Calling the tunes on transgenic crops: the case for regulatory harmony

Genetically modified (GM) crops are now grown commercially in 23 countries, with another 29 granting approval for import and release into the environment. Despite the socio-economic and environmental benefits of the technology, further development is being hampered by differences in national regulatory frameworks relating to research, biosafety, and to the trade and use of GM crops. The biosafety regulations in different countries are based on five main international instruments that influence the development of national biosafety systems in terms of field trial permit requirements, risk assessment criteria, labeling, traceability, transparency, public awareness, post-monitoring and import regulations. The global harmonization of data collection, testing procedures and information exchange would help to remove artificial trade barriers, expedite the adoption of GM crops, foster technology transfer and protect developing countries from exploitation, instilling confidence and bringing the benefits of GM products to the consumer.     

A guide to the contained use of plant virus infectious clones

Plant virus infectious clones are important tools with wide‐ranging applications in different areas of biology and medicine. Their uses in plant pathology include the study of plant–virus interactions, and screening of germplasm as part of prebreeding programmes for virus resistance. They can also be modified to induce transient plant gene silencing (Virus Induced Gene Silencing – VIGS) and as expression vectors for plant or exogenous proteins, with applications in both plant pathology and more generally for the study of plant gene function. Plant viruses are also increasingly being investigated as expression vectors for in planta production of pharmaceutical products, known as molecular farming. However, plant virus infectious clones may pose a risk to the environment due to their ability to reconstitute fully functional, transmissible viruses. These risks arise from both their inherent pathogenicity and the effect of any introduced genetic modifications. Effective containment measures are therefore required. There has been no single comprehensive review of the biosafety considerations for the contained use of genetically modified plant viruses, despite their increasing importance across many biological fields. This review therefore explores the biosafety considerations for working with genetically modified plant viruses in contained environments, with focus on plant growth facilities. It includes regulatory frameworks, risk assessment, assignment of biosafety levels, facility features and working practices. The review is based on international guidance together with information provided by plant virus researchers.     

The emerging international regulatory framework for biotechnology

Debate about the potential risks of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to the environment or human health spurred attention to biosafety. Biosafety is associated with the safe use of GMOs and, more generally, with the introduction of non-indigenous species into natural or managed ecosystems. Biosafety regulation--the policies and procedures adopted to ensure the environmentally safe application of modern biotechnology--has been extensively discussed at various national and international forums. Much of the discussion has focused on developing guidelines, appropriate legal frameworks and, at the international level, a legally binding international biosafety protocol--the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The Protocol is one among various international instruments and treaties that regulate specific aspects relevant to agricultural biotechnology. The present article presents the main international instruments relevant to biosafety regulation, and their key provisions. While international agreements and standards provide important guidance, they leave significant room for interpretation, and flexibility for countries implementing them. Implementation of biosafety at the national level has proven to be a major challenge, particularly in developing countries, and consequently the actual functioning of the international regulatory framework for biotechnology is still in a state of flux.     

基于DPSEEA模型构建生物安全评价体系：以深圳市为例

由于生物安全内涵外延和基本要素的模糊性、评价指标及评价方法的多元性等因素的限制, 我国至今尚未形成全面有效的生物安全评价指标体系。为构建生物安全评价体系, 研判生物安全现状, 本文首先运用规范分析法剖析《生物安全法》中有关“生物安全”定义的特点及不足, 从国家安全角度认为生物安全是指国家有效防范和应对危险生物因子及相关因素的威胁, 维护和保障自身安全与利益的能力和状态。明晰了生物安全的外延, 即只有对国家安全利益、民众健康、生态环境保护产生威胁的生物风险, 才是生物安全所规制的对象。其次, 生物安全基本要素包括自然生物安全和社会经济生物安全。自然生物安全主要指民众健康和生态环境保护方面, 包括生物个体安全和生物多样性安全。社会经济生物安全的关注点在国家安全利益, 即社会稳定和国家经济利益, 包括生物技术安全、生物实验室安全。第三, 以生物安全基本要素为管理对象的尺度, 将国家安全利益、民众健康和生态环境保护作为评价主体, 以生物法治为理念, 运用模型构建法, 将定性指标和定量指标相结合, 基于驱动力‒压力‒状态‒接触‒影响‒行动模型(driving force-pressure-state-exposure-effect-action, DPSEEA)构建了一套具有生物法治特色的生物安全评价指标体系, 包括生物安全法律法规体系健全水平、生物安全所涉违法犯罪行为的打击力度、生物安全各部门机构协调机制的建立和完善程度、符合规定标准的生物实验室数量和百分比、生物安全人才数量及密度、对生物产业和基本卫生部门的官方援助及其他途径投资总额、疫苗覆盖的目标人群比例、生物安全的宣传教育普及率8项评价指标在内共32项生物安全评价指标。最后, 基于实地调研及数据统计分析, 以2019年和2020年深圳生物安全工作为例对评价体系进行验证。结果显示, 深圳生物安全工作在农业生物安全、动植物防疫、防范外来物种入侵方面成果显著; 但仍在法律法规体系、生物安全人才培养和资金投入、生物安全普及率方面存在不足。针对上述问题提出完善生物安全法律法规体系并注重法律协调衔接、“一个健康”实现多元协同生物治理、加强人才培养和资金投入、加强生物安全宣传教育等建议。     

