Violinists,demandingness, and the impairment argument against abortion

The ‘impairment argument’ against abortion developed by Perry Hendricks aims to derive the wrongness of abortion from the wrongness of causing foetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Hendricks endorses an ‘impairment principle’, which states that, if it is wrong to inflict an impairment of a certain degree on an organism, then, ceteris paribus, it is also wrong to inflict a more severe impairment on that organism. Causing FAS is wrong in virtue of the impairment it inflicts. But abortion inflicts an even more severe impairment (death), and so, ceteris paribus, is also wrong. Notably, Hendricks thinks that this argument does not require the claim that the foetus is a person. Here, I respond to Hendricks by arguing that the ceteris paribus clause of the impairment principle is not met in ordinary cases of pregnancy. Carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term is much more burdensome than is refraining from excessive drinking for nine months. This provides a pro tanto justification for obtaining an abortion that does not apply to causing FAS. If the foetus is not a person, it seems fairly clear to me that this justification is strong enough to render abortion permissible. Hendricks is therefore incorrect in claiming that the impairment argument can go without claims concerning foetal personhood. If the foetus is a person, then whether burdensomeness justifies abortion depends on certain questions relating to Thomson’s famous violinist argument. I will not attempt to answer those. But anyone who is otherwise sympathetic to Thomson’s argument should not be moved by the impairment argument.     

The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply

In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro‐choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral.     

Against the impairment argument: A reply to Hendricks

In an article of this journal, Perry Hendricks makes a novel argument for the immorality of abortion. According to his impairment argument, abortion is immoral because: (a) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the nth degree, such as causing the fetus to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS); (b) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the n+1 degree (to cause the fetus to be more impaired than to have FAS); (c) killing the fetus impairs the fetus to the n+1 degree (causes it to be more impaired than to have FAS); (d) abortion kills the fetus; (e) therefore, abortion is immoral. The impairment argument is a promising account for the wrongness of abortion because it does not rely on the controversial metaphysical premise that a fetus is a person. This article aims to show, that despite some immediate advantages over the rival theories of the immorality of abortion there is a reason to believe that the impairment argument is untenable. That is because there are goods that can be achieved by abortion but that cannot be achieved by impairing the fetus.     

Even if the fetus is not a person,abortion is immoral: The impairment argument

Much of the debate about the ethics of abortion has centered on whether the fetus is a person. In an attempt to sidestep this complex issue, I argue that, even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral. To arrive at this conclusion, I argue that giving a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, and that if this is so, then killing the fetus is immoral. Roughly, this is because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome. Since abortion (in most cases) amounts to killing the fetus, this means that abortion (in most cases) is immoral. I defend the premises of this argument against a plethora of objections, concluding that they either do not work, or commit their proponent to a controversial position.     

POST‐ABORTION SYNDROME: CREATING AN AFFLICTION

The contention that abortion harms women constitutes a new strategy employed by the pro‐life movement to supplement arguments about fetal rights. David C. Reardon is a prominent promoter of this strategy. Post‐abortion syndrome purports to establish that abortion psychologically harms women and, indeed, can harm persons associated with women who have abortions. Thus, harms that abortion is alleged to produce are multiplied. Claims of repression are employed to complicate efforts to disprove the existence of psychological harm and causal antecedents of trauma are only selectively investigated. We argue that there is no such thing as post‐abortion syndrome and that the psychological harms Reardon and others claim abortion inflicts on women can usually be ascribed to different causes. We question the evidence accumulated by Reardon and his analysis of data accumulated by others. Most importantly, we question whether the conclusions Reardon has drawn follow from the evidence he cites.     

Prenatal wrongful death

In Tebbutt v. Virostek (1985), the New York Court of Appeals dismissed a suit for emotional distress caused by the stillbirth of an infant allegedly resulting from medical malpractice. Steinbock argues that parents should be able to recover for emotional anguish in cases like Tebbutt. Some states currently allow them to do so by recognizing prenatal wrongful death suits, which focus on the unborn. Steinbock maintains that a better legal approach would be to allow recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress upon the parent(s). She presents a six-part argument that discusses: (1) the facts of Tebbutt; (2) wrongful death actions and their extension to the unborn; (3) prenatal torts and prenatal wrongful death; (4) the recognition of harms or wrongs to nonviable fetuses; (5) the legal implications of recognizing fetal personhood; and (6) recognizing parental rights in cases like Tebbutt without recognizing the fetus as a person.     

