Multilevel selection, cooperation, and altruism

Unto Others (Sober and Wilson 1998) shows how the general principles of Multi-Level Selection (MLS) theory apply to selection at multiple levels of the biological hierarchy. It also argues for the existence of "genuine" evolutionary and psychological altruism. The authors’ views on altruism do not follow logically from principles of MLS, and their failure do disentangle these two themes undermines their otherwise excellent presentation of MLS theory. Rebuttal of the view that human nature is completely selfish depends not on the prevalence of altruism but on the importance of group-advantageous traits that benefit both self and other group members without necessarily inflicting direct costs on outsiders.     

Explosions and hot spots in supertree methods

In phylogenetic systematics a problem of great practical and theoretical interest is to construct one or more large phylogenies (evolutionary trees), i.e., supertrees, from a given set of small phylogenies with overlapping sets of leaf labels. Although the methods being used to solve this problem are usually given plausible biological or theoretical justifications, occasionally it is possible to see that the result of a supertree method (SM) is explosive, and therefore logically meaningless, in the sense that it has been inferred from logical propositions that are contradictory. This paper presents the basic ideas and issues of how explosions affect the inference of rooted trees by SMs. We define the relevant concepts, give examples, and show how sometimes it is possible to identify hot spots in the input from which an SM may make explosive inferences that cannot be logically justified.     

Evolutionary theory and the foundation of moral principles

Evolutionary biology is supposed to be relevant to ethics by a number of authors. Some of them believe that it may provide and justify basic moral values. Others argue that evolutionary biology is relevant only in a negative way. They assume that it reveals the illusory nature of any attempt to justify basic moral values. In this paper one example of either approach is criticized. An analysis of examples can hardly offer sufficient grounds for a general conclusion. Nevertheless I believe that evolutionary theory is of little help when we deal with the most basic ethical questions. Three themes which are often though to provide a link between evolutionary biology and (meta)ethics — altruism, sociality and human nature — do not in fact establish that link.     

An evolutionary critique of cultural analysis in sociology

A noteworthy development that has transpired in American sociology in the past quarter century has been the increasingly sophisticated interest in the analysis of human cultural systems. Sadly, however, these analyses reveal that social scientists rarely appreciate the profoundly evolutionary aspects of human culture. The chief purpose of this essay is to address this shortcoming and to offer some tentative suggestions toward its rectification. The essay begins by briefly reviewing recent developments in the analysis of cultural systems, primarily by reference to the influential work of Wuthnow. Second, a common flaw in these approaches is addressed—namely, the absence of any recognition of the value of grounding sociocultural theory in an informed evolutionary framework—and the case is made that this shortcoming is avoidable, even within the context of the intellectual traditions of the social sciences. Third, the evolutionary foundations of human cultural behavior are explored in terms of an analysis of relevant theoretical and empirical developments in the evolutionary neurosciences. Fourth, the value of these insights is illustrated by reference to an evolutionary critique of a recent and thought-provoking contribution to the study of modern political culture—Douglas and Wildavsky’s analysis ofRisk and Culture. Finally, the article concludes by emphasizing the value of and the necessity for incorporating evolutionary reasoning into the domain of sociocultural theory.     

Could sexual selection have made us psychological altruists?

Psychological altruism (being motivated by the needs of others) has a tendency to produce behaviour that is costly in evolutionary terms. How, then, could the capacity for psychological altruism evolve? One suggestion is that it is the result of sexual selection. There are, however, two problems that face such an account: first, it is not clear that the resulting behaviour would be altruistic in the relevant sense, and second, it does not seem to fit with key features of our actual helping behaviour. I will argue that both of these problems can be avoided if we adopt a modular account of desire formation.     

The handicap principle and the argument of subversion from within

This paper examines the very disparate positions that various actors have taken towards the argument of subversion from within (a classical argument against the evolution of altruism by group selection) in a set of related debates on group selection, altruism and the handicap principle. Using this set of debates as a case study, this paper argues that different applications of epistemic values were one of the factors behind the disagreements between John Maynard Smith and Amotz Zahavi over a number of important evolutionary issues. The paper also argues that these different applications were connected to important epistemological differences related in part (but not solely) to their disciplinary background. Apart from conflicting evolutionary views concerning the theoretical feasibility of the handicap effect, these antagonists both differed in the confidence they ascribed to mathematical modeling and over the hereditary basis for altruistic behavior.     

