Cognitive ornithology: the evolution of avian intelligence

Comparative psychologists interested in the evolution of intelligence have focused their attention on social primates, whereas birds tend to be used as models of associative learning. However, corvids and parrots, which have forebrains relatively the same size as apes, live in complex social groups and have a long developmental period before becoming independent, have demonstrated ape-like intelligence. Although, ornithologists have documented thousands of hours observing birds in their natural habitat, they have focused their attention on avian behaviour and ecology, rather than intelligence. This review discusses recent studies of avian cognition contrasting two different approaches; the anthropocentric approach and the adaptive specialization approach. It is argued that the most productive method is to combine the two approaches. This is discussed with respects to recent investigations of two supposedly unique aspects of human cognition; episodic memory and theory of mind. In reviewing the evidence for avian intelligence, corvids and parrots appear to be cognitively superior to other birds and in many cases even apes. This suggests that complex cognition has evolved in species with very different brains through a process of convergent evolution rather than shared ancestry, although the notion that birds and mammals may share common neural connectivity patterns is discussed.     

Social cognition,Stag Hunts,and the evolution of language

According to the socio-cognitive revolution (SCR) hypothesis, humans but not other great apes acquire language because only we possess the socio-cognitive abilities required for Gricean communication, which is a pre-requisite of language development. On this view, language emerged only following a socio-cognitive revolution in the hominin lineage that took place after the split of the Pan-Homo clade. In this paper, I argue that the SCR hypothesis is wrong. The driving forces in language evolution were not sweeping biologically driven changes to hominin social cognition. Our LCA with non-human great apes was likely already a Gricean communicator, and what came with evolution was not a raft of new socio-cognitive abilities, but subtle tweaks to existing ones. It was these tweaks, operating in conjunction with more dramatic ecological changes and a significant increase in general processing power, that set our ancestors on the road to language.     

The co-evolution of language and emotions

We argue that language evolution started like the evolution of reading and writing, through cultural evolutionary processes. Genuinely new behavioural patterns emerged from collective exploratory processes that individuals could learn because of their brain plasticity. Those cultural-linguistic innovative practices that were consistently socially and culturally selected drove a process of genetic accommodation of both general and language-specific aspects of cognition. We focus on the affective facet of this culture-driven cognitive evolution, and argue that the evolution of human emotions co-evolved with that of language. We suggest that complex tool manufacture and alloparenting played an important role in the evolution of emotions, by leading to increased executive control and inter-subjective sensitivity. This process, which can be interpreted as a special case of self-domestication, culminated in the construction of human-specific social emotions, which facilitated information-sharing. Once in place, language enhanced the inhibitory control of emotions, enabled the development of novel emotions and emotional capacities, and led to a human mentality that departs in fundamental ways from that of other apes. We end by suggesting experimental approaches that can help in evaluating some of these proposals and hence lead to better understanding of the evolutionary biology of language and emotions.     

The capacity of animals to acquire language: do species differences have anything to say to us?

Following the Gardners' discovery that an ape named Washoe could learn to produce and combine a number of hand movements similar to those used by deaf human beings, a variety of 'ape-language projects' sprang up. Some projects used different symbol systems, others used different training techniques, and others used different species of apes. While debate still rages regarding the appropriate way to interpret the symbolic productions of apes, three species of great apes (gorilla, orangutan, and chimpanzee) have now been credited with this capacity while no lesser apes or monkeys have been reported, at present, to have acquired such communicative skills. Among all of the claims made for the various animal species, the philosophers have entered the fray attempting to define the essence of what it is about language that makes it 'human'. This paper will compare and contrast the above positions to arrive at behavioural definitions of symbolic usage that can be applied across species. It will then present new data on a fourth ape species Pan paniscus which is proving to be the first non-human species to acquire symbolic skills in a spontaneous manner.     

The origins of gestures and language: history,current advances and proposed theories

