Darwin and the linguists: the coevolution of mind and language, part 2. The language-thought relationship

This paper examines Charles Darwin's idea that language-use and humanity's unique cognitive abilities reinforced each other's evolutionary emergence-an idea Darwin sketched in his early notebooks, set forth in his Descent of man (1871), and qualified in Descent's second (1874) edition. Darwin understood this coevolution process in essentially Lockean terms, based on John Locke's hints about the way language shapes thinking itself. Ironically, the linguist Friedrich Max Müller attacked Darwin's human descent theory by invoking a similar thesis, the German romantic notion of an identity between language and thought. Although Darwin avoided outright contradiction, when he came to defend himself against Müller's attacks, he undercut some of his own argumentation in favor of the coevolution idea. That is, he found it difficult to counter Müller's argument while also making a case for coevolution. Darwin's efforts in this area were further complicated by British and American writers who held a naturalistic view of speech origins yet still taught that language had been invented by fully evolved homo sapiens, thus denying coevolution.     

Humboldt,Darwin, and population

Conclusions I have attempted to clarify some of the pathways in the development of Darwin's thinking. The foregoing examples of influence by no means include all that can be found by comparing Darwin's writings with Humboldt's. However, the above examples seem adequate to show the nature and extent of this influence. It now seems clear that Humboldt not only, as had been previously known, inspired Darwin to make a voyage of exploration, but also provided him with his basic orientation concerning how and what to observe and how to write about it. An important part of what Darwin assimilated from Humboldt was an appreciation of population analysis as a tool for assessing the state of societies and of the benefits and hardships which these societies can expect to receive from the living world around them.Darwin exhibited in his Journal of Researches a casual interest in the economic and political conditions of the countries he visited, but these considerations were much less important to him than to Humboldt. Instead, Darwin, with the assistance of Lyell's Principles of Geology, shifted from Humboldt's largely economic framework to a biological one built around the species question. This shift led Darwin away from a consideration of how the population biology of animals was related to man's economy to focus instead upon how population biology fitted into the economy of nature.Humboldt's Personal Narrative served very well as a model for Darwin's Journal of Researches, thereby helping Darwin gain scientific eminence. The Journal of Researches, like virtually all of Humboldt's writings, was a contribution to scientific orthodoxy. But Darwin had, along the way, acquired an urge to do more than just add his building blocks to the orthodox scientific edifice. He decided to rearrange those blocks of knowledge into a different structure, and for that task neither Humboldt's Personal Narrative nor any other of his works could serve as a model. Humboldt had lacked the confidence which Darwin needed that biogeography and the origin of species could be understood. Humboldt had not explored very far the possible connections between biology and geology. Nor had he provided a general synthetic account of population biology. Had he done so, he might have been more explicit about the extent of his endorsement of Malthus. But even if he had, Humboldt's strong orientation toward cooperation would probably have inhibited his recognition of the importance of competition in nature.Lyell, who had also benefited from reading Humboldt, gave Darwin insights that were lacking in Humboldt's Personal Narrative. Lyell admirably demonstrated how stratigraphy, paleontology, biogeography, and population biology could be interrelated, and his reasons for doing so were essentially the same as Darwin's. Lyell's understanding of biogeography and ecology came from the writings of Augustin-Pyramus de Candolle as much as from Humboldt's, and from the former Lyell derived an appreciation for the importance of competition and also a confidence that the mysteries of biogeography could be explained.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, Lyell's discussion of all these subjects and also of evolution in his Principles of Geology is a good synthetic argument that was the ideal model for Darwin's greatest book.Darwin, having become convinced that species change through time, was able to synthesize in his mind the contributions which he had derived from the writings of Humboldt and Lyell as they applied to the species question. When Darwin wrote his Journal of Researches there were two large gaps in his thinking about evolution that bothered him—the mechanism of evolution and the causes of extinction. It was only after reading Malthus in 1838 that he realized, as Lyell had more or less pointed out, how important was competition in nature. He now had the general outlines for his theory, and in the 1845 abridged edition of his Journal, now retitled The Voyage of the Beagle, he inserted a fuller discussion of competition in nature which showed his awareness of its importance as an ecological factor.¹¹⁸ An abridged version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the History of Science Society in Washington, D.C., on 29 December 1969.     

