The cultural construction of gendered bodies: Biology and metaphors of production and destruction*

One way of conceiving of the anthropological task is that of countering the degradations and “dehumanizations” of the “other” to which the species is prone by promoting “transcendent humanization.” However efficiently and professionally anthropologists gather their materials and form them into their ethnographic and ethnologic analyses, may not this “ethical impulse” be postulated as the “final cause” of our efforts? But what could such a sonorous phrase mean ? And what is its relationship to the systematic study of the “differences that make or do not make a difference” in culture to which anthropology has long been devoted? I will argue that it involves a dynamic of categories and that this dynamic is itself an object of systematic study. Recently, for example, some anthropologists have been writing “against culture,” seeing the culture concept and associated theory more as barriers than as benefits to pan‐human understanding. I will argue that this is an instance of “transcendent humanization.” One cannot but be sympathetic to the thrust and merits of this argument. But at the same time one wants to ask what implications it holds for the systematic study and understanding of the other. This article, then, examines some elementary vectors in the “dynamic of the categorical” involved in these and related recent debates which also may be seen in terms of transcendence and humanization: the debate over relativism and the recently emergent debate over “enlightenment mythmaking” in anthropology.     

The green beards of language

Language transfers information on at least three levels; (1) what is said, (2) how it is said (what language is used), and, (3) that it is said (that speaker and listener both possess the ability to use language). The use of language is a form of honest cooperation on two of these levels; not necessarily on what is said, which can be deceitful, but always on how it is said and that it is said. This means that the language encoding and decoding systems had to evolve simultaneously, through mutual fitness benefits. Theoretical problems surrounding the evolution of cooperation disappear if a recognition system is present enabling cooperating individuals to identify each other – if they are equipped with “green beards”. Here, I outline how both the biological and cultural aspects of language are bestowed with such recognition systems. The biological capacities required for language signal their presence through speech and understanding. This signaling cannot be invaded by “false green beards” because the traits and the signal of their presence are one and the same. However, the real usefulness of language comes from its potential to convey an infinite number of meanings through the dynamic handling of symbols – through language itself. But any specific language also signals its presence to others through usage and understanding. Thus, languages themselves cannot be invaded by “false green beards” because, again, the trait and the signal of its presence are one and the same. These twin green beards, in both the biological and cultural realms, are unique to language.     

Science and Restoration Under a Big, Demon Haunted Tent: Reply to Giardina et al. (2007)

In a recent editorial, I discussed how the culture of science, heterogeneity of nature, and real‐world human complexities can limit the practical relevance of formal scientific research and argued that less formal approaches might often be more efficient and effective. Giardina et al. criticized this editorial and argued that formal science has and increasingly will play a central role in ecological restoration in particular and human progress in general. Here, I respond to these arguments and expand upon the ideas presented in my previous editorial. I further illustrate how despite superficial appearances the utilitarian value of formal science may often be largely indirect. I also argue that the complexities of ecological and human systems combined with the subjective values and political beliefs underlying restoration make transforming this discipline into a unified “hard science” virtually impossible. Because values and politics also underlie most environmental conflicts, and scientific inquiry is inherently unsuitable for resolving these kinds of disputes, the future success of restoration may depend more on political support than scientific progress. Dogmatic, nonfalsifiable faith in the universal superiority of “rigorous” scientific knowledge and methodologies can foster arrogance and intolerance and blind us to the ephemeral nature of scientific “truths” and the double‐edged sword of scientific “progress.” My hope is that Society for Ecological Restoration International (SERI) will remain a big inclusive tent that embraces a healthy diversity of foci and approaches that emulate the extraordinary diversity we find within the natural ecosystems and human cultures we strive to preserve, restore, and reconnect.     

Homeostasis and the physiological dimension of niche construction theory in ecology and evolution

Niche construction theory (NCT) has been represented as a new and comprehensive theory of evolution, one that breaks the constraints imposed by the dominant and largely gene-selectionist standard evolutionary model that is presently mischaracterized as “Darwinian.” I will argue that NCT is not so much a new theory, as it is a fruitful readmission of a venerable physiological perspective on adaptation, selection and evolution. This perspective is closer in spirit and philosophy to the original (and richer) Darwinian idea developed by Darwin himself, and that animated much of the rich late nineteenth century debate about evolution, heredity, adaptation and development, a debate that was largely eclipsed by the early twentieth century emergence of the Neodarwinian synthesis. I will argue that a full realization of the promise of NCT turns on a full understanding of another intellectual revolution of the nineteenth century, Claude Bernard’s conception of homeostasis, a profound statement of the nature of life that has, through the twentieth century, come to be widely misunderstood and trivialized.     

