Bioethics for clinicians: 12. Ethical dilemmas that arise in the care of pregnant women: rethinking "maternal-fetal conflicts".

When a pregnant woman makes a decision or acts in a manner that may be detrimental to the health and well-being of her fetus, her physician may be faced with an ethical dilemma. Is the physician''s primary duty to respect the woman''s autonomy, or to promote behaviour that may be in the best interest of the fetus? The controversial concept of "fetal rights" or the "fetus as a patient" contributes to the notion that the pregnant woman and her fetus are potential adversaries. However, Canadian law has upheld women''s right to life, liberty and security of the person and has not recognized fetal rights. If a woman is competent and refuses medical advice, her decision must be respected even if the physician believes that her fetus will suffer as a result. Coercion of the woman is not permissible no matter what appears to be in the best interest of the fetus.     

RESPECTING AUTONOMY WITHOUT DISCLOSING INFORMATION

There is widespread agreement that it would be both morally and legally wrong to treat a competent patient, or to carry out research with a competent participant, without the voluntary consent of that patient or research participant. Furthermore, in medical ethics it is generally taken that that consent must be informed. The most widely given reason for this has been that informed consent is needed to respect the patient's or research participant's autonomy. In this article I set out to challenge this claim by considering in detail each of the three most prominent ways in which ‘autonomy’ has been conceptualized in the medical ethics literature. I will argue that whilst these accounts support the claim that consent is needed if the treatment of competent patients, or research on competent individuals, is to respect their autonomy, they do not support the claim that informed consent is needed for this purpose.     

Ethical issues in recommending and offering fetal therapy

Fetal therapy should be offered and recommended for a viable fetus when these criteria are met: invasive therapy is reliably judged to have a high probability of being life-saving or of preventing serious and irreversible disease, injury, or disability for the fetus and for the child it can become; such therapy is reliably judged to involve low mortality risk and low or manageable risk of serious disease, injury, or disability to the viable fetus and the child it can become; and the mortality risk and the risk of disease, injury, or disability to the pregnant women is reliably judged to be low or manageable. When one or more of these criteria are not satisfied, intervention is experimental and can only be offered, not recommended, on the basis of benefit to future patients and the autonomy of the pregnant woman.     

CHALLENGING THE RHETORIC OF CHOICE IN PRENATAL SCREENING

Prenatal screening, consisting of maternal serum screening and nuchal translucency screening, is on the verge of expansion, both by being offered to more pregnant women and by screening for more conditions. The Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have each recently recommended that screening be extended to all pregnant women regardless of age, disease history, or risk status. This screening is commonly justified by appeal to the value of autonomy, or women's choice. In this paper, I critically examine the value of autonomy in the context of prenatal screening to determine whether it justifies the routine offer of screening and the expansion of screening services. I argue that in the vast majority of cases the option of prenatal screening does not promote or protect women's autonomy. Both a narrow conception of choice as informed consent and a broad conception of choice as relational reveal difficulties in achieving adequate standards of free informed choice. While there are reasons to worry that women's autonomy is not being protected or promoted within the limited scope of current practice, we should hesitate before normalizing it as part of standard prenatal care for all.     

Altruistic surrogacy and informed consent

A crucial premise in many recent arguments against the moral permissibility of surrogate motherhood arrangements is the claim that a woman cannot autonomously consent to gestating and relinquishing a child to another couple, because she cannot be fully informed about what her future emotional responses will be to the foetus developing within her, and to the giving up of the newborn infant to its social parents. When conjoined with some moral principle about the justifiable limits on the ways others can be expected to exercise their autonomy on our behalf, this claim is often taken to establish that various forms of surrogate motherhood arrangements are morally wrong. In this paper I want to show that there is a serious non sequitur in this kind of argument. That is, I want to show that even if women cannot in fact have this kind of information about what their future emotional responses to pregnancy and relinquishment will be, nothing follows about the wrongness or otherwise of surrogacy. For, when we consider what counts as informed consent in the context of other important ventures with uncertain consequences, it becomes clear that informed consent does not require having this kind of information about one's future emotional states. In putting these arguments, I also hope to clarify some of the connections which might be thought to hold between informed consent and autonomous decision-making generally.     

Medical Ghostwriting and Informed Consent

Ghostwriting in its various forms has received critical scrutiny from medical ethicists, journal editors, and science studies scholars trying to explain where ghostwriting goes wrong and ascertain how to counter it. Recent analyses have characterized ghostwriting as plagiarism or fraud, and have urged that it be deterred through stricter compliance with journal submission requirements, conflict of interest disclosures, author‐institutional censure, legal remedies, and journals' refusal to publish commercially sponsored articles. As a supplement to such efforts, this paper offers a critical assessment of medical ghostwriting as contrary to good patient care, on the grounds that it contradicts established general principles guiding clinical ethics. Specifically, I argue that ghostwriting undermines trust relationships between authors and their readers, and between these readers and their trusting patients, and in so doing contradicts the duty of respect for patient autonomy by obstructing informed consent. For this reason, complicity in ghostwriting practices should be understood as a violation of the professional ethical duties of physicians and other healthcare workers.     

