Multi-species evolutionary dynamics

Dynamical attainability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) through the process of mutations and natural selection has mostly been addressed through the use of the continuously stable strategy (CSS) concept for species evolutionary games in which strategies are drawn from a continuum, and by the adaptive trait dynamics method. We address the issue of dynamical attainability of an ESS in coevolving species through the use of the concept of an ESNIS. It is shown that the definition of an ESNIS coalition for coevolving species is not in general equivalent to other definitions for CSS given in the literature. We show under some additional conditions that, in a dynamic system which involves the strategies of a dimorphic ESNIS coalition and at most two strategies that are not members of ESNIS coalition, the ESNIS coalition will emerge as the winner. In addition an ESNIS will be approached because of the invasion structure of strategies in its neighborhood. This proves that under the above conditions an ESNIS has a better chance of being attained than a strategy coalition which is a CSS. The theory developed is applied to a class of coevolutionary game models with Lotka–Volterra type interactions and we show that for such models, an ESS coalition will be dynamically attainable through mutations and natural selection if the ESS coalition is also an ESNIS coalition.Co-ordinating editor: Metz     

Ecological stability,evolutionary stability and the ESS maximum principle

Summary Since the fitness of each individual organism in a biological community may be affected by the strategies of all other individuals in the community, the essential element of a game exists. This game is an evolutionary game where the individual organisms (players) inherit their strategies from continuous play of the game through time. Here, the strategies are assumed to be constants associated with certain adaptive parameters (such as sunlight conversion efficiency for plants or body length in animals) in a set of differential equations which describe the population dynamics of the community. By means of natural selection, these parameters will evolve to a set of strategy values that natural selection, by itself, can no longer modify, i.e. an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). For a given class of models, it is possible to predict the outcome of this evolutionary process by determining ESSs using an ESS maximum principle. However, heretofore, the proof of this principle has been based on a limited set of conditions. Herein, we generalize the proof by removing certain restrictions and use instead the concept of an ecological stable equilibrium (ESE). Individuals in a biological community will be at an ESE if fixing the strategies used by the individuals results in stable population densities subject to perturbations in those densities. We present both necessary and sufficient conditions for an ESE to exist and then use the ESE concept to provide a very simple proof of the ESS maximum principle (which is a necessary condition for an ESS). A simple example is used to illustrate the difference between a strategy that maximizes fitness and one that satisfies the ESS maximum principle. In general they are different. We also look for ESEs in Lotka—Volterra competition and use the maximum principle to determine when an ESE will be an ESS. Finally, we examine the applicability of these ideas to matrix games.     

Revisiting matrix games: the concept of neighborhood invader strategies

We extend the concept of neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) to finite-dimensional matrix games and compare this concept to the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) concept. We show that these two concepts are not equivalent in general. Just as ESS's may not be unique, NIS's may also not be unique. However, if there is an ESS and a NIS then these strategies must be the same. We show that an ESNIS (an ESS and NIS) for any matrix game is unique and that a mixed ESS with full support is a NIS. Thus a mixed ESS with full support is not invadable by any pure or mixed strategy and it can invade any pure or mixed strategy. An ESS which is an ESNIS, therefore, has better chance of being established evolutionarily through dynamic selection.     

CSS, NIS and dynamic stability for two-species behavioral models with continuous trait spaces

Static continuously stable strategy (CSS) and neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) conditions are developed for two-species models of frequency-dependent behavioral evolution when individuals have traits in continuous strategy spaces. These are intuitive stability conditions that predict the eventual outcome of evolution from a dynamic perspective. It is shown how the CSS is related to convergence stability for the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics and the NIS to convergence to a monomorphism for the replicator equation of evolutionary game theory. The CSS and NIS are also shown to be special cases of neighborhood p^*- superiority for p^* equal to one half and zero, respectively. The theory is illustrated when each species has a one-dimensional trait space.     

