Why not lie? Costs enforce honesty in an experimental signalling game

Communication depends on reliability. Yet, the existence of stable honest signalling presents an evolutionary puzzle. Why should animals signal honestly in the face of a conflict of interest? While students of animal signalling have offered several theoretical answers to this puzzle, the most widely studied model, commonly called the ‘handicap principle’, postulates that the costs of signals stabilize honesty. This model is the motivating force behind an enormous research enterprise that explores signal costs—whether they are physiological, immunological, neural, developmental or caloric. While there can be no question that many signals are costly, we lack definitive experimental evidence demonstrating that costs stabilize honesty. This study presents a laboratory signalling game using blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) that provides, to our knowledge, the first experimental evidence showing honesty persists when costs are high and disappears when costs are low.     

Structure and functional relevance of the Slit2 homodimerization domain

Slit proteins are secreted ligands that interact with the Roundabout (Robo) receptors to provide important guidance cues in neuronal and vascular development. Slit–Robo signalling is mediated by an interaction between the second Slit domain and the first Robo domain, as well as being dependent on heparan sulphate. In an effort to understand the role of the other Slit domains in signalling, we determined the crystal structure of the fourth Slit2 domain (D4) and examined the effects of various Slit2 constructs on chick retinal ganglion cell axons. Slit2 D4 forms a homodimer using the conserved residues on its concave face, and can also bind to heparan sulphate. We observed that Slit2 D4 frequently results in growth cones with collapsed lamellipodia and that this effect can be inhibited by exogenously added heparan sulphate. Our results show that Slit2 D4–heparan sulphate binding contributes to a Slit–Robo signalling mechanism more intricate than previously thought.     

Oxidative damage to DNA related to survivorship and carotenoid-based sexual ornamentation in the common yellowthroat

Carotenoid-based sexual ornaments are hypothesized to be reliable signals of male quality, based on an allocation trade-off between the use of carotenoids as pigments and their use in antioxidant defence against reactive oxygen species. Carotenoids appear to be poor antioxidants in vivo, however, and it is not clear whether variation in ornament expression is correlated with measures of oxidative stress (OXS) under natural conditions. We used single-cell gel electrophoresis to assay oxidative damage to erythrocyte DNA in the common yellowthroat (Geothlypis trichas), a sexually dichromatic warbler in which sexual selection favours components of the males' yellow 'bib'. We found that the level of DNA damage sustained by males predicted their overwinter survivorship and was reflected in the quality of their plumage. Males with brighter yellow bibs showed lower levels of DNA damage, both during the year the plumage was sampled (such that yellow brightness signalled current OXS) and during the previous year (such that yellow brightness signalled past OXS). We suggest that carotenoid-based ornaments can convey information about OXS to prospective mates and that further work exploring the proximate mechanism(s) linking OXS to coloration is warranted.     

Manipulating the appearance of a badge of status causes changes in true badge expression

Signals of dominance and fighting ability (i.e. status signals) are found in a wide range of taxa and are used to settle disputes between competitive rivals. Most previous research has considered status-signal phenotype as an attribute of the individual; however, it is more likely that signal expression is an emergent property that also incorporates aspects of the social environment. Furthermore, because an individual''s signal phenotype is likely to influence its social interactions, the relationships between status signals, social environment and individual quality are probably much more complex than previously appreciated. Here, we explore the dynamic relationship between social interactions and signal expression in a previously undescribed status signal, the frontal shield of the pukeko (Porphyrio porphyrio melanotus: Aves). We demonstrate that frontal shield size is a strong predictor of dominance status within social groups, even after controlling for potentially confounding variables. Then, we evaluate the relationship between social interactions and signal expression by testing whether manipulating apparent shield size influences (i) dominance interactions and (ii) future signal expression. By showing that decreasing apparent shield size causes both an increase in the amount of aggression received and a decrease in an individual''s true shield size, we provide the first evidence of dynamic feedback between signal expression and social interactions. Our study provides important insight into the role of receiver-dependent (i.e. social) costs in maintaining signal honesty and demonstrates a unique approach to studying status signalling applicable to future studies on dynamic morphological signals.     

Signal verification can promote reliable signalling

The central question in communication theory is whether communication is reliable, and if so, which mechanisms select for reliability. The primary approach in the past has been to attribute reliability to strategic costs associated with signalling as predicted by the handicap principle. Yet, reliability can arise through other mechanisms, such as signal verification; but the theoretical understanding of such mechanisms has received relatively little attention. Here, we model whether verification can lead to reliability in repeated interactions that typically characterize mutualisms. Specifically, we model whether fruit consumers that discriminate among poor- and good-quality fruits within a population can select for reliable fruit signals. In our model, plants either signal or they do not; costs associated with signalling are fixed and independent of plant quality. We find parameter combinations where discriminating fruit consumers can select for signal reliability by abandoning unprofitable plants more quickly. This self-serving behaviour imposes costs upon plants as a by-product, rendering it unprofitable for unrewarding plants to signal. Thus, strategic costs to signalling are not a prerequisite for reliable communication. We expect verification to more generally explain signal reliability in repeated consumer–resource interactions that typify mutualisms but also in antagonistic interactions such as mimicry and aposematism.     