At the Margins of Moral Personhood

In this article I examine the proposition that severe cognitive disability is an impediment to moral personhood. Moral personhood, as I understand it here, is articulated in the work of Jeff McMahan as that which confers a special moral status on a person. I rehearse the metaphysical arguments about the nature of personhood that ground McMahan’s claims regarding the moral status of the “congenitally severely mentally retarded” (CSMR for short). These claims, I argue, rest on the view that only intrinsic psychological capacities are relevant to moral personhood: that is, that relational properties are generally not relevant. In addition, McMahan depends on an argument that species membership is irrelevant for moral consideration and a contention that privileging species membership is equivalent to a virulent nationalism (these will be discussed below). In consequence, the CSMR are excluded from moral personhood and their deaths are less significant as their killing is less wrong than that of persons. To throw doubt on McMahan’s conclusions about the moral status and wrongness of killing the CSMR I question the exclusive use of intrinsic properties in the metaphysics of personhood, the dismissal of the moral importance of species membership, and the example of virulent nationalism as an apt analogy. I also have a lot to say about McMahan’s empirical assumptions about the CSMR.     

Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm

The actions of pregnant women can cause harm to their future children. However, even if the possible harm is serious and likely to occur, the law will generally not intervene. A pregnant woman is an autonomous person who is entitled to make her own decisions. A fetus in‐utero has no legal right to protection. In striking contrast, the child, if born alive, may sue for injury in‐utero; and the child is entitled to be protected by being removed from her parents if necessary for her protection. Indeed, there is a legal obligation for health professionals to report suspected harm, and for authorities to protect the child's wellbeing. We ask whether such contradictory responses are justified. Should the law intervene where a pregnant woman's actions risk serious and preventable fetal injury? The argument for legal intervention to protect a fetus is sometimes linked to the concept of ‘fetal personhood’ and the moral status of the fetus. In this article we will suggest that even if the fetus is not regarded as a separate person, and does not have the legal or moral status of a child, indeed, even if the fetus is regarded as having no legal or moral status, there is an ethical and legal case for intervening to prevent serious harm to a future child. We examine the arguments for and against intervention on behalf of the future child, drawing on the example of excessive maternal alcohol intake.     

Arguing by analogy in the fetal tissue debate

In the debate over fetal tissue use, an analogy is often drawn between removing organs from the body of a person who has been murdered to use for transplantation, and collecting tissue from an aborted fetus to use for the same purpose. The murder victim analogy is taken by its proponents to show that even if abortion is the moral equivalent of murder, there is still no good reason to refrain from using the fetal tissue, since as a society we do not see any problem about using organs from murder victims. However, I argue that the analogy between murder victims and aborted fetuses does not hold — the two situations are not the same in all morally relevant respects. Thus the murder victim analogy does not provide an argument in favour of fetal tissue transplant. In conclusion, I point to some of the potential pitfalls of using analogies in ethical argument.     

Potentiality and human embryos

Consideration of the potentiality of human embryos to develop characteristics of personhood, such as intellect and will, has figured prominently in arguments against abortion and the use of human embryos for research. In particular, such consideration was the basis for the call of the US President's Council on Bioethics for a moratorium on stem cell research on human embryos. In this paper, I critique the concept of potentiality invoked by the Council and offer an alternative account. In contrast to the Council's view that an embryo's potentiality is determined by definition and is not affected by external conditions that may prevent certain possibilities from ever being realized, I propose an empirically grounded account of potentiality that involves an assessment of the physical and decisional conditions that may restrict an embryo's possibilities. In my view, some human embryos lack the potentiality to become a person that other human embryos have. Assuming for the sake of argument that the potential to become a person gives a being special moral status, it follows that some human embryos lack this status. This argument is then used to support Gene Outka's suggestion that it is morally permissible to experiment on 'spare' frozen embryos that are destined to be destroyed.     

