Voting Intention and Choices: Are Voters Always Rational and Deliberative?

Human rationality–the ability to behave in order to maximize the achievement of their presumed goals (i.e., their optimal choices)–is the foundation for democracy. Research evidence has suggested that voters may not make decisions after exhaustively processing relevant information; instead, our decision-making capacity may be restricted by our own biases and the environment. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which humans in a democratic society can be rational when making decisions in a serious, complex situation–voting in a local political election. We believe examining human rationality in a political election is important, because a well-functioning democracy rests largely upon the rational choices of individual voters. Previous research has shown that explicit political attitudes predict voting intention and choices (i.e., actual votes) in democratic societies, indicating that people are able to reason comprehensively when making voting decisions. Other work, though, has demonstrated that the attitudes of which we may not be aware, such as our implicit (e.g., subconscious) preferences, can predict voting choices, which may question the well-functioning democracy. In this study, we systematically examined predictors on voting intention and choices in the 2014 mayoral election in Taipei, Taiwan. Results indicate that explicit political party preferences had the largest impact on voting intention and choices. Moreover, implicit political party preferences interacted with explicit political party preferences in accounting for voting intention, and in turn predicted voting choices. Ethnic identity and perceived voting intention of significant others were found to predict voting choices, but not voting intention. In sum, to the comfort of democracy, voters appeared to engage mainly explicit, controlled processes in making their decisions; but findings on ethnic identity and perceived voting intention of significant others may suggest otherwise.     

Parallel Explicit and Implicit Control of Reaching

Background

Human movement can be guided automatically (implicit control) or attentively (explicit control). Explicit control may be engaged when learning a new movement, while implicit control enables simultaneous execution of multiple actions. Explicit and implicit control can often be assigned arbitrarily: we can simultaneously drive a car and tune the radio, seamlessly allocating implicit or explicit control to either action. This flexibility suggests that sensorimotor signals, including those that encode spatially overlapping perception and behavior, can be accurately segregated to explicit and implicit control processes.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We tested human subjects'' ability to segregate sensorimotor signals to parallel control processes by requiring dual (explicit and implicit) control of the same reaching movement and testing for interference between these processes. Healthy control subjects were able to engage dual explicit and implicit motor control without degradation of performance compared to explicit or implicit control alone. We then asked whether segregation of explicit and implicit motor control can be selectively disrupted by studying dual-control performance in subjects with no clinically manifest neurologic deficits in the presymptomatic stage of Huntington''s disease (HD). These subjects performed successfully under either explicit or implicit control alone, but were impaired in the dual-control condition.

Conclusion/Significance

The human nervous system can exert dual control on a single action, and is therefore able to accurately segregate sensorimotor signals to explicit and implicit control. The impairment observed in the presymptomatic stage of HD points to a possible crucial contribution of the striatum to the segregation of sensorimotor signals to multiple control processes.     

Metacognition: computation, biology and function

Many complex systems maintain a self-referential check and balance. In animals, such reflective monitoring and control processes have been grouped under the rubric of metacognition. In this introductory article to a Theme Issue on metacognition, we review recent and rapidly progressing developments from neuroscience, cognitive psychology, computer science and philosophy of mind. While each of these areas is represented in detail by individual contributions to the volume, we take this opportunity to draw links between disciplines, and highlight areas where further integration is needed. Specifically, we cover the definition, measurement, neurobiology and possible functions of metacognition, and assess the relationship between metacognition and consciousness. We propose a framework in which level of representation, order of behaviour and access consciousness are orthogonal dimensions of the conceptual landscape.     

Procedural Metacognition and False Belief Understanding in 3- to 5-Year-Old Children

Some studies, so far limited in number, suggest the existence of procedural metacognition in young children, that is, the practical capacity to monitor and control one’s own cognitive activity in a given task. The link between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding is currently under theoretical discussion. If data with primates seem to indicate that procedural metacognition and false belief understanding are not related, no study in developmental psychology has investigated this relation in young children. The present paper aims, first, to supplement the findings concerning young children’s abilities to monitor and control their uncertainty (procedural metacognition) and, second, to explore the relation between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding. To examine this, 82 3- to 5-year-old children were presented with an opt-out task and with 3 false belief tasks. Results show that children can rely on procedural metacognition to evaluate their perceptual access to information, and that success in false belief tasks does not seem related to success in the task we used to evaluate procedural metacognition. These results are coherent with a procedural view of metacognition, and are discussed in the light of recent data from primatology and developmental psychology.     

Common molecular mechanisms in explicit and implicit memory

Cellular and molecular studies of both implicit and explicit memory suggest that experience-dependent modulation of synaptic strength and structure is a fundamental mechanism by which these memories are encoded and stored within the brain. In this review, we focus on recent advances in our understanding of two types of memory storage: (i) sensitization in Aplysia, a simple form of implicit memory, and (ii) formation of explicit spatial memories in the mouse hippocampus. These two processes share common molecular mechanisms that have been highly conserved through evolution.     

