Modelling mitigation strategies for pandemic (H1N1) 2009

Background

The 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic has required decision-makers to act in the face of substantial uncertainties. Simulation models can be used to project the effectiveness of mitigation strategies, but the choice of the best scenario may change depending on model assumptions and uncertainties.

Methods

We developed a simulation model of a pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak in a structured population using demographic data from a medium-sized city in Ontario and epidemiologic influenza pandemic data. We projected the attack rate under different combinations of vaccination, school closure and antiviral drug strategies (with corresponding “trigger” conditions). To assess the impact of epidemiologic and program uncertainty, we used “combinatorial uncertainty analysis.” This permitted us to identify the general features of public health response programs that resulted in the lowest attack rates.

Results

Delays in vaccination of 30 days or more reduced the effectiveness of vaccination in lowering the attack rate. However, pre-existing immunity in 15% or more of the population kept the attack rates low, even if the whole population was not vaccinated or vaccination was delayed. School closure was effective in reducing the attack rate, especially if applied early in the outbreak, but this is not necessary if vaccine is available early or if pre-existing immunity is strong.

Interpretation

Early action, especially rapid vaccine deployment, is disproportionately effective in reducing the attack rate. This finding is particularly important given the early appearance of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in many schools in September 2009.Jurisdictions in the northern hemisphere are bracing for a “fall wave” of pandemic (H1N1) 2009.^1–3 Decision-makers face uncertainty, not just with respect to epidemiologic characteristics of the virus,⁴ but also program uncertainties related to feasibility, timeliness and effectiveness of mitigation strategies.⁵ Policy decisions must be made against this backdrop of uncertainty. However, the effectiveness of any mitigation strategy generally depends on the epidemiologic characteristics of the pathogen as well as the other mitigation strategies adopted. Mathematical models can project strategy effectiveness under hypothetical epidemiologic and program scenarios.^6–12 In the case of pandemic influenza, models have been used to assess the effectiveness of school closure⁷ and optimal use of antiviral drug^6,9,10 and vaccination strategies.⁸ However, model projections can be sensitive to input parameter values; thus, data uncertainty is an issue.¹³ Uncertainty analysis can help address the impact of uncertainties on model predictions but is often underutilized.¹³In this article, we present a simulation model of pandemic influenza transmission and mitigation in a population. This model projects the overall attack rate (percentage of people infected) during an outbreak. We introduce a formal method of uncertainty analysis that has not previously been applied to pandemic influenza, and we use this method to assess the impact of epidemiologic and program uncertainties. The model is intended to address the following policy questions that have been raised during the 2009 influenza pandemic: What is the impact of delayed vaccine delivery on attack rates? Can attack rates be substantially reduced without closing schools? What is the impact of pre-existing immunity from spring and summer 2009? We addressed these questions using a simulation model that projects the impact of vaccination, school closure and antiviral drug treatment strategies on attack rates.     

Cytotoxic T Lymphocytes Established by Seasonal Human Influenza Cross-React against 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Virus

While few children and young adults have cross-protective antibodies to the pandemic H1N1 2009 (pdmH1N1) virus, the illness remains mild. The biological reasons for these epidemiological observations are unclear. In this study, we demonstrate that the bulk memory cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTLs) established by seasonal influenza viruses from healthy individuals who have not been exposed to pdmH1N1 can directly lyse pdmH1N1-infected target cells and produce gamma interferon (IFN-γ) and tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α). Using influenza A virus matrix protein 1 (M1_58-66) epitope-specific CTLs isolated from healthy HLA-A2⁺ individuals, we further found that M1_58-66 epitope-specific CTLs efficiently killed both M1_58-66 peptide-pulsed and pdmH1N1-infected target cells ex vivo. These M1_58-66-specific CTLs showed an effector memory phenotype and expressed CXCR3 and CCR5 chemokine receptors. Of 94 influenza A virus CD8 T-cell epitopes obtained from the Immune Epitope Database (IEDB), 17 epitopes are conserved in pdmH1N1, and more than half of these conserved epitopes are derived from M1 protein. In addition, 65% (11/17) of these epitopes were 100% conserved in seasonal influenza vaccine H1N1 strains during the last 20 years. Importantly, seasonal influenza vaccination could expand the functional M1_58-66 epitope-specific CTLs in 20% (4/20) of HLA-A2⁺ individuals. Our results indicated that memory CTLs established by seasonal influenza A viruses or vaccines had cross-reactivity against pdmH1N1. These might explain, at least in part, the unexpected mild pdmH1N1 illness in the community and also might provide some valuable insights for the future design of broadly protective vaccines to prevent influenza, especially pandemic influenza.Since its first identification in North America in April 2009, the novel pandemic H1N1 2009 (pdmH1N1) virus has been spreading in humans worldwide, giving rise to the first pandemic in the 21st century (13, 18). The pdmH1N1 virus contains a unique gene constellation, with its NA and M gene segments being derived from the Eurasian swine lineage while the other gene segments originated from the swine triple-reassortant H1N1 lineage. The triple-reassortant swine viruses have in turn derived the HA, NP, and NS gene segments from the classical swine lineage (20). The 1918 pandemic virus gave rise to both the seasonal influenza H1N1 and the classical swine H1N1 virus lineages (41). Evolution in different hosts during the subsequent 90 years has led to increasing antigenic differences between recent seasonal H1N1 viruses and swine H1 viruses (42). Thus, younger individuals have no antibodies that cross neutralize pdmH1N1, while those over 65 years of age are increasingly likely to have cross-neutralizing antibodies to pdmH1N1 (10, 25).Currently available seasonal influenza vaccines do not induce cross-reactive antibodies against this novel virus in any age group (10, 25). In animal models, it has been shown that pdmH1N1 replicated more efficiently and caused more severe pathological lesions than the current seasonal influenza virus (28). However, most patients with pdmH1N1 virus infection show a mild illness comparable to seasonal influenza (9, 42). The incidence of severe cases caused by pdmH1N1 was not significantly higher than that caused by human seasonal influenza viruses (43). These findings imply that seasonal influenza A virus-specific memory T cells preexisting in previously infected individuals may have cross-protection to this novel pdmH1N1.Cross-reactivity of influenza A virus-specific T-cell immunity against heterosubtypic strains which are serologically distinct has been demonstrated (5, 29, 33, 47). Humans who have not been exposed to avian influenza A (H5N1) virus do have cross-reactive memory CD4 and CD8 T cells to a wide range of H5N1 peptides (33, 47). More recently, one study also showed that some seasonal influenza A virus-specific memory T cells in individuals without exposure to prior pdmH1N1 infection can recognize pdmH1N1 (24). However, the results in most of these studies were determined by the gamma interferon (IFN-γ) responses to influenza virus peptides. Although the recalled IFN-γ response is commonly used to detect memory CD4 and CD8 T cells, the activated T cells that bind major histocompatibility complex (MHC)-presented peptide are not necessarily capable of lysing the target cells (6). In addition, the peptides, but not the whole virus, may not be able to fully represent the human cross-response against the virus as a whole. Therefore, in addition to cytokine production, the demonstration of direct antigen-specific cytotoxicity of cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTLs) against both peptide-pulsed and virus-infected target cells is needed for better understanding of human CTL responses against pdmH1N1 virus.In this study, using bulk memory CTLs and epitope-specific CTLs established by seasonal influenza A viruses and epitope-specific peptide from healthy individuals, respectively, we evaluated their cross-cytotoxicity and cytokine responses to pdmH1N1. We also examined the expression of chemokine receptors CXCR3 and CCR5, which could help CTLs to migrate to the site of infection. In addition, to understand whether the seasonal influenza vaccines have benefit for people who have not been exposed to pdmH1N1, we further examined the ability of seasonal influenza vaccines to induce the conserved M1_58-66 epitope-specific CTLs in HLA-A2-seropositive healthy individuals.     

Correlates of severe disease in patients with 2009 pandemic influenza (H1N1) virus infection

Background

In the context of 2009 pandemic influenza (H1N1) virus infection (pandemic H1N1 influenza), identifying correlates of the severity of disease is critical to guiding the implementation of antiviral strategies, prioritization of vaccination efforts and planning of health infrastructure. The objective of this study was to identify factors correlated with severity of disease in confirmed cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza.

Methods

This cumulative case–control study included all laboratory-confirmed cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza among residents of the province of Manitoba, Canada, for whom the final location of treatment was known. Severe cases were defined by admission to a provincial intensive care unit (ICU). Factors associated with severe disease necessitating admission to the ICU were determined by comparing ICU cases with two control groups: patients who were admitted to hospital but not to an ICU and those who remained in the community.

Results

As of Sept. 5, 2009, there had been 795 confirmed cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza in Manitoba for which the final treatment location could be determined. The mean age of individuals with laboratory-confirmed infection was 25.3 (standard deviation 18.8) years. More than half of the patients (417 or 52%) were female, and 215 (37%) of 588 confirmed infections for which ethnicity was known occurred in First Nations residents. The proportion of First Nations residents increased with increasing severity of disease (116 [28%] of 410 community cases, 74 [54%] of 136 admitted to hospital and 25 [60%] of 42 admitted to an ICU; p < 0.001), as did the presence of an underlying comorbidity (201 [35%] of 569 community cases, 103 [57%] of 181 admitted to hospital and 34 [76%] of 45 admitted to an ICU; p < 0.001). The median interval from onset of symptoms to initiation of antiviral therapy was 2 days (interquartile range, IQR 1–3) for community cases, 4 days (IQR 2–6) for patients admitted to hospital and 6 days (IQR 4–9) for those admitted to an ICU (p < 0.001). In a multivariable logistic model, the interval from onset of symptoms to initiation of antiviral therapy (odds ratio [OR] 8.24, 95% confidence interval [CI] 2.82–24.1), First Nations ethnicity (OR 6.52, 95% CI 2.04–20.8) and presence of an underlying comorbidity (OR 3.19, 95% CI 1.07–9.52) were associated with increased odds of admission to the ICU (i.e., severe disease) relative to community cases. In an analysis of ICU cases compared with patients admitted to hospital, First Nations ethnicity (OR 3.23, 95% CI 1.04–10.1) was associated with increased severity of disease.

Interpretation

Severe pandemic H1N1 influenza necessitating admission to the ICU was associated with a longer interval from onset of symptoms to treatment with antiviral therapy and with the presence of an underlying comorbidity. First Nations ethnicity appeared to be an independent determinant of severe infection. Despite these associations, the cause and outcomes of pandemic HINI influenza may involve many complex and interrelated factors, all of which require further research and analysis.In April 2009, Canada’s first wave of pandemic influenza (H1N1) virus infections (pandemic H1N1 influenza) began. The highest burden of severe illness in Canada occurred in the province of Manitoba, where 45 Manitobans and 9 out-of-province patients were admitted to an intensive care unit (ICU). In this first wave, ICU staff and equipment were mobilized to expand bed capacity and ventilator capabilities to accommodate clinical need.Although many individuals presented with mild, self-limited symptoms and no sign of pulmonary involvement, some people required admission to an ICU and received maximal life support measures.^1–3 Predicting disease and mitigating hazard in at-risk populations is an important aim of public heath epidemiology, and in preparation for future waves of pandemic H1N1 influenza, determining correlates of the severity of disease may be very important. Initial reports have suggested that, in addition to many of the previously known risk factors for complications of seasonal influenza, obesity⁴ and other underlying comorbidities^3,5 may be risk factors for severe disease. The interval from onset of symptoms to initiation of antiviral therapy or other treatment and supportive care was also associated with adverse outcome in a recent case series.⁶ In a Canadian study of severe pandemic H1N1 influenza, First Nations people were proportionally overrepresented among patients in the ICU.² However, it is unclear if this association was independent of potential confounding factors. The ability to determine correlates of severe pandemic H1N1 disease and subsequent need for ICU resources in at-risk populations would provide opportunities for public and population health analysis and action, public education, strategic prioritization of vaccination efforts, efficient and equitable allocation and use of antiviral drugs, and development of infrastructure within the health system.The objectives of this study were to identify factors that were correlated with severity of disease in confirmed cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza. Our hypothesis, which was based on existing literature, was that obesity, First Nations ethnicity and longer interval from onset of symptoms to treatment would be important determinants of the severity of disease.     