Understanding the 'conservative' view on abortion

The philosophical literature would have us believe that the conservative view on abortion is based on the claim that the fetus is a person from the time of conception. Given the widespread acceptance of this analysis, it comes as something of a surprise to learn that it conflicts with a number of major arguments offered in support of the conservative view. I argue, in the present paper, that a careful examination of these inconsistencies establishes that the personhood analysis is mistaken: the conservative view is based on the natural process of fetal development, not the personhood of the fetus.     

Will cognitive enhancement create post‐persons? The use(lessness) of induction in determining the likelihood of moral status enhancement

The prospect of cognitive enhancement well beyond current human capacities raises worries that the fundamental equality in moral status of human beings could be undermined. Cognitive enhancement might create beings with moral status higher than persons. Yet, there is an expressibility problem of spelling out what the higher threshold in cognitive capacity would be like. Nicholas Agar has put forward the bold claim that we can show by means of inductive reasoning that indefinite cognitive enhancement will probably mark a difference in moral status. The hope is that induction can determine the plausibility of post‐personhood existence in the absence of an account of what the higher status would be like. In this article, we argue that Agar's argument fails and, more generally, that inductive reasoning has little bearing on assessing the likelihood of post‐personhood in the absence of an account of higher status. We conclude that induction cannot bypass the expressibility problem about post‐persons.     

Substance,rights, value,and abortion

Most serious contemporary opposition to abortion is grounded on the belief that human fetuses are members of the same moral category as beings like us, and that the loss of any such life is one of the worst possible losses. Substance view theorists oppose abortion for this reason: in their view beings like us are essentially rational substances with inherent moral worth, and those who perform induced abortion fail to recognize this moral worth. In a recent series of articles, Rob Lovering presents reductio‐style arguments against the substance view, in part arguing that it is inconsistent with our intuitions in rescue and spontaneous abortion cases. In a recent reply, Henrik Friberg‐Fernros argues that the substance view can evade these problematic implications because of a distinction between killing and letting die. According to this argument, the fetus’s right to life is a negative right not to be killed, not a positive right to be rescued, thus the anti‐abortion theorist who lets fetuses die acts acceptably. I argue this stance fails to recognize the inherent moral worth that the substance view contends fetuses possess. One who refrains from saving a person, or doesn’t care how many people she saves, cannot reasonably claim to value life. Furthermore, this stance is at odds with most contemporary anti‐abortion views that oppose induced abortions of both the killing and letting die variety.     

Attitudes towards abortion in the Danish population

This article reports the results of a survey, by mailed questionnaire, of the attitudes among a sample of the Danish population towards abortion for social and genetic reasons. Of 1080 questionnaires sent to a random sample of persons between 18 and 45 years, 731 (68%) were completed and returned.
A great majority of the respondents were liberal towards early abortion both for social reasons and in case of minor disease. In contrast, there was controversy about late abortions for social reasons and in the case of Down syndrome. Further there was strong reluctance to accept late abortion in case of minor disease.
An analysis of the response patterns showed that most of the respondents had gradualist views on abortion, i.e. they would allow all early abortions, but only abortions for some reasons later in pregnancy. It was also found that the number who would find an early abortion acceptable in general was much higher than the number who would accept it in their own case. These findings suggest that a great part of the resistance towards abortion does not rest on a concern for the rights and interests for the fetus. Instead it may be explained on a view according to which fetal life is ascribed intrinsic moral value.     

Developing ways of reducing allograft immunogenicity.

Heavy alcohol consumption by the mother during pregnancy has long been suspected of being a risk factor for abnormalities in the fetus or infant. Only during the last decade have these assumptions been supported by scientific studies. A clustering of fetal defects observed in some cases has been labelled the fetal alcohol syndrome. The syndrome involves prenatal and postnatal growth retardation, central nervous system involvement and craniofacial abnormalities, some of which are characteristic of the syndrome. Fetal alcohol syndrome is relatively rare, affecting from 1 in 300 to 1 in 2000 infants; approximately 450 cases have been reported since the syndrome was identified. Despite this rarity, however, heavy alcohol consumption is an important risk factor during pregnancy. A review of the current literature indicates that in animals alcohol in high doses is embryotoxic and teratogenic, the heavy drinking is not uncommon before and during pregnancy and that the fetal alcohol syndrome and other effects on the fetus associated with alcohol abuse appear with significant frequency among mothers who drink heavily. Heavy alcohol consumption is a perinatal risk factor that not only can be detected by the physician, but also can be reduced in concerned, cooperative patients. Thus, awareness of this problem gives health care personnel an opportunity to help in the prevention of abnormal outcomes of pregnancy.     