Rebuilding ships while at sea—Character individuality,homology, and evolutionary innovation

How novel traits originate in evolution is still one of the most perplexing questions in Evolutionary Biology. Building on a previous account of evolutionary innovation, I here propose that evolutionary novelties are those individualized characters that are not homologous to any characters in the ancestor. To clarify this definition, I here provide a detailed analysis of the concepts of “character individuality” and “homology” first, before addressing their role for our understanding of evolutionary innovation. I will argue (1) that functional as well as structural considerations are important for character individualization; and (2) that compositional (structural) and positional homology need to be clearly distinguished to properly describe the evolutionary transformations of hierarchically structured characters. My account will therefore integrate functional and structural perspectives and put forward a new multi-level view of character identity and transformation.     

Getting respect or getting along with stigma?

By paying attention to the apparently minor forms of stigmatization, Getting Respect uncovers an underworld of threats that contribute to shape the sense of being disqualified and enlarge our understanding of racism and discrimination. In this paper, I engage with the main findings and argument of the book, especially the comparative dimension, questioning the status of the Israeli component of it. How “assaults on worth” that are key in this book are related to discrimination remain to be disentangled. One open question after reading this great research is whether we are facing a reformation of racism, with the new public debate on microaggression being both a symptom and a parameter of this evolution, or the book is a contribution to a deeper understanding of the expression of stigmatization in the same context of “racism without race” or “Laissez faire racism”.     

Self domestication and the evolution of language

We set out an account of how self-domestication plays a crucial role in the evolution of language. In doing so, we focus on the growing body of work that treats language structure as emerging from the process of cultural transmission. We argue that a full recognition of the importance of cultural transmission fundamentally changes the kind of questions we should be asking regarding the biological basis of language structure. If we think of language structure as reflecting an accumulated set of changes in our genome, then we might ask something like, “What are the genetic bases of language structure and why were they selected?” However, if cultural evolution can account for language structure, then this question no longer applies. Instead, we face the task of accounting for the origin of the traits that enabled that process of structure-creating cultural evolution to get started in the first place. In light of work on cultural evolution, then, the new question for biological evolution becomes, “How did those precursor traits evolve?” We identify two key precursor traits: (1) the transmission of the communication system through learning; and (2) the ability to infer the communicative intent associated with a signal or action. We then describe two comparative case studies—the Bengalese finch and the domestic dog—in which parallel traits can be seen emerging following domestication. Finally, we turn to the role of domestication in human evolution. We argue that the cultural evolution of language structure has its origin in an earlier process of self-domestication.     

Explaining embryological development: Should integration be the goal?

Two approaches to an integration of evolution and development are often distinguished, one “neo-Darwinian” and the other “structuralist”. Should these approaches in turn be integrated? Kelly Smith recently stated that we need a “more complete” theory of biological order, suggesting integration as the ideal. In response to him, I argue that a recognition of different types of scientific questions and causal explanation is more urgent. Do we understand development when we know the crucial factors in the process of differentiation, or rather when we know the laws that govern the transformations of fields? Without a recognition of these different explanatory ideals, “integration” is likely to have the character of annexation.     

DNA Repair: A changing geography? (1964–2008)

This article aims to explain the current state of DNA Repair studies’ global geography by focusing on the genesis of the community. Bibliometric data is used to localize scientific activities related to DNA Repair at the city level. The keyword “DNA Repair” was introduced first by American scientists. It started to spread after 1964 that is to say, after P. Howard-Flanders (Yale University), P. Hanawalt (Stanford University) and R. Setlow (Oak Ridge Laboratories) found evidence for Excision Repair mechanisms. It was the first stage in the emergence of an autonomous scientific community. In this article, we will try to assess to what extent the geo-history of this scientific field is determinant in understanding its current geography. In order to do so, we will localize the places where the first “DNA Repair” publications were signed fifty years ago and the following spatial diffusion process, which led to the current geography of the field. Then, we will focus on the evolution of the research activity of “early entrants” in relation to the activity of “latecomers”. This article is an opportunity to share with DNA Repair scientists some research results of a dynamic field in Science studies: spatial scientometrics.     

