A case reopened: teleology and its consequences for the units of selection discussion.

Darwinian explanations for teleology are often imprecise, and justify the occurrence of teleological features by referring to natural selection in a vague and unspecified sense. In this paper, the Darwinian account for teleology is further analyzed. It is argued that in theory only a specific form of teleology--teleology that is caused by and directed towards the preservation of the genetic program--can be explained in a naturalistic way by employing Darwin's theory of natural selection. This observation links teleology with the units of selection discussion, as for both discussions the end-direction of teleological processes and behavior is of elementary importance. According to Dawkins' analysis, the unit of selection is an active germ-like replicator with a sufficient degree of longevity-fecundity-copying fidelity. From the teleological point of view, the unit of selection should additionally incorporate the genetic program in order to naturalize teleology. It is shown that within sexually reproducing species these two requirements cannot be met. Dawkins' concept of genic selectionism cannot be maintained without violating the naturalistic claims on teleology, and none of the other frequently proposed unit of selection candidates can adequately meet the demands as developed by Dawkins and those developed in the light of teleology.     

Darwin's changing views on evolution: from centres of origin and teleology to vicariance and incomplete lineage sorting

It is a strange fact that in many ways the first edition of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species is closer to modern neodarwinism than the sixth and last edition. Sometimes this is attributed to a decline in the quality of the argument, but the opposite interpretation is given here. It is suggested that Darwin's early work on evolution is naïve and based on the two creationist principles of centre of origin and teleology (panselectionism). This fusion later became the 'modern synthesis'. However, after the first edition of the Origin , Darwin developed a non-teleological synthesis that integrated natural selection with what he called 'laws of growth'– phylogenetic/morphogenetic trends or tendencies. Discussion of Darwin's later, more sophisticated model of evolution has been suppressed in the teleological modern synthesis, but similar ideas are re-emerging in current work on molecular phylogenetics and biogeography. This indicates that the ancestor of a group can be diverse in its morphology and its ecology, that this diversity can be inherited, and that groups usually originate over a broad region and not at a single point.     

Natural selection and the conditions for existence: representational vs. conditional teleology in biological explanation

Human intentional action, including the design and use of artifacts, involves the prior mental representation of the goal (end) and the means to achieve that goal. This representation is part of the efficient cause of the action, and thus can be used to explain both the action and the achievement of the end. This is intentional teleological explanation. More generally, teleological explanation that depends on the real existence of a representation of the goal (and the means to achieve it) can be called representational teleological explanation. Such explanations in biology can involve both external representations (e.g., ideas in the mind of God) and internal representations (souls, vital powers, entelechies, developmental programs, etc.). However, another type of explanation of intentional action (or any other process) is possible. Given that an action achieving a result occurs, the action can be explained as fulfilling the necessary conditions (means) for that result (end), and, reciprocally, the result explained by the occurrence of those necessary conditions. This is conditional teleological explanation. For organisms, natural selection is often understood metaphorically as the designer, intentionally constructing them for certain ends. Unfortunately, this metaphor is often taken rather too literally, because it has been difficult to conceive of another way to relate natural selection to the process of evolution. I argue that combining a conditional teleological explanation of organisms and of evolution provides such an alternative. This conditional teleology can be grounded in existence or survival. Given that an organism exists, we can explain its existence by the occurrence of the necessary conditions for that existence. This principle of the 'conditions for existence' was introduced by Georges Cuvier in 1800, and provides a valid, conditional teleological method for explaining organismal structure and behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, the conditions for existence are the range of boundary conditions within which the evolutionary process must occur. Moreover, evolutionary change itself can be subjected to conditional teleological explanation, because natural selection theory is primarily a theory about the relation between the conditions for the existence of organisms and the conditions for the existence of traits in populations. I show that failure to distinguish representational from conditional teleological explanation has confused previous attempts to clarify the relation of teleology to biology.     