Altruism may arise from individual selection

The fact that humans cooperate with non-kin in large groups, or with people they will never meet again, is a long-standing evolutionary puzzle. Altruism, the capacity to perform costly acts that confer benefits on others, is at the core of cooperative behavior. Behavioral experiments show that humans have a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish non-cooperators at personal cost (so-called strong reciprocity) which, according to standard evolutionary game theory arguments, cannot arise from selection acting on individuals. This has led to the suggestion of group and cultural selection as the only mechanisms that can explain the evolutionary origin of human altruism. We introduce an agent-based model inspired on the Ultimatum Game, that allows us to go beyond the limitations of standard evolutionary game theory and show that individual selection can indeed give rise to strong reciprocity. Our results are consistent with the existence of neural correlates of fairness and in good agreement with observations on humans and monkeys.     

The Significance of Non-vertical Transmission of Phenotype for the Evolution of Altruism

My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that a very simple learning rule based on imitation can help to sustain altruism as a culturally transmitted pattern or behaviour among agents playing a standard prisoner’s dilemma game. The point of this demonstration is not to prove that imitation is single-handedly responsible for existing levels of altruism (a thesis that is false), nor is the point to show that imitation is an important factor in explanations for the evolution of altruism (a thesis already prominent in the existing literature). The point is to show that imitation contributes to the evolution of altruism in a particular way that is not always fairly represented by evolutionary game theory models. Specifically, the paper uses a simple model to illustrate that cultural transmission includes mechanisms that do not transmit phenotype vertically (i.e. from parent to related offspring) and that these mechanisms can promote altruism in the absence of any direct biological propensity favouring such behaviour. This is a noteworthy result because it shows that evolutionary models can be built to explicitly reflect the contribution of non-vertical transmission in our explanations for the evolution of altruism among humans and other social species.     

Altruism Can Proliferate through Population Viscosity despite High Random Gene Flow

The ways in which natural selection can allow the proliferation of cooperative behavior have long been seen as a central problem in evolutionary biology. Most of the literature has focused on interactions between pairs of individuals and on linear public goods games. This emphasis has led to the conclusion that even modest levels of migration would pose a serious problem to the spread of altruism through population viscosity in group structured populations. Here we challenge this conclusion, by analyzing evolution in a framework which allows for complex group interactions and random migration among groups. We conclude that contingent forms of strong altruism that benefits equally all group members, regardless of kinship and without greenbeard effects, can spread when rare under realistic group sizes and levels of migration, due to the assortment of genes resulting only from population viscosity. Our analysis combines group-centric and gene-centric perspectives, allows for arbitrary strength of selection, and leads to extensions of Hamilton’s rule for the spread of altruistic alleles, applicable under broad conditions.     

One-shot reciprocity under error management is unbiased and fragile

The error management model of altruism in one-shot interactions provides an influential explanation for one of the most controversial behaviors in evolutionary social science. The model posits that one-shot altruism arises from a domain-specific cognitive bias that avoids the error of mistaking a long-term relationship for a one-shot interaction. One-shot altruism is thus, in an intriguingly paradoxical way, a form of reciprocity. We examine the logic behind this idea in detail. In its most general form the error management model is exceedingly flexible, and restrictions about the psychology of agents are necessary for selection to be well-defined. Once these restrictions are in place, selection is well defined, but it leads to behavior that is perfectly consistent with an unbiased rational benchmark. Thus, the evolution of one-shot reciprocity does not require an evoked cognitive bias based on repeated interactions and reputation. Moreover, in spite of its flexibility in terms of psychology, the error management model assumes that behavior is exceedingly rigid when individuals face a new interaction partner. Reciprocity can only take the form of tit-for-tat, and individuals cannot adjust their behavior in response to new information about the duration of a relationship. Zefferman (2014) showed that one-shot reciprocity does not reliably evolve if one relaxes the first restriction, and we show that the behavior does not reliably evolve if one relaxes the second restriction. Altogether, these theoretical results on one-shot reciprocity do not square well with experiments showing increased altruism in the presence of payoff-irrelevant stimuli that suggest others are watching.     