The evolution of costly displays,cooperation and religion: credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural evolution

This paper lays out an evolutionary theory for the cognitive foundations and cultural emergence of the extravagant displays (e.g., ritual mutilation, animal sacrifice and martyrdom) that have so tantalized social scientists, as well as more mundane actions that influence cultural learning and historical processes. In Part I, I use the logic of natural selection to build a theory for how and why seemingly costly displays influence the cognitive processes associated with cultural learning — why do “actions speak louder than words?” The core idea is that cultural learners can both avoid being manipulated by their models (those they are inclined to learn from) and more accurately assess their belief commitment by attending to displays or actions by the model that would seem costly to the model if he held beliefs different from those he expresses verbally. Part II examines the implications for cultural evolution of this learning bias in a simple evolutionary model. The model reveals the conditions under which this evolved bias can create stable sets of interlocking beliefs and practices, including quite costly practices. Part III explores how cultural evolution, driven by competition among groups or institutions stabilized at alternative sets of these interlocking belief-practice combinations, has led to the association of costly acts, often in the form of rituals, with deeper commitments to group beneficial ideologies, higher levels of cooperation within groups, and greater success in competition with other groups or institutions. I close by discussing the broader implications of these ideas for understanding various aspects of religious phenomena.     

Social is Emotional

This is a biological approach to the philosophy of mind that feeds an investigation of the phenomena of “social” and “emotional”, both of which are widespread in nature. I scrutinize the non-dualistic Darwinian concept of the continuity of mind. For practical reasons, I address mind at different levels of organization: The systemic mind are the properties of which a common, coherent evolution works upon. Separated from this is “language-mind”: the crystallization of thought in words, which is a strictly human phenomenon. As the phenomenology of the body is a theory of philosophy that lie beyond language it can—to a certain extent—be extrapolated across a species boundary. In the process the phenomenology of the body comes to resemble biosemiotics and with this tool, I investigate a field study of social play behavior in canids. This leads to a possibility to study the non-human experience of emotion as “locally meaningful phenomena”.     

Genes,symptoms, and the “asymptomatic ill”: toward a broader understanding of genetic discrimination

Since the early 1990s, the term “genetic discrimination” has been used to designate adverse treatment on the grounds of genetic makeup. However, the full spectrum of possible disadvantage associated with genetic information has not been addressed by either the international scientific debate or statutory arrangements on genetic discrimination. Informed by legal contexts, they almost all focus on one specific group: the “asymptomatic ill.” On the basis of the sociological study, “Genetic Discrimination in Germany,” this article proposes to revise the terms of the debate and discusses some limitations of the concept. Drawing on the experiences reported by affected individuals, it advocates a more expansive social understanding which does not require that a person has to be healthy to be at risk of genetic discrimination.     

Animal morality: What is the debate about?

Empirical studies of the social lives of non-human primates, cetaceans, and other social animals have prompted scientists and philosophers to debate the question of whether morality and moral cognition exists in non-human animals. Some researchers have argued that morality does exist in several animal species, others that these species may possess various evolutionary building blocks or precursors to morality, but not quite the genuine article, while some have argued that nothing remotely resembling morality can be found in any non-human species. However, these different positions on animal morality generally appear to be motivated more by different conceptions of how the term “morality” is to be defined than by empirical disagreements about animal social behaviour and psychology. After delving deeper into the goals and methodologies of various of the protagonists, I argue that, despite appearances, there are actually two importantly distinct debates over animal morality going on, corresponding to two quite different ways of thinking about what it is to define “morality”, “moral cognition”, and associated notions. Several apparent skirmishes in the literature are thus cases of researchers simply talking past each other. I then focus on what I take to be the core debate over animal morality, which is concerned with understanding the nature and phylogenetic distribution of morality conceived as a psychological natural kind. I argue that this debate is in fact largely terminological and non-substantive. Finally, I reflect on how this core debate might best be re-framed.     

Historical and philosophical perspectives on the study of developmental bias

Throughout the recent history of research at the intersection of evolution and development, notions such as developmental constraint, evolutionary novelty, and evolvability have been prominent, but the term “developmental bias” has scarcely been used. And one may even doubt whether a unique and principled definition of bias is possible. I argue that the concept of developmental bias can still play a vital scientific role by means of setting an explanatory agenda that motivates investigation and guides the formulation of integrative explanatory frameworks. Less crucial is a definition that would classify patterns of phenotypic variation and unify variational patterns involving different traits and taxa as all being “bias.” Instead, what we should want is a concept that generates intellectual identity across various researchers, and that unites the diverse fields and approaches relevant to the study of developmental bias, from paleontology to behavioral biology. I point to some advantages of conducting research specifically under the label of “developmental bias,” compared with employing other, more common terms such as “evolvability.”     