The role of social cognition in decision making

Successful decision making in a social setting depends on our ability to understand the intentions, emotions and beliefs of others. The mirror system allows us to understand other people's motor actions and action intentions. 'Empathy' allows us to understand and share emotions and sensations with others. 'Theory of mind' allows us to understand more abstract concepts such as beliefs or wishes in others. In all these cases, evidence has accumulated that we use the specific neural networks engaged in processing mental states in ourselves to understand the same mental states in others. However, the magnitude of the brain activity in these shared networks is modulated by contextual appraisal of the situation or the other person. An important feature of decision making in a social setting concerns the interaction of reason and emotion. We consider four domains where such interactions occur: our sense of fairness, altruistic punishment, trust and framing effects. In these cases, social motivations and emotions compete with each other, while higher-level control processes modulate the interactions of these low-level biases.     

Metacognition and reasoning

This article considers the cognitive architecture of human meta-reasoning: that is, metacognition concerning one's own reasoning and decision-making. The view we defend is that meta-reasoning is a cobbled-together skill comprising diverse self-management strategies acquired through individual and cultural learning. These approximate the monitoring-and-control functions of a postulated adaptive system for metacognition by recruiting mechanisms that were designed for quite other purposes.     

Metacognition and reasoning

This article considers the cognitive architecture of human meta-reasoning: that is, metacognition concerning one''s own reasoning and decision-making. The view we defend is that meta-reasoning is a cobbled-together skill comprising diverse self-management strategies acquired through individual and cultural learning. These approximate the monitoring-and-control functions of a postulated adaptive system for metacognition by recruiting mechanisms that were designed for quite other purposes.     

Explaining distortions in metacognition with an attractor network model of decision uncertainty

Metacognition is the ability to reflect on, and evaluate, our cognition and behaviour. Distortions in metacognition are common in mental health disorders, though the neural underpinnings of such dysfunction are unknown. One reason for this is that models of key components of metacognition, such as decision confidence, are generally specified at an algorithmic or process level. While such models can be used to relate brain function to psychopathology, they are difficult to map to a neurobiological mechanism. Here, we develop a biologically-plausible model of decision uncertainty in an attempt to bridge this gap. We first relate the model’s uncertainty in perceptual decisions to standard metrics of metacognition, namely mean confidence level (bias) and the accuracy of metacognitive judgments (sensitivity). We show that dissociable shifts in metacognition are associated with isolated disturbances at higher-order levels of a circuit associated with self-monitoring, akin to neuropsychological findings that highlight the detrimental effect of prefrontal brain lesions on metacognitive performance. Notably, we are able to account for empirical confidence judgements by fitting the parameters of our biophysical model to first-order performance data, specifically choice and response times. Lastly, in a reanalysis of existing data we show that self-reported mental health symptoms relate to disturbances in an uncertainty-monitoring component of the network. By bridging a gap between a biologically-plausible model of confidence formation and observed disturbances of metacognition in mental health disorders we provide a first step towards mapping theoretical constructs of metacognition onto dynamical models of decision uncertainty. In doing so, we provide a computational framework for modelling metacognitive performance in settings where access to explicit confidence reports is not possible.     

Are All Beliefs Equal? Implicit Belief Attributions Recruiting Core Brain Regions of Theory of Mind

Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social contexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate mental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline deliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still unclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent believed an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs of another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects. While humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any possible belief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems to be restricted to beliefs with specific contents, a content selectivity that may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature property of implicit belief attribution.     

Implicit and explicit processes in social cognition

In this review we consider research on social cognition in which implicit processes can be compared and contrasted with explicit, conscious processes. In each case, their function is distinct, sometimes complementary and sometimes oppositional. We argue that implicit processes in social interaction are automatic and are often opposed to conscious strategies. While we are aware of explicit processes in social interaction, we cannot always use them to override implicit processes. Many studies show that implicit processes facilitate the sharing of knowledge, feelings, and actions, and hence, perhaps surprisingly, serve altruism rather than selfishness. On the other hand, higher-level conscious processes are as likely to be selfish as prosocial.     

Implicit and Explicit Illusory Correlation as a Function of Political Ideology

Research has demonstrated that people who embrace different ideological orientations often show differences at the level of basic cognitive processes. For instance, conservatives (vs. liberals) display an automatic selective attention for negative (vs. positive) stimuli, and tend to more easily form illusory correlations between negative information and minority groups. In the present work, we further explored this latter effect by examining whether it only involves the formation of explicit attitudes or it extends to implicit attitudes. To this end, following the typical illusory correlation paradigm, participants were presented with members of two numerically different groups (majority and minority) each performing either a positive or negative behaviour. Negative behaviors were relatively infrequent, and the proportion of positive and negative behaviors within each group was the same. Next, explicit and implicit (i.e., IAT-measured) attitudes were assessed. Results showed that conservatives (vs. liberals) displayed stronger explicit as well as implicit illusory correlations effects, forming more negative attitudes toward the minority (vs. majority) group at both the explicit and implicit level.     