Case studies on the use of biotechnologies and on biosafety provisions in four African countries

This review is based on a study commissioned by the European Commission on the evaluation of scientific, technical and institutional challenges, priorities and bottlenecks for biotechnologies and regional harmonisation of biosafety in Africa. Biotechnology was considered within four domains: agricultural biotechnologies (‘Green’), industrial biotechnologies and biotechnologies for environmental remediation (‘White’), biotechnologies in aquaculture (‘Blue’) and biotechnologies for healthcare (‘Red’). An important consideration was the decline in partnerships between the EU and developing countries because of the original public antipathy to some green biotechnologies, particularly genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and food from GM crops in Europe. The study focus reported here was West Africa (Ghana, Senegal, Mali and Burkina Faso).The overall conclusion was that whereas high-quality research was proceeding in the countries visited, funding is not sustained and there is little evidence of practical application of biotechnology and benefit to farmers and the wider community. Research and development that was being carried out on genetically modified crop varieties was concentrating on improving food security and therefore unlikely to have significant impact on EU markets and consumers. However, there is much non-controversial green biotechnology such as molecular diagnostics for plant and animal disease and marker-assisted selection for breeding that has great potential application. Regarding white biotechnology, it is currently occupying only a very small industrial niche in West Africa, basically in the sole sector of the production of liquid biofuels (i.e., bio-ethanol) from indigenous and locally planted biomass (very often non-food crops). The presence of diffused small-scale fish production is the basis to develop and apply new (Blue) aquaculture technologies and, where the research conditions and the production sector can permit, to increase this type of production and the economy of this depressed areas. However, the problems bound to environmental protection must not be forgotten; priority should be given to monitor the risks of introduction of foreign species. Red biotechnologies potentially bring a vast domain of powerful tools and processes to achieve better human health, most notably improved diagnostics by molecular techniques, better targeting of pathogens and a better knowledge of their sensitivities to drugs to permit better treatment.Biosafety regulatory frameworks had been initiated in several countries, starting with primary biosafety law. However, disparate attitudes to the purpose of biosafety regulation (e.g., fostering informed decision-making versus ‘giving the green-light for a flood of GMOs’) currently prevent a needed consensus for sub-regional harmonisation. To date, most R&D funding has come from North America with some commercial interests from Asia, but African biotechnology workers expressed strong desire for (re-)engagement with interested parties from the European Union. Although in some of the visited countries there are very well qualified personnel in molecular biology and biosafety/regulation, the main message received is that human resources and capacity building in-house are still needed. This could be achieved through home-based courses and capacity-building including funds for post-degree research to motivate and retain trained staff.     

Biosurveillance where it happens: state and local capabilities and needs

In recent years, improved biosurveillance has become a bipartisan national security priority. As has been pointed out by the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee and others, building a national biosurveillance enterprise requires having strong biosurveillance systems at the state and local levels, and additional policies are needed to strengthen their biosurveillance capabilities. Because of the foundational role that state and local health departments play in biosurveillance, we sought to determine to what extent state and local health departments have the right capabilities in place to provide the information needed to detect and manage an epidemic or public health emergency-both for state and local outbreak management and for reporting to federal agencies during national public health crises. We also sought to identify those policies or actions that would improve state and local biosurveillance and make recommendations to federal policymakers who are interested in improving national biosurveillance capabilities.     