Pandemic H1N1 2009 Influenza A Virus Induces Weak Cytokine Responses in Human Macrophages and Dendritic Cells and Is Highly Sensitive to the Antiviral Actions of Interferons

In less than 3 months after the first cases of swine origin 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infections were reported from Mexico, WHO declared a pandemic. The pandemic virus is antigenically distinct from seasonal influenza viruses, and the majority of human population lacks immunity against this virus. We have studied the activation of innate immune responses in pandemic virus-infected human monocyte-derived dendritic cells (DC) and macrophages. Pandemic A/Finland/553/2009 virus, representing a typical North American/European lineage virus, replicated very well in these cells. The pandemic virus, as well as the seasonal A/Brisbane/59/07 (H1N1) and A/New Caledonia/20/99 (H1N1) viruses, induced type I (alpha/beta interferon [IFN-α/β]) and type III (IFN-λ1 to -λ3) IFN, CXCL10, and tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α) gene expression weakly in DCs. Mouse-adapted A/WSN/33 (H1N1) and human A/Udorn/72 (H3N2) viruses, instead, induced efficiently the expression of antiviral and proinflammatory genes. Both IFN-α and IFN-β inhibited the replication of the pandemic (H1N1) virus. The potential of IFN-λ3 to inhibit viral replication was lower than that of type I IFNs. However, the pandemic virus was more sensitive to the antiviral IFN-λ3 than the seasonal A/Brisbane/59/07 (H1N1) virus. The present study demonstrates that the novel pandemic (H1N1) influenza A virus can readily replicate in human primary DCs and macrophages and efficiently avoid the activation of innate antiviral responses. It is, however, highly sensitive to the antiviral actions of IFNs, which may provide us an additional means to treat severe cases of infection especially if significant drug resistance emerges.The novel swine origin 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus was identified in April 2009, and it is currently causing the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. The virus is a completely new reassortant virus (8, 38), and the majority of the human population does not have preexisting immunity against it. The case fatality rate of the current pandemic virus infection is still unclear, but it is estimated to be somewhat higher than that of seasonal influenza virus infections (8). In most cases, the pandemic 2009 A (H1N1) virus causes an uncomplicated respiratory tract illness with symptoms similar to those caused by seasonal influenza viruses. However, gastrointestinal symptoms atypical to seasonal influenza have been detected in a significant proportion of cases (4, 7, 35).The pandemic 2009 (H1N1) influenza A virus originates from a swine influenza A virus strain. It underwent multiple reassortment events in pigs and then transferred into the human population (8, 38). The new virus has gene segments from the North American triple-reassortant and Eurasian swine H1N1 viruses (8, 38). Sequence analysis of this new pandemic virus revealed that hemagglutinin (HA), NP, and NS gene segments are derived from the classical swine viruses, PB1 from human H3N2, and PB2 and PA from avian viruses within the triple-reassortant virus (8). In addition, the NA and M segments originate from the Eurasian swine virus lineage. The pandemic 2009 (H1N1) virus is genetically and antigenically distinct from previous seasonal human influenza A (H1N1) viruses. Thus, the current seasonal influenza vaccines are likely to give little, if any, protection against pandemic 2009 A (H1N1) virus infection (12, 14). However, some evidence indicates that people born early in the 20th century have cross-neutralizing antibodies against the pandemic 2009 A (H1N1) viruses (12, 14).At present, relatively little is known about the pathogenesis and transmission of the pandemic 2009 A (H1N1) virus in humans. Studies with ferrets revealed that the pandemic virus replicated better than seasonal H1N1 viruses in the respiratory tracts of the animals. This suggests that the virus is more pathogenic in ferrets than seasonal influenza viruses (19, 24). The respiratory tract is the primary infection site of all mammalian influenza viruses, and, indeed, the specific glycan receptors on the apical surface of the upper respiratory tract have been reported to bind HA of the 2009 A (H1N1) virus (19). In human lung tissue binding assays, 2009 A (H1N1) HA showed a glycan binding pattern similar to that of the HA from the pandemic 1918 A (H1N1) virus though its affinity to α2,6 glycans was much lower than that of the 1918 virus HA. The lower glycan binding properties of the pandemic 2009 A (H1N1) virus seemed to correlate with less-efficient transmission in ferrets compared to seasonal H1N1 viruses (19). According to another study with ferrets, the transmission of the pandemic 2009 A (H1N1) virus via respiratory droplets was as efficient as that of a seasonal A (H1N1) virus (24). It is clear that, besides experimental infections in animal models, analyses of the characters and pathogenesis of the pandemic 2009 A (H1N1) virus infection in humans are urgently needed.In the present study, we have focused on analyzing innate immune responses in primary human dendritic cells (DCs) and macrophages in response to an infection with one of the Finnish isolates of the pandemic 2009 A (H1N1) virus. DCs and macrophages reside beneath the epithelium of the respiratory organs, and these cells are thus potential targets for influenza viruses. From the epithelial cells influenza viruses spread in DCs and macrophages, which coordinate the development of an effective innate immune response against the virus (22, 34, 41). During influenza virus infection, DCs and macrophages secrete antiviral cytokines such as interferons (IFNs) and tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α) (3, 13, 26). Moreover, DCs and macrophages activate virus-destroying NK cells and T cells with the cytokines they secrete and via direct cell-to-cell contacts (9, 29, 33, 37). Here we show that the pandemic (H1N1) virus infects and replicates very well in human monocyte-derived DCs and macrophages. The pandemic virus as well as two recent seasonal H1N1 viruses induced a relatively weak innate immune response in these cells, as evidenced by a poor expression of antiviral and proinflammatory cytokine genes. However, like seasonal influenza A viruses, the pandemic 2009 (H1N1) virus was extremely sensitive to the antiviral actions of type I IFNs (IFN-α/β). Interestingly, the pandemic 2009 (H1N1) virus was even more sensitive to antiviral IFN-λ3 than a seasonal A (H1N1) virus. Thus, IFNs may provide us with an additional means to combat severe pandemic influenza virus infections, especially if viral resistance against neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors begins to emerge.     

Enteric absorption and pharmacokinetics of oseltamivir in critically ill patients with pandemic (H1N1) influenza

Background

Whether the enteric absorption of the neuraminidase inhibitor oseltamivir is impaired in critically ill patients is unknown. We documented the pharmacokinetic profile of oseltamivir in patients admitted to intensive care units (ICUs) with suspected or confirmed pandemic (H1N1) influenza.

Methods

We included 41 patients 18 years of age and older with suspected or confirmed pandemic (H1N1) influenza who were admitted for ventilatory support to nine ICUs in three cities in Canada and Spain. Using tandem mass spectrometry, we assessed plasma levels of oseltamivir free base and its active metabolite carboxylate at baseline (before gastric administration of the drug) and at 2, 4, 6, 9 and 12 hours after the fourth or later dose.

Results

Among the 36 patients who did not require dialysis, the median concentration of oseltamivir free base was 10.4 (interquartile range [IQR] 4.8–14.9) μg/L; the median concentration of the carboxylate metabolite was 404 (IQR 257–900) μg/L. The volume of distribution of the carboxylate metabolite did not increase with increasing body weight (R² = 0.00, p = 0.87). The rate of elimination of oseltamivir carboxylate was modestly correlated with estimations of creatinine clearance (R² = 0.27, p < 0.001). Drug clearance in the five patients who required continuous renal replacement therapy was about one-sixth that in the 36 patients with relatively normal renal function.

Interpretation

Oseltamivir was well absorbed enterically in critically ill patients admitted to the ICU with suspected or confirmed pandemic (H1N1) influenza. The dosage of 75 mg twice daily achieved plasma levels that were comparable to those in ambulatory patients and were far in excess of concentrations required to maximally inhibit neuraminidase activity of the virus. Adjustment of the dosage in patients with renal dysfunction requiring continuous renal replacement therapy is appropriate; adjustment for obesity does not appear to be necessary.A substantial number of cases of pandemic (H1N1) influenza have involved young adults and adolescents without serious comorbidities who present with severe viral pneumonia complicated by acute respiratory distress syndrome, rhabdomyolysis, renal failure and, occasionally, shock.^1,2 Antiviral therapy in such critically ill patients typically requires oral or nasogastric administration of the neuraminidase inhibitor oseltamivir. Current guidelines from the World Health Organization for the pharmacologic management of progressive or severe pandemic (H1N1) influenza recommend the consideration of high-dose therapy (≥ 150 mg twice daily).^3,4 Critically ill patients exhibit defects in gastrointestinal absorption because of impaired gut perfusion, edema of the bowel wall and ileus as a consequence of critical illness and shock.⁵ Whether the enteric absorption of oseltamivir is impaired in such patients is unknown.We undertook this study to document the pharmacokinetic profile of oseltamivir administered orally or by nasogastric tube in patients admitted to intensive care units (ICUs) with respiratory failure due to suspected or confirmed pandemic (H1N1) influenza.     

Transmission of Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Virus and Impact of Prior Exposure to Seasonal Strains or Interferon Treatment