The evolution of theory of mind on welfare tradeoff ratios

People seem to attribute beliefs and desires to another person when interacting with them. Such a “theory of mind” capacity is essential for complex and uniquely human behavior such as language, but its evolutionary origin remains elusive. Using the formal tools of evolutionary game theory, we asked what environmental properties are necessary to select for a basic form of theory of mind—the ability to infer the prosociality, quantified by the welfare tradeoff ratio, of another person toward oneself. We found that none of the environments studied in classical or evolutionary game theory give an advantage to this form of theory of mind capacities; theory of mind is advantageous only in a new class of environments with stable opponents and variable payoff structures. In two behavioral experiments (n = 91) we verified that people can, and do use theory of mind in such an environment. These results suggest that some features of early humans’ social environment that were previously neglected in evolutionary game theory may be responsible for the evolution of people’s complex social capacities.     

The concept of developmental reprogramming and the quest for an inclusive theory of evolutionary mechanisms

SUMMARY Evolutionary developmental biology has already made a major contribution to our understanding of evolutionary patterns, notably homology. However, while it has the potential to make an equally important contribution to our understanding of evolutionary mechanisms, and indeed to the integration of mechanism and pattern, it has not yet done so. This paper explores how this potential may be realized. In particular, I focus on the limitations of present-day neo-Darwinian theory, and indicate how a combination of the neo-Darwinian and "evo-devo" approaches provides a more inclusive view of evolutionary mechanisms with greater explanatory power. There is a particular focus on developmental reprogramming, which lies logically between mutation and selection, yet has been neglected in mainstream evolutionary theory. The inclusion of developmental reprogramming in the list of evolutionary mechanisms leads to a view that the direction of evolutionary change is determined by a combination of internal and external factors, rather than being controlled entirely by the environment.     

The cooperative amoeba: Dictyostelium as a model for social evolution

Social interactions, including cooperation and altruism, are characteristic of numerous species, but many aspects of the evolution, ecology and genetics of social behavior remain unclear. The microbial soil amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum is a model system for the study of social evolution and provides insights into the nature of social cooperation and its genetic basis. This species exhibits altruism during both asexual and sexual cycles of its life history, and recent studies have uncovered several possible genetic mechanisms associated with kin discrimination and cheating behavior during asexual fruiting-body formation. By contrast, the molecular and evolutionary mechanisms that underlie sexual macrocyst formation remain largely enigmatic. D. discoideum, given its utility in molecular genetic studies, should continue to help us address these and other relevant questions in sociobiology, and thereby contribute to a coherent theoretical framework for the nature of social cooperation.     

Sober &; Wilson’s evolutionary arguments for psychological altruism: a reassessment

In their book Unto Others, Sober and Wilson argue that various evolutionary considerations (based on the logic of natural selection) lend support to the truth of psychological altruism. However, recently, Stephen Stich has raised a number of challenges to their reasoning: in particular, he claims that three out of the four evolutionary arguments they give are internally unconvincing, and that the one that is initially plausible fails to take into account recent findings from cognitive science and thus leaves open a number of egoistic responses. These challenges make it necessary to reassess the plausibility of Sober & Wilson’s evolutionary account—which is what I aim to do in this paper. In particular, I try to show that, as a matter of fact, Sober & Wilson’s case remains compelling, as some of Stich’s concerns rest on a confusion, and those that do not are not sufficiently strong to establish all the conclusions he is after. The upshot is that no reason has been given to abandon the view that evolutionary theory has advanced the debate surrounding psychological altruism.     

Simulation of biological evolution and the NFL theorems

William Dembski (No free lunch: why specified complexity cannot be purchased without intelligence, 2002) claimed that the NFL theorems from optimization theory render darwinian biological evolution impossible. Häggström (Biology and Philosophy 22:217–230, 2007) argued that the NFL theorems are not relevant for biological evolution at all, since the assumptions of the NFL theorems are not met. Although I agree with Häggström (Biology and Philosophy 22:217–230, 2007), in this article I argue that the NFL theorems should be interpreted as dealing with an extreme case within a much broader context. This broader context is in fact relevant for scientific research of certain evolutionary processes; not in the sense that the theorems can be used to draw conclusions about any intelligent design inference, but in the sense that it helps us to interpret computer simulations of evolutionary processes. As a result of this discussion, I will argue that from simulations, we do not learn much about how complexity arises in the universe. This position is in contrast with certain claims in the literature that I will discuss.     

