No unique effect of intergroup competition on cooperation: non-competitive thresholds are as effective as competitions between groups for increasing human cooperative behavior

Explaining cooperation remains a central topic for evolutionary theorists. Many have argued that group selection provides such an explanation: theoretical models show that intergroup competition could have given rise to cooperation that is costly for the individual. Whether group selection actually did play an important role in the evolution of human cooperation, however, is much debated. Recent experiments have shown that intergroup competitions do increase human cooperation, which has been taken as evidence for group selection as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Here we challenge this standard interpretation. Competitions change the payoff structure by creating a threshold effect whereby the group that contributes more earns an additional prize, which creates some incentive for individuals to cooperate. We present four studies that disentangle competition and thresholds, and strongly suggest that it is thresholds – rather than competitions per se – that increase cooperation. Thus, prior intergroup competition experiments provide no evidence of a unique or special role for intergroup competition in promoting human cooperation, and shed no light on whether group selection shaped human evolution.     

Prosocial primates: selfish and unselfish motivations

Non-human primates are marked by well-developed prosocial and cooperative tendencies as reflected in the way they support each other in fights, hunt together, share food and console victims of aggression. The proximate motivation behind such behaviour is not to be confused with the ultimate reasons for its evolution. Even if a behaviour is ultimately self-serving, the motivation behind it may be genuinely unselfish. A sharp distinction needs to be drawn, therefore, between (i) altruistic and cooperative behaviour with knowable benefits to the actor, which may lead actors aware of these benefits to seek them by acting cooperatively or altruistically and (ii) altruistic behaviour that offers the actor no knowable rewards. The latter is the case if return benefits occur too unpredictably, too distantly in time or are of an indirect nature, such as increased inclusive fitness. The second category of behaviour can be explained only by assuming an altruistic impulse, which—as in humans—may be born from empathy with the recipient''s need, pain or distress. Empathy, a proximate mechanism for prosocial behaviour that makes one individual share another''s emotional state, is biased the way one would predict from evolutionary theories of cooperation (i.e. by kinship, social closeness and reciprocation). There is increasing evidence in non-human primates (and other mammals) for this proximate mechanism as well as for the unselfish, spontaneous nature of the resulting prosocial tendencies. This paper further reviews observational and experimental evidence for the reciprocity mechanisms that underlie cooperation among non-relatives, for inequity aversion as a constraint on cooperation and on the way defection is dealt with.     

Asymmetry within social groups: division of labour and intergroup competition

Social animals vary in their ability to compete with group members over shared resources and also vary in their cooperative efforts to produce these resources. Competition among groups can promote within‐group cooperation, but many existing models of intergroup cooperation do not explicitly account for observations that group members invest differentially in cooperation and that there are often within‐group competitive or power asymmetries. We present a game theoretic model of intergroup competition that investigates how such asymmetries affect within‐group cooperation. In this model, group members adopt one of two roles, with relative competitive efficiency and the number of individuals varying between roles. Players in each role make simultaneous, coevolving decisions. The model predicts that although intergroup competition increases cooperative contributions to group resources by both roles, contributions are predominantly from individuals in the less competitively efficient role, whereas individuals in the more competitively efficient role generally gain the larger share of these resources. When asymmetry in relative competitive efficiency is greater, a group's per capita cooperation (averaged across both roles) is higher, due to increased cooperation from the competitively inferior individuals. For extreme asymmetry in relative competitive efficiency, per capita cooperation is highest in groups with a single competitively superior individual and many competitively inferior individuals, because the latter acquiesce and invest in cooperation rather than within‐group competition. These predictions are consistent with observed features of many societies, such as monogynous Hymenoptera with many workers and caste dimorphism.     

Cooperation and conflict: field experiments in Northern Ireland

The idea that cohesive groups, in which individuals help each other, have a competitive advantage over groups composed of selfish individuals has been widely suggested as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation in humans. Recent theoretical models propose the coevolution of parochial altruism and intergroup conflict, when in-group altruism and out-group hostility contribute to the group''s success in these conflicts. However, the few empirical attempts to test this hypothesis do not use natural groups and conflate measures of in-group and unbiased cooperative behaviour. We conducted field experiments based on naturalistic measures of cooperation (school/charity donations and lost letters'' returns) with two religious groups with an on-going history of conflict—Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Conflict was associated with reduced donations to out-group schools and the return of out-group letters, but we found no evidence that it influences in-group cooperation. Rather, socio-economic status was the major determinant of cooperative behaviour. Our study presents a challenge to dominant perspectives on the origins of human cooperation, and has implications for initiatives aiming to promote conflict resolution and social cohesion.     