Novel swine-origin influenza viruses of the H1N1 subtype were first detected in humans in April 2009. As of 12 August 2009, 180,000 cases had been reported globally. Despite the fact that they are of the same antigenic subtype as seasonal influenza viruses circulating in humans since 1977, these viruses continue to spread and have caused the first influenza pandemic since 1968. Here we show that a pandemic H1N1 strain replicates in and transmits among guinea pigs with similar efficiency to that of a seasonal H3N2 influenza virus. This transmission was, however, partially disrupted when guinea pigs had preexisting immunity to recent human isolates of either the H1N1 or H3N2 subtype and was fully blocked through daily intranasal administration of interferon to either inoculated or exposed animals. Our results suggest that partial immunity resulting from prior exposure to conventional human strains may blunt the impact of pandemic H1N1 viruses in the human population. In addition, the use of interferon as an antiviral prophylaxis may be an effective way to limit spread in at-risk populations.A pandemic of novel swine-origin influenza virus (H1N1) is developing rapidly. As of 12 August 2009, nearly 180,000 cases had been reported to the WHO from around the globe (36). Sustained human-to-human transmission has furthermore been observed in multiple countries, prompting the WHO to declare a public health emergency of international concern and to raise the pandemic alert level to phase 6 (7).Swine are a natural host of influenza viruses, and although sporadic incidences of human infection with swine influenza viruses occur (8, 9, 14, 29, 35), human-to-human transmission is rare. H1N1 influenza viruses have likely circulated in swine since shortly after the 1918 human influenza pandemic (38). From the 1930s, when a swine influenza virus was first isolated, to the late 1990s, this classical swine lineage has remained relatively stable antigenically (34). In the late 1990s, however, genetic reassortment between a human H3N2 virus, a North American avian virus, and a classical swine influenza virus produced a triple reassortant virus, which subsequently spread among North American swine (34). Further reassortment events involving human influenza viruses led to the emergence in pigs of triple reassortants of the H1N1 and H1N2 subtypes (34). None of these swine viruses have demonstrated the potential for sustained human-to-human transmission.The swine-origin influenza viruses now emerging in the human population possess a previously uncharacterized constellation of eight genes (28). The NA and M segments derive from a Eurasian swine influenza virus lineage, having entered pigs from the avian reservoir around 1979, while the HA, NP, and NS segments are of the classical swine lineage and the PA, PB1, and PB2 segments derive from the North American triple reassortant swine lineage (13). This unique combination of genetic elements (segments from multiple swine influenza virus lineages, some of them derived from avian and human influenza viruses) may account for the improved fitness of pandemic H1N1 viruses, relative to that of previous swine isolates, in humans.Several uncertainties remain about how this outbreak will develop over time. Although the novel H1N1 virus has spread over a broad geographical area, the number of people known to be infected remains low in many countries, which could be due, at least in part, to the lack of optimal transmission of influenza viruses outside the winter season; thus, it is unclear at this point whether the new virus will become established in the long term. Two major factors will shape the epidemiology of pandemic H1N1 viruses in the coming months and years: the intrinsic transmissibility of the virus and the degree of protection offered by previous exposure to seasonal human strains. Initial estimates of the reproductive number (R₀) have been made based on the epidemiology of the virus to date and suggest that its rate of spread is intermediate between that of seasonal flu and that of previous pandemic strains (3, 11). However, more precise estimates of R₀ will depend on better surveillance data in the future. The transmission phenotype of pandemic H1N1 viruses in a ferret model was also recently reported and was found to be similar to (16, 27) or less efficient (25) than that of seasonal H1N1 strains. The reason for this discrepancy in the ferret model is unclear.Importantly, in considering the human population, the impact of immunity against seasonal strains on the transmission potential of pandemic H1N1 viruses is not clear. According to conventional wisdom, an influenza virus must be of a hemagglutinin (HA) subtype which is novel to the human population in order to cause a pandemic (18, 38). Analysis of human sera collected from individuals with diverse influenza virus exposure histories has indicated that in those born in the early part of the 20th century, neutralizing activity against A/California/04/09 (Cal/04/09) virus is often present (16). Conversely, serological analyses of ferret postinfection sera (13) and human pre- and postvaccination sera (4a) revealed that neutralizing antibodies against recently circulating human H1N1 viruses do not react with pandemic H1N1 isolates. These serological findings may explain the relatively small number of cases seen to date in individuals greater than 65 years of age (6). Even in the absence of neutralizing antibodies, however, a measure of immune protection sufficient to dampen transmission may be present in a host who has recently experienced seasonal influenza (10). If, on the other hand, transmission is high and immunity is low, then pandemic H1N1 strains will likely continue to spread rapidly through the population. In this situation, a range of pharmaceutical interventions will be needed to dampen the public health impact of the pandemic.Herein we used the guinea pig model (4, 21-24, 26, 30) to assess the transmissibility of the pandemic H1N1 strains Cal/04/09 and A/Netherlands/602/09 (NL/602/09) relative to that of previous human and swine influenza viruses. To better mimic the human situation, we then tested whether the efficiency of transmission is decreased by preexisting immunity to recent human H1N1 or H3N2 influenza viruses. Finally, we assessed the efficacy of intranasal treatment with type I interferon (IFN) in limiting the replication and transmission of pandemic H1N1 viruses.     

The responses of Aboriginal Canadians to adjuvanted pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza vaccine

Background:

Because many Aboriginal Canadians had severe cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza, they were given priority access to vaccine. However, it was not known if the single recommended dose would adequately protect people at high risk, prompting our study to assess responses to the vaccine among Aboriginal Canadians.

Methods:

We enrolled First Nations and Métis adults aged 20–59 years in our prospective cohort study. Participants were given one 0.5-mL dose of ASO3-adjuvanted pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccine (Arepanrix, GlaxoSmithKline Canada). Blood samples were taken at baseline and 21–28 days after vaccination. Paired sera were tested for hemagglutination-inhibiting antibodies at a reference laboratory. To assess vaccine safety, we monitored the injection site symptoms of each participant for seven days. We also monitored patients for general symptoms within 7 days of vaccination and any use of the health care system for 21–28 days after vaccination.

Results:

We enrolled 138 participants in the study (95 First Nations, 43 Métis), 137 of whom provided all safety data and 136 of whom provided both blood samples. First Nations and Métis participants had similar characteristics, including high rates of chronic health conditions (74.4%–76.8%). Pre-existing antibody to the virus was detected in 34.3% of the participants, all of whom boosted strongly with vaccination (seroprotection rate [titre ≥ 40] 100%, geometric mean titre 531–667). Particpants with no pre-existing antibody also responded well. Fifty-eight of 59 (98.3%) First Nations participants showed seroprotection and a geometric mean titre of 353.6; all 30 Métis participants with no pre-existing antibody showed seroprotection and a geometric mean titre of 376.2. Pain at the injection site and general symptoms frequently occurred but were short-lived and generally not severe, although three participants (2.2%) sought medical attention for general symptoms.

Interpretation:

First Nations and Métis adults responded robustly to ASO3-adjuvanted pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccine. Virtually all participants showed protective titres, including those with chronic health conditions.

Trial registration:

ClinicalTrials.gov trial register no. NCT.01001026.During the first wave of the H1N1 pandemic in Canada in 2009, some First Nations communities were severely affected, with younger adults and children most at risk for severe disease.^1,2 Whereas Aboriginal Canadians make up 3.4% of the population (with 1.14 million people), they accounted for 16% of admissions to hospital during the first wave of the pandemic, and 43% of Aboriginal patients had underlying medical conditions.³ The increased rate of severe disease might have resulted from residential crowding, prevalence of chronic health conditions, delayed access to health care or suboptimal immune responses to infection.⁴ When a federally funded, ASO3-adjuvanted (squalene/tocopherol) pandemic vaccine became available for Canadians later in 2009,⁵ Aboriginal people were given priority access to it.³ However, dosing requirements at the time were tentative. Previous studies of an ASO3-adjuvanted influenza A (H5N1) vaccine established that two doses were needed for immunity in adults.⁶ Because the 2009 influenza (H1N1) pandemic occurred without warning, no prepandemic studies had been done with vaccines based on this novel swine-derived virus.⁷The ASO3-adjuvanted pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccine manufactured in Canada (Arepanrix, GlaxoSmithKline, Laval, Quebec) was released for public use as soon as it was available, unstudied, to mitigate morbidity during the pandemic’s second wave, which was already in progress. A single 3.75-μg dose of hemagglutinin was recommended for adults using the preliminary results of a European trial of another ASO3-adjuvanted vaccine (Pandemrix, GlaxoSmithKline, Rixensart, Belgium) given to 65 adults aged 18–60 years.⁸ The European product was believed to be equivalent to the Canadian-made vaccine, but this had not yet been shown.We wondered if the recommended single dose would be adequate for Aboriginal Canadian adults given their heightened risk of severe influenza during the first wave. We were unable to identify any previous studies of influenza vaccines involving Aboriginal Canadians to determine if their responses would be similar to other Canadians or to the healthy European study participants on whom the dosing recommendation was based. Consequently, we undertook a study involving First Nations and Métis adults to assess their responses to the pandemic vaccine.     

Rates and determinants of seasonal influenza vaccination in pregnancy and association with neonatal outcomes

Background:

There is growing evidence that seasonal influenza vaccination in pregnancy has benefits for mother and baby. We determined influenza vaccination rates among pregnant women during the 2 nonpandemic influenza seasons following the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, explored maternal factors as predictors of influenza vaccination status and evaluated the association between maternal influenza vaccination and neonatal outcomes.

Methods:

We used a population-based perinatal database in the province of Nova Scotia, Canada, to examine maternal vaccination rates, determinants of vaccination status and neonatal outcomes. Our cohort included women who gave birth between Nov. 1, 2010, and Mar. 31, 2012. We compared neonatal outcomes between vaccinated and unvaccinated women using logistic regression analysis.

Results:

Overall, 1958 (16.0%) of 12 223 women in our cohort received the influenza vaccine during their pregnancy. Marital status, parity, location of residence (rural v. urban), smoking during pregnancy and maternal influenza risk status were determinants of maternal vaccine receipt. The odds of preterm birth was lower among infants of vaccinated women than among those of nonvaccinated women (adjusted odds ratio [OR] 0.75, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.60–0.94). The rate of low-birth-weight infants was also lower among vaccinated women (adjusted OR 0.73, 95% CI 0.56–0.95).

Interpretation:

Despite current guidelines advising all pregnant women to receive the seasonal influenza vaccine, influenza vaccination rates among pregnant women in our cohort were low in the aftermath of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. This study and others have shown an association between maternal influenza vaccination and improved neonatal outcomes, which supports stronger initiatives to promote vaccination during pregnancy.Influenza viruses are the leading cause of serious wintertime respiratory morbidity worldwide. Several studies investigating the effects of influenza-related illness during pregnancy have shown a strong impact on the health of pregnant women in terms of increased rates of hospital admission because of respiratory illness.^1–3 Schanzer and colleagues² found that pregnant women in Canada were at increased risk of influenza-related hospital admission when compared with nonpregnant women of similar age and health status. In addition, influenza-related illness during pregnancy may have a negative impact on neonatal outcomes. A study in Nova Scotia, Canada, showed that infants whose mothers were admitted to hospital because of respiratory illness during influenza season while pregnant were more likely to be small for gestational age and to have lower mean birth weight.⁴By 2007, the cumulative evidence from these and other studies was compelling enough for advisory boards in Canada to recommend routine influenza vaccination for all pregnant women, including those without medical comorbidities.⁵ Despite these recommendations, seasonal vaccination rates among pregnant women have remained low. In a cohort of pregnant women who delivered at the IWK Health Centre, Halifax, from 2006 to 2009, only 20% had received the vaccine during their pregnancy.⁶ Increased vaccination rates among pregnant women were reported for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic year,⁷ but it is unknown whether this has translated into higher rates of seasonal influenza vaccination since then. Studies have shown that concern about vaccine safety is the most commonly cited reason for refusing the vaccine,^8,9 despite much evidence showing it to be safe in pregnancy.¹⁰ A recommendation from a maternity care provider has been shown to be a key factor in increasing vaccination rates.^11,12In light of the growing evidence that influenza vaccination during pregnancy has benefits for both the mother and the infant,^13–18 we evaluated rates of seasonal influenza vaccination among pregnant women in the 2 nonpandemic influenza seasons (2010/11 and 2011/12) following the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. We also assessed whether neonatal outcomes differed between women who received the vaccine during pregnancy and those who did not.     

Oseltamivir-Resistant Variants of the 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza A Virus Are Not Attenuated in the Guinea Pig and Ferret Transmission Models

