Judgments of Cruelty Toward Animals: Sex Differences and Effect of Awareness of Suffering

ABSTRACT

There is widespread agreement that cruelty toward animals is unacceptable (Hills 1994). Less clear is how people understand and make judgments about cruelty. A question of theoretical and practical importance is whether people judge the cruelty of what happens independently of the cruelty of the person responsible. In this study, 501 male and female business students read a scenario depicting suffering caused to an animal. The person responsible was aware of and indifferent to causing suffering in one version of the scenario, but unaware and subsequently distressed in another version. The dependant variables were participant ratings of: (a) the cruelty of what happened; (b) the cruelty of the person responsible; (c) how angry, and (d) how sad they felt on reading the scenario. Sex of participant main effects occurred for all four variables. A main effect of awareness for cruelty of the person, but not for cruelty of what happened, supported the independence of the two cruelty judgments. However, awareness by sex interactions on all variables except sadness complicated interpretation.     

The Humanity of Animals and the Animality of Humans: A View from Biological Anthropology Inspired by J. M. Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello

In his novel Elizabeth Costello (2003), J. M. Coetzee's title character espouses philosophical perspectives on cruelty and the human condition in a series of fictionalized lectures. In particular, she takes on the question of human cruelty to animals. As novelist, Coetzee relies on lyrical statements about the nature of cruelty, analogies between the atrocities of fascism and factory farms, and ethical elitism to address these issues. In this article, I use anthropological data to investigate such constructed notions of "human cruelty" and "human nature." I end with a discussion of cross-cultural variation in animal use by humans and of the current animal rights movement. The goal of this article is to engage, anthropologically, perspectives on cruelty in human natures and our relations with other animals.     

What really is the nature of suffering? Three problems with Eric Cassell’s concept of distress

Eric Cassell famously defined suffering as a person’s severe distress at a threat to their personal integrity. This article draws attention to some problems with the concept of distress in this theory. In particular, I argue that Cassell’s theory turns on distress but does not define it, which, in light of the complexity of distress, problematizes suffering in three ways: first, suffering becomes too equivocal to apply in at least some cases that Cassell nevertheless identifies as suffering; second, Cassell’s account does not explain what sort of experience suffering is, resulting in theoretical and practical difficulties in distinguishing it from other medical conditions; third, there is good reason to believe that, in medical contexts, ‘distress’ just means ‘suffering’ or some cognate concept not yet distinguished from it, rendering Cassell’s theory circular. I consider a rebuttal to my objections and reply, concluding that Cassell’s theory of suffering needs a definition of distress to settle what the nature of suffering really is.     

An Exploratory Study of Domestic Violence: Perpetrators’ Reports of Violence Against Animals

The goal of the current exploratory study was to examine associations between animal cruelty (AC), intimate partner violence (IPV), and antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) among incarcerated adult males. Forty-two men incarcerated in a state prison participated in the study; all participants were incarcerated for IPV and/or admitted to committing IPV in a past relationship. They completed measures on childhood animal cruelty (CAC), lifetime prevalence of AC, and IPV. It was hypothesized that men with ASPD diagnoses would report greater exposure to, and perpetration of, AC, as well as more severe IPV behaviors. It was also expected that lifetime exposure to, and perpetration of, AC would be associated with greater animal abuse in the context of IPV. Lastly, it was hypothesized that participants who reported exposure to, and perpetration of, AC would also report higher rates of IPV behaviors. Rates of animal cruelty were high in this sample. Approximately 36% of participants endorsed CAC, 81% reported animal cruelty perpetration in their lifetime, 85.7% reported being exposed to animal cruelty during their lifetime, 38% endorsed using threats against animals during a relationship conflict, and 52% reported abusing and/or killing a pet during a relationship conflict. CAC was significantly related to increased use of psychological abuse and sexual coercion in the context of intimate relationships. ASPD was not related to animal cruelty in the context of IPV. CAC was significantly associated with both threats to, and actual perpetration of, animal abuse during relationship conflicts. The limitations and implications of our findings are discussed in relation to future research.     

Automata, Living and Non-Living: Descartes' Mechanical Biology and His Criteria for Life

Despite holding to the essential distinction between mind and body, Descartes did not adopt a life-body dualism. Though humans are the only creatures which can reason, as they are the only creatures whose body is in an intimate union with a soul, they are not the only finite beings who are alive. In the present note, I attempt to determine Descartes' criteria for something to be 'living.' Though certain passages associate such a principle with the presence of a properly functioning heart, I show that there are important reasons for also understanding life in terms of a degree of complexity of design.     