Evolutionary routes to non-kin cooperative breeding in birds

Cooperatively breeding animals live in social groups in which some individuals help to raise the offspring of others, often at the expense of their own reproduction. Kin selection—when individuals increase their inclusive fitness by aiding genetic relatives—is a powerful explanation for the evolution of cooperative breeding, particularly because most groups consist of family members. However, recent molecular studies have revealed that many cooperative groups also contain unrelated immigrants, and the processes responsible for the formation and maintenance of non-kin coalitions are receiving increasing attention. Here, I provide the first systematic review of group structure for all 213 species of cooperatively breeding birds for which data are available. Although the majority of species (55%) nest in nuclear family groups, cooperative breeding by unrelated individuals is more common than previously recognized: 30% nest in mixed groups of relatives and non-relatives, and 15% nest primarily with non-relatives. Obligate cooperative breeders are far more likely to breed with non-kin than are facultative cooperators, indicating that when constraints on independent breeding are sufficiently severe, the direct benefits of group membership can substitute for potential kin-selected benefits. I review three patterns of dispersal that give rise to social groups with low genetic relatedness, and I discuss the selective pressures that favour the formation of such groups. Although kin selection has undoubtedly been crucial to the origin of most avian social systems, direct benefits have subsequently come to play a predominant role in some societies, allowing cooperation to persist despite low genetic relatedness.     

Cooperation in humans: competition between groups and proximate emotions

Understanding the ultimate and proximate mechanisms that favour cooperation remains one of the greatest challenges in the biological and social sciences. A number of theoretical studies have suggested that competition between groups may have played a key role in the evolution of cooperation within human societies, and similar ideas have been discussed for other organisms, especially cooperative breeding vertebrates. However, there is a relative lack of empirical work testing these ideas. Our experiment found, in public goods games with humans, that when groups competed with other groups for financial rewards, individuals made larger contributions within their own groups. In such situations, participants were more likely to regard their group mates as collaborators rather than competitors. Variation in contribution among individuals, either with or without intergroup competition, was positively correlated with individuals' propensity to regard group mates as collaborators. We found that the levels of both guilt and anger individuals experienced were a function of their own contributions and those of their group mates. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that the level of cooperation can be influenced by proximate emotions, which vary with the degree of intergroup competition.     

Cooperation beyond the dyad: on simple models and a complex society

Players in Axelrod and Hamilton''s model of cooperation were not only in a Prisoner''s Dilemma, but by definition, they were also trapped in a dyad. But animals are rarely so restricted and even the option to interact with third parties allows individuals to escape from the Prisoner''s Dilemma into a much more interesting and varied world of cooperation, from the apparently rare ‘parcelling’ to the widespread phenomenon of market effects. Our understanding of by-product mutualism, pseudo-reciprocity and the snowdrift game is also enriched by thinking ‘beyond the dyad’. The concepts of by-product mutualism and pseudo-reciprocity force us to think again about our basic definitions of cooperative behaviour (behaviour by a single individual) and cooperation (the outcome of an interaction between two or more individuals). Reciprocity is surprisingly rare outside of humans, even among large-brained ‘intelligent’ birds and mammals. Are humans unique in having extensive cooperative interactions among non-kin and an integrated cognitive system for mediating reciprocity? Perhaps, but our best chance for finding a similar phenomenon may be in delphinids, which also live in large societies with extensive cooperative interactions among non-relatives. A system of nested male alliances in bottlenose dolphins illustrates the potential and difficulties of finding a complex system of cooperation close to our own.     

Winner and loser effects in human competitions. Evidence from equally matched tennis players

Animals winning an agonistic encounter are more likely to win their next encounter while losers are less likely, even when controlling for motivation and physical size. Do these winner and loser effects exist in human competitions? Drawing on a large database of professional tennis matches, we were able to control for players' ability and thereby test for winner and loser effects. We narrowed the database to matches between players who on average did not differ significantly in rank, and further to matches in which the first set was fought to a long tie-break. These closely fought matches present a natural experiment because players are assigned to treatment conditions – winning or losing a set – despite similar ability and performance. We found that among men, the winner of a closely fought tie-break had an approximate 60% chance of winning the second set, the loser a 40% chance. These effects did not exist among women, a finding consistent with the hypothesis that androgens mediate winner and loser effects. Our results may help in the design of competitions in sport as well as in work environments, where it may prove useful to either encourage winner effects or to attenuate their occasional adverse consequences.     