Oseltamivir is routinely used worldwide for the treatment of severe influenza A virus infection, and should drug-resistant pandemic 2009 H1N1 viruses become widespread, this potent defense strategy might fail. Oseltamivir-resistant variants of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus have been detected in a substantial number of patients, but to date, the mutant viruses have not moved into circulation in the general population. It is not known whether the resistance mutations in viral neuraminidase (NA) reduce viral fitness. We addressed this question by studying transmission of oseltamivir-resistant mutants derived from two different isolates of the pandemic H1N1 virus in both the guinea pig and ferret transmission models. In vitro, the virus readily acquired a single histidine-to-tyrosine mutation at position 275 (H275Y) in viral neuraminidase when serially passaged in cell culture with increasing concentrations of oseltamivir. This mutation conferred a high degree of resistance to oseltamivir but not zanamivir. Unexpectedly, in guinea pigs and ferrets, the fitness of viruses with the H275Y point mutation was not detectably impaired, and both wild-type and mutant viruses were transmitted equally well from animals that were initially inoculated with 1:1 virus mixtures to naïve contacts. In contrast, a reassortant virus containing an oseltamivir-resistant seasonal NA in the pandemic H1N1 background showed decreased transmission efficiency and fitness in the guinea pig model. Our data suggest that the currently circulating pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus has a high potential to acquire drug resistance without losing fitness.Oseltamivir resistance was rare until 2008, when resistant seasonal H1N1 viruses were found circulating in the general Scandinavian population (15). Soon after, studies from other countries in Europe also reported the isolation of oseltamivir-resistant viruses, and eventually, oseltamivir resistance was recognized as a global phenomenon (9, 27). Prior to 2008, resistant viruses were primarily isolated from patients with nonresponsive influenza virus infections or from infected patients who received a low-dose prophylaxis regiment prior to symptom onset. At the time, these resistant isolates accounted for 1% of the circulating H1N1 virus. Drug resistance mutations were identified during oseltamivir development, including a histidine-to-tyrosine mutation at position 275 (H275Y) in N1 neuraminidase (NA). This mutation in particular was shown to attenuate virus growth and pathology in ferrets (17). Additionally, oseltamivir-resistant viruses with a nearby mutation in N2 neuraminidase transmitted less efficiently than oseltamivir-sensitive viruses in the guinea pig transmission model (4). Surprisingly, the seasonal 2008 H1N1 viral isolates that spread around the world had the same tyrosine mutation, which was previously associated with iatrogenic infections and attenuation. Furthermore, epidemiological studies concluded that this resistant virus developed independently of drug selection, suggesting that compensatory adaptations allowed an attenuating mutation to become permissible (3, 18). The ability of resistant 2008 isolates to perform on par with nonresistant 2008 isolates in growth curves, in mean plaque size, and in a transmission model was recently confirmed (2). Currently, 99% of seasonal H1N1 viruses are oseltamivir resistant; however, the prevalence of these viruses is very low due to replacement by a novel reassortant H1N1 virus (6, 8). This novel reassortant was originally identified in Mexico by doctors concerned about a jump in the number of influenza cases during the month of March in 2009 (7). Later referred to as swine-origin influenza virus, novel H1N1 virus, or 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus, this virus would continue to efficiently transmit around the world, even during the summer months of the northern hemisphere. Its robust transmission was later confirmed in aerosol transmission models, in which 86% of ferrets and 100% of guinea pigs exposed to infected animals contracted pandemic influenza (22, 28, 31). Oseltamivir was used broadly during the outbreak, treating those with complications and prophylactically treating close contacts of confirmed cases. The use of oseltamivir in this manner provided ample opportunity for oseltamivir-resistant viruses to develop. More than 225 cases of oseltamivir-resistant infections have been confirmed from the beginning of the pandemic, including four incidents of suspected aerosol transmission (21, 32, 33). Fortunately, these clinical isolates never progressed into stable transmission in the general public. This study seeks to evaluate if introducing the H275Y mutation into the pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus attenuates virus replication in vitro or in vivo using the guinea pig model and the ferret model to test aerosol transmission efficiency. Furthermore, this study evaluates if a reassortant between the circulating novel H1N1 virus and seasonal neuraminidase (NA) forms a well-adapted, resistant virus capable of efficient transmission.Currently, oseltamivir is the drug of choice for treating novel H1N1 complications and outpatient prophylaxis. Therefore, it is of great importance to study the in vitro replication and transmission phenotypes of oseltamivir-resistant novel H1N1 viruses to understand why broad oseltamivir resistance has not occurred or whether we should expect it to occur in the future.     

A Single Immunization with CoVaccine HT-Adjuvanted H5N1 Influenza Virus Vaccine Induces Protective Cellular and Humoral Immune Responses in Ferrets

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses of the H5N1 subtype continue to circulate in poultry, and zoonotic transmissions are reported frequently. Since a pandemic caused by these highly pathogenic viruses is still feared, there is interest in the development of influenza A/H5N1 virus vaccines that can protect humans against infection, preferably after a single vaccination with a low dose of antigen. Here we describe the induction of humoral and cellular immune responses in ferrets after vaccination with a cell culture-derived whole inactivated influenza A virus vaccine in combination with the novel adjuvant CoVaccine HT. The addition of CoVaccine HT to the influenza A virus vaccine increased antibody responses to homologous and heterologous influenza A/H5N1 viruses and increased virus-specific cell-mediated immune responses. Ferrets vaccinated once with a whole-virus equivalent of 3.8 μg hemagglutinin (HA) and CoVaccine HT were protected against homologous challenge infection with influenza virus A/VN/1194/04. Furthermore, ferrets vaccinated once with the same vaccine/adjuvant combination were partially protected against infection with a heterologous virus derived from clade 2.1 of H5N1 influenza viruses. Thus, the use of the novel adjuvant CoVaccine HT with cell culture-derived inactivated influenza A/H5N1 virus antigen is a promising and dose-sparing vaccine approach warranting further clinical evaluation.Since the first human case of infection with a highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus of the H5N1 subtype in 1997 (9, 10, 37), hundreds of zoonotic transmissions have been reported, with a high case-fatality rate (10, 44). Since these viruses continue to circulate among domestic birds and human cases are regularly reported, it is feared that they will adapt to their new host or exchange gene segments with other influenza A viruses, become transmissible from human to human, and cause a new pandemic. Recently, a novel influenza A virus of the H1N1 subtype emerged. This virus, which originated from pigs, was transmitted between humans efficiently, resulting in the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century (8, 45). Although millions of people have been inoculated with the (H1N1)2009 virus, the case-fatality rate was relatively low compared to that for infections with the H5N1 viruses (11, 31). However, the unexpected pandemic caused by influenza A/H1N1(2009) viruses has further highlighted the importance of rapid availability of safe and effective pandemic influenza virus vaccines. Other key issues for the development of pandemic influenza A virus vaccines include optimal use of the existing (limited) capacity for production of viral antigen and effectiveness against viruses that are antigenically distinct. Ideally, a single administration of a low dose of antigen would be sufficient to induce protective immunity against the homologous strain and heterologous antigenic variant strains. However, since the population at large will be immunologically naïve to a newly introduced virus, high doses of antigen are required to induce protective immunity in unprimed subjects (23, 36). The use of safe and effective adjuvants in pandemic influenza virus vaccines is considered a dose-sparing strategy. Clinical trials evaluating candidate inactivated influenza A/H5N1 virus vaccines showed that the use of adjuvants can increase their immunogenicity and broaden the specificity of the induced antibody responses (2, 7, 19, 23, 27, 36, 41). These research efforts have resulted in the licensing of adjuvanted vaccines against seasonal and pandemic influenza viruses (17). The protective efficacy of immune responses induced with candidate influenza A/H5N1 virus vaccines was demonstrated in ferrets after two immunizations (1, 22, 24, 25) or after a single immunization. The latter was achieved with a low dose of antigen in combination with the adjuvant Iscomatrix (26).Recently, a novel adjuvant that consists of a sucrose fatty acid sulfate ester (SFASE) immobilized on the oil droplets of a submicrometer emulsion of squalane in water has been developed (4). It has been demonstrated that the addition of this novel adjuvant, called CoVaccine HT, to multiple antigens increased the immune response to these antigens in pigs and horses and was well tolerated in both species (4, 16, 40). Furthermore, it was shown that the use of CoVaccine HT increased the virus-specific antibody responses in mice and ferrets after vaccination with a cell culture-derived whole inactivated influenza A/H5N1 virus vaccine (5, 13). One of the mode of actions of CoVaccine HT is the activation of antigen-presenting cells such as dendritic cells, most likely through Toll-like receptor 4 (TLR4) signaling (5).In the present study, we evaluated the protective potential of CoVaccine HT-adjuvanted cell culture-derived whole inactivated influenza A/H5N1 virus (WIV) vaccine in the ferret model, which is considered the most suitable animal model for the evaluation of candidate influenza virus vaccines (6, 14, 15). To this end, ferrets were vaccinated once or twice with various antigen doses with or without the adjuvant to test whether dose sparing could be achieved. The use of CoVaccine HT increased virus-specific antibody responses and T cell responses. A single administration of 3.8 μg hemagglutinin (HA) of WIV NIBRG-14 vaccine preparation in combination with CoVaccine HT conferred protection against challenge infection with the homologous highly pathogenic A/H5N1 virus strain A/VN/1194/04 and partial protection against infection with a heterologous, antigenically distinct strain, A/IND/5/05. Therefore, it was concluded that the use of CoVaccine HT in inactivated influenza virus vaccines induced protective virus-specific humoral and cell-mediated immune responses and that it could be suitable as adjuvant in (pre)pandemic A/H5N1 virus vaccines. Further clinical testing of these candidate vaccines seems to be warranted.     

Prevalence of seroprotection against the pandemic (H1N1) virus after the 2009 pandemic

Background

Before pandemic (H1N1) 2009, less than 10% of serum samples collected from all age groups in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, Canada, showed seroprotection against the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, except those from very elderly people. We reassessed this profile of seroprotection by age in the same region six months after the fall 2009 pandemic and vaccination campaign.

Methods

We evaluated 100 anonymized serum samples per 10-year age group based on convenience sampling. We measured levels of antibody against the pandemic virus by hemagglutination inhibition and microneutralization assays. We assessed geometric mean titres and the proportion of people with seroprotective antibody levels (hemagglutination inhibition titre ≥ 40). We performed sensitivity analyses to evaluate titre thresholds of 80, 20 and 10.

Results

Serum samples from 1127 people aged 9 months to 101 years were obtained. The overall age-standardized proportion of people with seroprotective antibody levels was 46%. A U-shaped age distribution was identified regardless of assay or titre threshold applied. Among those less than 20 years old and those 80 years and older, the prevalence of seroprotection was comparably high at about 70%. Seroprotection was 44% among those aged 20–49 and 30% among those 50–79 years. It was lowest among people aged 70–79 years (21%) and highest among those 90 years and older (88%).

Interpretation

We measured much higher levels of seroprotection after the 2009 pandemic compared than before the pandemic, with a U-shaped age distribution now evident. These findings, particularly the low levels of seroprotection among people aged 50–79 years, should be confirmed in other settings and closer to the influenza season.In a previous age-based survey of about 1000 anonymized serum samples collected before substantial pandemic (H1N1) 2009 activity in the Lower Mainland of the province of British Columbia, Canada, we found that less than 10% of children and adults under 70 years of age had seroprotective levels of antibody against the pandemic (H1N1) virus.¹ This proportion was slightly higher among people aged 70–79 years (27%) and substantially higher among those above 80 years of age (77%).¹The 2009 influenza pandemic and the broad and effective vaccination campaign introduced major changes to this population’s immune status. The first wave in the province, in the spring and summer months, was of limited activity and was followed by a second, more substantial and widespread wave in the fall that peaked during the last week of October and resolved by the end of 2009.² Meanwhile, a highly immunogenic adjuvanted vaccine was provided free of charge through a universal vaccination campaign that targeted all Canadians.³ Supply was limited initially, requiring sequenced rollout of the vaccine, starting with children under five years of age, pregnant women, and people under 65 years who had comorbidities.⁴ The uptake of the vaccine of about 35%–45% in the province overall^4–6 and 44% in the Lower Mainland (Dr. Monika Naus, BC Centre for Disease Control, Vancouver, BC: personal communication, 2010) was estimated to be moderate compared with rates of uptake in other provinces.To assess seroprotective antibody levels after the 2009 pandemic, we repeated our age-based survey of antibody levels against the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in a further 1000 serum samples collected from people in the Lower Mainland in May and June 2010, more than six months after the last peak of the epidemic.     

