Doctors in the decent society: torture, ill-treatment and civic duty

How should physicians act when faced with corporal punishment, such as amputation, or torture? In most cases, the answer is clear: international law, UN resolutions and universal codes of medical ethics absolutely forbid physicians from countenancing torture and corporal punishment in any form. An acute problem arises, however, in decent societies, but not necessarily liberal states, that are, nonetheless, welcome in the world community. The decent society is often governed, in whole or in part, by religious laws, and while these states abridge various human rights they are peace loving, generally tolerant, and offer their citizens wide avenues for political participation. Under these circumstances the prohibition against corporal punishment and torture weakens, often compelling physicians to participate. This is true in two cases. In Rawls’ hypothetical nation of Kazanistan, Islamic law is the order of the day, and amputations and corporal punishment play an integral part in the execution of traditional Islamic justice. In Israel, torture is sometimes used to elicit the information needed to thwart impending terror attacks. In each case, a physician's participation is essential. In light of the near universal condemnation that accompanies torture and corporal punishment, physicians can only appeal to norms anchored in collective well‐being and concern for life that override respect for human dignity in these societies. Western societies have consistently rejected this reasoning, but it is part and parcel of life in the decent society.     

Parental Use of Corporal Punishment in Europe: Intersection between Public Health and Policy

Studies have linked the use of corporal punishment of children to the development of mental health disorders. Despite the recommendation of international governing bodies for a complete ban of the practice, there is little European data available on the effects of corporal punishment on mental health and the influence of laws banning corporal punishment. Using data from the School Children Mental Health Europe survey, the objective of this cross-sectional study was to examine the prevalence and legal status of corporal punishment across six European countries and to evaluate the association between parental use of corporal punishment and children’s mental health. The study found that odds of having parents who reported using occasional to frequent corporal punishment were 1.7 times higher in countries where its use is legal, controlling for socio-demographic factors. Children with parents who reported using corporal punishment had higher rates of both externalized and internalized mental health disorders.     

Broad supernatural punishment but not moralizing high gods precede the evolution of political complexity in Austronesia

Supernatural belief presents an explanatory challenge to evolutionary theorists—it is both costly and prevalent. One influential functional explanation claims that the imagined threat of supernatural punishment can suppress selfishness and enhance cooperation. Specifically, morally concerned supreme deities or ‘moralizing high gods'' have been argued to reduce free-riding in large social groups, enabling believers to build the kind of complex societies that define modern humanity. Previous cross-cultural studies claiming to support the MHG hypothesis rely on correlational analyses only and do not correct for the statistical non-independence of sampled cultures. Here we use a Bayesian phylogenetic approach with a sample of 96 Austronesian cultures to test the MHG hypothesis as well as an alternative supernatural punishment hypothesis that allows punishment by a broad range of moralizing agents. We find evidence that broad supernatural punishment drives political complexity, whereas MHGs follow political complexity. We suggest that the concept of MHGs diffused as part of a suite of traits arising from cultural exchange between complex societies. Our results show the power of phylogenetic methods to address long-standing debates about the origins and functions of religion in human society.     

The hormonal costs of subtle forms of infant maltreatment

We show here that subtle forms of maltreatment during infancy (below 1 year of age) have potential consequences for the functioning of the child's adrenocortical response system. Infants who received frequent corporal punishment (e.g., spanking) showed high hormonal reactivity to stress (a repeated separation from mother, combined with the presence of a stranger). In addition, infants who experienced frequent emotional withdrawal by their mothers (either as a result of maternal depression, or mother's strategic use of withdrawal as a control tactic) showed elevated baseline levels of cortisol. It was suggested that there are hormonal "costs" when mothers show response patterns (intentionally or unintentionally) that limit their utility as a means of buffering the child against stress. The hormonal responses shown by infants may alter the functioning of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis in ways that, if continued, may foster risk for immune disorders, sensitization to later stress, cognitive deficits, and social-emotional problems.     

The 'spiteful' origins of human cooperation

We analyse generosity, second-party ('spiteful') punishment (2PP), and third-party ('altruistic') punishment (3PP) in a cross-cultural experimental economics project. We show that smaller societies are less generous in the Dictator Game but no less prone to 2PP in the Ultimatum Game. We might assume people everywhere would be more willing to punish someone who hurt them directly (2PP) than someone who hurt an anonymous third person (3PP). While this is true of small societies, people in large societies are actually more likely to engage in 3PP than 2PP. Strong reciprocity, including generous offers and 3PP, exists mostly in large, complex societies that face numerous challenging collective action problems. We argue that 'spiteful' 2PP, motivated by the basic emotion of anger, is more universal than 3PP and sufficient to explain the origins of human cooperation.     