The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty

Animals often convey useful information, despite a conflict of interest between the signaller and receiver. There are two major explanations for such ‘honest’ signalling, particularly when the size or intensity of signals reliably indicates the underlying quality of the signaller. Costly signalling theory (including the handicap principle) predicts that dishonest signals are too costly to fake, whereas the index hypothesis predicts that dishonest signals cannot be faked. Recent evidence of a highly conserved causal link between individual quality and signal growth appears to bolster the index hypothesis. However, it is not clear that this also diminishes costly signalling theory, as is often suggested. Here, by incorporating a mechanism of signal growth into costly signalling theory, we show that index signals can actually be favoured owing to the cost of dishonesty. We conclude that costly signalling theory provides the ultimate, adaptive rationale for honest signalling, whereas the index hypothesis describes one proximate (and potentially very general) mechanism for achieving honesty.     

Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication

Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.     

Evidence for a perception of prosodic cues in bat communication: contact call classification by <Emphasis Type="Italic">Megaderma lyra</Emphasis>

The perception of prosodic cues in human speech may be rooted in mechanisms common to mammals. The present study explores to what extent bats use rhythm and frequency, typically carrying prosodic information in human speech, for the classification of communication call series. Using a two-alternative, forced choice procedure, we trained Megaderma lyra to discriminate between synthetic contact call series differing in frequency, rhythm on level of calls and rhythm on level of call series, and measured the classification performance for stimuli differing in only one, or two, of the above parameters. A comparison with predictions from models based on one, combinations of two, or all, parameters revealed that the bats based their decision predominantly on frequency and in addition on rhythm on the level of call series, whereas rhythm on level of calls was not taken into account in this paradigm. Moreover, frequency and rhythm on the level of call series were evaluated independently. Our results show that parameters corresponding to prosodic cues in human languages are perceived and evaluated by bats. Thus, these necessary prerequisites for a communication via prosodic structures in mammals have evolved far before human speech.     

Sexual selection and condition‐dependence

The handicap theory of sexual selection suggests that females prefer mates who display extravagant ornaments that advertise their quality or condition. It is often assumed that as such ornamental traits undergo sexually‐selected exaggeration, they must inevitably become more sensitive to condition, and thus more informative. Here, we show that this is not necessarily the case. Depending on the precise form of the relationship between trait size and cost, expression may become more or less condition‐dependent as the trait undergoes exaggeration, or may remain unchanged. This leads us to question how much of the information content of sexual signals can be attributed to sexual selection, and how much to pre‐existing, naturally‐selected condition‐dependence.     

Resolving current disagreements and ambiguities in the terminology of animal communication

Communication is central to most interactions between organisms. There is currently considerable controversy about the evolution, function and even about the most basic definition of communication. The controversy is linked to definitional ambiguities and disagreements. Here we discuss how some recent disagreements can be resolved and offer a clear set of definitions. Central to our approach is a definition of communication as being a trade between one organism (the informer) and another (the perceiver). The informer exerts influence on the perceiver through the communication process, and the perceiver experiences a change in its informational state (that is, gains information) as a consequence of detecting the communication. We define both influence and information explicitly and delineate between signalling, deceptive communication, and situations where perceivers respond to cues rather than signals. We demonstrate how our definitions allow resolution of conflicts arising in recent publications on the definitions on communication and related terms.     

ARE WARNING COLORS HANDICAPS?

The handicap theory, in which the cost of waste guarantees honest advertising, is being used increasingly in solutions to the problems of biological signal evolution. However, it is usually applied to systems which are insufficiently understood to allow testing against alternative theories. In particular, the ability of the handicap theory to explain the design of signals has never been properly tested. We test its ability to explain signal design features in an unusually well studied area of biological signalling: warning coloration and mimicry. Since a full handicap model proves immediately unrealistic, we modify the model to incorporate realistic assumptions about predator learning. Using this model we explicitly compare the handicap theory with a purely “conventional” signalling model and with a null model. Predictions relating to three key design features (conspicuousness, pattern similarity, and Batesian mimicry) are compared, and tested against available data. Although many predictions remain to be tested adequately, we conclude that: (i) conspicuousness is most plausibly explained by the conventional signalling theory that ascribes the function of conspicuous coloration to signal efficacy rather than waste; (ii) pattern similarity, within and between species, is unlikely to be the result of the need to produce similar degrees of conspicuousness, as predicted by the handicap theory, but is plausibly explained as the result of pattern generalization amongst discriminating predators, as predicted by the conventional signalling theory; and (iii) Batesian mimicry is predicted by the conventional signalling theory, but not the handicap theory. Therefore the handicap theory fails to provide an adequate explanation of the main design features of at least one major signalling system.     

Primate Communication: By Nature Honest, or by Experience Wise?

We review evolutionary views on honesty and deception and their application to studies of nonhuman primate communication. There is evidence that some primate signals are likely to be accurate on the basis of costliness. They appear most often in contexts that include overtly competitive interactions in which unrelated individuals have limited access to information about one another. However, both game theoretic models and most empirical work suggest that costly signals are not often likely to be the basis for honest communication in nonhuman primates. Inexpensive signaling can exist in contexts wherein communication occurs among related animals, something common among many nonhuman primate societies. Another condition in which inexpensive signaling is possible and that is also typical of nonhuman primates, is when sender and receiver both benefit from coordinated interactions. Additionally, when individuals interact repeatedly and can use past interactions to assess the honesty of signals and to modify future response to signals, low-cost signals can evolve. Nonhuman primates appear to deal with the problem of deception via skeptical responding, which can be largely accounted for by learning rules and the fact that they live in stable social groups and can recognize one another and recall past interactions.