The Relationship between Childhood Cruelty to Animals and Psychological Adjustment: A Malaysian Study

ABSTRACT

In Western research, cruelty to animals in childhood has been associated with comorbid conduct problems and with interpersonal violence in later life. However, there is little understanding of the etiology of cruelty to animals, and what in the child's life may require attention if the chain linking animal cruelty and later violence is to be broken. The study reported in this paper investigated the association between parent-reported cruelty to animals, and parent- and self-reported psychological strengths and weaknesses in a sample of 379 elementary school children in an Eastern context, Malaysia. No gender differences were found in relation to cruelty to animals or psychological problems, as assessed with the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ). However, there were different predictors of cruelty to animals for boys and girls. Regression analyses found that for boys, parent-reported hyperactivity was a unique predictor of Malicious and Total Cruelty to animals. For girls, self-reported conduct problems was a unique predictor of Typical Cruelty to animals. Parent-reported total difficulties were associated with Typical, Malicious, and Total Cruelty to animals. We suggest that routine screening of children with an instrument such as the SDQ may help to detect those children who may need to undergo further assessment and perhaps intervention to break the chain linking childhood cruelty to animals and later conduct problems.     

Autonomy and Why You Can “Never Let Me Go”

Kazuo Ishiguro’s book Never Let Me Go is a thoughtful and provocative exploration of what it means to be human. Drawing on insights from the hermeneutic-phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, I argue that the movement of Ishiguro’s story can be understood in terms of actualising the human potential for autonomous action. Liberal theories take autonomy to be concerned with analytically and ethically isolatable social units directing their lives in accordance with self-interested preferences, arrived at by means of rational calculation. However, I argue that such theories are simplistic abstractions from our human-life world, distorting the fundamental embodied, embedded, and relational nature of autonomy. When we attend closely to our concrete, lived existence we see instead that autonomy is about responding appropriately to others with whom we share a world. As we follow the path of Ishiguro’s central character Kathy H., we are shown how an awareness and acceptance of our existential finitude as precarious and fallible creatures is necessary for guiding such appropriate interactions. As Kathy grows and is affirmed into her life-world, which grounds and supports her Being, she moves from heteronomy to autonomy; from being moved by external laws to embodying those laws, thereby becoming autonomous. This is exemplified by her appropriation of the carer role, through which she responds in a fitting way to those with whom she shares her world, bearing the weight of and dwelling responsibly within our human condition.     

Perception and Conception: Shaping Human Minds

Perceptual experiences provide an important source of information about the world. It is clear that having the capacity of undergoing such experiences yields an evolutionary advantage. But why should humans have developed not only the ability of simply seeing, but also of seeing that something is thus and so? In this paper, I explore the significance of distinguishing perception from conception for the development of the kind of minds that creatures such as humans typically have. As will become clear, it is crucial to pay careful attention to the different kinds of information that are involved in perceiving and conceiving (including the way such information is gathered and transmitted). By identifying such kinds of information and the role they play, we can then understand an important feature of why creatures like us have the kind of consciousness and mental processes we do.     

The autophagy community

There are various definitions of community. A definition that I found in one of my dictionaries is the following: “A social, religious, occupational, or other group sharing common characteristics or interests and perceived or perceiving itself as distinct in some respect from the larger society within which it exists.” Thus, I think it is fair to say that there is a worldwide autophagy community. That is, there is a group of researchers (our occupation), whose members share an interest in autophagy (our common characteristic), and that group is distinct from the larger society (I do not want to begin describing the many ways this applies). But do we feel like a community, and do we need a community? I suggest that a community is indeed beneficial, and I propose one mechanism for enhancing the development of the autophagy community.     

On the use of the word 'epigenetic'

Over the past few years we have seen an odd change, or extension, in the use of the word 'epigenetic' when describing matters of gene regulation in eukaryotes. Although it may generally be that it is not worth arguing over definitions, this is true only insofar as the participants in the discussion know what each other means. I believe the altered use of the term carries baggage from the standard definition that can have misleading implications. Here I wish to probe our use of language in this way, and to show how such a discussion leads to some more general considerations concerning gene regulation.     

THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY FOR BIOETHICS

It has long been thought that certain key bioethical views depend heavily on work in personal identity theory, regarding questions of either our essence or the conditions of our numerical identity across time. In this paper I argue to the contrary, that personal identity is actually not significant at all in this arena. Specifically, I explore three topics where considerations of identity are thought to be essential – abortion, definition of death, and advance directives – and I show in each case that the significant work is being done by a relation other than identity.     

Organisms in evolution

Organisms constitute one of the most remarkable features of our living world. However, they have not yet received any accepted characterization within the framework of the evolutionary theory. The reasons for this contrast between the saliency of organisms in the biological landscape and their theoretical status are multiple and they are analyzed in the first part of this paper. Starting from this contrast, I argue for a theoretically grounded concept of organism within the framework of evolutionary theory itself. To this effect I argue that the theory of major transitions in evolution (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Michod 1999) provides us with the theoretical basis for an understanding of the individuality of organisms and I propose a first characterization of organisms as evolutionary units structured by a division of reproductive labor among their parts. I also discuss one of the most important implications of this definition, namely that some colonial entities are to be counted as superorganisms. Finally, I show that though theoretically satisfying, this definition does not suffice in order fully to individuate the organisms and superorganisms in practice. To this end, physiology is needed, because it offers us some criteria for their individuation in ecological space. These criteria, however, are not immune to errors through misidentification and their shortcomings are discussed in the last section. In conclusion, I emphasize the positive implications of these criteria concerning the ecological significance of organisms.     

Suffering at the end of life

In the end‐of‐life context, alleviation of the suffering of a distressed patient is usually seen as a, if not the, central goal for the medical personnel treating her. Yet it has also been argued that suffering should be seen as a part of good dying. More precisely, it has been maintained that alleviating a dying patient’s suffering can make her unable to take care of practical end‐of‐life matters, deprive her of an opportunity to ask questions about and find meaning in and for her existence, and detach her from reality. In this article, I argue that the aims referred to either do not support suffering or are better served by alleviating it. When the aims would be equally well served by enduring suffering and relieving it, the latter appears to be the preferable option, given that the distress a patient experiences has no positive intrinsic value. Indeed, as the suffering can be very distressing, it may not be worth bearing even if that was the best way to achieve the aims: the distress can sometimes be bad enough to outbalance the worth of achieving the goals. Having considered an objection to the effect that a patient can have a self‐regarding moral duty to endure the distress she faces at the end of life, I conclude that the burden of proof is on the side of those who maintain that the suffering experienced at the end of life ought to be endured as a part of dying well.     

The autophagy community

There are various definitions of community. A definition that I found in one of my dictionaries is the following: “A social, religious, occupational, or other group sharing common characteristics or interests and perceived or perceiving itself as distinct in some respect from the larger society within which it exists.” Thus, I think it is fair to say that there is a worldwide autophagy community. That is, there is a group of researchers (our occupation), whose members share an interest in autophagy (our common characteristic), and that group is distinct from the larger society (I do not want to begin describing the many ways this applies). But do we feel like a community, and do we need a community? I suggest that a community is indeed beneficial, and I propose one mechanism for enhancing the development of the autophagy community.     

生物进化的根本动因在于主体程序的内化

通过主体、主体程序、内化、外化(进化)等核心概念的揭示和接入,展开了生命演化的崭新画卷——导致生物外在进化的根本动因是基于宇宙演化而产生的主体程序。论述了基于主体程序内化的引领及其与外化(进化)的互动,才使生物不断由低级走向到高级,并最终导致人类及人类精神的产生。主体程序理论的提出主旨在于弥补进化论在内在动因方面的重大缺陷,并由此奠定根本性解释生命现象的理论基础。     

Childhood Cruelty to Animals: Assessing Cruelty Dimensions and Motivations

ABSTRACT

Preventing and treating childhood cruelty to animals will require a) qualitative, as well as quantitative, assessment methods and b) specification of the varied motivations for such behavior. Although some information is available about the prevalence and frequency of animal maltreatment in samples of children and adolescents, especially those diagnosed with Conduct Disorder, other dimensions of such maltreatment (e.g., severity, chronicity) are only beginning to be explored.

We describe the research and development process leading to construction of a semi-structured interview, the Children and Animals (Cruelty to Animals) Assessment Instrument (CAAI), for use with children over four years of age and their parents, to obtain information on animal maltreatment. The CAAI was field-tested with a community and clinical sample of twenty children and included children in day treatment and residential programs for emotionally disturbed youth, incarcerated adolescents, and children accompanying their mothers to shelters for battered women.