Darwin on Aristotle

Charles Darwin's famous 1882 letter, in response to a gift by his friend, William Ogle of Ogle's recent translation of Aristotle's Parts of Animals, in which Darwin remarks that his “two gods,” Linnaeus and Cuvier, were “mere school-boys to old Aristotle,” has been thought to be only an extravagantly worded gesture of politeness. However, a close examination of this and other Darwin letters, and of references to Aristotle in Darwin's earlier work, shows that the famous letter was written several weeks after a first, polite letter of thanks, and was carefully formulated and literally meant. Indeed, it reflected an authentic, and substantial, increase in Darwin's already high respect for Aristotle, as a result of a careful reading both of Ogle's Introduction and of more or less the portion of Ogle's translation which Darwin says he has read. Aristotle's promotion to the pantheon, as an examination of the basis for Darwin's admiration of Linnaeus and Cuvier suggests, was most likely the result specifically of Darwin's late discovery that the man he already knew as “one of the greatest ... observers that ever lived” (1879) was also the ancient equivalent both of the great modern systematist and of the great modern advocate of comparative functional explanation. It may also have reflected some real insight on Darwin's part into the teleological aspect of Aristotle's thought, indeed more insight than Ogle himself had achieved, as a portion of their correspondence reveals. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Children’s Intuitive Teleology: Shifting the Focus of Evolution Education Research

Research has shown that children usually provide teleological explanations for the features of organisms and artifacts, from a very early age (3–4 years old). However, there is no consensus on whether teleological explanations are given in the same manner for non-living natural objects as well. The present study aimed to document the teleological explanations of 5- to 8-year-old children for particular features (color and shape) of organisms, artifacts and non-living natural objects. In addition, it was examined if there was any correlation between these explanations and children’s explanations for the usefulness of those features. Our results indicate a developmental shift in children’s teleological explanations, from a non-selective teleology in pre-school to a selective one in the second grade. In the latter case, children provided teleological explanations mostly for the shape of the feet of organisms and for the shape of artifacts, whereas pre-school children provided teleological explanations for non-living natural objects as well, both for the color and for the shape in all cases. Our results are not conclusive and further research is required, including a larger spectrum of students, since teleology is one of the most important conceptual obstacles in understanding evolution that persists even into adulthood. We conclude by proposing a particular research program for this purpose.     

Was Darwin a creationist?

Throughout the Origin of Species, Darwin contrasts his theory of natural selection with the theory that God independently created each species. This makes it seem as though the Origin offers a scientific alternative to a theological worldview. A few months after the Origin appeared, however, the eminent anatomist Richard Owen published a review that pointed out the theological assumptions of Darwin's theory. Owen worked in the tradition of rational morphology, within which one might suggest that evolution occurs by processes that are continuous with those by which life arises from matter; in contrast, Darwin rested his account of life's origins on the notion that God created one or a few life forms upon which natural selection could act. Owen argued that Darwin's reliance on God to explain the origins of life makes his version of evolution no less supernatural than the special creationist that Darwin criticizes: although Darwin limits God to one or a few acts of creation, he still relies upon God to explain life's existence.     

Nietzsche's aesthetic critique of Darwin

Despite his position as one of the first philosophers to write in the "post-Darwinian" world, the critique of Darwin by Friedrich Nietzsche is often ignored for a host of unsatisfactory reasons. I argue that Nietzsche's critique of Darwin is important to the study of both Nietzsche's and Darwin's impact on philosophy. Further, I show that the central claims of Nietzsche's critique have been broadly misunderstood. I then present a new reading of Nietzsche's core criticism of Darwin. An important part of Nietzsche's response can best be understood as an aesthetic critique of Darwin, reacting to what he saw as Darwin having drained life of an essential component of objective aesthetic value. For Nietzsche, Darwin's theory is false because it is too intellectual, because it searches for rules, regulations, and uniformity in a realm where none of these are to be found - and, moreover, where they should not be found. Such a reading goes furthest toward making Nietzsche's criticism substantive and relevant. Finally, I attempt to relate this novel explanation of Nietzsche's critique to topics in contemporary philosophy of biology, particularly work on the evolutionary explanation of culture.     

Darwin's language may seem teleological,but his thinking is another matter

Darwin's biology was teleological only if the term teleology is defined in a manner that fails to recognize his contribution to the metaphysics and epistemology of modern science. His use of teleological metaphors in a strictly teleonomic context is irrelevant to the meaning of his discourse. The myth of Darwin's alleged teleology is partly due to misinterpretations of discussions about whether morphology should be a purely formal science. Merely rejecting such notions as special creation and vitalism does not prevent the pernicious effects of teleological reasoning, even at the present time.     