Haeckel,un darwinien allemand ?

German biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) is often considered the most renowned Darwinian in his country since, as early as 1862, he declared that he accepted the conclusions Darwin had reached three years before in On the Origin of Species, and afterwards, he continuously proclaimed himself a supporter of the English naturalist and championed the evolutionary theory. Nevertheless, if we examine carefully his books, in particular his General Morphology (1866), we can see that he carries on a tradition very far from Darwin's thoughts. In spite of his acceptance of the idea of natural selection, that he establishes as an argument for materialism, he adopts, indeed, a conception of evolution that is, in some respects, rather close to Lamarck's views. He is, thus, a good example of the ambiguities of the reception of Darwinism in Germany in the second part of the 19th century. To cite this article: S. Schmitt, C. R. Biologies 332 (2009).     

Charles Darwin's debt to malthus and Edward Blyth

Conclusion It is not justifiable to accuse Darwin of conscious or unconscious plagiarism. This charge is contrary to the historical evidence and to the extensive information that we have about his character. When Darwin listed the writers on the origin of species by natural selection before himself, he did not mention Blyth, and this omission did not disturb the cordial relations between Darwin and Blyth. Blyth continued to supply Darwin with information which Darwin used in his later publications with due acknowledgment to Blyth. For example, in The Descent of Man, Darwin cited Blyth: Mr. Blyth, as he informs me, saw Indian crows feeding two or three of their companions which were blind.⁶³ Blyth felt no resentment. If he did, he would have so informed Darwin. Blyth did not regard himself as in any sense a predecessor of Darwin and he certainly did not resent Darwin as a plagiarizer of himself. Moreover, Darwin went to a great deal of trouble to find his own predecessors and to give them proper credit.⁶⁴ After Darwin had completed his work on natural selection, he wrote a letter to the Reverend Baden Powell in which he clearly showed recognition of the contribution of others to his own work:No educated person, not even the most ignorant, could suppose I mean to arrogate to myself the origination of the doctrine that species had not been independently created. The only novelty in my work is the attempt to explain how species became modified, and to a certain extent how the theory of descent explains certain large classes of facts; and in these respects I received no assistance from my predecessors.⁶⁵ *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402011 00002     

Evolved ethics re-examined: The theory of Robert J. Richards

Conclusion Richards's theory, then, fails on three counts. By illegitimately importing a premise from outside of the theory of evolution in order to construct a valid argument, Richards has failed to achieve his objective of deriving a moral theory exclusively from biological facts. By sliding from a causal use of ought to a moral one, Richards commits the fallacy of ambiguity. And by insisting that action from the motive of altruism is moral while claiming that an ethical theory which justifies Hitler's camps must be judged false, Richards has falsified his own ethical theory.     

Really taking Darwin seriously: An alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian metaethics

Michael Ruse has proposed in his recent book Taking Darwin Seriously and elsewhere a new Darwinian ethics distinct from traditional evolutionary ethics, one that avoids the latter's inadequate accounts of the nature of morality and its failed attempts to provide a naturalistic justification of morality. Ruse argues for a sociobiologically based account of moral sentiments, and an evolutionary based casual explanation of their function, rejecting the possibility of ultimate ethical justification. We find that Ruse's proposal distorts, overextends and weakens both Darwinism and naturalism. So we propose an alternative Darwinian metaethics that both remedies the problems in Ruse's proposal and shows how a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness avoids the naturalistic fallacy and can provide genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Thus, we propose to really take Darwin seriously.The authors are equally responsible for the writing of this paper.     