Punishment is strongly motivated by revenge and weakly motivated by inequity aversion

There are two broad functional explanations for second-party punishment: fitness-leveling and deterrence. The former suggests that people punish to reduce fitness differences, while the latter suggests that people punish in order to reciprocate losses and deter others from inflicting losses on them in the future. We explore the relative roles of these motivations using a pre-registered, two-player experiment with 2426 US participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants played as the “responder” and were assigned to either a Take or Augment condition. In the Take condition, the “partner” could steal money from the responder's bonus or do nothing. In the Augment condition, the partner could augment the responder's bonus by giving them money at no cost to themselves or do nothing. We also manipulated the responders' starting endowments, such that after the partner's decision, responders experienced different payoff outcomes: advantageous inequity, equality, or varying degrees of disadvantageous inequity. Responders then decided whether to pay a cost to punish the partner. Punishment was clearly influenced by theft and was most frequent when theft resulted in disadvantageous inequity. However, people also punished in the absence of theft, particularly when confronted with disadvantageous inequity. While the effect of inequity on punishment was small, our results suggest that punishment is motivated by more than just the desire to reciprocate losses. These findings highlight the multiple motivations undergirding punishment and bear directly on functional explanations for the existence of punishment in human societies.     

Outsourcing punishment to God: beliefs in divine control reduce earthly punishment

The sanctioning of norm-transgressors is a necessary--though often costly--task for maintaining a well-functioning society. Prior to effective and reliable secular institutions for punishment, large-scale societies depended on individuals engaging in 'altruistic punishment'--bearing the costs of punishment individually, for the benefit of society. Evolutionary approaches to religion suggest that beliefs in powerful, moralizing Gods, who can distribute rewards and punishments, emerged as a way to augment earthly punishment in large societies that could not effectively monitor norm violations. In five studies, we investigate whether such beliefs in God can replace people's motivation to engage in altruistic punishment, and their support for state-sponsored punishment. Results show that, although religiosity generally predicts higher levels of punishment, the specific belief in powerful, intervening Gods reduces altruistic punishment and support for state-sponsored punishment. Moreover, these effects are specifically owing to differences in people's perceptions that humans are responsible for punishing wrongdoers.     

Policing and punishment across the domains of social evolution

Several decades of research in humans, other vertebrates, and social insects have offered fascinating insights into the dynamics of punishment (and its subset, policing), but authors have only rarely addressed whether there are fundamental joint principles underlying the maintenance of these behaviors. Here we present a punisher/bystander approach rooted in inclusive fitness logic to predict which individuals should take on punishing roles in animal societies. We apply our scheme to societies of eusocial Hymenoptera and nonhuman vertebrate social breeders, and we outline potential extensions for understanding conflict regulation among cells in metazoan bodies and unrelated individuals in human societies. We highlight that: 1) no social unit is expected to express punishment behavior unless it collects positive inclusive fitness benefits that surpass alternative benefits of bystanding; 2) punishment with public good benefits can be maintained through either direct fitness benefits (coercion) or indirect fitness benefits (correction) or both; 3) differences across social systems in the distributions of power, relatedness, and reproductive options drive variation in the extent to which individuals actively punish; and 4) inclusive fitness logic captures many punishment‐relevant evolutionary and ecological variables in a single framework that appears to apply across very different types of social arrangements. Synthesis Researchers have long observed that individuals in animal societies punish (and by extension, police) each other, but they have rarely investigated whether general principles underlie this behavior across social arrangements. In this paper, we present a punisher/bystander approach rooted in inclusive fitness logic to predict which individuals should take on punisher roles in animal societies. We apply the approach to eusocial insects and cooperatively breeding vertebrates and outline extensions towards the control of cancer cell lineages and punishment in human groups. We highlight how variation in specific social variables may drive differences in punishing/policing across the social domains.     

An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons

Punishment can stabilize costly cooperation and ensure the success of a common project that is threatened by free-riders. Punishment mechanisms can be classified into pool punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by a paid third party, (e.g. a police system or a sheriff), and peer punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by peers. Which punishment mechanism is preferred when both are concurrently available within a society? In an economic experiment, we show that the majority of subjects choose pool punishment, despite being costly even in the absence of defectors, when second-order free-riders, cooperators that do not punish, are also punished. Pool punishers are mutually enforcing their support for the punishment organization, stably trapping each other. Our experimental results show how organized punishment could have displaced individual punishment in human societies.     

Hadza Cooperation

Strong reciprocity is an effective way to promote cooperation. This is especially true when one not only cooperates with cooperators and defects on defectors (second-party punishment) but even punishes those who defect on others (third-party, “altruistic” punishment). Some suggest we humans have a taste for such altruistic punishment and that this was important in the evolution of human cooperation. To assess this we need to look across a wide range of cultures. As part of a cross-cultural project, I played three experimental economics games with the Hadza, who are hunter-gatherers in Tanzania. The Hadza frequently engaged in second-party punishment but they rarely engaged in third-party punishment. Other small-scale societies engaged in less third-party punishment as well. I suggest third-party punishment only became more important in large, complex societies to solve more pressing collective-action problems.     

