Justice and global care chains: Lessons from Singapore

Growing demand for direct care workers to assist care‐dependent elderly people has created an opening for migrant workers from low‐ income nations to sell their services to middle and high‐income nations. Using Singapore as a case example, we draw on capability theory to make the case that receiving nations that import direct care workers should be held to global justice standards that protect workers’ floor level human capabilities. Specifically, we (1) show that Singapore and other receiving nations fail to protect human capabilities at a threshold level required by dignity; (2) identify specific human capabilities placed at risk; and (3) recommend standards for receiving nations that support central capabilities. As populations in both developed and developing nations are rapidly aging, these concerns could not be timelier.     

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL AID

Every year approximately 18 million people die prematurely from treatable medical conditions including infectious diseases and nutritional deficiencies. The deaths occur primarily amongst the poorest citizens of poor developing nations. Various groups and individuals have advanced plans for major international medical aid to avert many of these unnecessary deaths. For example, the World Health Organization's Commission on Macroeconomics and Health estimated that eight million premature deaths could be prevented annually by interventions costing roughly US$57 bn per year.
This essay advances an argument that human rights require high-income nations to provide such aid. The essay briefly examines John Rawls' obligations of justice and the reasons that their applicability to cases of international medical aid remains controversial. Regardless, the essay argues that purely humanitarian obligations bind the governments and citizens of high-income liberal democracies at a minimum to provide major medical aid to avert premature deaths in poor nations. In refusing to undertake such medical relief efforts, developed nations fail to adequately protect a fundamental human right to life.     

Intergenerational healthcare inequities in developing countries

Concern about the rapid ageing of all societies reaches alarming proportions as healthcare inequities are steeply rising, prompting the elderly to live longer but subject to insufficient social protection and healthcare in the wake of dwindling public resources. The aged population of developing nations are facing additional hardships due to the growing gap between needs and the financial reductions of public institutions, retirement funds, and the trend towards privatization of essential services turned into commodities. Current approaches to allocation of insufficient resources without ageist discrimination are briefly discussed: individual self‐care aimed at successful, active and healthy ageing based on resourcefulness of the privileged elderly; utilitarian approaches founded on QALY and fair innings, and human rights focused on the plights of the elderly. These approaches cannot apply to resources poor nations, who need to engage in context‐bound bioethics dealing with the realities of their exposed ageing population. A developing world bioethics is needed to face the plights of the elderly in countries with low and middle‐income and insufficient social capital. Suggested are: 1) a phenomenological approach based on the interaction of bioethics and ethnology, furthering grass‐roots input from the elderly; 2) Create small communities –campus‐like boroughs– to simplify accessibility to social services and healthcare facilities, as an alternative to the high‐cost WHO proposal of age‐friendly large cities.     

Global sharing of COVID-19 vaccines: A duty of justice,not charity

Global scarcity of COVID-19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID-19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case-based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, contributing to global disparities of COVID-19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID-19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures.     

Bioethics and practical justice in the post‐COVID‐19 era

The ethical concept of justice, as it relates to the development and deployment of innovative health technologies, commands the fair and equitable distribution of burdens and benefits. In bioethics, specific guidance on practical strategies for achieving what this concept of justice demands are somewhat elusive. Drawing on issues of justice arising or likely to arise in the context of the search for a vaccine or cure for COVID‐19, this paper argues for a focus on the concept of “practical justice” in post‐pandemic bioethics work. To illustrate the value and promise of this concept, the paper reflects on an approach to achieving practical justice in health biotechnology research that is grounded in a commitment to offer technical assistance to developing and under‐resourced nations.     