Evolutionary ethics,Darwinian ethics and ethical naturalism

The relevance of evolutionary theory to ethics goes back to Darwin but until recently discussion employed evolutionary theory to justify ethical, social and political positions. Recently, evolutionary theory has been used to explain the existence of moral systems and moral propensities and, thereby, to provide a naturalistic basis for ethics. I argue that this approach has advanced our understanding of the basis of moral systems and moral propensities but does not as yet adequately incorporate the role of cognition in its account. Cognition has the effect of decoupling to some extent — though, of course, far from fully — human moral systems from their evolutionary origins. In an adequate account, evolutionary theory will play a crucial role but so also will our evolved cognitive abilities.     

Ruse's Darwinian meta-ethics: A critique

Michael Ruse, in Taking Darwin Seriously seeks to establish that taking Darwin seriously requires us to treat morality as subjective and naturalistic. I argue that, if morality is not objective, then we have no good reason for being moral if we can avoid detection and punishment. As a consequence, we will only continue to behave morally as long as we remain ignorant of Ruse's theory, that is, as long as the cat is not let out of the bag. Ruse offers a number of arguments to show that his theory can overcome such problems. I argue that they all fail. Ruse also argues that he can offer a naturalistic account of ethics which steps around the naturalistic fallacy and avoids the confusion of reasons with causes. His principal argument for this view is an analogy between spiritualism and morality. I argue that this analogy fails.     

Darwin's principles of divergence and natural selection: Why Fodor was almost right

Darwin maintained that the principles of natural selection and divergence were the “keystones” of his theory. He introduced the principle of divergence to explain a fundamental feature of living nature: that organisms cluster into hierarchical groups, so as to be classifiable in the Linnaean taxonomic categories of variety, species, genus, and so on. Darwin’s formulation of the principle of divergence, however, induces many perplexities. In his Autobiography, he claimed that he had neglected the problem of divergence in his Essay of 1844 and only solved it in a flash during a carriage ride in the 1850s; yet he does seem to have stated the problem in the Essay and provided the solution. This initial conundrum sets three questions I wish to pursue in this essay: (1) What is the relationship of the principle of divergence to that of natural selection? Is it independent of selection, derivative of selection, or a type of selection, perhaps comparable to sexual selection? (2) What is the advantage of divergence that the principle implies—that is, why is increased divergence beneficial in the struggle for life? And (3) What led Darwin to believe he had discovered the principle only in the 1850s? The resolution of these questions has implications for Darwin’s other principle, natural selection, and permits us to readjust the common judgment made about Jerry Fodor’s screed against that latter principle.     

Michael Ruse's Design for Living

The eminent historian and philosopher ofbiology, Michael Ruse, has writtenseveral books that explore the relationship ofevolutionary theory to its larger scientificand cultural setting. Among the questions hehas investigated are: Is evolution progressive? What is its epistemologicalstatus? Most recently, in Darwin and Design:Does Evolution have a Purpose?,Ruse has provided a history of the concept ofteleology in biological thinking, especially inevolutionary theorizing. In his book, he moves quickly from Plato and Aristotle to Kantand such British thinkers as Paley andWhewell. His main focus, though, is on Darwin'stheory and its subsequent fate. Ruserests his history on some shaky historical andphilosophic assumptions, particularly theunexamined notion that evolutionary theory isan abstract entity that isunproblematically realized in differenthistorical periods. He also assumes that Darwinconceived nature as if it were a Manchesterspinning loom – a clanking, dispassionatemachine. A more subtle analysis, which Ruseeschews, might discover that Darwin'sconception of nature owed a strong debt toGerman Romanticism and that he contrivedto infuse nature with moral and aestheticvalues, not to suck them from nature. Ruseproves he is a thinker to contend with, and this essayis quite contentious.     