Fetal alcohol syndrome: an assessment of the field

Fetal exposure to alcohol is the major known cause of mental retardation in the Western world. For more than half of the 20th century, the placenta was widely believed to be an effective barrier against environmental agents. The discovery that offspring of pregnant women who were exposed to German measles or administered thalidomide were often malformed raised awareness that teratogens could be any environmental agent, including viruses and drugs, that caused abnormal development. Alcohol was not identified as a teratogen until the 1970s. Fetal exposure to alcohol can cause fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS), which is characterized by specific physical traits and central nervous system dysfunctions. The development of animal model systems has facilitated our study of the effects of fetal alcohol exposure and the elucidation of the mechanisms involved in alcohol-induced abnormal development. Despite our current understanding of the effects of fetal alcohol exposure, the occurrence of FAS and associated fetal alcohol spectrum disorders is still widespread and the associated health-care costs are staggering. This symposium provides an up-to-date analysis of fetal exposure to alcohol and FAS. It is directed not only to investigators working in the field but to a diverse group of scientists working in the biological and biomedical fields to stimulate cross-disciplinary awareness, interest, and collaboration.     

The problem of abortion: essentially contested concepts and moral autonomy

When one thinks about the ethics of abortion, one inevitably thinks about rights, since it is in terms of the concept of rights that much of the debate has been conducted. This is true of overtly feminist as well as non-feminist accounts. Indeed, some early feminist writers--Judith Jarvis Thomson and Mary Ann Warren, for example--employ a model of rights that is indistinguishable, or virtually indistinguishable, from that of their non-feminist counterparts. However, more recent feminist writers have developed a different understanding of 'a woman's right to choose.' In this paper, I will begin by outlining the non-feminist debate over the moral permissibility of abortion. I will suggest that this debate is irresolvable, since at its heart is an 'essentially contested concept', that of personhood. I will then consider the way in which some feminist writers have attempted to reconceive the terms of the abortion debate and suggest an expanded account of women's right to abortion, drawing on the work of Susan Sherwin. Finally, I will argue that there is a further element to a 'woman's right to choose' that expands on and provides a conceptual link between feminist and non-feminist understanding of abortion.     

Moebius syndrome: animal model--human correlations and evidence for a brainstem vascular etiology

The Moebius syndrome consists of congenital seventh nerve palsy associated with other cranial nerve palsies, most often of the sixth, and/or musculoskeletal abnormalities. A retrospective study of the events of pregnancy in 15 cases was undertaken, after a rat animal model showed that abdominal trauma, uterine vessel clamping and handling and hyperthermia caused bilateral brainstem lesions in fetal rats. Eight of the 15 cases surveyed included a possible associated event during pregnancy; hyperthermia, previous uterine surgery, electric shock, failed abortion, prolonged rupture of the membranes, or alcohol abuse. These events can be correlated with animal studies that involve acute uteroplacental vascular insufficiency produced by a variety of methods. The cause of most cases of Moebius syndrome is probably a transient ischemic/hypoxic insult to the fetus.     

The Beginning of Personhood: A Thomistic Biological Analysis

‘When did I, a human person, begin to exist?’ In developing an answer to this question, I utilize a Thomistic framework, which holds that the human person is a composite of a biological organism and an intellective soul. Eric Olson and Norman Ford both argue that the beginning of an individual human biological organism occurs at the moment when implantation of the zygote in the uterus occurs and the ‘primitive streak’ begins to form. Prior to this point, there does not exist an individual human organism, but a cluster of biological cells which has the potential to split and develop as one or more separate human organisms (identical twinning). Ensoulment (the instantiation of a human intellective soul in biological matter) does not occur until the point of implantation. This conception of the beginning of human personhood has moral implications concerning the status of pre‐implantation biological cell clusters. A new understanding of the beginning of human personhood entails a new understanding of the morality of certain medical procedures which have a direct affect on these cell clusters which contain human DNA. Such procedures discussed in this article are embryonic stem cell research, in vitro fertilization, procured abortion, and the use of abortifacient contraceptives.