Mort ou persistance du darwinisme ? Regard d’un épistémologue

The article examines why evolutionary biologists have been haunted by the question whether they are “Darwinian” or “non-Darwinian” ever since Darwin's Origin of species. Modern criticisms addressed to Darwinism are classified into two categories: those concerning Darwin's hypothesis of “descent with modification” and those addressed to the hypothesis of natural selection. In both cases, although the particular models that Darwin proposed for these two hypotheses have been significantly revised and expanded, Darwin's general framework has constrained and canalized evolutionary research, in the sense that it has settled an array of possible theoretical choices. Gould's changing attitudes regarding Darwinism is taken as a striking illustration of this interpretation.     

The robustness of altruism as an evolutionary strategy

Kin selection, reciprocity and group selection are widely regarded as evolutionary mechanisms capable of sustaining altruism among humans andother cooperative species. Our research indicates, however, that these mechanisms are only particular examples of a broader set of evolutionary possibilities.In this paper we present the results of a series of simple replicator simulations, run on variations of the 2–player prisoner's dilemma, designed to illustrate the wide range of scenarios under which altruism proves to be robust under evolutionary pressures. The set of mechanisms we explore is divided into four categories:correlation, group selection, imitation, and punishment. We argue that correlation is the core phenomenon at work in all four categories.     

Altruism across disciplines: one word, multiple meanings

Altruism is a deep and complex phenomenon that is analysed by scholars of various disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, biology, evolutionary anthropology and experimental economics. Much confusion arises in current literature because the term altruism covers variable concepts and processes across disciplines. Here we investigate the sense given to altruism when used in different fields and argumentative contexts. We argue that four distinct but related concepts need to be distinguished: (a) psychological altruism, the genuine motivation to improve others’ interests and welfare; (b) reproductive altruism, which involves increasing others’ chances of survival and reproduction at the actor’s expense; (c) behavioural altruism, which involves bearing some cost in the interest of others; and (d) preference altruism, which is a preference for others’ interests. We show how this conceptual clarification permits the identification of overstated claims that stem from an imprecise use of terminology. Distinguishing these four types of altruism will help to solve rhetorical conflicts that currently undermine the interdisciplinary debate about human altruism.     

Half a Century on the Concepts of Innateness and Instinct: Survey,Synthesis and Philosophical Implications

This paper first surveys and criticizes the various attempts by students of behavior to define the concept of innateness. A new definition, based on these (especially that of Lorenz), and reformulable in terms of now classic notions in genetics and evolutionary theory, is then offered: A trait is innate if, and only if, it is canalized and such that any phenotype in the reaction norm which does not possess the trait is a morphose — hence maladapted — and such that all modifications do possess the trait. A narrower definition of innateness, based on the first definition, is suggested to delimit what is called “the Lorenzian notions of innateness” and to provide a framework within which to discuss the notion of a fixed action pattern. Evidence, from the recent literature, is adduced to show the existence and importance of such patterns — even for human behavior. In the final section, it is argued that a paradigm shift has indeed occurred and that although this scientific revolution has been accompanied by many of the irrational elements noted by the Kuhnian school of philosophy of science, the shift has in fact been made upon perfectly rational grounds. That this should be true of so controversial a field is strong evidence against the irrationalist thesis in philosophy of science.     

Getting rid of interventions

According to James Woodward’s influential interventionist account of causation, X is a cause of Y iff, roughly, there is a possible intervention on X that changes Y. Woodward requires that interventions be merely logically possible. I will argue for two claims against this modal character of interventions: First, merely logically possible interventions are dispensable for the semantic project of providing an account of the meaning of causal statements. If interventions are indeed dispensable, the interventionist theory collapses into (some sort of) a counterfactual theory of causation. Thus, the interventionist theory is not tenable as a theory of causation in its own right. Second, if one maintains that merely logically possible interventions are indispensable, then interventions with this modal character lead to the fatal result that interventionist counterfactuals are evaluated inadequately. Consequently, interventionists offer an inadequate theory of causation. I suggest that if we are concerned with explicating causal concepts and stating the truth-conditions of causal claims we best get rid of Woodwardian interventions.