Generation of Live Attenuated Novel Influenza Virus A/California/7/09 (H1N1) Vaccines with High Yield in Embryonated Chicken Eggs

Several live attenuated influenza virus A/California/7/09 (H1N1) (CA09) candidate vaccine variants that possess the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) gene segments from the CA09 virus and six internal protein gene segments from the cold-adapted influenza virus A/Ann Arbor/6/60 (H2N2) virus were generated by reverse genetics. The reassortant viruses replicated relatively poorly in embryonated chicken eggs. To improve virus growth in eggs, reassortants expressing the HA and NA of CA09 were passaged in MDCK cells and variants exhibiting large-plaque morphology were isolated. These variants replicated at levels approximately 10-fold higher than the rate of replication of the parental strains in embryonated chicken eggs. Sequence analysis indicated that single amino acid changes at positions 119, 153, 154, and 186 were responsible for the improved growth properties in MDCK cells and eggs. In addition, the introduction of a mutation at residue 155 that was previously shown to enhance the replication of a 1976 swine influenza virus also significantly improved the replication of the CA09 virus in eggs. Each variant was further evaluated for receptor binding preference, antigenicity, attenuation phenotype, and immunogenicity. Mutations at residues 153, 154, and 155 drastically reduced viral antigenicity, which made these mutants unsuitable as vaccine candidates. However, changes at residues 119 and 186 did not affect virus antigenicity or immunogenicity, justifying their inclusion in live attenuated vaccine candidates to protect against the currently circulating 2009 swine origin H1N1 viruses.Human infections with the swine origin influenza virus A (H1N1) were first detected in April 2009 and spread across the globe, resulting in WHO declaring a pandemic on 12 June 2009 for the first time in the past 41 years. More than 296,471 people have had confirmed infections with this novel H1N1 virus, and there have been at least 3,486 deaths as of September 18, 2009. In the last century, an influenza H1N1 virus caused the devastating 1918-1919 pandemic; this pandemic was characterized by a mild outbreak in the spring of 1918, followed by a lethal wave globally in the fall of that year which killed as many as 50 million people worldwide (20, 29). The 2009 H1N1 viruses circulating globally since April 2009 have not caused a significant rise in mortality related to influenza. Nucleotide sequence analysis suggested that E627 in PB2, a deletion of the PDZ ligand domain in NS1, and the lack of the PB1-F2 open reading frame in the 2009 H1N1 viruses may contribute to the relatively mild virulence (20, 26, 27). Recent animal studies have shown that the 2009 H1N1 influenza viruses did not replicate in tissues beyond the respiratory tract and did not cause significant mortality in the ferret model; however, the 2009 H1N1 viruses are capable of infecting deep in the lung tissues and caused more significant lesions in the lung tissues of animals, including nonhuman primates, than typical seasonal strains (13, 17, 19). Children and young adults are particularly susceptible to the 2009 H1N1 virus infection because they have no or low immunity to the novel 2009 H1N1 strains (11, 13). The widespread and rapid distribution of the 2009 H1N1 viruses in humans raises a concern about the evolution of more virulent strains during passage in the population. One fear is that mutant forms of the 2009 H1N1 viruses may exhibit significantly increased virulence (2, 19). Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop an effective vaccine to control the influenza pandemic caused by the swine origin H1N1 viruses.Live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) has been licensed in the United States annually since 2003. The seasonal vaccine protects against influenza illness and elicits both systemic and mucosal immune responses, including serum hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) antibodies that react to antigenically drifted strains (3, 4). A critical attribute of an effective pandemic vaccine is its capability to elicit an immune response in immunonaive individuals; LAIV has been shown to offer protection following a single dose in young children. However, two doses of vaccines are recommended for children younger than 9 years of age who have never been immunized with influenza vaccines. In order to produce LAIV to protect against the newly emerged swine origin H1N1 influenza virus, we have produced several 6:2 reassortant candidate vaccine strains that express the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) gene segments from influenza virus A/California/4/09 (A/CA/4/09) (H1N1) or A/CA/7/09 (H1N1), as well as the six internal protein gene segments (PB1, PB2, PA, NP, M, and NS) from cold-adapted A/Ann Arbor/6/60 (H2N2) (AA60) virus, which is the master donor virus for all influenza virus A strains in trivalent seasonal LAIV. Initial evaluation of these candidate vaccine strains indicated that they did not replicate as efficiently as seasonal H1N1 influenza vaccine strains in embryonated chicken eggs. In this report, we describe directed modifications of the HA gene segment that improved vaccine yields in eggs, resulting in a number of vaccine candidates that are available for human use.     