Removing politics from innovations that improve food security

Genetically modified (GM) organisms and crops have been a feature of food production for over 30 years. Despite extensive science-based risk assessment, the public and many politicians remain concerned with the genetic manipulation of crops, particularly food crops. Many governments have addressed public concern through biosafety legislation and regulatory frameworks that identify and regulate risks to ensure human health and environmental safety. These domestic regulatory frameworks align to international scientific risk assessment methodologies on a case-by-case basis. Regulatory agencies in 70 countries around the world have conducted in excess of 4400 risk assessments, all reaching the same conclusion: GM crops and foods that have been assessed provide no greater risk to human health or the environment than non-GM crops and foods. Yet, while the science regarding the safety of GM crops and food appears conclusive and societal benefits have been globally demonstrated, the use of innovative products have only contributed minimal improvements to global food security. Regrettably, politically-motivated regulatory barriers are currently being implemented with the next genomic innovation, genome editing, the implications of which are also discussed in this article. A decade of reduced global food insecurity was witnessed from 2005 to 2015, but regrettably, the figure has subsequently risen. Why is this the case? Reasons have been attributed to climate variability, biotic and abiotic stresses, lack of access to innovative technologies and political interference in decision making processes. This commentary highlights how political interference in the regulatory approval process of GM crops is adversely affecting the adoption of innovative, yield enhancing crop varieties, thereby limiting food security opportunities in food insecure economies.

     

Easter Art Feast

The purpose of this report is to provide insight into how state departments are implementing legislative requirements for educator evaluation, particularly the specific circumstances states encounter around arts education. Spotlights on Delaware, a first-round recipient of Race to the Top funding, and Colorado and Arizona, third-round recipients, provide a variety of state-level approaches. Not only do the state contexts differ because of funding variability and level of focus on arts education, size and state laws around local control also play a factor in how states are able to implement educator evaluation requirements. To add to the complexity of this implementation, educator evaluation is a component within several education reforms in all disciplines, including new standards adoption, student assessment development and/or implementation, and need for professional development for arts educators. These multiple components play important roles in state efforts to meet educator evaluation requirements for arts educators. This report outlines each state context and other reform elements at play, and shares opportunities and challenges within the educational landscape. This report does not advocate for, speculate on, or share opinions about these efforts, as the primary role of state departments is to oversee, manage, and support schools and districts in any change process required by state and/or federal law.     

美国对入侵种的管理对策

外来种入侵是产生当前世界生物多样性危机的重要原因之一。目前外来种入侵问题已经引起人们的普遍关注。1999年2月美国联邦政府发布总统令,号召联邦政府机构执行人员防止外来入侵种所造成的严重环境威胁,指示有关职能部门行使职权阻止引入入侵种并且恢复本地种。总统令指示建立一个入侵物种理事会,并就理事会、联邦机构的职责做了相应界定。美国农业部等部门支持的入侵植物管理国家策略项目,提出了针对入侵种的三项国家目标一入侵种的预防、控制和本地种的恢复。国家管理策略的制定不同层次的人们提供了合作、教育和研究的机遇。美国政府部门以及有关社会团体已经就外来种入侵危害防范积极展开行动,包括制定标准防止入侵种进入,控制、根除入侵种,向民众进行有关外来种入侵的教育,增加财政年度预算等等。     

FDA regulation of invasive neural recording electrodes: a daunting task for medical innovators

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is charged with assuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. Before any medical device can be brought to market, it must comply with all federal regulations regarding FDA processes for clearance or approval. Navigating the FDA regulatory process may seem like a daunting task to the innovator of a novel medical device who has little experience with the FDA regulatory process or device commercialization. This review introduces the basics of the FDA regulatory premarket process, with a focus on issues relating to chronically implanted recording devices in the central or peripheral nervous system. Topics of device classification and regulatory pathways, the use of standards and guidance documents, and optimal time lines for interaction with the FDA are discussed. Additionally, this article summarizes the regulatory research on neural implant safety and reliability conducted by the FDA's Office of Science and Engineering Laboratories (OSEL) in collaboration with Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Reliable Neural Technology (RE-NET) Program. For a more detailed explanation of the medical device regulatory process, please refer to several excellent reviews of the FDA's regulatory pathways for medical devices [1]-[4].