The dimensions of cruelty to animals scorable using the CAAI include: SEVERITY (degree of intentional pain/injury caused), FREQUENCY (number of separate acts), DURATION (period of time over which cruelty occurred), RECENCY (most current acts), DIVERSITY ACROSS AND WITHIN CATEGORIES (number of types and number of animals within a type that were abused), ANIMAL SENTIENCE LEVEL, COVERT (related to child's attempts to conceal cruelty), ISOLATE (individual versus group cruelty), and EMPATHY (indications of remorse or concern for the injured animal). A method is described for converting these ratings to numerical scores in which higher scores indicate more severe, problematic cruelty. Varied motivations for children's cruelty to animals are discussed including curiosity and peer reinforcement, modification of mood state, imitation of adult cruelty, and using animals as an “implement” of self-injury. The need for the CAAI is especially critical for assessment since we often found discrepancies between parent reports on one-item cruelty-to-animals assessments (e.g., Child Behavior Checklist) and CAAI results.     

浅析物种概念的演变历史

本文是一篇关于物种概念演变的简述。生物学家用不同的方法或标准划分物种, 就形成了不同的物种概念, 如生物学物种、形态学物种、生态学物种、进化物种、系统发生或支序物种, 或它们的组合, 等等。它们都揭示了物种属性的特定侧面, 都是不同物种客观存在的真实反映, 但都无法令所有人满意。对真核生物来说, 无论它们在形态上的差别有多大, 生殖隔离(不能产生可育的后代)应该是两个群体能否真正分化成不同物种的关键, 这种隔离机制可以是地理的、行为的或其他方式; 而生殖隔离总会伴随着一些形态或遗传上的变化, 虽然这些特征可能与生殖隔离本身并无多大关系, 但往往成为分类学家或分子进化生物学家区分种的依据,对已经灭绝的化石物种来说, 生殖隔离的物种划分方式就无能为力了。如何准确定义一个物种依然充满着矛盾, 因为基于生殖隔离的物种概念不实用, 而实用的物种概念(如形态学物种)又被认为是人为的。     

Defining Life: The Virus Viewpoint

Are viruses alive? Until very recently, answering this question was often negative and viruses were not considered in discussions on the origin and definition of life. This situation is rapidly changing, following several discoveries that have modified our vision of viruses. It has been recognized that viruses have played (and still play) a major innovative role in the evolution of cellular organisms. New definitions of viruses have been proposed and their position in the universal tree of life is actively discussed. Viruses are no more confused with their virions, but can be viewed as complex living entities that transform the infected cell into a novel organism—the virus—producing virions. I suggest here to define life (an historical process) as the mode of existence of ribosome encoding organisms (cells) and capsid encoding organisms (viruses) and their ancestors. I propose to define an organism as an ensemble of integrated organs (molecular or cellular) producing individuals evolving through natural selection. The origin of life on our planet would correspond to the establishment of the first organism corresponding to this definition.     

The Science of Animal Suffering

Can suffering in non‐human animals be studied scientifically? Apart from verbal reports of subjective feelings, which are uniquely human, I argue that it is possible to study the negative emotions we refer to as suffering by the same methods we use in ourselves. In particular, by asking animals what they find positively and negatively reinforcing (what they want and do not want), we can define positive and negative emotional states. Such emotional states may or may not be accompanied by subjective feelings but fortunately it is not necessary to solve the problem of consciousness to construct a scientific study of suffering and welfare. Improvements in animal welfare can be based on the answers to two questions: Q1: Will it improve animal health? and Q2: Will it give the animals something they want? This apparently simple formulation has the advantage of capturing what most people mean by ‘improving welfare’ and so halting a potentially dangerous split between scientific and non‐scientific definitions of welfare. It can also be used to validate other controversial approaches to welfare such as naturalness, stereotypies, physiological and biochemical measures. Health and what animals want are thus not just two of many measures of welfare. They provide the definition of welfare against which others can be validated. They also tell us what research we have to do and how we can judge whether welfare of animals has been genuinely improved. What is important, however, is for this research to be done in situ so that it is directly applicable to the real world of farming, the sea or an animal’s wild habitat. It is here that ethology can make major contributions.