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures?in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.     

Linking implicit and explicit memory: common encoding factors and shared representations

Dissociations between implicit and explicit memory have featured prominently in theories of human memory. However, similarities between the two forms of memory have been less studied. One open question concerns whether implicit and explicit memory share encoding resources. To explore this question, we employed a subsequent memory design in which several novel scenes were repeated once during an fMRI session and explicit memory for the scenes was unexpectedly tested afterward. Subsequently remembered scenes produced more behavioral priming and neural attenuation-two conventional measures of implicit memory-than did subsequently forgotten scenes. Moreover, brain-behavior correlations between these two implicit measures were mediated by subsequent memory. Finally, tonic activity, possibly reflecting the natural time course of attention, was predictive of subsequent memory. These results suggest that implicit and explicit memory are subject to the same encoding factors and can rely on similar perceptual processes and representations.     

Evolving intentions for social interaction: from entrainment to joint action

This article discusses four different scenarios to specify increasingly complex mechanisms that enable increasingly flexible social interactions. The key dimension on which these mechanisms differ is the extent to which organisms are able to process other organisms' intentions and to keep them apart from their own. Drawing on findings from ecological psychology, scenario 1 focuses on entrainment and simultaneous affordance in 'intentionally blind' individuals. Scenario 2 discusses how an interface between perception and action allows observers to simulate intentional action in others. Scenario 3 is concerned with shared perceptions, arising through joint attention and the ability to distinguish between self and other. Scenario 4 illustrates how people could form intentions to act together while simultaneously distinguishing between their own and the other's part of a joint action. The final part focuses on how combining the functionality of the four mechanisms can explain different forms of social interactions. It is proposed that basic interpersonal processes are put to service by more advanced functions that support the type of intentionality required to engage in joint action, cultural learning, and communication.     

To Bet, or Not to Bet: That Is the Question of SEF Spikes

The ability of animals to monitor their own cognitive processes is called metacognition. In this issue of Neuron, Middlebrooks and Sommer (2012) show that single-unit activity of SEF neurons exhibit?a metacognitive signal while monkeys perform a postdecision wagering task.     

Young Children’s Sensitivity to Their Own Ignorance in Informing Others

Prior research suggests that young children selectively inform others depending on others’ knowledge states. Yet, little is known whether children selectively inform others depending on their own knowledge states. To explore this issue, we manipulated 3- to 4-year-old children’s knowledge about the content of a box and assessed the impact on their decisions to inform another person. Moreover, we assessed the presence of uncertainty gestures while they inform another person in light of the suggestions that children''s gestures reflect early developing, perhaps transient, epistemic sensitivity. Finally, we compared children’s performance in the informing context to their explicit verbal judgment of their knowledge states to further confirm the existence of a performance gap between the two tasks. In their decisions to inform, children tend to accurately assess their ignorance, whereas they tend to overestimate their own knowledge states when asked to explicitly report them. Moreover, children display different levels of uncertainty gestures depending on the varying degrees of their informational access. These findings suggest that children’s implicit awareness of their own ignorance may be facilitated in a social, communicative context.     

Harnessing the MinION: An example of how to establish long‐read sequencing in a laboratory using challenging plant tissue from Eucalyptus pauciflora

Long‐read sequencing technologies are transforming our ability to assemble highly complex genomes. Realizing their full potential is critically reliant on extracting high‐quality, high‐molecular‐weight (HMW) DNA from the organisms of interest. This is especially the case for the portable MinION sequencer which enables all laboratories to undertake their own genome sequencing projects, due to its low entry cost and minimal spatial footprint. One challenge of the MinION is that each group has to independently establish effective protocols for using the instrument, which can be time‐consuming and costly. Here, we present a workflow and protocols that enabled us to establish MinION sequencing in our own laboratories, based on optimizing DNA extraction from a challenging plant tissue as a case study. Following the workflow illustrated, we were able to reliably and repeatedly obtain >6.5 Gb of long‐read sequencing data with a mean read length of 13 kb and an N50 of 26 kb. Our protocols are open source and can be performed in any laboratory without special equipment. We also illustrate some more elaborate workflows which can increase mean and average read lengths if this is desired. We envision that our workflow for establishing MinION sequencing, including the illustration of potential pitfalls and suggestions of how to adapt it to other tissue types, will be useful to others who plan to establish long‐read sequencing in their own laboratories.