Enhancing Beyond What Ought to be the Case ‐ A Conceptual Clarification

In order to do justice to the intuition that medical treatments as such do not form proper instances of bio‐enhancement, as the notion is employed in the ethical debate, we should construe bio‐enhancements as interventions, which do not aim at states that, other things being equal, ought to obtain. In the light of this clarification, we come to see that cases of moral enhancement are not covered by the notion of bio‐enhancement, properly construed.     

Faith-based perspectives on the use of chimeric organisms for medical research

Efforts to advance our understanding of neurodegenerative diseases involve the creation chimeric organisms from human neural stem cells and primate embryos—known as prenatal chimeras. The existence of potential mentally complex beings with human and non-human neural apparatus raises fundamental questions as to the ethical permissibility of chimeric research and the moral status of the creatures it creates. Even as bioethicists find fewer reasons to be troubled by most types of chimeric organisms, social attitudes towards the non-human world are often influenced by religious beliefs. In this paper scholars representing eight major religious traditions provide a brief commentary on a hypothetical case concerning the development and use of prenatal human–animal chimeric primates in medical research. These commentaries reflect the plurality and complexity within and between religious discourses of our relationships with other species. Views on the moral status and permissibility of research on neural human animal chimeras vary. The authors provide an introduction to those who seek a better understanding of how faith-based perspectives might enter into biomedical ethics and public discourse towards forms of biomedical research that involves chimeric organisms.     

Drugs,genes and screens: The ethics of preventing and treating spinal muscular atrophy

Spinal muscular atrophy (SMA) is the most common genetic disease that causes infant mortality. Its treatment and prevention represent the paradigmatic example of the ethical dilemmas of 21st-century medicine. New therapies (nusinersen and AVXS-101) hold the promise of being able to treat, but not cure, the condition. Alternatively, genomic analysis could identify carriers, and carriers could be offered in vitro fertilization and preimplantation genetic diagnosis. In the future, gene editing could prevent the condition at the embryonic stage. How should these different options be evaluated and compared within a health system? In this paper, we discuss the ethical considerations that bear on the question of how to prioritize the different treatments and preventive options for SMA, at a policy level. We argue that despite the tremendous value of what we call ‘ex-post’ approaches to treating SMA (such as using pharmacological agents or gene therapy), there is a moral imperative to pursue ‘ex-ante’ interventions (such as carrier screening in combination with prenatal testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or gene editing) to reduce the incidence of SMA. There are moral reasons relating to autonomy, beneficence and justice to prioritize ex-ante methods over ex-post methods.     

Normal Human Variation: Refocussing the Enhancement Debate

This article draws attention to several common mistakes in thinking about biomedical enhancement, mistakes that are made even by some supporters of enhancement. We illustrate these mistakes by examining objections that John Harris has recently raised against the use of pharmacological interventions to directly modulate moral decision‐making. We then apply these lessons to other influential figures in the debate about enhancement. One upshot of our argument is that many considerations presented as powerful objections to enhancement are really strong considerations in favour of biomedical enhancement, just in a different direction. Another upshot is that it is unfortunate that much of the current debate focuses on interventions that will radically transform normal human capacities. Such interventions are unlikely to be available in the near future, and may not even be feasible. But our argument shows that the enhancement project can still have a radical impact on human life even if biomedical enhancement operated entirely within the normal human range.     

Moral residue and health justice for the global south: Addressing past issues through current interventions and research

This paper introduces the concept of moral residue to global health, and shows how its presence undermines crucial interventions and research, especially in the global south. Lingering feelings of anxiety, anger, blame or frustration often exist among local populations, where previous interventions or research have left traces of harm and/or exploitation. The existence of such feelings reflects the presence of moral residue, recognizing the moral experiences of epistemic injustices, which in turn undermines critical interventions and research through outright rejection or passive non‐compliance among affected populations. While such situations have been variously interpreted and relevant strategies developed to address the issues, little to no consideration is made on the implications of moral residue experiences in global health contexts and how to address them. This paper demonstrates the presence of moral residue in global health and proffers an African ethical approach, a harmony framework, for addressing moral residue issues, as part of a holistic approach towards tackling population health crises without compromising health gains for affected populations in the global south.     