[Re]considering Respect for Persons in a Globalizing World

Contemporary clinical ethics was founded on principlism, and the four principles: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice, remain dominant in medical ethics discourse and practice. These principles are held to be expansive enough to provide the basis for the ethical practice of medicine across cultures. Although principlism remains subject to critique and revision, the four‐principle model continues to be taught and applied across the world. As the practice of medicine globalizes, it remains critical to examine the extent to which both the four‐principle framework, and individual principles among the four, suffice patients and practitioners in different social and cultural contexts. Using the four‐principle model we analyze two accounts of surrogate decision making – one from the developed and one from the developing world – in which the clinician undertakes medical decision‐making with apparently little input from the patient and/or family. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight challenges in assessing ethical behaviour according to the principlist model. We next describe cultural expectations and mores that inform both patient and clinician behaviors in these scenarios in order to argue that the principle of respect for persons informed by culture‐specific ideas of personhood may offer an improved ethical construct for analyzing and guiding medical practice in a globalized and plural world.     

Anorexia nervosa and refusal of naso-gastric treatment: a response to Heather Draper

Imposing artificial feeding on people with anorexia nervosa may be unethical. This seems to be Heather Draper's suggestion in her article, 'Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging Therapy: A Limited Justification.' Although this is an important point, I shall show that the arguments supporting this point are flawed. Draper should have made a brave claim: she should have claimed that people with anorexia nervosa, who competently decide not to be artificially fed, should be respected because everybody is entitled to exercise their autonomy, not only 'in the middle' of their life, but also at the end of it, or when their own life is at stake, because autonomy also extends to the most difficult moments of our life, and, ultimately, 'stretches [.*T*.*T*.] far out into the distance' at the end of it. I explain why Draper should have made the brave claim, and why she has not made it. I conclude that a defence of people's entitlement to competently refuse artificial feeding cannot rest upon the arguments developed by Draper. Whether or not we should respect competent refusal of artificial feeding depends on the normative strength that we are ready to ascribe to the principle of autonomy, to the moral relevance that we ascribe to the circumstances in which a person's autonomy is exercised, and, perhaps, eventually, on our sense of compassion.     

The failure of DNA forensic testing: a case study of the 2009 Australian bushfire disaster

Different constructions of the fetus lie at the centre of reproductive, abortion and disability politics. Recent developments mean that, within the same hospital, a fetus may be perceived in contrasting and potentially conflicting ways. It is also argued that the status given to the fetus is directly relevant to the status given to pregnant women. During group discussions facilitated by an ethicist, health-care staff highlighted various perceptions of the fetus which included: person; patient; 'nobody'; commodity. Perhaps not surprisingly in view of the current legal situation, staff tended to claim that it is usually the pregnant woman who decides how her fetus will be constructed, and the practitioner who responds to this. However, various ways in which practitioners might influence women's perceptions of their fetus are highlighted, as are some ways in which the perceptions of staff might be influenced. This paper illustrates how sensitive health-care staff will need to be if they are indeed to respond to, rather than shape, women's constructions of their fetus.     

US IRBs confronting research in the developing world

Increasingly, US‐sponsored research is carried out in developing countries, but how US Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) approach the challenges they then face is unclear. METHODS: I conducted in‐depth interviews of about 2 hours each, with 46 IRB chairs, directors, administrators and members. I contacted the leadership of 60 IRBs in the United States (US) (every fourth one in the list of the top 240 institutions by National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding), and interviewed IRB leaders from 34 (55%). RESULTS: US IRBs face ethical and logistical challenges in interpreting and applying principles and regulations in developing countries, given economic and health disparities, and limited contextual knowledge. These IRBs perceive wide variations in developing world IRBs/RECs' quality, resources and training; and health systems in some countries may have long‐standing practices of corruption. These US IRBs often know little of local contexts, regulations and standards of care, and struggle with understandings of other cultures' differing views of autonomy, and risks and benefits of daily life. US IRBs thus face difficult decisions, including how to interpret principles, how much to pay subjects and how much sustainability to require from researchers. IRB responses and solutions include trying to maintain higher standards for developing world research, obtain cultural expertise, build IRB infrastructure abroad, communicate with foreign IRBs, and ‘negotiate’ for maximum benefits for participants and fearing ‘worst‐case scenarios’. CONCLUSIONS: US and foreign IRBs confront a series of tensions and dilemmas in reviewing developing world research. These data have important implications for increased education of IRBs/RECs and researchers in the US and abroad, and for research and practice.     

