North America (ENA) and eastern Asia (EAS), have yielded tremendous insight on the geologic history and assembly of rich temperate floras. However, one of the most prevalent disjunction patterns involving ENA forests has been largely overlooked: that of taxa disjunct between ENA and cloud forests of Mesoamerica (MAM), with examples including Acer saccharum, Liquidambar styraciflua, Cercis canadensis, Fagus grandifolia, and Epifagus virginiana. Despite the remarkable nature of this disjunction pattern, which has been recognized for over 75 years, there have been few recent efforts to empirically examine its evolutionary and ecological origins. Here I synthesize previous systematic, paleobotanical, phylogenetic, and phylogeographic studies to establish what is known about this disjunction pattern to provide a roadmap for future research. I argue that this disjunction pattern, and the evolution and fossil record of the Mexican flora more broadly, represents a key missing piece in the broader puzzle of northern hemisphere biogeography. I also suggest that the ENA–MAM disjunction represents an excellent system for examining fundamental questions about how traits and life history strategies mediate plant evolutionary responses to climate change and for predicting how broadleaf temperate forests will respond to the ongoing climatic pressures of the Anthropocene.     

The phylogeny fallacy and the ontogeny fallacy

In 1990 Robert Lickliter and Thomas Berry identified the phylogeny fallacy, an empirically untenable dichotomy between proximate and evolutionary causation, which locates proximate causes in the decoding of ‘genetic programs’, and evolutionary causes in the historical events that shaped these programs. More recently, Lickliter and Hunter Honeycutt (Psychol Bull 129:819–835, 2003a) argued that Evolutionary Psychologists commit this fallacy, and they proposed an alternative research program for evolutionary psychology. For these authors the phylogeny fallacy is the proximate/evolutionary distinction itself, which they argue constitutes a misunderstanding of development, and its role in the evolutionary process. In this article I argue that the phylogeny fallacy should be relocated to an error of reasoning that this causal framework sustains: the conflation of proximate and evolutionary explanation. Having identified this empirically neutral form of the phylogeny fallacy, I identify its mirror image, the ontogeny fallacy. Through the lens of these fallacies I attempt to solve several outstanding problems in the debate that ensued from Lickliter and Honeycutt’s provocative article.     

Conserving the Stage: Climate Change and the Geophysical Underpinnings of Species Diversity

Conservationists have proposed methods for adapting to climate change that assume species distributions are primarily explained by climate variables. The key idea is to use the understanding of species-climate relationships to map corridors and to identify regions of faunal stability or high species turnover. An alternative approach is to adopt an evolutionary timescale and ask ultimately what factors control total diversity, so that over the long run the major drivers of total species richness can be protected. Within a single climatic region, the temperate area encompassing all of the Northeastern U.S. and Maritime Canada, we hypothesized that geologic factors may take precedence over climate in explaining diversity patterns. If geophysical diversity does drive regional diversity, then conserving geophysical settings may offer an approach to conservation that protects diversity under both current and future climates. Here we tested how well geology predicts the species diversity of 14 US states and three Canadian provinces, using a comprehensive new spatial dataset. Results of linear regressions of species diversity on all possible combinations of 23 geophysical and climatic variables indicated that four geophysical factors; the number of geological classes, latitude, elevation range and the amount of calcareous bedrock, predicted species diversity with certainty (adj. R² = 0.94). To confirm the species-geology relationships we ran an independent test using 18,700 location points for 885 rare species and found that 40% of the species were restricted to a single geology. Moreover, each geology class supported 5–95 endemic species and chi-square tests confirmed that calcareous bedrock and extreme elevations had significantly more rare species than expected by chance (P<0.0001), strongly corroborating the regression model. Our results suggest that protecting geophysical settings will conserve the stage for current and future biodiversity and may be a robust alternative to species-level predictions.     

Biological Levers and Extended Adaptationism

Two critiques of simple adaptationism are distinguished: anti-adaptationism and extended adaptationism. Adaptationists and anti-adaptationists share the presumption that an evolutionary explanation should identify the dominant simple cause of the evolutionary outcome to be explained. A consideration of extended-adaptationist models such as coevolution, niche construction and extended phenotypes reveals the inappropriateness of this presumption in explaining the evolution of certain important kinds of features—those that play particular roles in the regulation of organic processes, especially behavior. These biological or behavioral ‘levers’ are distinctively available for adaptation and exaptation by their possessors and for co-optation by other organisms. As a result they are likely to result from a distinctive and complex type of evolutionary process that conforms neither to simple adaptationist nor to anti-adaptationist styles of explanation. Many of the human features whose evolutionary explanation is most controversial belong to this category, including the female orgasm.