The incompatibility of the United Nations' goals and conventionalist ethical relativism

The Universal Draft Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights seeks to provide moral direction to nations and their citizens on a series of bioethical concerns. In articulating principles, it ranks respect for human rights, human dignity and fundamental freedoms ahead of respect for cultural diversity and pluralism. This ranking is controversial because it entails the rejection of the popular theory, conventionalist ethical relativism. If consistently defended, this theory also undercuts other United Nations activities that assume member states and people around the world can reach trans-cultural judgments having moral authority about health, pollution, aggression, rights, slavery, and so on. To illustrate problems with conventionalist ethical relativism and the importance of rejecting it for reasons of health, human rights, human dignity and fundamental freedoms, the widespread practice of female genital circumcision or cutting is discussed. These surgeries are virtually a test case for conventionalist ethical relativism since they are widely supported within these cultures as religious and health practices and widely condemned outside them, including by the United Nations.     

Insight and the no‐self in deep brain stimulation

Ethical analyses of the effects of neural interventions commonly focus on changes to personality and behavior, interpreting these changes in terms of authenticity and identity. These phenomena have led to debate among ethicists about the meaning of these terms for ethical analysis of such interventions. While these theoretical approaches have different criteria for ethical significance, they agree that patients’ reports are concerning because a sense of self is valuable. In this paper, I question this assumption. I propose that the Buddhist theory of no‐self offers a novel approach to making ethical sense of patients’ claims following deep brain stimulation. This alternative approach is based on the value of insight into patterns of cause and effect among mental states and actions.     

Ethical issues raised by uterus transplantation: A report from the People's Republic of China

The recent advances in assisted reproductive technology, such as hormonal stimulation, IVF, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), have made it possible to circumvent many causes of male and female factor infertility. However, uterine infertility is still considered an ‘‘unconditionally infertile’’ condition. Owing to the continued advances in organ transplantation, microvascular anastomosis techniques, and immunosuppressive medicine, the transplantation of organs is no longer restricted to the ones necessary for continued life. Quality-of-life enhancing types of transplantation, such as uterine transplantation, in recent years, have also entered the clinical arena. This undoubtedly brings new hope to such women, but also creates ethical challenges. Selection of the donor, the impact on the recipient and offspring, as well as challenges to moral and social norms are issues that cannot be ignored. In the present review, the ethical issues of transplantation of the uterus will be discussed in light of recent progress in the procedure.     

NO ETHICAL BYPASS OF MORAL STATUS IN STEM CELL RESEARCH

Recent advances in reprogramming technology do not bypass the ethical challenge of embryo sacrifice. Induced pluripotent stem cell (iPS) research has been and almost certainly will continue to be conducted within the context of embryo sacrifice. If human embryos have moral status as human beings, then participation in iPS research renders one morally complicit in their destruction; if human embryos have moral status as mere precursors of human beings, then advocacy of iPS research policy that is inhibited by embryo sacrifice concerns renders one morally complicit in avoidable harms to persons. Steps may be taken to address these complicity concerns, but in the final analysis there is no alternative to achieving clarity with respect to the moral status of the human embryo.     

The Enhancement of Children versus Circumcision: A Case of Double Moral Standards?

The application of enhancement technologies to children and non‐medical infant male circumcision are both topics that enjoy the continuous attention of bioethical research but are usually discussed in isolation from each other. Yet one can show that three major arguments used by opponents of the enhancement of children are also applicable to circumcision. These arguments are based on the insecurity of these procedures, the child's right to an open future, and human nature as a foundation of human dignity. People who reject the enhancement of children because of these arguments but accept circumcision hold mutually inconsistent moral convictions or apply double moral standards to these cases. This is particularly important when legislative systems treat the enhancement of children and circumcision in a considerably different manner, which is true for many contemporary legislative systems. At least three strategies can be adopted in order to avoid such inconsistencies, two of which, however, fail for various reasons. According to a third, more promising strategy, circumcision should be subsumed under human enhancement and treated like other enhancement technologies. This strategy justifies restrictions on, but not the prohibition of circumcision. Furthermore, proponents of circumcision should be prepared for future technologies that provide similar benefits as circumcision but are not as contentious as this intervention, so that, in the future, circumcision could become more and more unacceptable.     

The biological roots of morality

The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to thecapacity for ethics (e.i., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moralnorms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. My theses are: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution.Humans exhibits ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup determines the presence of the three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgements; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequece of man's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection.Since Darwin's time there have been evolutionists proposing that the norms of morality are derived from biological evolution. Sociobiologists represent the most recent and most subtle version of that proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution. I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the naturalistic fallacy. The isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and those sanctioned by moral norms exist only with respect to the consequences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely disparate.This article is based on a paper presented at the International Symposium onBiological Models of Human Action, Palma de Mallorca, Spain, 16–18 December 1985.     