Altruistic Punishment and Between-Group Competition

Collective action, or the large-scale cooperation in the pursuit of public goods, has been suggested to have evolved through cultural group selection. Previous research suggests that the costly punishment of group members who do not contribute to public goods plays an important role in the resolution of collective action dilemmas. If large-scale cooperation sustained by the punishment of defectors has evolved through the mechanism of cultural group selection, two implications regarding costly punishment follow: (1) that people are more willing to punish defecting group members in a situation of intergroup competition than in a single-group social dilemma game and (2) that levels of "perverse" punishment of cooperators are not affected by intergroup competition. We find confirmation for these hypotheses. However, we find that the effect of intergroup competition on the punishment of defectors is fully explained by the stronger conditionality of punishment on expected punishment levels in the competition condition.     

Human cooperation in social dilemmas: comparing the Snowdrift game with the Prisoner's Dilemma

Explaining the evolution of cooperation among non-relatives is one of the major challenges for evolutionary biology. In this study, we experimentally examined human cooperation in the iterated Snowdrift game (ISD), which has received little attention so far, and compared it with human cooperation in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), which has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation. We show that iteration in the ISD leads to consistently higher levels of cooperation than in the IPD. We further demonstrate that the most successful strategies known for the IPD (generous Tit-for-Tat and Pavlov) were also successfully used in the ISD. Interestingly, we found that female players cooperated significantly more often than male players in the IPD but not in the ISD. Moreover, female players in the IPD applied Tit-for-Tat-like or Pavlovian strategies significantly more often than male players, thereby achieving significantly higher pay-offs than male players did. These data demonstrate that the willingness to cooperate does not only depend on the type of the social dilemma, but also on the class of individuals involved. Altogether, our study shows that the ISD can potentially explain high levels of cooperation among non-relatives in humans. In addition, the ISD seems to reflect the social dilemma more realistically than the IPD because individuals obtain immediate direct benefits from the cooperative acts they perform and costs of cooperation are shared between cooperators.     

The stability of cooperation involving variable investment

In this paper, we attempt to reconcile the results of several studies which have investigated the evolution of cooperation between non-relatives in systems where investment in partners can vary. In contrast to previous proposals, we show for the first time that variable-investment cooperation can be readily maintained in inter-species mutualistic relationships even in the absence of spatial structure, but that the stability of this interaction is dependent on the particular investment-response rule that is employed. By allowing the evolution of investment-response parameters in both inter- and intra-specific versions of the continuous variable-investment Prisoners' Dilemma we show that, in the absence of further factors, the raise-the stakes (RTS) strategy is likely to evolve into a simpler, variable investment form of Give-as-Good-as-you-Get that initially offers a high fixed amount and subsequently matches its partner's investment. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that genuine RTS-like strategies will still be selected if two intuitively reasonable conditions hold: if individuals are limited in terms of the total they can invest in cooperative actions over their lifetimes, and if there are always some individuals in a population that cannot cooperate.     

Evolving the neuroendocrine physiology of human and primate cooperation and collective action

While many hormones play vital roles in facilitating or reinforcing cooperative behaviour, the neurohormones underlying competitive and cooperative behaviours are largely conserved across all mammals. This raises the question of how endocrine mechanisms have been shaped by selection to produce different levels of cooperation in different species. Multiple components of endocrine physiology—from baseline hormone concentrations, to binding proteins, to the receptor sensitivity and specificity—can evolve independently and be impacted by current socio-ecological conditions or individual status, thus potentially generating a wide range of variation within and between species. Here, we highlight several neurohormones and variation in hormone receptor genes associated with cooperation, focusing on the role of oxytocin and testosterone in contexts ranging from parenting and pair-bonding to reciprocity and territorial defence. While the studies reviewed herein describe the current state of the literature with regard to hormonal modulators of cooperation and collective action, there is still a paucity of research on hormonal mechanisms that help facilitate large-scale collective action. We end by discussing several potential areas for future research.     

Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans

Reciprocal altruism has been the backbone of research on the evolution of altruistic behaviour towards non-kin, but recent research has begun to apply costly signalling theory to this problem. In addition to signalling resources or abilities, public generosity could function as a costly signal of cooperative intent, benefiting altruists in terms of (i) better access to cooperative relationships and (ii) greater cooperation within those relationships. When future interaction partners can choose with whom they wish to interact, this could lead to competition to be more generous than others. Little empirical work has tested for the possible existence of this 'competitive altruism'. Using a cooperative monetary game with and without opportunities for partner choice and signalling cooperative intent, we show here that people actively compete to be more generous than others when they can benefit from being chosen for cooperative partnerships, and the most generous people are correspondingly chosen more often as cooperative partners. We also found evidence for increased scepticism of altruistic signals when the potential reputational benefits for dishonest signalling were high. Thus, this work supports the hypothesis that public generosity can be a signal of cooperative intent, which people sometimes 'fake' when conditions permit it.     

The evolution of cooperation by negotiation in a noisy world

Cooperative interactions among individuals are ubiquitous despite the possibility of exploitation by selfish free riders. One mechanism that may promote cooperation is ‘negotiation’: individuals altering their behaviour in response to the behaviour of others. Negotiating individuals decide their actions through a recursive process of reciprocal observation, thereby reducing the possibility of free riding. Evolutionary games with response rules have shown that infinitely many forms of the rule can be evolutionarily stable simultaneously, unless there is variation in individual quality. This potentially restricts the conditions under which negotiation could maintain cooperation. Organisms interact with one another in a noisy world in which cooperative effort and the assessment of effort may be subject to error. Here, we show that such noise can make the number of evolutionarily stable rules finite, even without quality variation, and so noise could help maintain cooperative behaviour. We show that the curvature of the benefit function is the key factor determining whether individuals invest more or less as their partner's investment increases, investing less when the benefit to investment has diminishing returns. If the benefits of low investment are very small then behavioural flexibility tends to promote cooperation, because negotiation enables cooperators to reach large benefits. Under some conditions, this leads to a repeating cycle in which cooperative behaviour rises and falls over time, which may explain between‐population differences in cooperative behaviour. In other conditions, negotiation leads to extremely high levels of cooperative behaviour, suggesting that behavioural flexibility could facilitate the evolution of eusociality in the absence of high relatedness.     

How is human cooperation different?

Although cooperation is a widespread phenomenon in nature, human cooperation exceeds that of all other species with regard to the scale and range of cooperative activities. Here we review and discuss differences between humans and non-humans in the strategies employed to maintain cooperation and control free-riders. We distinguish forms of cooperative behaviour based on their influence on the immediate payoffs of actor and recipient. If the actor has immediate costs and only the recipient obtains immediate benefits, we term this investment. If the behaviour has immediate positive effects for both actor and recipient, we call this a self-serving mutually beneficial behaviour or mutual cooperation. We argue that humans, in contrast to all other species, employ a wider range of enforcement mechanisms, which allow higher levels of cooperation to evolve and stabilize among unrelated individuals and in large groups. We also discuss proximate mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviour and focus on our experimental work with humans and our closest primate relatives. Differences in the proximate mechanisms also seem to contribute to explaining humans'' greater ability to cooperate and enforce cooperation.     

Cooperation between non-relatives in a primitively eusocial paper wasp,Polistes dominula

In cooperatively breeding vertebrates, the existence of individuals that help to raise the offspring of non-relatives is well established, but unrelated helpers are less well known in the social insects. Eusocial insect groups overwhelmingly consist of close relatives, so populations where unrelated helpers are common are intriguing. Here, we focus on Polistes dominula—the best-studied primitively eusocial wasp, and a species in which nesting with non-relatives is not only present but frequent. We address two major questions: why individuals should choose to nest with non-relatives, and why such individuals participate in the costly rearing of unrelated offspring. Polistes dominula foundresses produce more offspring of their own as subordinates than when they nest independently, providing a potential explanation for co-founding by non-relatives. There is some evidence that unrelated subordinates tailor their behaviour towards direct fitness, while the role of recognition errors in generating unrelated co-foundresses is less clear. Remarkably, the remote but potentially highly rewarding chance of inheriting the dominant position appears to strongly influence behaviour, suggesting that primitively eusocial insects may have much more in common with their social vertebrate counterparts than has commonly been thought.     