Darwin's explanation of races by means of sexual selection

In Darwin's Sacred Cause, Adrian Desmond and James Moore contend that "Darwin would put his utmost into sexual selection because the subject intrigued him, no doubt, but also for a deeper reason: the theory vindicated his lifelong commitment to human brotherhood" (2009: p. 360). Without questioning Desmond and Moore's evidence, I will raise some puzzles for their view. I will show that attention to the structure of Darwin's arguments in the Descent of Man shows that they are far from straightforward. As Desmond and Moore note, Darwin seems to have intended sexual selection in non-human animals to serve as evidence for sexual selection in humans. However, Darwin's account of sexual selection in humans was different from the canonical cases that Darwin described at great length. If explaining the origin of human races was the main reason for introducing sexual selection, and if sexual selection was a key piece of Darwin's anti-slavery arguments, then it is puzzling why Darwin would have spent so much time discussing cases that did not really support his argument for the origin of human races, and it is also puzzling that his argument for the origin of human races would be so (atypically) poor.     

Genetic enhancement--a threat to human rights?

Genetic enhancement is the modification of the human genome for the purpose of improving capacities or 'adding in' desired characteristics. Although this technology is still largely futuristic, debate over the moral issues it raises has been significant. George Annas has recently leveled a new attack against genetic enhancement, drawing on human rights as his primary weapon. I argue that Annas' appeal to human rights ultimately falls flat, and so provides no good reason to object to genetic technology. Moreover, this argument is an example of the broader problem of appealing to human rights as a panacea for ethical problems. Human rights, it is often claimed, are 'trumps': if it can be shown that a proposed technology violates human rights, then it must be cast aside. But human rights are neither a panacea for ethical problems nor a trump card. If they are drafted into the service of an argument, it must be shown that an actual human rights violation will occur. Annas' argument against genetic technology fails to do just this. I shall conclude that his appeal to human rights adds little to the debate over the ethical questions raised by genetic technology.     

Darwin and sexual selection: One hundred years of misunderstanding

Darwin's book on the Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871) is often viewed as the continuation of TheOrigin of Species published 12 years earlier (1859), both because of the implicit parallelism between natural selection and sexual selection, and because Darwin himself presents the book as developing a subject (man) which he intentionally omitted in the Origin. But the Descent can also be viewed as the continuation of his book on Variation published three years earlier (1868). Firstly because Darwin's hypothesis of pangenesis links the selection process to the origin of variation through use and disuse, an idea underlying his speculations on the origin of moral sense in humans. Second because like the action of the horticulturist on his domestic crops, sexual selection exerted by one sex on the other sex can develop fancy traits that are not easily accounted for by their utility to the selected organism itself, such as artistic taste, pride, courage, and the morphological differences between human populations. These traits are difficult to reconcile with pangenesis. They add up to other contradictions of the book possibly resulting from Darwin's erroneous inference about the mechanism of inheritance, like those on the determination of sex-ratio, or the confusion between individual adaptation and the advantage to the species. These inconsistencies inaugurate a weakening of the Darwinian message, which will last 50 years after his death. They contributed to the neglect of sexual selection for a century. Darwin however maintained a logical distinction between evolutionary mechanisms and hereditary mechanisms, and an epistemological distinction between evolutionary theory and Pangenesis hypothesis. In the modern context of Mendelian genetics, Darwin's sexual selection retrospectively appears as luminous an idea in its pure principle as natural selection, even though the mechanisms governing the evolution of sexual choice in animals remain largely unresolved.     