Investigating in depth the mechanisms underlying human and non‐human primate intentional communication systems (involving gestures, vocalisations, facial expressions and eye behaviours) can shed light on the evolutionary roots of language. Reports on non‐human primates, particularly great apes, suggest that gestural communication would have been a crucial prerequisite for the emergence of language, mainly based on the evidence of large communication repertoires and their associated multifaceted nature of intentionality that are key properties of language. Such research fuels important debates on the origins of gestures and language. We review here three non‐mutually exclusive processes that can explain mainly great apes' gestural acquisition and development: phylogenetic ritualisation, ontogenetic ritualisation, and learning via social negotiation. We hypothesise the following scenario for the evolutionary origins of gestures: gestures would have appeared gradually through evolution via signal ritualisation following the principle of derived activities, with the key involvement of emotional expression and processing. The increasing level of complexity of socioecological lifestyles and associated daily manipulative activities might then have enabled the acquisition and development of different interactional strategies throughout the life cycle. Many studies support a multimodal origin of language. However, we stress that the origins of language are not only multimodal, but more broadly multicausal. We propose a multicausal theory of language origins which better explains current findings. It postulates that primates' communicative signalling is a complex trait continually shaped by a cost–benefit trade‐off of signal production and processing of interactants in relation to four closely interlinked categories of evolutionary and life cycle factors: species, individual and context‐related characteristics as well as behaviour and its characteristics. We conclude by suggesting directions for future research to improve our understanding of the evolutionary roots of gestures and language.     

Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis

Nicholas Humphrey's social intelligence hypothesis proposed that the major engine of primate cognitive evolution was social competition. Lev Vygotsky also emphasized the social dimension of intelligence, but he focused on human primates and cultural things such as collaboration, communication and teaching. A reasonable proposal is that primate cognition in general was driven mainly by social competition, but beyond that the unique aspects of human cognition were driven by, or even constituted by, social cooperation. In the present paper, we provide evidence for this Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis by comparing the social-cognitive skills of great apes with those of young human children in several domains of activity involving cooperation and communication with others. We argue, finally, that regular participation in cooperative, cultural interactions during ontogeny leads children to construct uniquely powerful forms of perspectival cognitive representation.     

The emergence of consciousness: Research on animals yields insights into how,when and why consciousness evolved

Whether some animal species possess consciousness is no longer the question; rather how their environment and evolution shaped species‐specific forms of self‐awareness Subject Categories: Ecology, Neuroscience

Ever since humans acknowledged consciousness in themselves, they speculated whether animals could have a similar sentience or awareness of their internal and external existence. But although human philosophers had pondered on consciousness for centuries, it was not until 1927 when the American psychologist Harvey Carr laid the foundations for research on animal consciousness. He argued that awareness in animals could be only understood and measured when we had developed “an accurate and complete knowledge of its essential conditions in man” (Carr, 1927).This may have provided a springboard for the field, but a definition of the essential conditions of consciousness in Homo sapiens has proved elusive to this day—hence, research on animal consciousness has struggled to achieve a sound basis for formulating and evaluating testable hypotheses. However, there has been some progress in developing correlates of human consciousness that can be applied to study animals, while brain scanning and imaging has recently allowed comparative studies of human and animal neurological activity while performing mental tasks. It has also become possible to observe animal behaviour and communication in much greater depth and identify examples of activities—such as advance planning, or recognition of individuals through their vocalization—that can be associated with human consciousness. Overall, there is a growing consensus that this research has moved beyond merely questioning whether animals can be conscious or aware of themselves to defining different dimensions along which this can be assessed.

… research has moved beyond merely questioning whether animals can be conscious or aware of themselves to defining different dimensions along which this can be assessed.

     

Results of human evolution research in Czechoslovakia

The results of anthropological research into human evolution have been discussed. Only two research places in CSSR have been engaged with the human evolution: the Department Anthropos in the Moravian Museum in Brno and the Laboratory of Evolutionary Biology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in Praha. The first of them has been mainly concerned with the paleontological and archeological research reported elsewhere. In the second, the following main questions of human evolution have been discussed: the evolution of bipedal locomotion, the morphological aspects, both qualitative and quantitative ones, the locomotion in other primates and various aspects of their behaviour have been studied. In this connection also various questions of the evolution the of human mind and social consciousness were studied. Special attention has been paid to role of neoteny in the evolution of man and to the import of synergism of the main evolutionary factors. As one of the main results is the principle of sociogenesis viewed and its various aspects. Its top product is human consciousness integrating the most important results of human thinking. Much attention has been paid to its evolution on the basis of the principle of reflection. Also the philosophical and ideological consequences of the sociogenesis as the main trend in the evolution of organisms have been elaborated in detail.     