Darwin's concept of final cause: neither new nor trivial

Darwin'suse of final cause accords with the Aristotelian idea of finalcauses as explanatory types – as opposed to mechanical causes, which arealways particulars. In Wright's consequence etiology, anadaptation is explained by particular events, namely, its past consequences;hence, that etiology is mechanistic at bottom. This justifies Ghiselin'scharge that such versions of teleology trivialize the subject, But a purelymechanistic explanation of an adaptation allows it to appear coincidental.Patterns of outcome, whether biological or thermodynamic, cannot be explainedbytracing causal chains, even were that possible. They are explicanda of aspecialkind. The form of their explanation, in statistical mechanics or by naturalselection, is not captured by statistical variants of the covering-law model orrelated models of explanation. In them as in classical teleology, types ofoutcome are cited to explain why there are outcomes of those types. But onlywhen types are explanatory by being selected for, as inexplanations of animal and human behavior as well as in Darwin's theory ofnatural selection, but not in statistical mechanics, is the explanationteleological. Darwin's theory is nontrivially teleological.     

Charles Darwin and the problem of evolutionary progress

According to Ch. Darwin's evolutionary theory, evolutionary progress (interpreted as morpho-physiological progress or arogenesis in recent terminology) is one of logical results of natural selection. At the same time, natural selection does not hold any factors especially promoting evolutionary progress. Darwin emphasized that the pattern of evolutionary changes depends on organism nature more than on the pattern of environment changes. Arogenesis specificity is determined by organization of rigorous biological systems - integral organisms. Onward progressive development is determined by fundamental features of living organisms: metabolism and homeostasis. The concept of social Darwinism differs fundamentally from Darwin's ideas about the most important role of social instincts in progress of mankind. Competition and selection play secondary role in socio-cultural progress of human society.     

Darwin teleologist? Design in the Orchids

Focusing on the Orchids, this article aims at disentangling the concepts of teleology, design and natural theology. It refers to several contemporary critics of Darwin (Kölliker, Argyll, Royer, Candolle, Delpino) to challenge Huxley's interpretation that Darwin's system was “a deathblow” to teleology. The Orchids seem rather to be a “flank-movement” (Gray): it departs from the Romantic theories of transmutation and the “imaginary examples” of the Origin; it focuses on empirical data and on teleological structures. Although Darwin refers to natural selection, his readers mock him for his fascination for delicate morphological contrivances and co-adaptations – a sign that he was inescapably lured to finality. Some even suggested that his system was a “theodicy”. In the history of Darwinism, the Orchids reveal “another” quite unexpected and heterodox Darwin: freed from the hypothetical fancies of the Origin, and even suggesting a new kind of physico-theology.     

Darwin's explanation of races by means of sexual selection

In Darwin's Sacred Cause, Adrian Desmond and James Moore contend that "Darwin would put his utmost into sexual selection because the subject intrigued him, no doubt, but also for a deeper reason: the theory vindicated his lifelong commitment to human brotherhood" (2009: p. 360). Without questioning Desmond and Moore's evidence, I will raise some puzzles for their view. I will show that attention to the structure of Darwin's arguments in the Descent of Man shows that they are far from straightforward. As Desmond and Moore note, Darwin seems to have intended sexual selection in non-human animals to serve as evidence for sexual selection in humans. However, Darwin's account of sexual selection in humans was different from the canonical cases that Darwin described at great length. If explaining the origin of human races was the main reason for introducing sexual selection, and if sexual selection was a key piece of Darwin's anti-slavery arguments, then it is puzzling why Darwin would have spent so much time discussing cases that did not really support his argument for the origin of human races, and it is also puzzling that his argument for the origin of human races would be so (atypically) poor.     