The individuality of the species: A Darwinian theory? — from Buffon to Ghiselin, and back to Darwin

Since the 1970s, there has been a tremendous amount of literature on Ghiselin's proposal that “species are individuals”. After recalling the origins and stakes of this thesis in contemporary evolutionary theory, I show that it can also be found in the writings of the French naturalist Buffon in the 18th Century. Although Buffon did not have the conception that one species could be derived from another, there is an interesting similarity between the modern argument and that of Buffon regarding the “individuality of species’. The analogy is strong enough to force us to recognize that genuine evolutionary (or Darwinian) questions might be of secondary importance in the discussion. In consequence, the third section of the paper proposes an alternative schema for the “logical structure” of the Darwinian concept of species. Darwin distinguished the problem of the designation of a concrete species, and the problem of its signification of species within his theory of descent? The resulting notion of species involves a logical structure based on the fusion of the logical operations of classification and ordering. The difficulty — and interest — is that this interpretation of species does not entail any precise operational definition of species; it can only tell us what the ultimate signification of classification is within the theory of descent with modification through natural selection.     

Darwin and palaeontology: a re-evaluation of his interpretation of the fossil record

Charles Darwin's empirical research in palaeontology, especially on fossil invertebrates, has been relatively neglected as a source of insight into his thinking, other than to note that he viewed the fossil record as very incomplete. During the Beagle voyage, Darwin gained extensive experience with a wide diversity of fossil taxa, and he thought deeply about the nature of the fossil record. That record was, for him, a major source of evidence for large-scale transmutation, but much less so for natural selection or single lineages. Darwin's interpretation of the fossil record has been criticised for its focus on incompleteness, but the record as he knew it was extremely incomplete. He was compelled to address this in arguing for descent with modification, which was likely his primary goal. Darwin's gradualism has been both misrepresented and exaggerated, and has distracted us from the importance of the fossil record in his thinking, which should be viewed in the context of the multiple, sometimes competing demands of the multifaceted argument he presented in the Origin of Species.     

An ambiguity in Habermas’s argument against liberal eugenics

In his book The future of human nature, Jürgen Habermas argues against a scenario of liberal eugenics, in which parents are free to prenatally manipulate their children’s genetic constitution via germline interventions. In this paper, I draw attention to the fact that his species‐ethical line of argument is pervaded by a substantial ambiguity between an argument from actual intervention (AAI) and an argument from mere controllability (AMC). Whereas the first argument focuses on threats for the autonomy and equality of prenatally modified persons, the second argument takes all human beings, whether they have been modified or not, into account. Hence, when invoking Habermas in these debates, bioethicists need to consider carefully which argument they are referring to.     

Why Darwin rejected intelligent design

As a Cambridge University undergraduate Charles Darwin was fascinated and convinced by the argument for intelligent design, as set forth in William Paley’s 1802 classic, Natural Theology. Subsequently, during his five-year voyage on HMS Beagle (1831–1836), Darwin interpreted his biological findings through a creationist lens, including the thought-provoking evidence he encountered during his historic visit to the Galápagos Islands in September and October 1835. After his return to England in 1836 and his subsequent conversion to the idea of organic evolution in March 1837, Darwin searched for a theory that would explain both the fact of evolution and the widespread appearance of intelligent design. His insight into the process of natural selection, which occurred in September 1838, provided this alternative explanation. Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) exemplifies his skillful deployment of the hypothetico-deductive method in testing and refuting the arguments for intelligent design that he had once so ardently admired.     