Evolution and control of H5N1

The evolutionary dynamics of the H5N1 virus present a challenge for conventional control measures. Efforts must consider the regional aspects of endemic H5N1.The H5N1 virus has spread across Asia, Europe and Africa, and has infected birds in several endemic areas, including China, Indonesia, Vietnam and Egypt. H5N1 outbreaks pose a massive threat for the poultry industry and, ultimately, for human health [1]. However, the rapid spread of the virus also offers the opportunity to study and learn from its dynamics in the wild. The insights gained should inform new public health policies and preventive actions against a possible pandemic.Progress in influenza research has been impressive. In particular, the application of reverse genetics has led to the identification of mutations and reassortment changes that determine virus virulence. Perhaps the most significant results come from the two now infamous studies, published in Nature and Science, about the generation of recombinant H5N1 viruses that are transmissible in ferrets [2,3]. These advances show that we are steadily elucidating influenza virus at the molecular level. By contrast, our understanding of the dynamics of highly pathogenic influenza virus in the environment remains limited [4,5].Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is an important poultry disease. The major reservoir of the virus is wild waterfowl, and infected birds are usually asymptomatic as a result of long-term evolutionary adaptation [1,6]. After transmission from wild waterfowl to poultry, however, avian influenza viruses occasionally become highly pathogenic and can cause mortalities of up to 100% within 48 h of infection. The standard method for controlling an HPAI outbreak is the testing and culling of all infected poultry, and the setting up of a concentric control area around the infected flock.The HPAI H5N1 virus, circulating in Eurasia and Africa, emerged in China around 1997 [1] but it only infected terrestrial birds at the time. Continuous transmission in poultry eventually allowed the virus to evolve, resulting in large outbreaks in China in 2005 with high mortality in wild waterfowl. The virus spread rapidly, probably though migratory birds, to Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Such ‘east to west'' movements of H5N1 viruses over comparably long distances have not since been recorded. Moreover, migrating wildfowl have begun to spread the virus intermittently between Asia and Siberia [7]. This H5N1 lineage is the longest-circulating HPAI virus that has been reported, and it has reached epizootic levels in both domestic and wild bird populations.…the challenge is to understand the evolution of H5N1 to better predict new strains that could become a serious threat for human healthOne of the striking characteristics of the H5N1 lineage, in contrast with other HPAI, is its infectivity toward mammals. H5N1 can be directly transmitted from birds to humans and cause severe disease, although it has a significantly lower transmissibility than seasonal influenza viruses [1]. So far, 608 cases of human H5N1 infections have been reported with 59% mortality [5]. Most human infections have resulted from close contact with H5N1-infected poultry or poultry products, and no sustained human–human transmission has as yet been documented. Nonetheless, a potential H5N1 pandemic remains a great concern for public health.The viruses that caused the five influenza pandemics since 1900 arose by two mechanisms: reassortment among avian, human and swine influenza viruses, and accumulation of mutations in an avian influenza virus [1,8]. Triple reassortment between avian H5N1, swine H3N1 and H1N1 viruses, and double reassortment between avian H5N1 and H9N2 viruses has already been reported in Asia, which raises concerns about new reassortment viruses that could infect humans [9,10]. Meanwhile, research has identified some 80 genetic mutations that could increase infectivity of avian influenza viruses in mammals, and thus potentially facilitate avian influenza evolution to generate a pandemic strain [8,11]. H5N1 strains with some of these mutations have often been found in bird populations [5] and in human H5N1 strains [12]. Indeed, specific mutations that could confer switching in receptor-binding specificity were reported in H5N1-infected patients in Thailand [13]. The two controversial studies published in Nature and Science also showed how a handful of mutations might enable the H5N1 virus to be transmitted between humans [2,3]. Pathogenic variants of the H5N1 virus with a higher pandemic potential could naturally evolve; the challenge is to understand the evolution of H5N1 to better predict new strains that could become a serious threat for human health.…continuous replication of H5N1 virus in Egypt has provided a valuable opportunity to study the impact of genetic evolution on phenotypic variation without reassortmentThe evolutionary dynamics of the Egyptian H5N1 strains provide clues to understanding the pandemic potential of H5N1. The virus was introduced only once in Egypt, in early 2006, and spread among a variety of bird species, including chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese and quail [14]. The virus rapidly evolved to form a phylogenetically distinct clade that has since diverged into multiple sublineages [15]. Thus, continuous replication of H5N1 virus in Egypt has provided a valuable opportunity to study the impact of genetic evolution on phenotypic variation without reassortment.After diversification in local bird populations, some new H5 sublineages have emerged in Egypt with a higher affinity for human-type receptors. Indeed, since their emergence in 2008, almost all human H5N1 strains in Egypt have been phylogenetically grouped into these new sublineages, which can be transmitted to humans with a higher efficacy than other avian influenza viruses. This might explain why, since 2009, Egypt has had the highest number of human cases of H5N1 infection, with more than 50% of the cases worldwide [5]. Fortunately, these Egyptian H5N1 sublineages still do not have binding affinity for receptors in the upper respiratory tract and, therefore, do not sustain transmission in humans. However, it increases the risk of H5N1 variants that are better adapted to humans after viral replication in infected patients.…Egypt is regarded as the country with the highest H5N1 pandemic potential worldwideThe Egyptian H5N1 sublineages are also diversifying antigenically in the field, as some are no longer crossreactive to other co-circulating sublineages [15]. Moreover, faint traces of species-specific evolutionary changes have been detected [16], implying a change in their host species. It shows that the H5N1 virus has undergone significant diversification in Egypt during the past seven years. Of greater concern, however, are Egyptian H5N1 strains that carry mammalian influenza virus type PB2 and have lost the N-linked 158 glycosylation site in the top region of haemagglutinin [15,17], both of which can potentially facilitate viral transmission to humans. The genetic diversification of H5N1 virus in Egypt represents an increasing pandemic potential, and Egypt is regarded as the country with the highest H5N1 pandemic potential worldwide [18].A similar situation exists in other geographical areas. Multiple clades and sublineages of H5N1 are co-circulating in Asia, occasionally enabling reassortment events within and beyond the viral subtypes in the field [19,20]. Several H5N1 strains with enhanced binding affinity to human-type receptors have been reported in Indonesia [12]. Similarly, avian and swine H5N1 strains with an altered receptor-binding preference have been isolated sporadically in Indonesia and Laos [21,22]. As in other areas, distinct groups of H5N1 viruses are circulating amongst themselves and with other avian influenza viruses, generating diverse viral phenotypes in nature. The evolutionary dynamics of H5N1 might even accelerate in the wild. H5N1 viruses diverge genetically in ducks [23]; they can transfer the virus over long distances by migration. Thus, the H5N1 virus has established a complex life cycle in nature with accelerated evolutionary dynamics. The pandemic threat of H5N1 remains a serious concern and might be increasing.Control measures based on isolating and culling are still the gold standard for controlling the early phase of an H5N1 outbreak, and worked against the H5N1 outbreaks in Hong Kong in 1997 and in Thailand in 2004 [4]. However, this measure failed in several countries and made H5N1 endemic. Cross-border circulation of H5N1 further complicates implementation of a classical control strategy based on culling in the infected area.In response, public health officials in several countries, including Egypt and Indonesia, advocate poultry vaccination as a preventive or adjunct control measure [1]. Although vaccination does not completely prevent infections, its proper use can help to control avian influenza outbreaks by reducing virus transmission from infected animals. However, it can also increase vaccine-driven evolution among avian influenza viruses. The endemic status of H5N1, which can cause devastating local epidemics, puts pressure on health officers to use a vaccine or a vaccination strategy that might eventually increase selective pressure and thereby accelerate H5N1 evolution. Given the high mutability and diversity of circulating viruses, it seems best to avoid using a vaccine based on a strain from a different geographical area because there would only be a partial antigen match; such a heterologous vaccine would only be effective in the short term compared with a homologous vaccine. During past control of H5N1 epidemics using imported vaccines, escape mutants have emerged within about a year of the start of vaccination, which made the epidemic even worse [14]. When a vaccination strategy is implemented in an endemic area, the vaccine seed strain should be selected from the same geographical area to try to get the longest possible protection. Vaccine seed virus selection must be periodically revised to produce well-matched and efficacious vaccines.Close communication and workshops hold the greatest potential for controlling the H5N1 virusIn most cases, H5 vaccine for an endemic area comes from a foreign supplier. It would be necessary to enable foreign manufacturers to produce customized H5 vaccines based on epidemic strains from different areas. The best approach might be a plasmid-based reverse genetics system to construct vaccine seed viruses [1]. In egg-based production, which is the basis of flu vaccine production, the seed virus needs to be adapted for high growth. This time-consuming step carries the risk of antigenic changes during vaccine production. Yet, advances in influenza reverse genetics have led to the development of cell culture systems to produce recombinant viruses, which would enable rapid genetic mutagenesis and reassortment. Once reverse genetics generates a virus genome that is well adapted to growth in cell culture, the haemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes can be easily interchanged with those of other influenza viruses. In addition, virus growth in cell culture can shorten production time, which increases the probability of selecting a seed virus antigenically appropriate for the upcoming flu season, and enables a rapid increase in production if necessary [24].A control strategy imposed without consideration of regional customs will not be successfulGiven the zoonotic risks of influenza viruses to both humans and animals, the establishment of a vaccine production system applicable to both human and animal infections is an urgent issue. The capacity of vaccine production needs to be flexible for seasonal, pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines. Advances in genetic engineering facilitate in vitro control of human- and avian-type receptor expression on cultured cells, which should allow both human and avian influenza viruses to grow in the same system. As vaccine production capacity based on cell culture develops, commercial production of H5N1 vaccines tailored to each geographical area should become possible. In addition, emergency vaccination guidelines, such as pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiling, expanding and accelerating vaccine production and setting vaccination priorities, should be formulated in a business–government partnership, to ensure pandemic preparation. There is no guarantee that the H5N1 virus will be the next pandemic influenza strain. However, exploring options for versatile vaccine manufacturing is a key to controlling zoonotic influenza viruses, including H5N1.The complexity of H5N1 ecology also makes control of endemic H5N1 by vaccination a complex task. The problem is that antigenically different groups of viruses, which are not crossreactive, are often co-circulating in endemic areas. Circulation of viruses in each sublineage is not restricted in terms of geography or host species, which complicates efforts to use a vaccine produced against antigens from a single virus strain [15]. Of greater concern, H5N1 virus infects a variety of bird species [1], which means the vaccination targets have expanded. Bird species differ in their optimal vaccination protocol—for example, the single vaccination used routinely in chickens does not induce an adequate immune response in turkeys, which require multi-dose vaccination at an older age [25]. Furthermore, rearing many bird species and their hybrid breeds in uncontrolled confinement is common in H5N1 endemic countries, especially in rural areas. Therefore, the immunogenicity of existing vaccines is probably inadequate to protect all target species with a single vaccination scheme. Endemic H5N1 already forces public health officials to redefine vaccine development policy to improve both vaccine immunogenicity and vaccination regime.Unfortunately, it is unlikely that science will ever produce a clear answer as to when, where and how the next pandemic influenza virus will emergeToday, there are numerous techniques that could overcome these problems by increasing immunogenic potency and crossreactivity. Innovative vaccine formats—multivalent, universal, nasal and synthetic vaccines—possibly coupled with the use of adjuvants, could improve the global vaccine supply [24]. These new technologies should be applied as soon as possible. Nevertheless, no single technique can probably resolve the underlying complexity of H5N1 dynamics. Over-reliance on vaccination might therefore only worsen the situation. Vaccination can help control endemic H5N1 only when administered as part of an integrated control programme that includes surveillance, culling, restricting host movement and enhanced quarantine and biosecurity.The complex evolutionary dynamics of the H5N1 virus are challenging host species barriers and the ecology brings H5N1 into close proximity to humans [1]. The close link between the virus and humans is a multifaceted phenomenon that can affect health in myriad ways. Thus, we need to redefine control strategies to address the nature of H5N1 dynamics. Surveillance is the basis of infection control in the field. Wild birds and their predators should be included as surveillance targets, thereby expanding the H5N1 host species range. Another drawback is the fact that epidemiological studies focus mainly on virus genotyping. Although genetic data is informative, the diversity of H5N1 viruses makes characterization based only on genetic traits difficult. Characterization of viral phenotypes—antigenicity, receptor-binding preference, pathogenicity and transmissibility—is equally important for investigating the evolutionary dynamics of H5N1 viruses in nature. We would need techniques to determine easily viral phenotype, in particular new rapid diagnostic systems that can be used for timely epidemiological investigations and rapid infection control measures [1]. For example, portable kits that can determine virus receptor specificity would allow field testing of whether a particular avian influenza virus strain has adapted to human-type receptors, thereby adding a new dimension for characterizing and assessing H5N1 outbreaks.Our perception of H5N1 control should change from short-term hunting to long-term controlThe large-scale slaughter of all known and suspected infected birds in H5N1 endemic countries is hugely expensive in terms of execution costs and compensation for lost poultry. Financial assistance from international organizations might be needed to promote the thorough implementation of such a policy. However, H5N1 endemic countries are not all poor nations and some have already built a certain level of technology infrastructure. Thus, transfer of epidemiological skills and concepts to local health officers and scientists is a priority. Overseas collaborations between technologically developed countries and their institutions, and H5N1 endemic countries and their institutions, should be established at a functional level. Close communication and workshops hold the greatest potential for controlling the H5N1 virus. Such projects supported by governments and funding agencies would encourage establishment of bilateral and multilateral relationships between developed countries and the developing countries, which are the epicentres of H5N1 outbreaks. Sharing information about risk and risk management is one of the key methods for reducing the threat of future H5N1 epidemics.Globalization has had major benefits for international travel and trade, and sharing of information. The improvements in information technology have dramatically increased the speed and ease of data flow [26]. Intelligence networks facilitate instantaneous sharing of information and enable global warnings about potential hazards as well as problem-solving. Moreover, collaborative research centres, which have been established on reciprocal bases between scientifically advanced countries and institutes and overseas partner countries and institutes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, are important players in information networking—for instance the Institute Pasteur Network, the Mahidol Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit and Japan Initiative for Global Research Network on Infectious Diseases. Linking such laboratory-based networks should be the next step. This would have a profound synergistic effect by maximizing research capacity, human resources and geographic coverage to build a robust global-scale network for infection control.However, regional socio-cultural issues can be a significant concern for virus control wherever accepted values and scientific understanding might differ. Multiple local and regional factors—customs, religion, politics and economics—can affect H5N1 control in an area. Successful implementation of an H5N1 control strategy depends largely on mutual understanding and consideration of local idiosyncrasies.Some examples from Egypt show how regional identity can be closely linked with local public health initiatives. Egypt is an Islamic nation and bird meat is an important source of animal protein, and the only source in some rural areas [14]. A large proportion of Egyptian households in rural areas raise poultry. Although broiler and layer chickens are raised under modern hygienic controls on commercial farms, backyard birds are raised in open uncontrolled farms, leaving them free to interact with other birds (Fig 1A). The poultry meat trade depends mainly on live bird markets in traditional bazaars (Fig 1B), because of a preference for freshly slaughtered poultry. Pigeon towers are built on farms, backyards and roofs throughout villages to raise pigeons for eating. Generally, birds in Egypt are raised in proximity to humans (Fig 1C), which presents an increasing risk of human H5N1 infection in Egypt and establishment of endemic H5N1 in birds nationwide.Open in a separate windowFigure 1Socio-cultural traditions in rearing birds for food in Egypt. (A) Free rearing of backyard birds. (B) Live birds at a downtown market. (C) An example of the intertwined relationship between birds and humans.Such regional identity is inseparable from socio-cultural contexts, making fundamental change virtually impossible. Although there are many scenarios in which a local public health system could be improved by food safety standards and veterinary inspection or short-term closing of live bird markets for virus clearance, H5N1 control measures have to be implemented whilst respecting the intrinsic socio-cultural traditions in the region. A control strategy imposed without consideration of regional customs will not be successful. It is the local health officers and scientists who are best suited to address the enormous complexity and breadth of issues required for H5N1 control. They also experience H5N1 outbreaks in their area on a regular basis and have a great incentive to be involved in infection control. Therefore, it is important to include local expertise in planning and implementing a control strategy.Science in an area such as infectious disease research can no longer be viewed as independent of societal needs…Science is frequently looked at as if it can produce a ‘silver bullet'' to solve every problem. Early success in vaccine and antibiotic development also created a false sense of optimism that scientific methods could eliminate the risk of infection. However, the reality has turned out to be different—some infectious diseases remain uncontrollable and far from eradication. Given the mutable and diversifying nature of avian influenza viruses, there is a significant possibility that different avian influenza subtypes and strains do not follow a single evolutionary pathway. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that science will ever produce a clear answer as to when, where and how the next pandemic influenza virus will emerge. Our perception of H5N1 control should change from short-term hunting to long-term control. The ecology of H5N1 virus brings it into close proximity to humans. The most important strategy is to minimize contact between terrestrial poultry and wild waterfowl to segregate H5N1 in poultry, because H5N1 spread would be uncontrollable if it established a stable equilibrium in waterfowl. For example, H5N1 viruses in Siberia have not been consistently isolated each year from carcasses and faeces of wildfowl migrating from Asia [7]. This implies that H5N1 circulation in the wild still largely depends on occasional introduction from poultry. It is possible that trials to limit H5N1 infection in poultry would lead to a reduction in viral spread and a dwindling evolutionary path in nature. Infection control policy must abandon fixed strategies in favour of flexible ones to keep pace with the evolutionary dynamics of pathogens such as H5N1 (Fig 2).Open in a separate windowFigure 2Changing dynamics of H5N1 virus in the field. Endemic H5N1 virus diversifies in nature, making traditional control measures extremely difficult.Today''s infection control strategy is becoming largely dependent on the reliability and accuracy of information networking. However, the vast flood of scientific information can hide erroneous information and easily mislead the public [26]. Of greater concern, globalization has prompted the centralization of capital and resources, which can lead to an overemphasis on certain research topics. As a consequence, research projects are often short term, without consideration of effects that might have a long-term social impact [27]. This has led to a debate about whether to limit publication of certain types of research or keep scientific information completely accessible. There is probably no easy answer to this. Our global society needs a more mature approach to support research projects that are accurate reflections of societal needs in public health. At the same time, the increasing links between science and society put more pressure on science to play a greater role in society. This is a serious dilemma—how to use science to solve societal problems whilst maintaining its autonomy [27]. Science in an area such as infectious disease research can no longer be viewed as independent of societal needs; we need to establish a balance between the pursuit of independent basic research and its application for solving clinical problems and crises.? Open in a separate windowYohei WatanabeOpen in a separate windowKazuyoshi IkutaOpen in a separate windowMadiha S Ibrahim     

Unseasonal Transmission of H3N2 Influenza A Virus During the Swine-Origin H1N1 Pandemic