A mixed strategy model for the emergence and intensification of social learning in a periodically changing natural environment

Based on a population genetic model of mixed strategies determined by alleles of small effect, we derive conditions for the evolution of social learning in an infinite-state environment that changes periodically over time. Each mixed strategy is defined by the probabilities that an organism will commit itself to individual learning, social learning, or innate behavior. We identify the convergent stable strategies (CSS) by a numerical adaptive dynamics method and then check the evolutionary stability (ESS) of these strategies. A strategy that is simultaneously a CSS and an ESS is called an attractive ESS (AESS). For certain parameter sets, a bifurcation diagram shows that the pure individual learning strategy is the unique AESS for short periods of environmental change, a mixed learning strategy is the unique AESS for intermediate periods, and a mixed learning strategy (with a relatively large social learning component) and the pure innate strategy are both AESS's for long periods. This result entails that, once social learning emerges during a transient era of intermediate environmental periodicity, a subsequent elongation of the period may result in the intensification of social learning, rather than a return to innate behavior.     

Differential games in evolutionary theory: Height growth strategies of trees

Differential game theory is applied to the analysis of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in this article. A general form for the evolutionary differential game is introduced in the case of intra-specific competition, and a connection between the ESS and the mathematical Nash solution concept is indicated. A dynamic ESS is found for the height growth strategies of trees. A hierarchical model is introduced to account for different time constants in simultaneous selection processes. Differential evolutionary games are compared with static evolutionary games utilizing the hierarchical approach.     

Maximal ecological diversity exceeds evolutionary diversity in model ecosystems

Understanding community saturation is fundamental to ecological theory. While investigations of the diversity of evolutionary stable states (ESSs) are widespread, the diversity of communities that have yet to reach an evolutionary endpoint is poorly understood. We use Lotka–Volterra dynamics and trait-based competition to compare the diversity of randomly assembled communities to the diversity of the ESS. We show that, with a large enough founding diversity (whether assembled at once or through sequential invasions), the number of long-time surviving species exceeds that of the ESS. However, the excessive founding diversity required to assemble a saturated community increases rapidly with the dimension of phenotype space. Additionally, traits present in communities resulting from random assembly are more clustered in phenotype space compared to random, although still markedly less ordered than the ESS. By combining theories of random assembly and ESSs we bring a new viewpoint to both the saturation and random assembly literature.     

Fighting for food: a dynamic version of the Hawk-Dove game

Summary The Hawk-Dove game (Maynard Smith, 1982) has been used to analyse conflicts over resources such as food. At the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), either a proportionp* of animals always play Hawk, or each animal has a probabilityp* of playing Hawk. We modify the standard Hawk-Dove game to include a state variable,x, that represents the animal's level of energy reserves. A strategy is now a rule for choosing an action as a function ofx and time of day. We consider a non-reproductive period and adopt the criterion of minimizing mortality over this period. We find the ESS, which has the form play Hawk if reserves are belowc* (t) at timet, otherwise play Dove. This ESS is very different from the ESS in the standard Hawk-Dove game. It is a pure ESS that depends on the animal's state and on time. Furthermore, it is characterized by the strong condition that any single mutant that does not adopt the ESS suffers a reduction in fitness. The standard Hawk-Dove game assumes pay-offs that are related to fitness; our approach starts from a definition of fitness and derives the pay-offs in the process of finding the ESS. When the environment becomes worse (e.g. food becomes less reliable or energy expenditure increases) the ESS changes in such a way as to increase the proportion of animals that will play Hawk.     

Evolutionarily stable strategies in food selection models with fitness sets

Most current models for optimal food selection apply to ecological and behavioural optimization. In this paper optimal food selection theory is extended to apply to evolutionary optimization. A general evolutionary model for optimal food selection must incorporate the concept of fitness sets--or that variables, changing as a result of natural selection in evolutionary time, cannot, in general, vary independently of each other. A "Charnov type" optimal food selection model with a fitness set is investigated, and evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) solutions of the evolutionary variables (i.e., the efficiencies of using available food types) are found. From this analysis it follows that the relative frequency of various food types in the environment may, under specified conditions, influence the evolutionarily optimal diet. Secondly, the analysis demonstrates that a food type not in the optimal diet may, in evolutionary time, be added to this by becoming more abundant. Thirdly, it follows from the analysis that the ecological result of MacArthur and Pianka, that food types are worth eating even if there is competition for them, is not generally applicable when referring to an evolutionary time scale. Finally, it is pointed out that for the diet to be an ESS, it is necessary that the consumer's density is stable and that the consumer's population dynamics are subjected to some density-dependent factor.     