Moral enhancement and freedom

This paper identifies human enhancement as one of the most significant areas of bioethical interest in the last twenty years. It discusses in more detail one area, namely moral enhancement, which is generating significant contemporary interest. The author argues that so far from being susceptible to new forms of high tech manipulation, either genetic, chemical, surgical or neurological, the only reliable methods of moral enhancement, either now or for the foreseeable future, are either those that have been in human and animal use for millennia, namely socialization, education and parental supervision or those high tech methods that are general in their application. By that is meant those forms of cognitive enhancement that operate across a wide range of cognitive abilities and do not target specifically 'ethical' capacities. The paper analyses the work of some of the leading contemporary advocates of moral enhancement and finds that in so far as they identify moral qualities or moral emotions for enhancement they have little prospect of success.     

Should human germ line editing be allowed? Some suggestions on the basis of the existing regulatory framework

The application of genetic editing techniques for the prevention or cure of disease is a highly promising tool for the future of humanity. However, its implementation contains a number of ethical and legal challenges that should not be underestimated. On this basis, some sectors have already asked for a veto on any intervention that modifies the human germ line, while supporting somatic line editing. In this paper, I will support that this suggestion makes no sense at all, because the somatic/germ line disjunctive has no moral relevance and, therefore, it should not play any role in legal terms. I will provide a number of reasons to hold this assumption, such as the non‐sacred nature of the germ line, the difference between germ line and human genome modification, or the moral importance of the presence of a will to create modified descendants. While doing so, I will provide some examples of the different approaches to germ line editing adopted by different regulations so as to demonstrate that, contrary to what is sometimes stated, a general ban on this practice is not the rule, but the exception. Additionally, I will show how alternative options which currently exist, such as a selective ban based on criteria different to the germ line/somatic line distinction, match better with the need to conciliate research needs and legitimate ethical concerns. Finally, I will introduce some further suggestions to this same purpose.     

Ethical considerations in the use of DNA for the diagnosis of diseases

Scientific advances in genetics have recently provided new information and enabled new interventions that are challenging existing ethical conventions. ISO 15189:20031 obliges the laboratory to consider its ethical responsibilities and the AACB (through membership of the IFCC) has taken a leading role in the discussion of evolving new ethical frameworks.This paper discusses the ethical implication of many of these recent advances in genetics and highlights some of the still unresolved ethical issues.     

The ethics of managing affective and emotional states to improve informed consent: autonomy, comprehension, and voluntariness

Over the past several decades the 'affective revolution' in cognitive psychology has emphasized the critical role affect and emotion play in human decision-making. Drawing on this affective literature, various commentators have recently proposed strategies for managing therapeutic expectation that use contextual, symbolic, or emotive interventions in the consent process to convey information or enhance comprehension. In this paper, we examine whether affective consent interventions that target affect and emotion can be reconciled with widely accepted standards for autonomous action. More specifically, the ethics of affective consent interventions is assessed in terms of key elements of autonomy, comprehension and voluntariness. While there may appear to be a moral obligation to manage the affective environment to ensure valid informed consent, in circumstances where volunteers may be prone to problematic therapeutic expectancy, this moral obligation needs to be weighed against the potential risks of human instrumentalization. At this point in time we do not have enough information to be able to justify clearly the programmatic manipulation of human subjects' affective states. The lack of knowledge about affective interventions requires corresponding caution in its ethical justification.     

Ethical questions concerning research on human embryos, embryonic stem cells and chimeras

Research using human embryos and embryonic stem cells is viewed as important for various reasons. Apart from questions concerning legal regulations, numerous ethical objections are raised pertaining to the use of surplus embryos from reproductive medicine as well as the creation of embryos and stem cells through cloning. In the hopes of avoiding ethical problems, alternatives have been proposed including the extraction of egg cells from "dead" embryos derived from in vitro fertilization procedures, the extraction of pluripotent stem cells from blastocysts, technologies such as "altered nuclear transfer" (ANT) and "oocyte-assisted reprogramming" (ANT-OAR) as well as parthenogenesis. Initial ethical assessments show that certain questions pertaining to such strategies have remained unanswered. Furthermore, with the help of new or more differentiated biotechnological procedures, it is possible to create chimeras and hybrids in which human and non-human cells are combined. Human-animal chimeras, in which gametes or embryonic tissue have been mixed with embryonic or adult stem cells, demonstrate a different "quality" and "degree of penetration" from those produced in previous experiments. Not only does this have consequences regarding questions of patentability, this situation also raises fundamental questions concerning the human being's self image, the concept of person, identity and species and the moral rights and duties that are connected with such concepts. There is a need for legal regulation, on the national as well as the international level.     