The initial wave of swine-origin influenza A virus (pandemic H1N1/09) in the United States during the spring and summer of 2009 also resulted in an increased vigilance and sampling of seasonal influenza viruses (H1N1 and H3N2), even though they are normally characterized by very low incidence outside of the winter months. To explore the nature of virus evolution during this influenza “off-season,” we conducted a phylogenetic analysis of H1N1 and H3N2 sequences sampled during April to June 2009 in New York State. Our analysis revealed that multiple lineages of both viruses were introduced and cocirculated during this time, as is typical of influenza virus during the winter. Strikingly, however, we also found strong evidence for the presence of a large transmission chain of H3N2 viruses centered on the south-east of New York State and which continued until at least 1 June 2009. These results suggest that the unseasonal transmission of influenza A viruses may be more widespread than is usually supposed.The recent emergence of swine-origin H1N1 influenza A virus (pandemic H1N1/09) in humans has heightened awareness of how the burden of morbidity and mortality due to influenza is associated with the appearance of new genetic variants (5) and of the genetic and epidemiological determinants of viral transmission (8). The emergence of pandemic H1N1/09 is also unprecedented in recorded history as it means that three antigenically distinct lineages of influenza A virus—pandemic H1N1/09 and the seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 viruses— currently cocirculate within human populations.Although the presence of multiple subtypes of influenza A virus may place an additional burden on public health resources, it also provides a unique opportunity to compare the patterns and dynamics of evolution in these viruses on a similar time scale. Indeed, one of the most interesting secondary effects of the current H1N1/09 pandemic has been an increased vigilance for cases of influenza-like illness and hence an intensified sampling of seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 viruses during the typical influenza “off-season” (i.e., spring-summer) in the northern hemisphere. Because the influenza season in the northern hemisphere generally runs from November through March, with a usual peak in January or February, influenza viruses sampled outside of this period are of special interest.The current model for the global spatiotemporal dynamics of influenza A virus is that the northern and southern hemispheres represent ecological “sinks” for this virus, with little ongoing viral transmission during the summer months (9). In contrast, more continual viral transmission occurs within the tropical “source” population (13) that is most likely centered on an intense transmission network in east and southeast Asia (10). However, the precise epidemiological and evolutionary reasons for this major geographic division, and for the seasonality of influenza A virus in general, remain uncertain (1, 4). Evidence for this “sink-source” ecological model is that viruses sampled from successive seasons in localities such as New York State do not usually form linked clusters on phylogenetic trees, indicating that they are not connected by direct transmission through the summer months (7). Similar conclusions can be drawn for the United States as a whole and point to multiple introductions of phylogenetically distinct lineages during the winter (6), followed by complex patterns of spatial diffusion (14). However, despite the growing epidemiological and phylogenetic data supporting this model, it is also evident that there is relatively little sequence data from seasonal influenza viruses that are sampled from April to October in the northern hemisphere. Hence, it is uncertain whether extended chains of transmission can occur during this time period, even though this may have an important bearing on our understanding of influenza seasonality.To address these issues, we examined the evolutionary behavior of seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 viruses as they cocirculated during a single time period—(late) April to June 2009—within a single locality (New York State). Not only are levels of influenza virus transmission in the northern hemisphere usually very low during this time period, but in this particular season the human host population was also experiencing the emerging epidemic of pandemic H1N1/09.     

Reassortment between Avian H5N1 and Human H3N2 Influenza Viruses in Ferrets: a Public Health Risk Assessment

This study investigated whether transmissible H5 subtype human-avian reassortant viruses could be generated in vivo. To this end, ferrets were coinfected with recent avian H5N1 (A/Thailand/16/04) and human H3N2 (A/Wyoming/3/03) viruses. Genotype analyses of plaque-purified viruses from nasal secretions of coinfected ferrets revealed that approximately 9% of recovered viruses contained genes from both progenitor viruses. H5 and H3 subtype viruses, including reassortants, were found in airways extending toward and in the upper respiratory tract of ferrets. However, only parental H5N1 genotype viruses were found in lung tissue. Approximately 34% of the recovered reassortant viruses possessed the H5 hemagglutinin (HA) gene, with five unique H5 subtypes recovered. These H5 reassortants were selected for further studies to examine their growth and transmissibility characteristics. Five H5 viruses with representative reassortant genotypes showed reduced titers in nasal secretions of infected ferrets compared to the parental H5N1 virus. No transmission by direct contact between infected and naïve ferrets was observed. These studies indicate that reassortment between H5N1 avian influenza and H3N2 human viruses occurred readily in vivo and furthermore that reassortment between these two viral subtypes is likely to occur in ferret upper airways. Given the relatively high incidence of reassortant viruses from tissues of the ferret upper airway, it is reasonable to conclude that continued exposure of humans and animals to H5N1 alongside seasonal influenza viruses increases the risk of generating H5 subtype reassortant viruses that may be shed from upper airway secretions.Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 subtype have caused devastating outbreaks in avian species during the past decade. After emerging in the Guangdong province of China in 1996, H5N1 viruses have extended their geographic distribution from Asia into Europe and Africa (45, 51). Sporadic transmission of H5N1 viruses from infected birds to humans has resulted in over 380 laboratory-confirmed infections and a case fatality rate of ∼60% since 2003 (48). Currently circulating H5N1 viruses lack the ability to undergo efficient and sustained transmission among humans although instances of limited human-to-human transmission have been reported (13, 41). If H5N1 viruses were to acquire genetic changes that confer efficient transmissibility among humans, then another pandemic would likely occur.The pandemics of 1957 and 1968 highlight the importance of genetic reassortment between avian and human influenza viruses as a mechanism for the generation of human pandemic strains (15, 46, 47). The structural separation of the influenza virus genome into eight independent genes allows formation of hybrid progeny viruses during coinfections. The 1957 H2N2 and 1968 H3N2 pandemic viruses acquired the hemagglutinin (HA) and PB1 genes, with or without the neuraminidase (NA) gene, respectively, from an avian virus progenitor (14, 33). The remaining genes of these pandemic reassortants were derived from a contemporary human virus (14, 33). The host species in which such human pandemic strains were generated by reassortment between human and avian viruses is not known. However, coinfection of the same cell with both human and avian viruses must have occurred, even though human and avian influenza viruses have preferences for different sialic acid receptor structures present on cell surface glycoproteins and glycolipids (20, 30). The HA of human viruses preferentially binds α(2,6)-linked sialic acids while that of avian viruses preferentially bind α(2,3)-linked sialic acids (3, 12). Cells possessing both of these receptors could support coinfection of avian and human viruses, leading to reassortment.Human respiratory tract epithelial cells can possess surface glycans with α(2,3)- and α(2,6)-linked sialic acids and as such represent a potential host for the generation of avian-human reassortant viruses (24, 35). The general distribution of surface α(2,3)- and α(2,6)-linked sialic acids varies among cells of the human upper and lower respiratory tracts, which are anatomically separated by the larynx. Recent studies have shown that α(2,3)-linked sialic acids are present in tissues of the human lower respiratory tract (i.e., lung alveolar cells) (24, 35) as well as tissues of the human upper respiratory tract (24). Consistent with these findings, HPAI H5N1 viruses have been shown to attach to and infect tissues belonging to the lower respiratory tract (i.e., trachea, bronchi, and lung) (5, 25, 35, 40, 42, 43) as well as tissues belonging to the upper respiratory tract (i.e., nasopharyngeal, adenoid, and tonsillar) (25). Glycans with α(2,6)-linked sialic acids are more widespread on epithelial cells of the upper airways than lung alveoli (24, 35). In accordance, human seasonal influenza viruses preferentially attach to and infect cells of the upper respiratory tract (6, 25, 35, 43). If cells with both types of receptors are present in the human respiratory tract, simultaneous infection of a person with both human and avian viruses could generate reassortant viruses.Although viruses derived by reassortment between avian H5N1 and human H3N2 progenitors have been generated in vitro (17), reassortment between these avian and human strains in a coinfected mammalian host has not been shown. Furthermore, our knowledge of the genetic and phenotypic repertoire of such reassortants generated in vivo and their potential for transmission to uninfected hosts is limited (2, 17). In the present study, we used the ferret model to better understand the generation of reassortant viruses in a host coinfected with contemporary avian (H5N1) and human (H3N2) viruses and the extent to which such reassortants replicate and transmit from animal to animal. The domestic ferret (Mustela putoris) serves as an ideal small-animal model for influenza because ferrets are susceptible to human and avian influenza viruses, including HPAI H5N1 viruses, and reflect the relative transmissibility of human and avian influenza viruses in humans (9, 17, 18, 31, 36, 39, 53). Our study revealed that coinfection of ferrets reproducibly generated reassortant viruses that could be recovered from tissues within and extending toward the upper respiratory tract. Although H5 reassortant viruses were recovered from the upper airways, they displayed no transmissibility to contact ferrets, suggesting that additional functional changes are required for these viral subtypes to become pandemic within human populations.     

Swine Influenza H1N1 Virus Induces Acute Inflammatory Immune Responses in Pig Lungs: a Potential Animal Model for Human H1N1 Influenza Virus

Pigs are capable of generating reassortant influenza viruses of pandemic potential, as both the avian and mammalian influenza viruses can infect pig epithelial cells in the respiratory tract. The source of the current influenza pandemic is H1N1 influenza A virus, possibly of swine origin. This study was conducted to understand better the pathogenesis of H1N1 influenza virus and associated host mucosal immune responses during acute infection in humans. Therefore, we chose a H1N1 swine influenza virus, Sw/OH/24366/07 (SwIV), which has a history of transmission to humans. Clinically, inoculated pigs had nasal discharge and fever and shed virus through nasal secretions. Like pandemic H1N1, SwIV also replicated extensively in both the upper and lower respiratory tracts, and lung lesions were typical of H1N1 infection. We detected innate, proinflammatory, Th1, Th2, and Th3 cytokines, as well as SwIV-specific IgA antibody in lungs of the virus-inoculated pigs. Production of IFN-γ by lymphocytes of the tracheobronchial lymph nodes was also detected. Higher frequencies of cytotoxic T lymphocytes, γδ T cells, dendritic cells, activated T cells, and CD4⁺ and CD8⁺ T cells were detected in SwIV-infected pig lungs. Concomitantly, higher frequencies of the immunosuppressive T regulatory cells were also detected in the virus-infected pig lungs. The findings of this study have relevance to pathogenesis of the pandemic H1N1 influenza virus in humans; thus, pigs may serve as a useful animal model to design and test effective mucosal vaccines and therapeutics against influenza virus.Swine influenza is a highly contagious, acute respiratory viral disease of swine. The causative agent, swine influenza virus (SwIV), is a strain of influenza virus A in the Orthomyxoviridae family. Clinical disease in pigs is characterized by sudden onset of anorexia, weight loss, dyspnea, pyrexia, cough, fever, and nasal discharge (21). Porcine respiratory tract epithelial cells express sialic acid receptors utilized by both avian (α-2,3 SA-galactose) and mammalian (α-2,6 SA-galactose) influenza viruses. Thus, pigs can serve as “mixing vessels” for the generation of new reassortant strains of influenza A virus that may contain RNA elements of both mammalian and avian viruses. These “newly generated” and reassorted viruses may have the potential to cause pandemics in humans and enzootics in animals (52).Occasional transmission of SwIV to humans has been reported (34, 43, 52), and a few of these cases resulted in human deaths. In April 2009, a previously undescribed H1N1 influenza virus was isolated from humans in Mexico. This virus has spread efficiently among humans and resulted in the current human influenza pandemic. Pandemic H1N1 virus is a triple reassortant (TR) virus of swine origin that contains gene segments from swine, human, and avian influenza viruses. Considering the pandemic potential of swine H1N1 viruses, it is important to understand the pathogenesis and mucosal immune responses of these viruses in their natural host. Swine can serve as an excellent animal model for the influenza virus pathogenesis studies. The clinical manifestations and pathogenesis of influenza in pigs closely resemble those observed in humans. Like humans, pigs are also outbred species, and they are physiologically, anatomically, and immunologically similar to humans (9, 23, 39, 40). In contrast to the mouse lung, the porcine lung has marked similarities to its human counterpart in terms of its tracheobronchial tree structure, lung physiology, airway morphology, abundance of airway submucosal glands, and patterns of glycoprotein synthesis (8, 10, 17). Furthermore, the cytokine responses in bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) fluid from SwIV-infected pigs are also identical to those observed for nasal lavage fluids of experimentally infected humans (20). These observations support the idea that the pig can serve as an excellent animal model to study the pathogenesis of influenza virus.Swine influenza virus causes an acute respiratory tract infection. Virus replicates extensively in epithelial cells of the bronchi and alveoli for 5 to 6 days followed by clearance of viremia by 1 week postinfection (48). During the acute phase of the disease, cytokines such as alpha interferon (IFN-α), tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α), interleukin-1 (IL-1), IL-6, IL-12, and gamma interferon (IFN-γ) are produced. These immune responses mediate both the clinical signs and pulmonary lesions (2). In acute SwIV-infected pigs, a positive correlation between cytokines in BAL fluid, lung viral titers, inflammatory cell infiltrates, and clinical signs has been detected (2, 48).Infection of pigs with SwIV of one subtype may confer complete protection from subsequent infections by homologous viruses and also partial protection against heterologous subtypes, but the nature of the immune responses generated in the swine are not fully delineated. Importantly, knowledge related to host mucosal immune responses in the SwIV-infected pigs is limited. So far only the protective virus-specific IgA and IgG responses in nasal washes and BAL fluid, as well as IgA, IgG, and IgM responses in the sera of infected pigs, have been reported (28). Pigs infected with H3N2 and H1N1 viruses have an increased frequency of neutrophils, NK cells, and CD4 and CD8 T cells in the BAL fluid (21). Pigs infected with the pandemic H1N1 virus showed activated CD4 and CD8 T cells in the peripheral blood on postinfection day (PID) 6 (27). Proliferating lymphocytes in BAL fluid and blood and virus-specific IFN-γ-secreting cells in the tracheobronchial lymph nodes (TBLN) and spleen were detected in SwIV-infected pigs (7). Limited information is available on the mucosal immune responses in pig lungs infected with SwIV, which has a history of transmission to humans.In this study, we examined the acute infection of SwIV (strain SwIV OH07) in pigs with respect to viral replication, pathology, and innate and adaptive immune responses in the respiratory tract of these pigs. This virus was isolated from pigs which suffered from respiratory disease in Ohio, and the same virus was also transmitted to humans and caused clinical disease (43, 55). Interestingly, like pandemic H1N1 influenza virus, SwIV also infects the lower respiratory tract of pigs. Delineation of detailed mucosal immune responses generated in pig lungs during acute SwIV OH07 infection may provide new insights for the development of therapeutic strategies for better control of virus-induced inflammation and for the design and testing of effective vaccines.     

