Analysis by Single-Gene Reassortment Demonstrates that the 1918 Influenza Virus Is Functionally Compatible with a Low-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus in Mice

The 1918-1919 "Spanish" influenza pandemic is estimated to have caused 50 million deaths worldwide. Understanding the origin, virulence, and pathogenic properties of past pandemic influenza viruses, including the 1918 virus, is crucial for current public health preparedness and future pandemic planning. The origin of the 1918 pandemic virus has not been resolved, but its coding sequences are very like those of avian influenza virus. The proteins encoded by the 1918 virus differ from typical low-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses at only a small number of amino acids in each open reading frame. In this study, a series of chimeric 1918 influenza viruses were created in which each of the eight 1918 pandemic virus gene segments was replaced individually with the corresponding gene segment of a prototypical low-pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) H1N1 virus in order to investigate functional compatibility of the 1918 virus genome with gene segments from an LPAI virus and to identify gene segments and mutations important for mammalian adaptation. This set of eight "7:1" chimeric viruses was compared to the parental 1918 and LPAI H1N1 viruses in intranasally infected mice. Seven of the 1918 LPAI 7:1 chimeric viruses replicated and caused disease equivalent to the fully reconstructed 1918 virus. Only the chimeric 1918 virus containing the avian influenza PB2 gene segment was attenuated in mice. This attenuation could be corrected by the single E627K amino acid change, further confirming the importance of this change in mammalian adaptation and mouse pathogenicity. While the mechanisms of influenza virus host switch, and particularly mammalian host adaptation are still only partly understood, these data suggest that the 1918 virus, whatever its origin, is very similar to avian influenza virus.     

Reassortment Patterns in Swine Influenza Viruses

Three human influenza pandemics occurred in the twentieth century, in 1918, 1957, and 1968. Influenza pandemic strains are the results of emerging viruses from non-human reservoirs to which humans have little or no immunity. At least two of these pandemic strains, in 1957 and in 1968, were the results of reassortments between human and avian viruses. Also, many cases of swine influenza viruses have reportedly infected humans, in particular, the recent H1N1 influenza virus of swine origin, isolated in Mexico and the United States. Pigs are documented to allow productive replication of human, avian, and swine influenza viruses. Thus it has been conjectured that pigs are the “mixing vessel” that create the avian-human reassortant strains, causing the human pandemics. Hence, studying the process and patterns of viral reassortment, especially in pigs, is a key to better understanding of human influenza pandemics. In the last few years, databases containing sequences of influenza A viruses, including swine viruses, collected since 1918 from diverse geographical locations, have been developed and made publicly available. In this paper, we study an ensemble of swine influenza viruses to analyze the reassortment phenomena through several statistical techniques. The reassortment patterns in swine viruses prove to be similar to the previous results found in human viruses, both in vitro and in vivo, that the surface glycoprotein coding segments reassort most often. Moreover, we find that one of the polymerase segments (PB1), reassorted in the strains responsible for the last two human pandemics, also reassorts frequently.     

Functional Match between Influenza Virus Hemagglutinin and Neuraminidase Is Restored after Gene Reassortment

Influenza virus A (FluA) reassortants with low-functional neuraminidase (NA) of subtype N1 and hemagglutinin (HA) of subtypes H2, H3, H4, and H13 display virion aggregation and accumulate to a lower titer because sialyl residues are not completely removed from virion components. Nonaggregating variants of FluA (H13N1) were shown to result from a mutation that reduces the HA affinity for sialyl substrates. Amino acid substitution K156E, which increases a negative charge at the edge of the receptor-binding pocket of HA large subunit (HA1), was revealed in two independent variants. This substitution was the only difference between HA1 of the original reassortant and one of its variants and, therefore, accounted for restoration of the functional match between HA and NA.     

Self-Folding of Naked Segment 8 Genomic RNA of Influenza A Virus

Influenza A is a negative sense RNA virus that kills hundreds of thousands of humans each year. Base pairing in RNA is very favorable, but possibilities for RNA secondary structure of the influenza genomic RNA have not been investigated. This work presents the first experimentally-derived exploration of potential secondary structure in an influenza A naked (protein-free) genomic segment. Favorable folding regions are revealed by in vitro chemical structure mapping, thermodynamics, bioinformatics, and binding to isoenergetic microarrays of an entire natural sequence of the 875 nt segment 8 vRNA and of a smaller fragment. Segment 8 has thermodynamically stable and evolutionarily conserved RNA structure and encodes essential viral proteins NEP and NS1. This suggests that vRNA self-folding may generate helixes and loops that are important at one or more stages of the influenza life cycle.     