Ethical aspects of cryobiology: responsible applications in biomedicine and in clinical practice

This paper focuses on ethical issues in applications of cryobiology to humans, more particularly in the field of human reproduction and cryosurgery. The paper also provides essential ingredients for the interface of bioethics and cryobiology. For instance, since the 1970s bioethicists have developed four principles to guide the moral evaluation of the 'new medicine.' These are: respect for persons, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. In the field of human reproduction major progress was made by the cryopreservation of reproductive material. Still, ethical issues arise whenever partnerships cease to exist (death) or deteriorate (divorce), and decisions have to be made about the disposition of frozen gametes and embryos. Policy-making becomes, then, a prime concern. Examples of regulation in the United States of America, in the United Kingdom, and across Europe are being offered. Cryosurgery remains a field where cryobiologists struggle in their quest for an optimal technique, thus illustrating the need for assessment of safety, efficacy, and benefit to patients. Increasingly, cryobiologists have been joining in the ethical reflection on the use of cryo-technologies. They may further do so by perfecting their ability to identify ethical aspects, by analysing the norms and values at stake, by learning the skill of making the appropriate choices, and by showing their willingness to justify the choices made be it in the inner circle of pairs or publicly.     

Mapping out structural features in clinical care calling for ethical sensitivity: a theoretical approach to promote ethical competence in healthcare personnel and clinical ethical support services (CESS)

Clinical ethical support services (CESS) represent a multifaceted field of aims, consultancy models, and methodologies. Nevertheless, the overall aim of CESS can be summed up as contributing to healthcare of high ethical standards by improving ethically competent decision-making in clinical healthcare. In order to support clinical care adequately, CESS must pay systematic attention to all real-life ethical issues, including those which do not fall within the 'favourite' ethical issues of the day. In this paper we attempt to capture a comprehensive overview of categories of ethical tensions in clinical care. We present an analytical exposition of ethical structural features in judgement-based clinical care predicated on the assumption of the moral equality of human beings and the assessment of where healthcare contexts pose a challenge to achieving moral equality. The account and the emerging overview is worked out so that it can be easily contextualized with regards to national healthcare systems and specific branches of healthcare, as well as local healthcare institutions. By considering how the account and the overview can be applied to i) improve the ethical competence of healthcare personnel and consultants by broadening their sensitivity to ethical tensions, ii) identify neglected areas for ethical research, and iii) clarify the ethical responsibility of healthcare institutions' leadership, as well as specifying required institutionalized administration, we conclude that the proposed account should be considered useful for CESS.     

Procreative reasons-relevance: on the moral significance of why we have children

Advances in reproductive technologies – in particular in genetic screening and selection – have occasioned renewed interest in the moral justifiability of the reasons that motivate the decision to have a child. The capacity to select for desired blood and tissue compatibilities has led to the much discussed 'saviour sibling' cases in which parents seek to 'have one child to save another'. Heightened interest in procreative reasons is to be welcomed, since it prompts a more general philosophical interrogation of the grounds for moral appraisal of reasons-to-parent, and of the extent to which such reasons are relevant to the moral assessment of procreation itself. I start by rejecting the idea that we can use a distinction between 'other-regarding' and 'future-child-regarding' reasons as a basis on which to distinguish good from bad procreative reasons. I then offer and evaluate three potential grounds for elucidating and establishing a relationship between procreative motivation and the rightness/wrongness of procreative conduct: the predictiveness, the verdictiveness, and the expressiveness of procreative reasons.     

Orphaned at conception: the uncanny offspring of embryos

A number of advances in assisted reproduction have been greeted by the accusation that they would produce children 'without parents'. In this paper I will argue that while to date these accusations have been false, there is a limited but important sense in which they would be true of children born of a reproductive technology that is now on the horizon. If our genetic parents are those individuals from whom we have inherited 50% of our genes, then, unlike in any other reproductive scenario, children who were conceived from gametes derived from stem cell lines derived from discarded IVF embryos would have no genetic parents! This paper defends this claim and investigates its ethical implications. I argue that there are reasons to think that the creation of such embryos might be morally superior to the existing alternatives in an important set of circumstances.