Selection of H5N1 Influenza Virus PB2 during Replication in Humans

Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses continue to cause concern, even though currently circulating strains are not efficiently transmitted among humans. For efficient transmission, amino acid changes in viral proteins may be required. Here, we examined the amino acids at positions 627 and 701 of the PB2 protein. A direct analysis of the viral RNAs of H5N1 viruses in patients revealed that these amino acids contribute to efficient virus propagation in the human upper respiratory tract. Viruses grown in culture or eggs did not always reflect those in patients. These results emphasize the importance of the direct analysis of original specimens.Given the continued circulation of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses and their sporadic transmission to humans, the threat of a pandemic persists. However, for H5N1 influenza viruses to be efficiently transmitted among humans, amino acid substitutions in the avian viral proteins may be necessary.Two positions in the PB2 protein affect the growth of influenza viruses in mammalian cells (3, 11, 18): the amino acid at position 627 (PB2-627), which in most human influenza viruses is lysine (PB2-627Lys) and most avian viruses is glutamic acid (PB2-627Glu), and the amino acid at position 701. PB2-627Lys is associated with the efficient replication (16) and high virulence (5) of H5N1 viruses in mice. Moreover, an H7N7 avian virus isolated from a fatal human case of pneumonia possessed PB2-627Lys, whereas isolates from a nonfatal human case of conjunctivitis and from chickens during the same outbreak possessed PB2-627Glu (2).The amino acid at position 701 in PB2 is important for the high pathogenicity of H5N1 viruses in mice (11). Most avian influenza viruses possess aspartic acid at this position (PB2-701Asp); however, A/duck/Guangxi/35/2001 (H5N1), which is highly virulent in mice (11), possesses asparagine at this position (PB2-701Asn). PB2-701Asn is also found in equine (4) and swine (15) viruses, as well as some H5N1 human isolates (7, 9). Thus, both amino acids appear to be markers for the adaptation of H5N1 viruses in humans (1, 3, 17).Massin et al. (13) reported that the amino acid at PB2-627 affects viral RNA replication in cultured cells at low temperatures. Recently, we demonstrated that viruses, including those of the H5N1 subtype, with PB2-627Lys (human type) grow better at low temperatures in cultured cells than those with PB2-627Glu (avian type) (6). This association between the PB2 amino acid and temperature-dependent growth correlates with the body temperatures of hosts; the human upper respiratory tract is at a lower temperature (around 33°C) than the lower respiratory tract (around 37°C) and the avian intestine, where avian influenza viruses usually replicate (around 41°C). The ability to replicate at low temperatures may be crucial for viral spread among humans via sneezing and coughing by being able to grow in the upper respiratory organs. Therefore, the Glu-to-Lys mutation in PB2-627 is an important step for H5N1 viruses to develop pandemic potential.However, there is no direct evidence that the substitutions of PB2-627Glu with PB2-627Lys and PB2-701Asp with PB2-701Asn occur during the replication of H5N1 avian influenza viruses in human respiratory organs. Therefore, here, we directly analyzed the nucleotide sequences of viral genes from several original specimens collected from patients infected with H5N1 viruses.     

Virulence-Associated Substitution D222G in the Hemagglutinin of 2009 Pandemic Influenza A(H1N1) Virus Affects Receptor Binding

The clinical impact of the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus (pdmH1N1) has been relatively low. However, amino acid substitution D222G in the hemagglutinin of pdmH1N1 has been associated with cases of severe disease and fatalities. D222G was introduced in a prototype pdmH1N1 by reverse genetics, and the effect on virus receptor binding, replication, antigenic properties, and pathogenesis and transmission in animal models was investigated. pdmH1N1 with D222G caused ocular disease in mice without further indications of enhanced virulence in mice and ferrets. pdmH1N1 with D222G retained transmissibility via aerosols or respiratory droplets in ferrets and guinea pigs. The virus displayed changes in attachment to human respiratory tissues in vitro, in particular increased binding to macrophages and type II pneumocytes in the alveoli and to tracheal and bronchial submucosal glands. Virus attachment studies further indicated that pdmH1N1 with D222G acquired dual receptor specificity for complex α2,3- and α2,6-linked sialic acids. Molecular dynamics modeling of the hemagglutinin structure provided an explanation for the retention of α2,6 binding. Altered receptor specificity of the virus with D222G thus affected interaction with cells of the human lower respiratory tract, possibly explaining the observed association with enhanced disease in humans.In April 2009, the H1N1 influenza A virus of swine origin was detected in humans in North America (9, 12, 42). Evidence for its origin came from analyses of the viral genome, with six gene segments displaying the closest resemblance to American “triple-reassortant” swine viruses and two to “Eurasian-lineage” swine viruses (13, 42). After this first detection in humans, the virus spread rapidly around the globe, starting the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. The 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus (pdmH1N1) has been relatively mild, with a spectrum of disease ranging from subclinical infections or mild upper respiratory tract illness to sporadic cases of severe pneumonia and acute respiratory distress syndrome (3, 11, 27, 29, 30, 37). Overall, the case-fatality rate during the start of the pandemic was not significantly higher than in seasonal epidemics in most countries. However, a marked difference was observed in the case-fatality rate in specific age groups, with seasonal influenza generally causing highest mortality in elderly and immunocompromised individuals, and the pdmH1N1 affecting a relatively large proportion of (previously healthy) young individuals (3, 11, 27, 29, 30, 37).Determinants of influenza A virus virulence have been mapped for a wide variety of zoonotic and pandemic influenza viruses to the polymerase genes, hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and nonstructural protein 1 (NS1). Such virulence-associated substitutions generally facilitate more efficient replication in humans via improved interactions with host cell factors. Since most of these virulence-associated substitutions were absent in the earliest pdmH1N1s, it has been speculated that the virus could acquire some of these mutations, potentially resulting in the emergence of more pathogenic viruses. Such virulence markers could be acquired by gene reassortment with cocirculating influenza A viruses, or by mutation. The influenza virus polymerase genes, in particular PB2, have been shown to be important determinants of the virulence of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 and H7N7 viruses and the transmission of the 1918 H1N1 Spanish influenza virus (17, 26, 34, 51). One of the most commonly identified virulence markers to date is E627K in PB2. The glutamic acid (E) residue is generally found in avian influenza viruses, while human viruses have a lysine (K), and this mutation was described as a determinant of host range in vitro (48). Given that all human and many zoonotic influenza viruses of the last century contained 627K, it was surprising that the pdmH1N1 had 627E. In addition, an aspartate (D)-to-asparagine (N) substitution at position 701 (D701N) of PB2 has previously been shown to expand the host range of avian H5N1 virus to mice and humans and to increase virus transmission in guinea pigs (26, 46). Like E627K, D701N was absent in the genome of pdmH1N1. Thus, the pdmH1N1 was the first known human pandemic virus with 627E and 701D, and it has been speculated that pdmH1N1 could mutate into a more virulent form by acquiring one of these mutations or both. Recently, it was shown that neither E627K nor D701N in PB2 of pdmH1N1 increased its virulence in ferrets and mice (18). The PB1-F2 protein has previously also been associated with high pathogenicity of the 1918 H1N1 and HPAI H5N1 viruses (8). The PB1-F2 protein of the pdmH1N1 is truncated due to premature stop codons. However, restoration of the PB1-F2 reading frame did not result in viruses with increased virulence (15). The NS1 protein of pdmH1N1 is also truncated due to a stop codon and, as a result, does not contain a PDZ ligand domain that is involved in cell-signaling pathways and has been implicated in the pathogenicity of 1918 H1N1 and HPAI H5N1 viruses (5, 8, 21). Surprisingly, restoration of a full-length version of the NS1 gene did not result in increased virulence in animal models (16). Mutations affecting virulence and host range have further frequently been mapped to hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) in relation to their interaction with α2,3- or α2,6-linked sialic acids (SAs), the virus receptors on host cells (17, 32, 35, 50). The HA gene of previous pandemic viruses incorporated substitutions that allow efficient attachment to α2,6-SAs—the virus receptor on human cells—compared to ancestral avian viruses that attach more efficiently to α2,3-SAs (35, 47, 50).To search for mutations of potential importance to public health, numerous laboratories performed genome sequencing of pdmH1N1s, resulting in the real-time accumulation of information on emergence of potential virulence markers. Of specific interest were reports on amino acid substitutions from aspartic acid (D) to glycine (G) at position 222 (position 225 in H3) in HA of pdmH1N1. This substitution was observed in a fatal case of pdmH1N1 infection in June 2009 in the Netherlands (M. Jonges et al., unpublished data). Between July and December 2009, viruses from 11 (18%) of 61 cases with severe disease outcome in Norway have also been reported to harbor the D222G substitution upon direct sequencing of HA in clinical specimens. Such mutant viruses were not observed in any of 205 mild cases investigated, and the frequency of detection of this mutation was significantly higher in severe cases than in mild cases (23). In Hong Kong, the D222G substitution was detected in 12.5% (6) and 4.1% (31) of patients with severe disease and in 0% of patients with mild disease, in two different studies without prior propagation in embryonated chicken eggs. In addition to Norway and Hong Kong, the mutation has been detected in Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Ukraine, and the United States (56). Thus, D222G in HA could be the first identified “virulence marker” of pdmH1N1. pdmH1N1 with D222G in HA have not become widespread in the population, although they were detected in several countries. However, D222G in HA is of special interest, since it has also been described as the single change in HA between two strains of the “Spanish” 1918 H1N1 virus that differed in receptor specificity (47). Furthermore, upon propagation in embryonated chicken eggs, pdmH1N1 can acquire the mutation rapidly, presumably because it results in virus adaptation to avian (α2,3-SAs) receptors (49). The presence of the substitution in pdmH1N1s in the human population and its potential association with more severe disease prompted us to test its effect on pdmH1N1 receptor binding, replication, antigenic properties, and pathogenesis and transmission in animal models.