The meaning of Darwin's 'abominable mystery'

Charles Darwin's "abominable mystery" has come to symbolize just about all aspects of the origin and early evolution of flowering plants. Yet, there has never been an analysis of precisely what Darwin thought was so abominably mysterious. Here I explicate Darwin's thoughts and frustrations with the fossil record of flowering plants as revealed in correspondence with Joseph Hooker, Gaston de Saporta, and Oswald Heer between 1875 and 1881. I also examine the essay by John Ball that prompted Darwin to write his "abominable mystery" letter to Hooker in July of 1879. Contrary to what is generally believed, Darwin's abominable mystery has little if anything to do with the fossil prehistory of angiosperms, identification of the closest relatives of flowering plants, questions of the homologies (and character transformations) of defining features of flowering plants, or the phylogeny of flowering plants themselves. Darwin's abominable mystery and his abiding interest in the radiation of angiosperms were never driven primarily by a need to understand the literal text of the evolutionary history of flowering plants. Rather, Darwin was deeply bothered by what he perceived to be an abrupt origin and highly accelerated rate of diversification of flowering plants in the mid-Cretaceous. This led Darwin to create speculative arguments for a long, gradual, and undiscovered pre-Cretaceous history of flowering plants on a lost island or continent. Darwin also took refuge in the possibility that a rapid diversification of flowering plants in the mid-Cretaceous might, if real, have a biological explanation involving coevolutionary interactions between pollinating insects and angiosperms. Nevertheless, although generations of plant biologists have seized upon Darwin's abominable mystery as a metaphor for their struggle to understand angiosperm history, the evidence strongly suggests that the abominable mystery is not about angiosperms per se. On the contrary, Darwin's abominable mystery is about his abhorrence that evolution could be both rapid and potentially even saltational. Throughout the last years of his life, it just so happens that flowering plants, among all groups of organisms, presented Darwin with the most extreme exception to his strongly held notion natura non facit saltum, nature does not make a leap.     

Darwin,Cuvier and Geoffroy: comments and questions

In writing, in the Origin of Species, of 'two great laws' on which organic beings are formed, 'Unity of Type' and 'Conditions of Existence', Darwin was referring to the famous opposition between Cuvier and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, first stated publicly in the spring of 1830. After a brief statement of the chief points at issue in the debate, I raise the question of Darwin's attitude to the disagreement and the views of the two protagonists. There are numerous earlier, and some later, references to Cuvier and Geoffroy in the Darwin archives, notebooks, marginalia and correspondence. An examination of these materials suggests a shift in Darwin's sympathies, from Geoffroy to Cuvier. However, some of Geoffroy's principles are retained, and, in adopting Cuvier's phrase 'conditions of existence', Darwin partly alters its meaning. Finally, since originally, and in its adoption by such writers as Whewell and Owen, the expression 'conditions of existence' was interpreted as entailing design or final cause, I consider the vexed question of Darwin's attitude to teleology.     

Darwin's evolutionary philosophy: The laws of change

The philosophical or metaphysical architecture of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is analyzed and diflussed. It is argued that natural selection was for Darwin a paradigmatic case of a natural law of change — an exemplar of what Ghiselin (1969) has called selective retention laws. These selective retention laws lie at the basis of Darwin's revolutionary world view. In this essay special attention is paid to the consequences for Darwin's concept of species of his selective retention laws. Although Darwin himself explicity supported a variety of nominalism, implicit in the theory of natural selection is a solution to the dispute between nominalism and realism. It is argued that, although implicit, this view plays a very important role in Darwin's theory of natural selection as the means for the origin of species. It is in the context of these selective retention laws and their philosophical implications that Darwin's method is appraised in the light of recent criticisms, and the conclusion drawn that he successfully treated some philosophical problems by approaching them through natural history. Following this an outline of natural selection theory is presented in which all these philosophical issues are highlighted.     

Phylogenetic inertia and Darwin's higher law

The concept of 'phylogenetic inertia' is routinely deployed in evolutionary biology as an alternative to natural selection for explaining the persistence of characteristics that appear sub-optimal from an adaptationist perspective. However, in many of these contexts the precise meaning of 'phylogenetic inertia' and its relationship to selection are far from clear. After tracing the history of the concept of 'inertia' in evolutionary biology, I argue that treating phylogenetic inertia and natural selection as alternative explanations is mistaken because phylogenetic inertia is, from a Darwinian point of view, simply an expected effect of selection. Although Darwin did not discuss 'phylogenetic inertia,' he did assert the explanatory priority of selection over descent. An analysis of 'phylogenetic inertia' provides a perspective from which to assess Darwin's view.     