Darwin's use of the analogy between artificial and natural selection

Conclusion The central role played by Darwin's analogy between selection under domestication and that under nature has been adequately appreciated, but I have indicated how important the domesticated organisms also were to other elements of Darwin's theory of evolution-his recognition of the constant principle of change, for instance, of the imperfection of adaptation, and of the extent of variation in nature. The further development of his theory and its presentation to the public likewise hinged on frequent reference to domesticates.We have seen that Darwin's reliance on the analogy between domesticated varieties and wild species was a bold and original step, in light of contemporary views on the nature of domesticates. However, as Darwin undoubtedly foresaw, his reliance on the analogy created difficulties as well as solving problems, and these began with his Malthusian codiscoverer of the principle of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace. Wallace's paper On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Original Type, presented to the Linnean Scoiety along with the first public unveiling of Darwin's theory, states: We see, then, that no inferences as to varieties in a state of nature can be deduced from the observation of those occurring among domestic animals. The two are so much opposed to each other in every circumstance of their existence, that what applies to the one is almost sure not to apply to the other. Domestic animals are abnormal, irregular, artificial; they are subject to varieties which never occur and never can occur in a state of nature.⁶² Much has been made of the similarity of views of Darwin and Wallace, but this quotation surely reveals how utterly different their views were on what to Darwin was an important matter. Several critics of the Origin saw Darwin's reliance on the domesticates as his Achilles heel. As Young has pointed out, Samuel Wilberforce included the following passage in his attack on the Origin: Nor must we pass over unnoticed the transference of the argument from the domesticated to the untamed animals. Assuming that man as the selector can do much in a limited time, Mr. Darwin argues that Nature, a more powerful, a more continuous power, working over vastly extended ranges of time, can do more. But why should Nature, so uniform and persistent in all her operations, tend in this instance to change? Why should she become a selector of varieties?⁶³ Another critic, Fleeming Jenkin, found the analogy a weakness in Darwin's theory because of the limited extent of variation in any one direction in domestic animals and plants.⁶⁴ We have already seen that Darwin had confided a similar view to his notebook thirty years earlier, but changed his mind as a result of his profound study of domesticates. De Beer's reference to an English country gentleman's knowledge of domestic plants and animals and their breeding⁶⁵ fails totally to recognize the originality and depth of Darwin's knowledge of domesticates.Why did Darwin, against the currents of his time, rely so heavily on mankind's experience with domesticated organisms to shape his theory about species in nature? On reason is that only with domesticates was an approach that came close to experimental verification possible. Darwin fully realized the inadequacies of the experiment, as is emphasized by his repeated contrasting of selection under nature and selection by man. Yet the extensive experience and data of plant and animal breeders offered the only reliable base against which Darwin could continually challenge his views. As he wrote in the introduction to Variation, with domestication, man ... may be said to have been trying an experiment on a gigantic scale.⁶⁶ Given Darwin's high opinion of the quantitative work of Malthus and Quetelet (as emphasized by Schweber),⁶⁷ and his unremitting efforts to secure data by which to test his theories, it was inevitable that he should attach high significance to domesticated varieties. John Tyndall, in his Belfast address of 1874, said: The strength of the doctrine of Evolution consists, not in experimental demonstration (for the subject is hardly accessible to this mode of proof), but in its general harmony with scientific thought.⁶⁸ Darwin would have agreed with the latter thought, but I think he would have challenged the preceding one on the grounds that long experience with domesticated varieties did provide an element of experimental demonstration. It gave him confidence in his theory, and he used his vast knowledge of artificial selection boldly and creatively.     

“A Great Complication of Circumstances” – Darwin and the Economy of Nature

In 1749, Linnaeus presided over the dissertation “Oeconomia Naturae,” which argued that each creature plays an important and particular role in nature’s economy. This phrase should be familiar to readers of Darwin, for he claims in the Origin that “all organic beings are striving, it may be said, to seize on each place in the economy of nature.” Many scholars have discussed the influence of political economy on Darwin’s ideas. In this paper, I take a different tack, showing that Darwin’s idea of an economy of nature stemmed from the views of earlier naturalists like Linnaeus and Lyell. I argue, in the first section of the paper, that Linnaeus’ idea of oeconomia naturae is derived from the idea of the animal economy, and that his idea of politia naturae is an extension of the idea of a politia civitatis. In the second part, I explore the use of the concept of stations in the work of De Candolle and Lyell – the precursor to Darwin’s concept of places. I show in the third part of the paper that the idea of places in an economy of nature is employed by Darwin at many key points in his thinking: his discussion of the Galapagos birds, his reading of Malthus, etc. Finally, in the last section, I demonstrate that the idea of a place in nature’s economy is essential to Darwin’s account of divergence. To tell his famous story of divergence and adaptation, Darwin needed the economy of nature.