A High-Order,Symplectic, Finite-Difference Time-Domain Scheme for Bioelectromagnetic Applications within the Mother/Fetus Model

An explicit high-order, symplectic, finite-difference time-domain (SFDTD) scheme is applied to a bioelectromagnetic simulation using a simple model of a pregnant woman and her fetus. Compared to the traditional FDTD scheme, this scheme maintains the inherent nature of the Hamilton system and ensures energy conservation numerically and a high precision. The SFDTD scheme is used to predict the specific absorption rate (SAR) for a simple model of a pregnant female woman (month 9) using radio frequency (RF) fields from 1.5 T and 3 T MRI systems (operating at approximately 64 and 128 MHz, respectively). The results suggest that by using a plasma protective layer under the 1.5 T MRI system, the SAR values for the pregnant woman and her fetus are significantly reduced. Additionally, for a 90 degree plasma protective layer, the SAR values are approximately equal to the 120 degree layer and the 180 degree layer, and it is reduced relative to the 60 degree layer. This proves that using a 90 degree plasma protective layer is the most effective and economical angle to use.     

Family refusal of emergency medical treatment in China: An investigation from legal,empirical and ethical perspectives

This paper is an analysis of the limits of family authority to refuse life saving treatment for a family member (in the Chinese medical context). Family consent has long been praised and practiced in many non-Western cultural settings such as China and Japan. In contrast, the controversy of family refusal remains less examined despite its prevalence in low-income and middle-income countries. In this paper, we investigate family refusal in medical emergencies through a combination of legal, empirical and ethical approaches, which is highly relevant to the ongoing discussion about the place of informed consent in non-Western cultures. We first provide an overview of the Chinese legislation concerning informed consent to show the significance of family values in the context of medical decision-making and demonstrate the lack of legal support to override family refusal. Next, we present the findings of a vignette question that investigated how 11,771 medical professionals and 2,944 patients in China responded to the family refusal of emergency treatment for an unconscious patient. In our analysis of these results, we employ ethical reasoning to question the legitimacy of family refusal of life-sustaining emergency treatment for temporarily incompetent patients. Last, we examine some practical obstacles encountered by medical professionals wishing to override family refusal to give context to the discussion.     

END‐OF‐LIFE CARE IN THE 21st CENTURY: ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN UNIVERSAL RIGHTS DISCOURSE

This article explores universal normative bases that could help to shape a workable legal construct that would facilitate a global use of advance directives. Although I believe that advance directives are of universal character, my primary aim in approaching this issue is to remain realistic. I will make three claims. First, I will argue that the principles of autonomy, dignity and informed consent, embodied in the Oviedo Convention and the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, could arguably be regarded as universal bases for the global use of advance directives. Second, I will demonstrate that, despite the apparent consensus of ethical authorities in support of their global use, it is unlikely, for the time being, that such consensus could lead to unqualified legal recognition of advance directives, because of different understandings of the nature of the international rules, meanings of autonomy and dignity which are context‐specific and culture‐specific, and existing imperfections that make advance directives either unworkable or hardly applicable in practice. The third claim suggests that the fact that the concept of the advance directive is not universally shared does not mean that it should not become so, but never as the only option in managing incompetent patients. A way to proceed is to prioritize work on developing higher standards in managing incompetent patients and on progressing towards the realization of universal human rights in the sphere of bioethics, by advocating a universal, legally binding international convention that would outlaw human rights violations in end‐of‐life decision‐making.     

The Nocebo Effect of Informed Consent

The nocebo effect, the mirror‐phenomenon to the placebo effect, is when the expectation of a negative outcome precipitates the corresponding symptom or leads to its exacerbation. One of the basic ethical duties in health care is to obtain informed consent from patients before treatment; however, the disclosure of information regarding potential complications or side effects that this involves may precipitate a nocebo effect. While dilemmas between the principles of respect for patient autonomy and of nonmaleficence are recognized in medical ethics, there has not yet been an ethical discussion focused on the potential dilemma raised by the nocebo effect of informed consent (NEIC). This dilemma is especially pernicious, since it involves a direct causality of harm by the caregiver that is unparalleled by other potential harmful effects of information disclosure. This paper articulates the dilemma of the NEIC and offers a seminal ethical analysis.     