Reassortment between Two Serologically Unrelated Bluetongue Virus Strains Is Flexible and Can Involve any Genome Segment

Coinfection of a cell by two different strains of a segmented virus can give rise to a “reassortant” with phenotypic characteristics that might differ from those of the parental strains. Bluetongue virus (BTV) is a double-stranded RNA (dsRNA) segmented virus and the cause of bluetongue, a major infectious disease of livestock. BTV exists as at least 26 different serotypes (BTV-1 to BTV-26). Prompted by the isolation of a field reassortant between BTV-1 and BTV-8, we systematically characterized the process of BTV reassortment. Using a reverse genetics approach, our study clearly indicates that any BTV-1 or BTV-8 genome segment can be rescued in the heterologous “backbone.” To assess phenotypic variation as a result of reassortment, we examined viral growth kinetics and plaque sizes in in vitro experiments and virulence in an experimental mouse model of bluetongue disease. The monoreassortants generated had phenotypes that were very similar to those of the parental wild-type strains both in vitro and in vivo. Using a forward genetics approach in cells coinfected with BTV-1 and BTV-8, we have shown that reassortants between BTV-1 and BTV-8 are generated very readily. After only four passages in cell culture, we could not detect wild-type BTV-1 or BTV-8 in any of 140 isolated viral plaques. In addition, most of the isolated reassortants contained heterologous VP2 and VP5 structural proteins, while only 17% had homologous VP2 and VP5 proteins. Our study has shown that reassortment in BTV is very flexible, and there is no fundamental barrier to the reassortment of any genome segment. Given the propensity of BTV to reassort, it is increasingly important to have an alternative classification system for orbiviruses.     

Evolutionary Conservation of the PA-X Open Reading Frame in Segment 3 of Influenza A Virus

PA-X is a fusion protein of influenza A virus encoded in part from a +1 frameshifted X open reading frame (X-ORF) in segment 3. We show that the X-ORFs of diverse influenza A viruses can be divided into two groups that differ in selection pressure and likely function, reflected in the presence of an internal stop codon and a change in synonymous diversity. Notably, truncated forms of PA-X evolved convergently in swine and dogs, suggesting a strong species-specific effect.     

Absence of 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza A Virus in Fresh Pork

The emergence of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus in humans and subsequent discovery that it was of swine influenza virus lineages raised concern over the safety of pork. Pigs experimentally infected with pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus developed respiratory disease; however, there was no evidence for systemic disease to suggest that pork from pigs infected with H1N1 influenza would contain infectious virus. These findings support the WHO recommendation that pork harvested from pandemic influenza A H1N1 infected swine is safe to consume when following standard meat hygiene practices.     

The Possible Impact of Vaccination for Seasonal Influenza on Emergence of Pandemic Influenza via Reassortment

Background

One pathway through which pandemic influenza strains might emerge is reassortment from coinfection of different influenza A viruses. Seasonal influenza vaccines are designed to target the circulating strains, which intuitively decreases the prevalence of coinfection and the chance of pandemic emergence due to reassortment. However, individual-based analyses on 2009 pandemic influenza show that the previous seasonal vaccination may increase the risk of pandemic A(H1N1) pdm09 infection. In view of pandemic influenza preparedness, it is essential to understand the overall effect of seasonal vaccination on pandemic emergence via reassortment.

Methods and Findings

In a previous study we applied a population dynamics approach to investigate the effect of infection-induced cross-immunity on reducing such a pandemic risk. Here the model was extended by incorporating vaccination for seasonal influenza to assess its potential role on the pandemic emergence via reassortment and its effect in protecting humans if a pandemic does emerge. The vaccination is assumed to protect against the target strains but only partially against other strains. We find that a universal seasonal vaccine that provides full-spectrum cross-immunity substantially reduces the opportunity of pandemic emergence. However, our results show that such effectiveness depends on the strength of infection-induced cross-immunity against any novel reassortant strain. If it is weak, the vaccine that induces cross-immunity strongly against non-target resident strains but weakly against novel reassortant strains, can further depress the pandemic emergence; if it is very strong, the same kind of vaccine increases the probability of pandemic emergence.

Conclusions

Two types of vaccines are available: inactivated and live attenuated, only live attenuated vaccines can induce heterosubtypic immunity. Current vaccines are effective in controlling circulating strains; they cannot always help restrain pandemic emergence because of the uncertainty of the oncoming reassortant strains, however. This urges the development of universal vaccines for prevention of pandemic influenza.     

Transmission of a 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Virus Occurs before Fever Is Detected, in the Ferret Model

During the early phase of the 2009 influenza pandemic, attempts were made to contain the spread of the virus. Success of reactive control measures may be compromised if the proportion of transmission that occurs before overt clinical symptoms develop is high. In this study we investigated the timing of transmission of an early prototypic strain of pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza virus in the ferret model. Ferrets are the only animal model in which this can be assessed because they display typical influenza-like clinical signs including fever and sneezing after infection. We assessed transmission from infected animals to sentinels that were placed either in direct contact or in adjacent cages, the latter reflecting the respiratory droplet (RD) transmission route. We found that pre-symptomatic influenza transmission occurred via both contact and respiratory droplet exposure before the earliest clinical sign, fever, developed. Three of 3 animals exposed in direct contact between day 1 and 2 after infection of the donor animals became infected, and 2/3 of the animals exposed at this time period by the RD route acquired the infection, with the third animal becoming seropositive indicating either a low level infection or significant exposure. Moreover, this efficient transmission did not temporally correlate with respiratory symptoms, such as coughs and sneezes, but rather with the peak viral titre in the nose. Indeed respiratory droplet transmission did not occur late in infection, even though this was when sneezing and coughing were most apparent. None of the 3 animals exposed at this time by the RD route became infected and these animals remained seronegative at the end of the experiment. These data have important implications for pandemic planning strategies and suggest that successful containment is highly unlikely for a human-adapted influenza virus that transmits efficiently within a population.