Properties of a mixed ESS candidate in continuous strategy sets

An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy that if almost all members of the population adopt, then this population cannot be invaded by any mutant strategy. An ESS is not necessarily a possible end point of the evolutionary process. Moreover, there are cases where the population evolves towards a strategy that is not an ESS. This paper studies the properties of a unique mixed ESS candidate in a continuous time animal conflict. A member of a group sized three finds itself at risk and needs the assistance of another group member to be saved. In this conflict, a player's strategy is to choose the probability distribution of the interval between the beginning of the game and the moment it assists the player which is at risk. We first assume that a player is only allowed to choose an exponential distribution, and show that in this case the ESS candidate is an attracting ESS; the population will always evolve towards this strategy, and once it is adopted by most members of the population it cannot be invaded by mutant strategies. Then, we extend the strategy sets and allow a player to choose any continuous distribution. We show that although this ESS candidate may no longer be an ESS, under fairly general conditions the population will tend towards it. This is done by characterizing types of strategies that if established in the population, can be invaded by this ESS candidate, and by presenting possible paths of transition from other types of common strategies to this ESS candidate.     

Why do some nectar foragers perch and others hover while probing flowers?

Diurnal hawkmoths, Hemaris fuciformis, and bumblebees, Bombus pasquorum, were observed foraging for nectar in flowers of Viscaria vulgaris. The hawkmoths hovered in front of the flowers, while the bees perched on them. The hawkmoths had a faster probing rate than the bees, and consequently also had higher gross and net rates of energy gain. A model is presented that shows that hovering only yields a higher net rate of energy gain (NREG) than perching when nectar volumes are high due to low competition for the resource. The difference in NREG of perchers and hoverers decreases with an increase of competition, and eventually perching yields the highest NREG. This is an effect of the higher cost of hovering. The results suggest that hovering can only evolve as a pure evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if competition is reduced, for example by co-evolutionary specializations with plants. The possibility that it has evolved as a mixed ESS (i.e. individuals can both hover and perch depending on the resource level) is discussed. The evolution of optimal foraging strategies is discussed, and it is pointed out that the rate of gain of an animal is independent of the strategy used when all competing foragers use the same strategy, but competitively superior strategies will nevertheless evolve because they are ESSs. Competition between strategies with different energy costs are special, because resource availability determines which strategy is competitively superior. A high-cost strategy can only evolve as a pure ESS at high resource levels, or as a mixed ESS at intermediate levels.     

Evolutionary stability and quasi-stationary strategy in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics for finite populations has recently been widely explored in the study of evolutionary game theory. It is known from the work of Traulsen et al. [2005. Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 238701] that the stochastic evolutionary dynamics approaches the deterministic replicator dynamics in the limit of large population size. However, sometimes the limiting behavior predicted by the stochastic evolutionary dynamics is not quite in agreement with the steady-state behavior of the replicator dynamics. This paradox inspired us to give reasonable explanations of the traditional concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the context of finite populations. A quasi-stationary analysis of the stochastic evolutionary game dynamics is put forward in this study and we present a new concept of quasi-stationary strategy (QSS) for large but finite populations. It is shown that the consistency between the QSS and the ESS implies that the long-term behavior of the replicator dynamics can be predicted by the quasi-stationary behavior of the stochastic dynamics. We relate the paradox to the time scales and find that the contradiction occurs only when the fixation time scale is much longer than the quasi-stationary time scale. Our work may shed light on understanding the relationship between the deterministic and stochastic methods of modeling evolutionary game dynamics.     