Evolving Righteousness in a Corrupt World

Punishment offers a powerful mechanism for the maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies, but the maintenance of costly punishment itself remains problematic. Game theory has shown that corruption, where punishers can defect without being punished themselves, may sustain cooperation. However, in many human societies and some insect ones, high levels of cooperation coexist with low levels of corruption, and such societies show greater wellbeing than societies with high corruption. Here we show that small payments from cooperators to punishers can destabilize corrupt societies and lead to the spread of punishment without corruption (righteousness). Righteousness can prevail even in the face of persistent power inequalities. The resultant righteous societies are highly stable and have higher wellbeing than corrupt ones. This result may help to explain the persistence of costly punishing behavior, and indicates that corruption is a sub-optimal tool for maintaining cooperation in human societies.     

Blood,War, and Ritual: Religious Ecology, ‘Strong’ Culture,and Human Sacrifice in the Premodern World

What social factors predict human sacrifice in premodern societies? After summarising key insights from competing theoretical perspectives that seek to explain the presence of human sacrifice in premodern societies, we empirically assess the explanatory utility of each theory. We draw from Stark's ‘moral communities’ argument and Alexander and Smith's insights regarding cultural autonomy to highlight how the macro-level organisation of premodern societies impacted the practice of human sacrifice. Using data from Murdock and White's Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, logistic regression models suggest that premodern societies that expressed community ties through religious ceremonies were more likely to engage in human sacrifice, while beliefs in spirit aggression are correlated with lower likelihood of human sacrifice. In terms of non-religious factors, societies that experienced frequent famine were slightly less likely to activity in the ancient world are partly a function of societal complexity. We conclude by specifying the theoretical implications of these findings.     

Personality Factors Associated with Frequency of Marijuana Use

A number of personality and style-of-life variables were found to be significantly related to frequency of marijuana use, in a study of 1215 students on the University of California, Los Angeles, campus. Compared with the non-user, in composite the typical marijuana-user is somewhat depressed, more inclined to doubt his emotional adjustment. He likes to take risks and seeks stimulation; he has strong political opinions; he believes in punishment for law-breakers, but he is more likely to question it. He is not religious; he is less well identified with parents, and he has a lower opinion of their marital adjustment. He is not decisive about career goals; he is a fine arts or liberal arts major. He uses alcohol, sometimes in combination with marijuana; he first tried marijuana after entering college and is not increasing his use. The typical marijuana-user in the sample uses it infrequently, twice a month or less often, and is not likely to be using other drugs. The frequent user probably uses other drugs.     

Punishment of Minor Female Genital Ritual Procedures: Is the Perfect the Enemy of the Good?

Female genital alteration (FGA) is any cutting, removal or destruction of any part of the external female genitalia. Various FGA practices are common throughout the world. While most frequent in Africa and Asia, transglobal migration has brought ritual FGA to Western nations. All forms of FGA are generally considered undesirable for medical and ethical reasons when performed on minors. One ritual FGA procedure is the vulvar nick (VN). This is a small laceration to the vulva that does not cause morphological changes. Besides being performed as a primary ritual procedure it has been proposed as a substitute for more extensive forms of FGA. Measures advocated or taken to reduce the burden of FGA can be punitive or non‐punitive. Even if it is unethical to perform VN, we argue that it also is unethical to attempt to suppress it through punishment. First, punishment of VN is likely to cause more harm than good overall, even to those ostensibly being protected. Second, punishment is likely to exceed legitimate retributive ends. We do not argue in favor of performing VN. Rather, we argue that non‐punitive strategies such as education and harm reduction should be employed.     

Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games

The puzzle of the emergence of cooperation between unrelated individuals is shared across diverse fields of behavioural sciences and economics. In this article we combine the public goods game originating in economics with evolutionary approaches traditionally used in biology. Instead of pairwise encounters, we consider the more complex case of groups of three interacting individuals. We show that territoriality is capable of promoting cooperative behaviour, as in the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Moreover, by adding punishment opportunities, the readiness to cooperate is greatly enhanced and asocial strategies can be largely suppressed. Finally, as soon as players carry a reputation for being willing or unwilling to punish, highly cooperative and fair outcomes are achieved. This group-beneficial result is obtained, intriguingly, by making individuals more likely to exploit their co-players if they can get away with it. Thus, less-cooperative individuals make more-cooperative societies.     