Educational pelvic exams on anesthetized women: Why consent matters

It is argued here that the practice of medical students performing pelvic exams on women who are under anesthetic and have not consented is immoral and indefensible. This argument begins by laying out the ethical justification for the practice of informed consent, which can be found in autonomy and basic rights. Foregoing the process of consent within medicine can result in violations of both autonomy and basic rights, as well as trust, forming the basis of the wrong of unauthorized pelvic examinations. Several objections to this argument are considered, all of which stem from the idea that this practice constitutes an exception to the general requirement of informed consent. These objections suggest that nonconsensual pelvic examinations on women under anesthetic are ethically acceptable on utilitarian grounds, in that they offer benefits either to the patient or to society, or on the grounds of triviality, in that consent is already presumed, or the practice is insignificant. Each of these objections is rejected and the practice is deemed indefensible.     

The Responsibility Objection to Abortion: Rejecting the Notion that the Responsibility Objection Successfully Refutes a Woman's Right to Choose

This article considers the objection to abortion that a woman who voluntarily engages in sexual activity is responsible for her fetus and so cannot have an abortion. The conclusion argued for is that the conceptions of responsibility that can ground the objection that are considered do not necessitate a requirement on the part of a pregnant woman to carry her pregnancy to term. Thus, the iterations of the responsibility objection presented cannot be used to curtail reproductive choice.     

Prenatal diagnosis and significance of fetal infections.

Viruses like rubella, cytomegalovirus, varicella-zoster virus and parasites like Toxoplasma gondii can be transmitted from a pregnant woman to her fetus and can affect fetal development. Several factors determine the likelihood of fetal infection and the risk of consequences for the fetus, such as the timing of transmission during gestation or the immunologic status of the mother. No single diagnostic modality can be applied to all infections. Knowledge of the diagnostic methods available is essential for accurate counseling and treatment of affected pregnant women.     

Physical abuse during pregnancy: prevalence and risk factors

BACKGROUND: Violence during pregnancy is a health and social problem that poses particular risks to the woman and her fetus. To address the lack of Canadian information on this issue, the authors studied the prevalence and predictors of physical abuse in a sample of pregnant women in Saskatoon. METHODS: Of 728 women receiving prenatal services through the Saskatoon District public health system between Apr. 1, 1993, and Mar. 31, 1994, 605 gave informed consent to participate in the study and were interviewed in the second trimester. Of these, 543 were interviewed again late in the third trimester. During the initial interview, information was collected on the women''s sociodemographic characteristics, the current pregnancy, health practices and psychosocial variables. The second interview focused on the women''s experience of physical abuse during the pregnancy and during the preceding year, the demographic characteristics and the use of alcohol or illicit drugs by their male partner. RESULTS: In all, 31 (5.7%) of the women reported experiencing physical abuse during pregnancy; 46 (8.5%) reported experiencing it within the 12 months preceding the second interview. Of the 31 women 20 (63.3%) reported that the perpetrator was her husband, boyfriend or ex-husband. Although all ethnic groups of women suffered abuse, aboriginal women were at greater risk than nonaboriginal women (adjusted odds ratio 2.8, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.0-7.8). Women whose partner had a drinking problem were 3.4 times (95% CI 1.2-9.9) more likely to have been abused than women whose partner did not have a drinking problem. Perceived stress and number of negative life events in the preceding year were also predictors of abuse. Abused women tended to report having fewer people with whom they could talk about personal issues or get together; however, they reported socializing with a larger number of people in the month before the second interview than did the women who were not abused. INTERPRETATION: Physical abuse affects a significant minority of pregnant women and is associated with stress, lack of perceived support and a partner with a drinking problem.     

Perceived Quality of Informed Refusal Process: A Cross‐Sectional Study from Iranian Patients' Perspectives

Patients have the right to refuse their treatment; however, this refusal should be informed. We evaluated the quality of the informed refusal process in Iranian hospitals from patients' viewpoints. To this end, we developed a questionnaire that covered four key aspects of the informed refusal process including; information disclosure, voluntariness, comprehension, and provider‐patient relationship. A total of 284 patients who refused their treatment from 12 teaching hospitals in the Isfahan Province, Iran, were recruited and surveyed to produce a convenience sample. Patients' perceptions about the informed refusal process were scored and the mean scores of the four components were calculated. The findings showed that the practice of information disclosure (9.6 ± 6.4 out of 22 points) was perceived to be moderate, however, comprehension (2.3 ± 1.4 out of 4 points), voluntariness (8.7 ± 1.5 out of 12 points) and provider–patient relationship (10.2 ± 5.2 out of 16 points) were perceived to be relatively good. We found that patients, who refused their care before any treatment had commenced, reported a lower quality of information disclosure and voluntariness. Patients informed by nurses and those who had not had a previous related admission, reported lower scores for comprehension and relationship. In conclusion, the process of obtaining informed refusal was relatively satisfactory except for levels of information disclosure. To improve current practices, Iranian patients need to be better informed about; different treatment options, consequences of treatment refusal, costs of not continuing treatment and follow‐ups after refusal. Developing more informative refusal forms is needed.