Fair Resource Allocation to Health Research: Priority Topics for Bioethics Scholarship

This article draws attention to the limited amount of scholarship on what constitutes fairness and equity in resource allocation to health research by individual funders. It identifies three key decisions of ethical significance about resource allocation that research funders make regularly and calls for prioritizing scholarship on those topics – namely, how health resources should be fairly apportioned amongst public health and health care delivery versus health research, how health research resources should be fairly allocated between health problems experienced domestically versus other health problems typically experienced by disadvantaged populations outside the funder's country, and how domestic and non‐domestic health research funding should be further apportioned to different areas, e.g. types of research and recipients. These three topics should be priorities for bioethics research because their outcomes have a substantial bearing on the achievement of health justice. The proposed agenda aims to move discussion on the ethics of health research funding beyond its current focus on the mismatch between worldwide basic and clinical research investment and the global burden of disease. Individual funders’ decision‐making on whether and to what extent to allocate resources to non‐domestic health research, health systems research, research on the social determinants of health, capacity development, and recipients in certain countries should also be the focus of ethical scrutiny.     

Age‐related inequalities in health and healthcare: the life stages approach

How should healthcare systems prepare to care for growing numbers and proportions of older people? Older people generally suffer worse health than younger people do. Should societies take steps to reduce age‐related health inequalities? Some express concern that doing so would increase age‐related inequalities in healthcare. This paper addresses this debate by (1) presenting an argument in support of three principles for distributing scarce resources between age groups; (2) framing these principles of age group justice in terms of life stages; and (3) indicating policy implications that merit further attention in light of rapidly aging societies.     

Beware the curriculum-reform troops

Questions of resource allocation can pose practical and ethical dilemmas for clinicians. In the Aristotelian conception of distributive justice, the unequal allocation of a scarce resource may be justified by morally relevant factors such as need or likelihood of benefit. Even using these criteria, it can be difficult to reconcile completing claims to determine which patients should be given priority. To what extent the physician''s fiduciary duty toward a patient should supersede the interests of other patients and society as a whole is also a matter of controversy. Although the courts have been reluctant to become involved in allocation decisions in health care, they expect physicians to show allegiance to their patients regardless of budgetary concerns. The allocation of resources on the basis of clinically irrelevant factors such as religion or sexual orientation is prohibited. Clear, fair and publicly acceptable institutional and professional policies can help to ensure that resource allocation decisions are transparent and defensible.     

Threshold considerations in fair allocation of health resources: justice beyond scarcity

Application of egalitarian and prioritarian accounts of health resource allocation in low-income countries have both been criticized for implying distribution outcomes that allow decreasing/undermining health gains and for tolerating unacceptable standards of health care and health status that result from such allocation schemes. Insufficient health care and severe deprivation of health resources are difficult to accept even when justified by aggregative efficiency or legitimized by fair deliberative process in pursuing equality and priority oriented outcomes. I affirm the sufficientarian argument that, given extreme scarcity of public health resources in low-income countries, neither health status equality between populations nor priority for the worse off is normatively adequate. Nevertheless, the threshold norm alone need not be the sole consideration when a country's total health budget is extremely scarce. Threshold considerations are necessary in developing a theory of fair distribution of health resources that is sensitive to the lexically prior norm of sufficiency. Based on the intuition that shares must not be taken away from those who barely achieve a minimal level of health, I argue that assessments based on standards of minimal physical/mental health must be developed to evaluate the sufficiency of the total resources of health systems in low-income countries prior to pursuing equality, priority, and efficiency based resource allocation. I also begin to examine how threshold sensitive health resource assessment could be used in the Philippines.     

Response: Freedom from Pain as a Rawlsian Primary Good

In a recent article in this journal, Carl Knight and Andreas Albertsen argue that Rawlsian theories of distributive justice as applied to health and healthcare fail to accommodate both palliative care and the desirability of less painful treatments. The asserted Rawlsian focus on opportunities or capacities, as exemplified in Normal Daniels’ developments of John Rawls’ theory, results in a normative account of healthcare which is at best only indirectly sensitive to pain and so unable to account for the value of efforts of which the sole purpose is pain reduction. I argue that, far from undermining the Rawlsian project and its application to problems of health, what the authors’ argument at most amounts to is a compelling case for the inclusion of freedom from physical pain within its index of primary goods.