Did farming arise from a misapplication of social intelligence?

The origins of farming is the defining event of human history--the one turning point that has resulted in modern humans having a quite different type of lifestyle and cognition to all other animals and past types of humans. With the economic basis provided by farming, human individuals and societies have developed types of material culture that greatly augment powers of memory and computation, extending the human mental capacity far beyond that which the brain alone can provide. Archaeologists have long debated and discussed why people began living in settled communities and became dependent on cultivated plants and animals, which soon evolved into domesticated forms. One of the most intriguing explanations was proposed more than 20 years ago not by an archaeologist but by a psychologist: Nicholas Humphrey suggested that farming arose from the 'misapplication of social intelligence'. I explore this idea in relation to recent discoveries and archaeological interpretations in the Near East, arguing that social intelligence has indeed played a key role in the origin of farming and hence the emergence of the modern world.     

No evidence that polymorphisms of brain regulator genes Microcephalin and ASPM are associated with general mental ability, head circumference or altruism

We test the hypothesis that polymorphisms of the brain regulator genes MCPH1 and ASPM contribute to variations in human brain size and its correlates. We measured general mental ability, head circumference and social intelligence in 644 Canadian adults (496 Caucasians, 36 Orientals, 84 Mixed Race/Other and 28 Blacks; 257 men and 387 women). The gene polymorphisms were assessed from buccal DNA; mental ability by Wonderlic Personnel Test and Multidimensional Aptitude Battery; head circumference by stretchless tape; and social intelligence by prosocial attitude questionnaires. Although all measures were construct valid and the allele frequencies showed expected population differences, no relationship was found between the genes and any of the criteria. Among Caucasian 18-25 year olds, for example, the two mental ability tests correlated with each other (r=0.78, N=476, p<0.001), with head circumference (r=0.17, N=182, p<0.05) and with prosocial attitudes (r=0.23, N=182, p<0.001).     

Cognitive abilities, androgen levels, and body mass index in 5-year-old children

This study explores the potential relationship between a series of cognitive abilities and testosterone, dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA), androstenedione, and body mass index (BMI) measurements in 5-year-old children. 60 boys and 69 girls were administered a test (K-BIT) which provided measurements of fluid intelligence (Matrices subtest), crystallized intelligence (Vocabulary subtest), and IQ composite (the combination of the two subtests); a sub-sample of 48 boys and 61 girls was also subjected to diverse tests related to theory of mind (affective labeling, appearance-reality distinction, display rules, and false belief). Testosterone, DHEA, and androstenedione levels were measured using an enzyme immunoassay technique in saliva samples. An analysis of variance failed to reveal any significant differences between boys and girls in any of the cognitive abilities assessed. The correlation analysis revealed a positive relationship between fluid intelligence and testosterone levels in boys, a negative relationship between crystallized intelligence and androstenedione levels in girls, and between affective labeling and androstenedione levels in boys. A multiple regression analysis indicated that androstenedione and BMI were the best predictors for some of the cognitive abilities assessed.     

Do young rhesus macaques know what others see?: A comparative developmental perspective

Humans undergo robust ontogenetic shifts in the theory of mind capabilities. Are these developmental changes unique to human development or are they shared with other closely related non-human species? To explore this issue, we tested the development of the theory of mind capacities in a population of 236 infant and juvenile rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Using a looking-time method, we examined what developing monkeys know about others’ perceptions. Specifically, we tested whether younger monkeys predict that a person will reach for an object where she last saw it. Overall, we found a significant interaction between a monkey's age and performance on this task (p = .014). Juvenile monkeys (between two and 5 years of age) show a nonsignificant trend towards human infant-like patterns of performance, looking longer during the unexpected condition as compared to the expected condition, though this difference is nonsignificant (p = .09). However, contrary to findings in human infants, infant rhesus macaques show a different trend. Infant monkeys on average look slightly longer on average during the expected condition than the unexpected condition, though this pattern was not significant (p = .06). Our developmental results in monkeys provide some hints about the development of the theory of mind capacities in non-humans. First, young rhesus macaques appear to show some interest in the perception of other agents. Second, young rhesus seems able to make predictions based on the visual perspective of another agent, though the developmental pattern of this ability is not as clear nor as robust as in humans. As such, though an understanding of others’ perceptions is early-emerging in human infants, it may require more experience interacting with other social agents in our non-human relatives.     

Association of chronotype and social jetlag with human non-verbal intelligence

The aim of this study was to evaluate the effects of chronotype and social jetlag (SJL) on intelligence. Subjects were aged 14–25 years (n = 1008). A significant effect of intelligence on academic performance, as measured by the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test, was found (F_2,917 = 11.75, P < 0.0001, η² = 0.03). When SJL was less than 2 hours, the intelligence of people with late chronotype was found to be higher than that of subjects with early and intermediate chronotypes (F_2,305 = 3.12, P < 0.05, η² = 0.02). A negative effect of SJL on the results of intelligence testing was noted only in subjects with late chronotype (F_2,536 = 2.61, P < 0.05, η² = 0.02). Our data suggest that people with late chronotype have a higher level of intelligence, but these advantages disappear when SJL ≥2 hours.     