The Evolution of Language: A Comparative Review

For many years the evolution of language has been seen as a disreputable topic, mired in fanciful “just so stories” about language origins. However, in the last decade a new synthesis of modern linguistics, cognitive neuroscience and neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory has begun to make important contributions to our understanding of the biology and evolution of language. I review some of this recent progress, focusing on the value of the comparative method, which uses data from animal species to draw inferences about language evolution. Discussing speech first, I show how data concerning a wide variety of species, from monkeys to birds, can increase our understanding of the anatomical and neural mechanisms underlying human spoken language, and how bird and whale song provide insights into the ultimate evolutionary function of language. I discuss the “descended larynx” of humans, a peculiar adaptation for speech that has received much attention in the past, which despite earlier claims is not uniquely human. Then I will turn to the neural mechanisms underlying spoken language, pointing out the difficulties animals apparently experience in perceiving hierarchical structure in sounds, and stressing the importance of vocal imitation in the evolution of a spoken language. Turning to ultimate function, I suggest that communication among kin (especially between parents and offspring) played a crucial but neglected role in driving language evolution. Finally, I briefly discuss phylogeny, discussing hypotheses that offer plausible routes to human language from a non-linguistic chimp-like ancestor. I conclude that comparative data from living animals will be key to developing a richer, more interdisciplinary understanding of our most distinctively human trait: language.     

Sex Cells: Gender and the Language of Bacterial Genetics

Between 1946 and 1960, a new phenomenon emerged in the field of bacteriology. “Bacterial sex,” as it was called, revolutionized the study of genetics, largely by making available a whole new class of cheap, fast-growing, and easily manipulated organisms. But what was “bacterial sex?” How could single-celled organisms have “sex” or even be sexually differentiated? The technical language used in the scientific press – the public and inalienable face of 20th century science – to describe this apparently neuter organism was explicit: the cells “copulated,” had “intimate contract,” “conjugal unions,” and engaged in “ménage ã trois” relationships. And yet, to describe bacteria as sexually reproducing organisms, the definition of sex itself had to change. Despite manifold contradictions and the availability of alternative language, the notion of sexually active (even promiscuous) single-celled organisms has persisted, even into contemporary textbooks on cell biology and genetics. In this paper I examine the ways in which bacteria were brought into the genetic fold, sexualized, and given gender; I also consider the issues underlying the durability of “bacterial sex.”     

Risky cultures to risky genes: The racialised discursive construction of south Asian genetic diabetes risk

Type 2 diabetes within UK South Asian populations has increasingly become the focus of health science discourse. Growing rates across the globe have been a public health concern for a number of decades. Diabetes discourse has focused on lifestyle and a generalized idea of “cultural” factors as contributory factors. These have become part of what I identify as a South Asian diabetes “risk-package.” This risk formulation is extended to an additional genetic discourse which generates new causal explanations for this heightened “risk.” South Asian groups are already the subject of discursive, racialized risk constructions, which positions them as active owners of “risky culture.” The mobilization of genetic arguments repositions them as additionally passive owners of “risky genes.” I argue that the use of racial categories in genetic diabetes science, despite the relative uncertainty and ambiguity of scientific knowledge claims, is problematic and requires critical re-situating.     

Present State and Future Perspectives of Restoration Ecology—Introduction

Although the aim of and the need for ecological restoration, and restoration ecology as its scientific base, are obvious, the field is still struggling with defining its basics. This situation, reflected by the debate about alternative terms to replace “restoration,” the ambiguous self‐image as a movement, art, application, or science, and the lack of a unifying conceptual framework, results in an uncertainty about the future development of the field. In a 10‐year project, an interdisciplinary Research Training Group in Jena followed the regeneration of one degraded terrestrial and aquatic ecosystem, respectively, and suggested a conceptual model for regeneration and restoration that was derived from the shared features of the two systems. As part of the scientific discussion of this new approach, an international workshop “Present State and Future Perspectives of Restoration Ecology” was organized in Jena in November 2004. The following collection of 12 opinion papers and 1 concluding chapter reflect the discussions at the workshop and contributes to the “self‐finding” process of restoration ecology.