Persistent cooperators in nature

The evolution and maintenance of cooperation fascinated researchers for several decades. Recently, theoretical models and experimental evidence show that costly punishment may facilitate cooperation in human societies. The puzzle how the costly punishment behaviour evolves can be solved under voluntary participation. Could the punishers emerge if participation is compulsory? Is the punishment inevitably a selfish behaviour or an altruistic behaviour? The motivations behind punishment are still an enigma. Based on public goods interactions, we present a model in which just a certain portion of the public good is divided equally among all members. The other portion is distributed to contributors when paying a second cost. The contributors who are willing to pay a second cost are called the persistent cooperators (PC), indicating their desire to retrieve the proportion of the payoff derived from their own contributions with persistent efforts. We show that the persistent cooperators can be costly punishers, which may account for the origin of human costly punishment behaviour under compulsory participation. In this sense our models may show theoretically that the original motivation behind punishment is to retrieve deserved payoff from their own contributions, a selfish incentive. But the persistent cooperators can also flourish or dominate the population in other situations. We list many real examples in which contributors are the persistent cooperators, and they benefit. This indicates a simple norm promoting cooperation: contributing more and gaining more.     

More 'altruistic' punishment in larger societies

If individuals will cooperate with cooperators, and punish non-cooperators even at a cost to themselves, then this strong reciprocity could minimize the cheating that undermines cooperation. Based upon numerous economic experiments, some have proposed that human cooperation is explained by strong reciprocity and norm enforcement. Second-party punishment is when you punish someone who defected on you; third-party punishment is when you punish someone who defected on someone else. Third-party punishment is an effective way to enforce the norms of strong reciprocity and promote cooperation. Here we present new results that expand on a previous report from a large cross-cultural project. This project has already shown that there is considerable cross-cultural variation in punishment and cooperation. Here we test the hypothesis that population size (and complexity) predicts the level of third-party punishment. Our results show that people in larger, more complex societies engage in significantly more third-party punishment than people in small-scale societies.     

Love or fear: Can punishment promote cooperation?

Cooperation is a paradox: Why should one perform a costly behavior only to increase the fitness of another? Human societies, in which individuals cooperate with genetically unrelated individuals on a considerably larger scale than most mammals do, are especially puzzling in this regard. Recently, the threat of punishment has been given substantial attention as one of the mechanisms that could help sustain human cooperation in such situations. Nevertheless, using punishment to explain cooperation only leads to further questions: Why spend precious resources to penalize free‐riders, especially if others can avoid this investment and cheaters can punish you back? Here, it is argued that current evidence supports punishment as an efficient means for the maintenance of cooperation, and that the gravity of proposed limitations of punishment for maintaining cooperation may have been overestimated in previous studies due to the features of experimental design. Most notably, the importance of factors as characteristic of human societies as reputation and language has been greatly neglected. Ironically, it was largely the combination of the two that enabled humans to shape costly punishment into numerous low‐cost and less detrimental strategies that clearly can promote human cooperation.     

Resolving social conflict among females without overt aggression

Members of animal societies compete over resources and reproduction, but the extent to which such conflicts of interest are resolved peacefully (without recourse to costly or wasteful acts of aggression) varies widely. Here, we describe two theoretical mechanisms that can help to understand variation in the incidence of overt behavioural conflict: (i) destruction competition and (ii) the use of threats. The two mechanisms make different assumptions about the degree to which competitors are socially sensitive (responsive to real-time changes in the behaviour of their social partners). In each case, we discuss how the model assumptions relate to biological reality and highlight the genetic, ecological and informational factors that are likely to promote peaceful conflict resolution, drawing on empirical examples. We suggest that, relative to males, reproductive conflict among females may be more frequently resolved peacefully through threats of punishment, rather than overt acts of punishment, because (i) offspring are more costly to produce for females and (ii) reproduction is more difficult to conceal. The main need now is for empirical work to test whether the mechanisms described here can indeed explain how social conflict can be resolved without overt aggression.     

Explaining the evolution of parochial punishment in humans

Humans usually favour members of their own group, ethnicity or culture (parochial cooperation), and punish out-group wrongdoers more harshly (parochial punishment). The evolution of parochial cooperation is mainly explained by intergroup conflict, as restricting cooperation to in-groups can provide a relative advantage during conflict. However, explanations for the evolution of parochial punishment are still lacking. It is unclear whether conflict can also explain parochial punishment, because conflict is expected to lead to full hostility towards out-groups, irrespective of their behaviour. Here, we use an agent-based simulation to explore which conditions favour the evolution of parochial third-party punishment. We show that when groups interact and then engage in conflict with each other, third-party punishment is not parochial but spiteful, and directed towards all out-groups. A parochial bias in punishment decisions evolves (i) without conflict, when groups compete against nature and enforcing cooperation requires many punitive actions, and (ii) with conflict, when groups come into conflict with a group other than one they previously interacted with. Our findings suggest that intergroup conflict does not always lead to parochial punishment, and that stable collaborative relations between groups is a key factor promoting third-party parochial punishment. Our findings also provide novel predictions on how punishment and intergroup conflict influence in-group bias in human societies.