The evolution of animal 'cultures' and social intelligence

Decades-long field research has flowered into integrative studies that, together with experimental evidence for the requisite social learning capacities, have indicated a reliance on multiple traditions ('cultures') in a small number of species. It is increasingly evident that there is great variation in manifestations of social learning, tradition and culture among species, offering much scope for evolutionary analysis. Social learning has been identified in a range of vertebrate and invertebrate species, yet sustained traditions appear rarer, and the multiple traditions we call cultures are rarer still. Here, we examine relationships between this variation and both social intelligence--sophisticated information processing adapted to the social domain--and encephalization. First, we consider whether culture offers one particular confirmation of the social ('Machiavellian') intelligence hypothesis that certain kinds of social life (here, culture) select for intelligence: 'you need to be smart to sustain culture'. Phylogenetic comparisons, particularly focusing on our own study animals, the great apes, support this, but we also highlight some paradoxes in a broader taxonomic survey. Second, we use intraspecific variation to address the converse hypothesis that 'culture makes you smart', concluding that recent evidence for both chimpanzees and orangutans support this proposition.     

The social brain hypothesis

Conventional wisdom over the past 160 years in the cognitive and neurosciences has assumed that brains evolved to process factual information about the world. Most attention has therefore been focused on such features as pattern recognition, color vision, and speech perception. By extension, it was assumed that brains evolved to deal with essentially ecological problem-solving tasks. © 1998 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Female bonobos use copulation calls as social signals

During mating events, females of many primate species produce loud and distinct vocalizations known as 'copulation calls'. The adaptive significance of these signals is considered to be in promoting the caller's direct reproductive success. Here, we investigated copulation calling in bonobos (Pan paniscus), a species in which females produce these vocalizations during sexual interactions with partners of both sexes. Females were more likely to call when mating with males than with females. We also observed a positive relationship between the likelihood of calling and partner rank, regardless of partner sex. Sexual activity generally increased with swelling size (an indicator of reproductive state) and, during their peak swelling, females called more with male than with female partners. Female bonobos are unusual among the non-human primates in terms of their heightened socio-sexuality. Our results suggest that in this species, copulation calls have undergone an evolutionary transition from a purely reproductive to a more general social function, reflecting the intrinsic evolutionary links between vocal behaviour and social cognition.     

Problems faced by food-caching corvids and the evolution of cognitive solutions

The scatter hoarding of food, or caching, is a widespread and well-studied behaviour. Recent experiments with caching corvids have provided evidence for episodic-like memory, future planning and possibly mental attribution, all cognitive abilities that were thought to be unique to humans. In addition to the complexity of making flexible, informed decisions about caching and recovering, this behaviour is underpinned by a motivationally controlled compulsion to cache. In this review, we shall first discuss the compulsive side of caching both during ontogeny and in the caching behaviour of adult corvids. We then consider some of the problems that these birds face and review the evidence for the cognitive abilities they use to solve them. Thus, the emergence of episodic-like memory is viewed as a solution for coping with food perishability, while the various cache-protection and pilfering strategies may be sophisticated tools to deprive competitors of information, either by reducing the quality of information they can gather, or invalidating the information they already have. Finally, we shall examine whether such future-oriented behaviour involves future planning and ask why this and other cognitive abilities might have evolved in corvids.     

Social games between bonobos and humans: evidence for shared intentionality?

Triadic social games are interesting from a cognitive perspective because they require a high degree of mutual social awareness. They consist of two agents incorporating an object in turn-taking sequences and require individuals to coordinate their attention to the task, the object, and to one another. Social games are observed commonly in domesticated dogs interacting with humans, but they have received only little empirical attention in nonhuman primates. Here, we report observations of bonobos (Pan paniscus) engaging in social games with a human playmate. Our behavioral analyses revealed that the bonobos behaved in many ways similar to human children during these games. They were interested in the joint activity, rather than the play objects themselves, and used communicative gestures to encourage reluctant partners to perform their role, suggesting rudimentary understanding of others' intentions. Our observations thus may imply that shared intentionality, the ability to understand and shares intention with other individuals, has emerged in the primate lineage before the origins of hominids.     

Chimpanzees predict that a competitor's preference will match their own

The ability to predict how another individual will behave is useful in social competition. Chimpanzees can predict the behaviour of another based on what they observe her to see, hear, know and infer. Here we show that chimpanzees act on the assumption that others have preferences that match their own. All subjects began with a preference for a box with a picture of food over one with a picture of nothing, even though the pictures had no causal relation to the contents. In a back-and-forth food competition, chimpanzees then avoided the box with the picture of food when their competitor had chosen one of the boxes before them—presumably on the assumption that the competitor shared their own preference for it and had already chosen it. Chimpanzees predicted that their competitor''s preference would match their own and adjusted their behavioural strategies accordingly.     