Teleology and its constitutive role for biology as the science of organized systems in nature

'Nothing in biology makes sense, except in the light of teleology'. This could be the first sentence in a textbook about the methodology of biology. The fundamental concepts in biology, e.g. 'organism' and 'ecosystem', are only intelligible given a teleological framework. Since early modern times, teleology has often been considered methodologically unscientific. With the acceptance of evolutionary theory, one popular strategy for accommodating teleological reasoning was to explain it by reference to selection in the past: functions were reconstructed as 'selected effects'. But the theory of evolution obviously presupposes the existence of organisms as organized and regulated, i.e. functional systems. Therefore, evolutionary theory cannot provide the foundation for teleology. The underlying reason for the central methodological role of teleology in biology is not its potential to offer particular forms of (evolutionary) explanations for the presence of parts, but rather an ontological one: organisms and other basic biological entities do not exist as physical bodies do, as amounts of matter with a definite form. Rather, they are dynamic systems in stable equilibrium; despite changes of their matter and form (in metabolism and metamorphosis) they maintain their identity. What remains constant in these kinds of systems is their 'organization', i.e. the causal pattern of interdependence of parts with certain effects of each part being relevant for the working of the system. Teleological analysis consists in the identification of these system-relevant effects and at the same time of the system as a whole. Therefore, the identity of biological systems cannot be specified without teleological reasoning.     

Natural selection without survival of the fittest

Susan Mills and John Beatty proposed a propensity interpretation of fitness (1979) to show that Darwinian explanations are not circular, but they did not address the critics' chief complaint that the principle of the survival of the fittest is either tautological or untestable. I show that the propensity interpretation cannot rescue the principle from the critics' charges. The critics, however, incorrectly assume that there is nothing more to Darwin's theory than the survival of the fittest. While Darwinians all scoff at this assumption, they do not agree about what role, if any, this principle plays in Darwin's theory of natural selection. I argue that the principle has no place in Darwin's theory. His theory does include the idea that some organisms are fitter than others. But greater reproductive success is simply inferred from higher fitness. There is no reason to embody this inference in the form of a special principle of the survival of the fittest.I would like to thank John Beatty, Ron Giere, Philip Kitcher and John Winnie for detailed and helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.     

Darwin's species category realism

Ever since Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species was published, the received view has been that Darwin literally thought of species as not extra-mentally real. In 1969 Michael Ghiselin upset the received view by interpreting Darwin to mean that species taxa are indeed real but not the species category. In 1985 John Beatty took Ghiselin's thesis a step further by providing a strategy theory to explain why Darwin would say one thing (his repeated nominalistic definition of species) and do another (hold that species taxa are real). In the present paper I attempt to take this line of interpretation to a new level. Guided by the principle of charity, I provide and analyze a considerable amount of evidence from Darwin's mature writings (both private and published) to show that (contra Ghiselin and Beatty) Darwin did not simply accept the species delimitations of his fellow naturalists but actually employed, repeatedly and consistently, a species concept in a thoroughly modern sense, albeit with an implicit definition, a concept uniquely his own and fully in accord with his theory of evolution by natural selection. This implicit concept and definition is carefully reconstructed in the present paper. A new strategy theory is then provided to account for why Darwin would define species (both taxa and category) nominalistically on the one hand but delimit species realistically on the other.     

Advanced eusociality, kin selection and male haploidy

Abstract  The generation-long primacy of kin selection in explaining the evolution of advanced eusociality in social insects has been challenged in recent papers. Does this challenge succeed? I consider three questions: is kin selection still the unchallengeable explanation for the evolution of eusociality; is the male haploidy of Hymenoptera important in this explanation; and, a subsidiary question of why are there no male workers in Hymenoptera? I briefly trace the origins of kin selection back to Darwin and then consider the explanations of mutualism, group selection, parental manipulation, and kin selection and its variant 'green beard' alleles. I stress that in the kin selection equation, however written, relatedness is deeply intertwined with ecology so that both are essential. Kin selection does remain unchallengeable but, for some, the role of male haploidy has lost favour recently despite several modelling efforts all finding that it favours the evolution of eusociality. Sex allocation is deep at the heart of the evolution of hymenopteran advanced eusociality, indicating the interacting roles of population genetics and general biology. Modellers have also found no reason for a lack of male workers, so that a biological superiority of females for this role is indicated for social Hymenoptera.