Dominance,Politics, and Physiology: Voters' Testosterone Changes on the Night of the 2008 United States Presidential Election

Background

Political elections are dominance competitions. When men win a dominance competition, their testosterone levels rise or remain stable to resist a circadian decline; and when they lose, their testosterone levels fall. However, it is unknown whether this pattern of testosterone change extends beyond interpersonal competitions to the vicarious experience of winning or losing in the context of political elections. Women''s testosterone responses to dominance competition outcomes are understudied, and to date, a clear pattern of testosterone changes in response to winning and losing dominance competitions has not emerged.

Methodology/Principal Findings

The present study investigated voters'' testosterone responses to the outcome of the 2008 United States Presidential election. 183 participants provided multiple saliva samples before and after the winner was announced on Election Night. The results show that male Barack Obama voters (winners) had stable post-outcome testosterone levels, whereas testosterone levels dropped in male John McCain and Robert Barr voters (losers). There were no significant effects in female voters.

Conclusions/Significance

The findings indicate that male voters exhibit biological responses to the realignment of a country''s dominance hierarchy as if they participated in an interpersonal dominance contest.     

Multiple reputation domains and cooperative behaviour in two Latin American communities

Reputations are a ubiquitous feature of human social life, and a large literature has been dedicated to explaining the relationship between prosocial reputations and cooperation in social dilemmas. However, humans form reputations in domains other than prosociality, such as economic competency that could affect cooperation. To date, no research has evaluated the relative effects of multiple reputation domains on cooperation. To bridge this gap, we analyse how prosocial and competency reputations affect cooperation in two Latin American communities (Bwa Mawego, Dominica, and Pucucanchita, Peru) across a number of social contexts (Dominica: labour contracting, labour exchange and conjugal partnership formation; Peru: agricultural and health advice network size). First, we examine the behavioural correlates of prosocial and competency reputations. Following, we analyse whether prosocial, competency, or both reputation domains explain the flow of cooperative benefits within the two communities. Our analyses suggest that (i) although some behaviours affect both reputation domains simultaneously, each reputation domain has a unique behavioural signature; and (ii) competency reputations affect cooperation across a greater number of social contexts compared to prosocial reputations. Results are contextualized with reference to the social markets in which behaviour is embedded and a call for greater theory development is stressed.     

The smell of cooperation: rats increase helpful behaviour when receiving odour cues of a conspecific performing a cooperative task

Reciprocity can explain cooperative behaviour among non-kin, where individuals help others depending on their experience in previous interactions. Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) cooperate reciprocally according to direct and generalized reciprocity. In a sequence of four consecutive experiments, we show that odour cues from a cooperating conspecific are sufficient to induce the altruistic help of rats in a food-exchange task. When rats were enabled to help a non-cooperative partner while receiving olfactory information from a rat helping a conspecific in a different room, they helped their non-cooperative partner as if it was a cooperative one. We further show that the cues inducing altruistic behaviour are released during the act of cooperation and do not depend on the identity of the cue provider. Remarkably, olfactory cues seem to be more important for cooperation decisions than experiencing a cooperative act per se. This suggests that rats may signal their cooperation propensity to social partners, which increases their chances to receive help in return.     

The effects of training volume and competition on the salivary cortisol concentrations of Olympic weightlifters

This study examined the effects of training volume and competition on the salivary cortisol (Sal-C) concentrations of Olympic weightlifters. Male (n = 5) and female (n = 4) Olympic weightlifters provided saliva samples across a 5-week experimental = period. The first aim was to assess the weekly effects of high (≥ 200 sets) and low (≤ 100 sets) training volume on Sal-C. The second aim was to compare Sal-C concentrations and 1 repetition maximum (1RM) performance during 2 simulated and 2 actual competitions. Performance was assessed using the snatch, clean and jerk, and the Olympic total lift. Data from each competition setting were pooled before analysis. There were no significant weekly changes in Sal-C levels (p > 0.05). The actual competitions produced higher (128-130%) Sal-C concentrations (p < 0.001) and superior 1RM lifts (1.9-2.6%) for the clean and jerk, and the Olympic total, than the simulated competitions (p < 0.05). Individual Sal-C concentrations before the simulated competitions were positively correlated to all of the 1RM lifts (r = 0.48-0.49, p < 0.05). In conclusion, actual competitions produced greater Sal-C responses than simulated competitions, and this appeared to benefit the 1RM performance of Olympic weightlifters. Individuals with higher Sal-C concentrations also tended to exhibit superior 1RM lifts during the simulated competitions. Given these findings, greater emphasis should be placed upon the monitoring of C to establish normative values, training standards and to assist with performance prediction.