Chimpanzee social intelligence: selfishness,altruism, and the mother–infant bond

To better understand the human mind from an evolutionary perspective, a great deal of research has focused on the closest living relative of humans, the chimpanzee, using various approaches, including studies of social intelligence. Here, I review recent research related to several aspects of social intelligence, including deception, understanding of perception and intention, social learning, trading, cooperation, and regard for others. Many studies have demonstrated that chimpanzees are proficient in using their social intelligence for selfish motives to benefit from their interactions with others. In contrast, it is not yet clear whether chimpanzees engage in prosocial behaviors that benefit others; however, chimpanzee mother–infant interactions indicate the possibility of such behaviors. Therefore, I propose that chimpanzees possess rudimentary traits of human mental competence not only in terms of theory of mind in a broader sense but also in terms of prosociality involving regard for others. Mother–infant interactions appear to be particularly important to understanding the manifestation of social intelligence from an evolutionary perspective.     

Perspective-taking abilities in the balance between autism tendencies and psychosis proneness

Difficulties with the ability to appreciate the perspective of others (mentalizing) is central to both autism and schizophrenia spectrum disorders. While the disorders are diagnostically independent, they can co-occur in the same individual. The effect of such co-morbidity is hypothesized to worsen mentalizing abilities. The recent influential ‘diametric brain theory’, however, suggests that the disorders are etiologically and phenotypically diametrical, predicting opposing effects on one''s mentalizing abilities. To test these contrasting hypotheses, we evaluated the effect of psychosis and autism tendencies on the perspective-taking (PT) abilities of 201 neurotypical adults, on the assumption that autism tendencies and psychosis proneness are heritable dimensions of normal variation. We show that while both autism tendencies and psychosis proneness induce PT errors, their interaction reduced these errors. Our study is, to our knowledge, the first to observe that co-occurring autistic and psychotic traits can exert opposing influences on performance, producing a normalizing effect possibly by way of their diametrical effects on socio-cognitive abilities. This advances the notion that some individuals may, to some extent, be buffered against developing either illness or present fewer symptoms owing to a balanced expression of autistic and psychosis liability.     

The society of selves

Human beings are not only the most sociable animals on Earth, but also the only animals that have to ponder the separateness that comes with having a conscious self. The philosophical problem of 'other minds' nags away at people's sense of who--and why--they are. But the privacy of consciousness has an evolutionary history--and maybe even an evolutionary function. While recognizing the importance to humans of mind-reading and psychic transparency, we should consider the consequences and possible benefits of being--ultimately--psychically opaque.     

Social learning and evolution: the cultural intelligence hypothesis

If social learning is more efficient than independent individual exploration, animals should learn vital cultural skills exclusively, and routine skills faster, through social learning, provided they actually use social learning preferentially. Animals with opportunities for social learning indeed do so. Moreover, more frequent opportunities for social learning should boost an individual's repertoire of learned skills. This prediction is confirmed by comparisons among wild great ape populations and by social deprivation and enculturation experiments. These findings shaped the cultural intelligence hypothesis, which complements the traditional benefit hypotheses for the evolution of intelligence by specifying the conditions in which these benefits can be reaped. The evolutionary version of the hypothesis argues that species with frequent opportunities for social learning should more readily respond to selection for a greater number of learned skills. Because improved social learning also improves asocial learning, the hypothesis predicts a positive interspecific correlation between social-learning performance and individual learning ability. Variation among primates supports this prediction. The hypothesis also predicts that more heavily cultural species should be more intelligent. Preliminary tests involving birds and mammals support this prediction too. The cultural intelligence hypothesis can also account for the unusual cognitive abilities of humans, as well as our unique mechanisms of skill transfer.     

Gazing at me: the importance of social meaning in understanding direct-gaze cues

Direct gaze is an engaging and important social cue, but the meaning of direct gaze depends heavily on the surrounding context. This paper reviews some recent studies of direct gaze, to understand more about what neural and cognitive systems are engaged by this social cue and why. The data show that gaze can act as an arousal cue and can modulate actions, and can activate brain regions linked to theory of mind and self-related processing. However, all these results are strongly modulated by the social meaning of a gaze cue and by whether participants believe that another person is really watching them. The implications of these contextual effects and audience effects for our theories of gaze are considered.     

Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis

Nicholas Humphrey's social intelligence hypothesis proposed that the major engine of primate cognitive evolution was social competition. Lev Vygotsky also emphasized the social dimension of intelligence, but he focused on human primates and cultural things such as collaboration, communication and teaching. A reasonable proposal is that primate cognition in general was driven mainly by social competition, but beyond that the unique aspects of human cognition were driven by, or even constituted by, social cooperation. In the present paper, we provide evidence for this Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis by comparing the social-cognitive skills of great apes with those of young human children in several domains of activity involving cooperation and communication with others. We argue, finally, that regular participation in cooperative, cultural interactions during ontogeny leads children to construct uniquely powerful forms of perspectival cognitive representation.