Evolutionary game dynamics with impulsive effects

The jumps in population size due to the occurrence of an unfavorable physical environment (e.g. the effects of periodic climate disaster on the population size), or due to the intrinsic physiological and reproductive mechanisms of the population (e.g. the seasonal reproduction of most animal populations), can be called impulsive perturbations. A two-phenotype evolutionary game dynamics with impulsive effects is investigated. The main goal is to show how the evolutionary game dynamics is affected by the impulsive perturbations. The results show that the impulsive perturbations not only result in periodic behavior, but also it is possible that an ESS strategy based on the traditional concept of evolutionary stability can be replaced successfully by a non-ESS strategy.     

The evolutionary dynamics of direct phenotypic overdominance: emergence possible, loss probable

An evolutionary dynamical system with explicit diploid genetics is used to investigate the likelihood of observing phenotypically overdominant heterozygotes versus heterozygous phenotypes that are intermediate between the homozygotes. In this model, body size evolves in a population with discrete demographic episodes and with competition limiting reproduction. A genotype-phenotype map for body size is used that can generate the two qualitative types of dominance interactions (overdominance versus intermediate dominance). It is written as a single-locus model with one focal locus and parameters summarizing the effects of alleles at other loci. Two types of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; continuously stable strategy, CSS) occur. The ESS is generated either (1) by the population ecology; or (2) by a local maximum of the genotype-phenotype map. Overdominant heterozygotes are expected to arise if the population evolves toward the second type of ESS, where nearly maximum body sizes are found. When other loci with partially dominant inheritance also evolve, the location of the maximum in the genotype-phenotype map repeatedly changes. It is unlikely that an evolving population will track these changes; ESSs of the second type now are at best quasi-stationary states of the evolutionary dynamics. Considering the restrictions on its probability, a pattern of phenotypic overdominance is expected to be rare.     

Evolutionarily stable resource allocation for production of wind-dispersed seeds

We developed a game-theoretic model for wind-dispersed seed production to examine the seed mass–dispersal ability relationship and the evolutionarily stable distance of seed dispersal in terms of exploitation of safe sites. We assumed trade-offs between masses of the embryo (including albumen) and the wind-dispersal structures per seed, and also between seed mass and number of seeds per parent. We showed that ESS wing-loading is independent of embryo mass; that is, heavy seeds are not poor dispersers if the cost of producing wind-dispersal structures per unit area is constant. The ESS embryo mass per seed depends only on the factors which determine the probability of a seedling being established from a seed. However, wing-loading was found to increase with embryo mass when the change in length was isometric and there was a negative correlation between seed mass and dispersal ability. Thus, the area–mass relationship in wind-dispersal structures may have large effects on the ESS production of wind-dispersed seeds. On the other hand, given that only a limited number of adults can be established at a safe site, the ESS seed dispersal distance depends on the relative degree of sib to non-sib competition. A parent disperses its seeds over a wide area to exploit many safe sites if sib competition is strong. However, it disperses its seeds within a narrow area if the mean number of parents per unit area is large, or if non-sib competition is strong. Thus, in addition to an upper limit on the number of adults per safe site, the degree of sib and non-sib competition may be important for the ESS dispersal distance in wind-dispersed seeds. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Simulating natural selection as a culling mechanism on finite populations with the hawk-dove game

The behaviors of individuals and species are often explained in terms of evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs). The analysis of ESSs determines which, if any, combinations of behaviors cannot be invaded by alternative strategies. Two assumptions required to generate an ESS (i.e., an infinite population and payoffs described only on the average) do not hold under natural conditions. Previous experiments indicated that under more realistic conditions of finite populations and stochastic payoffs, populations may evolve in trajectories that are unrelated to an ESS, even in very simple games. The simulations offered here extend earlier research by employing truncation selection with random parental selection in a hawk-dove game. Payoffs are determined in pairwise contests using either the expected outcome, or the result of a random variable. In each case, however, the mean fraction of hawks over many generations and across many independent trials does not conform to the expected ESS. Implications of these results and philosophical underpinnings of ESS theory are offered.     