The neural circuitry underlying primate calls and human language

There are significant structural and functional differences between primate calls and human speech. In addition, these two forms of vocal communication appear to largely depend on nonhomologous brain structures. However, an analysis of the underlying axonal circuitry of these brain systems suggests that there are significant interrelationships between them, both in functional and in evolutionary terms. Based on both primate neuroanatomical studies and humanin vivo mapping studies it is argued that the ventral prefrontal area is the critical link, both functionally and anatomically between these distinct vocal systems. A model of human brain evolution with respect to language is proposed in which limbic-midbrain vocalization circuits became progressively subordinated to the activity of prefrontal-midbrain and frontalmotor circuits for regulating facial gesture, skilled oral food manipulation, and conditional association learning. Quantitative and developmental data are used to suggest that this resulted from the relative enlargement of prefrontal areas and the consequences this has on the relative proportions of different corticomidbrain and diencephalic-midbrain projections. Although humans exhibit a significantly reduced call repertoire, it is argued that the display-vocalization circuits that play the central role in all other primate communication have neither been eliminated, supplanted nor suppressed by language systems. They have instead become integrated into the more distributed language circuits and play a ubiquitous though subordinate role in all normal language processes.     

Biosemiotics and Hominidae history: technicity,animals, and the limitations of human exceptionalism

This article is focused on problematic distinctions of difference among animals in the lineage of great apes. It combines several theoretical perspectives on evolutionary relationships, technological innovation, the development of body parts as tools, and a semiotic interpretation of what André Leroi-Gourhan called technicity. Foundational questions in social theory are developed using biosemiotics, particularly as concerns a materialist understanding of religion and the magical aspects of cultural representation. This, it is argued, provides a framework for theorizing social history in terms of real ecological relations, embodied meaning, and the transference of meaning onto objects. Understood semiotically, the material history of Hominidae, encompassing animals with different kinds of motility, dexterity, and techno-semiotic orientations towards the world, is inclusive and relational rather than exclusively anthropocentric, as is the case for social theory based on the artifice of language and articulations of belief, creativity, and cultural distinction that are thought to be distinctive of the genus Homo.     

Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation

All social species face various “collective action problems” (CAPs) or “social dilemmas,” meaning problems in achieving cooperating when the best move from a selfish point of view yields an inferior collective outcome. Compared to most other species, humans are very good at solving these challenges, suggesting that something rather peculiar about human sociality facilitates collective action. This article proposes that language — the uniquely human faculty of symbolic communication — fundamentally alters the possibilities for collective action. I explore these issues using simple game-theoretic models and empirical evidence (both ethnographic and experimental). I review several standard mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation — mutualism, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity and signaling — highlighting their limitations when it comes to explaining large-group cooperation, as well as the ways in which language helps overcome those limitations. Language facilitates complex coordination and is essential for establishing norms governing production efforts and distribution of collective goods that motivate people to cooperate voluntarily in large groups. Language also significantly lowers the cost of detecting and punishing “free riders,” thus greatly enhancing the scope and power of standard conditional reciprocity. In addition, symbolic communication encourages new forms of collectively beneficial displays and reputation management — what evolutionists often term “signaling” and “indirect reciprocity.” Thus, language reinforces existing forces that favor the evolution of cooperation, as well as creating new opportunities for collective action not available even to our closest primate relatives.     

Understanding Language Evolution: Beyond Pan-Centrism

Language does not fossilize but this does not mean that the language's evolutionary timeline is lost forever. Great apes provide a window back in time on our last prelinguistic ancestor's communication and cognition. Phylogeny and cladistics implicitly conjure Pan (chimpanzees, bonobos) as a superior (often the only) model for language evolution compared with earlier diverging lineages, Gorilla and Pongo (orangutans). Here, in reviewing the literature, it is shown that Pan do not surpass other great apes along genetic, cognitive, ecologic, or vocal traits that are putatively paramount for language onset and evolution. Instead, revived herein is the idea that only by abandoning single-species models and learning about the variation among great apes, there might be a chance to retrieve lost fragments of the evolutionary timeline of language.     

The ecology of social transitions in human evolution

We know that there are fundamental differences between humans and living apes, and also between living humans and their extinct relatives. It is also probably the case that the most significant and divergent of these differences relate to our social behaviour and its underlying cognition, as much as to fundamental differences in physiology, biochemistry or anatomy. In this paper, we first attempt to demarcate what are the principal differences between human and other societies in terms of social structure, organization and relationships, so that we can identify what derived features require explanation. We then consider the evidence of the archaeological and fossil record, to determine the most probable context in time and taxonomy, of these evolutionary trends. Finally, we attempt to link five major transitional points in hominin evolution to the selective context in which they occurred, and to use the principles of behavioural ecology to understand their ecological basis. Critical changes in human social organization relate to the development of a larger scale of fission and fusion; the development of a greater degree of nested substructures within the human community; and the development of intercommunity networks. The underlying model that we develop is that the evolution of ‘human society’ is underpinned by ecological factors, but these are influenced as much by technological and behavioural innovations as external environmental change.     

