共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
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David Gullick 《BMJ (Clinical research ed.)》1982,284(6312):348-349
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Altruistic surrogacy and informed consent 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Oakley J 《Bioethics》1992,6(4):269-287
A crucial premise in many recent arguments against the moral permissibility of surrogate motherhood arrangements is the claim that a woman cannot autonomously consent to gestating and relinquishing a child to another couple, because she cannot be fully informed about what her future emotional responses will be to the foetus developing within her, and to the giving up of the newborn infant to its social parents. When conjoined with some moral principle about the justifiable limits on the ways others can be expected to exercise their autonomy on our behalf, this claim is often taken to establish that various forms of surrogate motherhood arrangements are morally wrong. In this paper I want to show that there is a serious non sequitur in this kind of argument. That is, I want to show that even if women cannot in fact have this kind of information about what their future emotional responses to pregnancy and relinquishment will be, nothing follows about the wrongness or otherwise of surrogacy. For, when we consider what counts as informed consent in the context of other important ventures with uncertain consequences, it becomes clear that informed consent does not require having this kind of information about one's future emotional states. In putting these arguments, I also hope to clarify some of the connections which might be thought to hold between informed consent and autonomous decision-making generally. 相似文献
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Standard consent forms for blood and tissue sampling are inadequate for DNA sampling. However, creating new and separate forms for each type of activity associated with DNA analysis (banking, linkage analysis and genetic diagnosis) tends to dissociate the participant from what is essentially a medical continuum. Furthermore, DNA sampling involves the sharing of samples and data among centres. To ensure patient control throughout this multifaceted process, we have developed an integrated approach to obtaining consent for DNA sampling at each level of participation. Movement from one level to another is reflected in the choices offered to participants. This inclusive approach is based on the underlying principle of informed consent, namely the respect for individuality, confidentiality and freedom of choice. This approach should help practitioners of medical genetics recognize the medical context of DNA sampling. 相似文献
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Sankar P 《Medical anthropology quarterly》2004,18(4):429-446
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Plakins are cytoskeletal linker proteins initially thought to interact exclusively with intermediate filaments (IFs), but recently were found to associate additionally with actin and microtubule networks. Here, we report on ACF7, a mammalian orthologue of the Drosophila kakapo plakin genetically involved in epidermal-muscle adhesion and neuromuscular junctions. While ACF7/kakapo is divergent from other plakins in its IF-binding domain, it has at least one actin (K(d) = 0.35 microM) and one microtubule (K(d) approximately 6 microM) binding domain. Similar to its fly counterpart, ACF7 is expressed in the epidermis. In well spread epidermal keratinocytes, ACF7 discontinuously decorates the cytoskeleton at the cell periphery, including microtubules (MTs) and actin filaments (AFs) that are aligned in parallel converging at focal contacts. Upon calcium induction of intercellular adhesion, ACF7 and the cytoskeleton reorganize at cell-cell borders but with different kinetics from adherens junctions and desmosomes. Treatments with cytoskeletal depolymerizing drugs reveal that ACF7's cytoskeletal association is dependent upon the microtubule network, but ACF7 also appears to stabilize actin at sites where microtubules and microfilaments meet. We posit that ACF7 may function in microtubule dynamics to facilitate actin-microtubule interactions at the cell periphery and to couple the microtubule network to cellular junctions. These attributes provide a clear explanation for the kakapo mutant phenotype in flies. 相似文献
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In this paper we argue that the standard focus on problems of informed consent in debates about the ethics of human experimentation is inadequate because it fails to capture a more fundamental way in which such experiments may be wrong. Taking clinical trials as our case in point, we suggest that it is the moral offence of using people as mere means which better characterizes what is wrong with violations of personal autonomy in certain kinds of clinical trials. This account also helps bring out another important way in which the autonomy of the participants in clinical trials my be violated, even in cases where they have given informed consent to their involvement. Where relevant information about the trial is framed in such a way as to induce a patient's participation by appeal to their nonrational preferences, this is also a violation of their autonomy, and one which is distinct from a failure of informed consent. The underlying wrongness of both kinds of violations, we argue, is plausibly captured by the moral offence of using people as mere means. 相似文献