The evolution of phenotypic traits in a predator-prey system subject to Allee effect

This paper considers the evolution of phenotypic traits in a community comprising the populations of predators and prey subject to Allee effect. The evolutionary model is constructed from a deterministic approximation of the stochastic process of mutation and selection. Firstly, we investigate the ecological and evolutionary conditions that allow for continuously stable strategy and evolutionary branching. We find that the strong Allee effect of prey facilitates the formation of continuously stable strategy in the case that prey population undergoes evolutionary branching if the Allee effect of prey is not strong enough. Secondly, we show that evolutionary suicide is impossible for prey population when the intraspecific competition of prey is symmetric about the origin. However, evolutionary suicide can occur deterministically on prey population if prey individuals undergo strong asymmetric competition and are subject to Allee effect. Thirdly, we show that the evolutionary model with symmetric interactions admits a stable limit cycle if the Allee effect of prey is weak. Evolutionary cycle is a likely outcome of the process, which depends on the strength of Allee effect and the mutation rates of predators and prey.     

Stability in an evolutionary game

A behavior or strategy which is evolutionarily stable must be both optimal and stable. The strategy must be optimal in that it maximizes the expected fitness of all the individuals using it. In addition, the strategy must be resistant to invasion by a mutant. The difference between the Nash solution of game theory and the ESS used in ecology is that the Nash solution only satisfies an optimality criterion and not an evolutionary stability criterion. We extend the ESS definition of Maynard Smith and Price so that it can be applied directly to two-strategy evolutionary games. The concept of a balanced game is introduced, and necessary conditions are derived which are similar to the Nash necessary conditions. The balanced game necessary conditions may be used for direct calculation of ESS candidates. These results are used to examine the optimal flowering time of an annual plant experiencing competition from neighboring plants. The plant competition model is general, and the results may be applied to a wide range of interference competition problems.     

The dynamical attainability of ESS in evolutionary games

In this paper, the attainability of ESS of the evolutionary game among n players under the frequency-independent selection is studied by means of a mathematical model describing the dynamical development and a concept of stability (strongly determined stability). It is assumed that natural selection and small mutations cause the phenotype to change gradually in the direction of fitness increasing. It is shown that (1) the ESS solution is not always evolutionarily attainable in the evolutionary dynamics, (2) in the game where the interaction between two species is completely competitive, the Nash solution is always attainable, and (3) one of two species may attain the state of minimum fitness as a result of evolution. The attainability of ESS is also examined in two game models on the sex ratio of wasps and aphids in light of our criterion of the attainability of ESS.     

POLYPHENISM IN SPADEFOOT TOAD TADPOLES AS A LOCALLY ADJUSTED EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY

I examined the evolutionary factors maintaining two environmentally induced morphs in ponds of variable duration. Larvae of New Mexico spadefoot toads (Scaphiopus multiplicatus) often occur in the same pond as a large, rapidly developing carnivorous morph and as a smaller, more slowly developing omnivorous morph. Previous studies revealed that carnivores can be induced by feeding tadpoles live fairy shrimp and that morph determination is reversible. Field and laboratory experiments indicated that the ability of an individual to become a carnivore or an omnivore is maintained evolutionarily as a response to variability in pond longevity and food abundance. Carnivores survived better in highly ephemeral artificial ponds, because they developed faster. Omnivores survived better in longer-duration artificial ponds, because their larger fat reserves enhanced postmetamorphic survival. The two morphs also occupy different trophic niches. Experimental manipulations of morph frequency in ponds of intermediate duration revealed that increased competition for food among individuals of the more common morph made the rarer form more successful. Morph frequency within each pond was stabilized at an equilibrium by frequency-dependent morph reversal, which reflected frequency-dependent natural selection on size at metamorphosis: larger metamorphs had higher survival, and individuals reared at a frequency above the pond's equilibrium frequency were smaller at metamorphosis than were individuals of that morph reared at a frequency below the pond's equilibrium. Because neighboring ponds often differed in pond longevity and food abundance, each pond possessed a unique equilibrium morph frequency. This implies that morph determination in Scaphiopus is a locally adjusted evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).