Evolutionary biology of language

Language is the most important evolutionary invention of the last few million years. It was an adaptation that helped our species to exchange information, make plans, express new ideas and totally change the appearance of the planet. How human language evolved from animal communication is one of the most challenging questions for evolutionary biology The aim of this paper is to outline the major principles that guided language evolution in terms of mathematical models of evolutionary dynamics and game theory. I will discuss how natural selection can lead to the emergence of arbitrary signs, the formation of words and syntactic communication.     

The father(to)child affiliative bond: convergent evolution with the canid analogue

Primate homologues, especially from the African great apes, can usually be successfully utilized to form comparisons with the human condition. However, the man(to)child pair-bond is not paralleled by any terrestrial primate nor even many mammals. Hence, knowledge of primate behavior would not be predictive of the pan-human social father. It is suggested that female choices of mating partners shifted in the direction of a canid analogue in that men's motivations to share resources with the female and to exhibit paternalistic behaviors were positively selected. Accordingly, it is argued that, for humans, convergent evolution occurred which trended toward the canid template. Consequently, it would be predicted that, compared to other terrestrial primates, the neuro-hormonal basis for the mother-child affiliative bond would be similar, but the basis for man(to)child affiliative bond would be dissimilar.     

Reliance on head versus eyes in the gaze following of great apes and human infants: the cooperative eye hypothesis

As compared with other primates, humans have especially visible eyes (e.g., white sclera). One hypothesis is that this feature of human eyes evolved to make it easier for conspecifics to follow an individual's gaze direction in close-range joint attentional and communicative interactions, which would seem to imply especially cooperative (mututalistic) conspecifics. In the current study, we tested one aspect of this cooperative eye hypothesis by comparing the gaze following behavior of great apes to that of human infants. A human experimenter "looked" to the ceiling either with his eyes only, head only (eyes closed), both head and eyes, or neither. Great apes followed gaze to the ceiling based mainly on the human's head direction (although eye direction played some role as well). In contrast, human infants relied almost exclusively on eye direction in these same situations. These results demonstrate that humans are especially reliant on eyes in gaze following situations, and thus, suggest that eyes evolved a new social function in human evolution, most likely to support cooperative (mututalistic) social interactions.     

Animal signals: Ethological and games-theory approaches are not incompatible

Recent authors have contrasted the ‘traditional ethological approach’ to the study of animal signals with that derived from games theory. It is argued here that the ‘traditonal ethological approach’ they portray is not in keeping with main stream of ethological research on animal signals. In particular, it has not been generally assumed that the evolution of animal signals was based on selection for mutual benefit of actor and reactor, nor that signals carry precise information of what the actor will do next. A synthesis of the ethological and games-theory approaches is possible. It is suggested that many threat displays may signal ‘Will stay, but attack if provoked’ or ‘Will stay, but will flee if provoked’, and that the subsequent behaviour of the displaying bird depends in part on that of the reactor.     

The origin of human multi-modal communication

One reason for the apparent gulf between animal and human communication systems is that the focus has been on the presence or the absence of language as a complex expressive system built on speech. But language normally occurs embedded within an interactional exchange of multi-modal signals. If this larger perspective takes central focus, then it becomes apparent that human communication has a layered structure, where the layers may be plausibly assigned different phylogenetic and evolutionary origins—especially in the light of recent thoughts on the emergence of voluntary breathing and spoken language. This perspective helps us to appreciate the different roles that the different modalities play in human communication, as well as how they function as one integrated system despite their different roles and origins. It also offers possibilities for reconciling the ‘gesture-first hypothesis’ with that of gesture and speech having evolved together, hand in hand—or hand in mouth, rather—as one system.     

Cultural evolution: implications for understanding the human language faculty and its evolution

Human language is unique among the communication systems of the natural world: it is socially learned and, as a consequence of its recursively compositional structure, offers open-ended communicative potential. The structure of this communication system can be explained as a consequence of the evolution of the human biological capacity for language or the cultural evolution of language itself. We argue, supported by a formal model, that an explanatory account that involves some role for cultural evolution has profound implications for our understanding of the biological evolution of the language faculty: under a number of reasonable scenarios, cultural evolution can shield the language faculty from selection, such that strongly constraining language-specific learning biases are unlikely to evolve. We therefore argue that language is best seen as a consequence of cultural evolution in populations with a weak and/or domain-general language faculty.