Virulence and genetic compatibility of polymerase reassortant viruses derived from the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus and circulating influenza A viruses

Gene mutations and reassortment are key mechanisms by which influenza A virus acquires virulence factors. To evaluate the role of the viral polymerase replication machinery in producing virulent pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza viruses, we generated various polymerase point mutants (PB2, 627K/701N; PB1, expression of PB1-F2 protein; and PA, 97I) and reassortant viruses with various sources of influenza viruses by reverse genetics. Although the point mutations produced no significant change in pathogenicity, reassortment between the pandemic A/California/04/09 (CA04, H1N1) and current human and animal influenza viruses produced variants possessing a broad spectrum of pathogenicity in the mouse model. Although most polymerase reassortants had attenuated pathogenicity (including those containing seasonal human H3N2 and high-pathogenicity H5N1 virus segments) compared to that of the parental CA04 (H1N1) virus, some recombinants had significantly enhanced virulence. Unexpectedly, one of the five highly virulent reassortants contained a A/Swine/Korea/JNS06/04(H3N2)-like PB2 gene with no known virulence factors; the other four had mammalian-passaged avian-like genes encoding PB2 featuring 627K, PA featuring 97I, or both. Overall, the reassorted polymerase complexes were only moderately compatible for virus rescue, probably because of disrupted molecular interactions involving viral or host proteins. Although we observed close cooperation between PB2 and PB1 from similar virus origins, we found that PA appears to be crucial in maintaining viral gene functions in the context of the CA04 (H1N1) virus. These observations provide helpful insights into the pathogenic potential of reassortant influenza viruses composed of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus and prevailing human or animal influenza viruses that could emerge in the future.     

Characterization of a human H5N1 influenza A virus isolated in 2003

In 2003, H5N1 avian influenza virus infections were diagnosed in two Hong Kong residents who had visited the Fujian province in mainland China, affording us the opportunity to characterize one of the viral isolates, A/Hong Kong/213/03 (HK213; H5N1). In contrast to H5N1 viruses isolated from humans during the 1997 outbreak in Hong Kong, HK213 retained several features of aquatic bird viruses, including the lack of a deletion in the neuraminidase stalk and the absence of additional oligosaccharide chains at the globular head of the hemagglutinin molecule. It demonstrated weak pathogenicity in mice and ferrets but caused lethal infection in chickens. The original isolate failed to produce disease in ducks but became more pathogenic after five passages. Taken together, these findings portray the HK213 isolate as an aquatic avian influenza A virus without the molecular changes associated with the replication of H5N1 avian viruses in land-based poultry such as chickens. This case challenges the view that adaptation to land-based poultry is a prerequisite for the replication of aquatic avian influenza A viruses in humans.     

Role of host cytokine responses in the pathogenesis of avian H5N1 influenza viruses in mice

Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses are now widespread in poultry in Asia and have recently spread to some African and European countries. Interspecies transmission of these viruses to humans poses a major threat to public health. To better understand the basis of pathogenesis of H5N1 viruses, we have investigated the role of proinflammatory cytokines in transgenic mice deficient in interleukin-6 (IL-6), macrophage inflammatory protein 1 alpha (MIP-1alpha), IL-1 receptor (IL-1R), or tumor necrosis factor receptor 1 (TNFR1) by the use of two avian influenza A viruses isolated from humans, A/Hong Kong/483/97 (HK/483) and A/Hong Kong/486/97 (HK/486), which exhibit high and low lethality in mice, respectively. The course of disease and the extent of virus replication and spread in IL-6- and MIP-1alpha-deficient mice were not different from those observed in wild-type mice during acute infection with 1,000 50% mouse infective doses of either H5N1 virus. However, with HK/486 virus, IL-1R-deficient mice exhibited heightened morbidity and mortality due to infection, whereas no such differences were observed with the more virulent HK/483 virus. Furthermore, TNFR1-deficient mice exhibited significantly reduced morbidity following challenge with either H5N1 virus but no difference in viral replication and spread or ultimate disease outcome compared with wild-type mice. These results suggest that TNF-alpha may contribute to morbidity during H5N1 influenza virus infection, while IL-1 may be important for effective virus clearance in nonlethal H5N1 disease.     

NP, PB1, and PB2 viral genes contribute to altered replication of H5N1 avian influenza viruses in chickens

The virulence determinants for highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are considered multigenic, although the best characterized virulence factor is the hemagglutinin (HA) cleavage site. The capability of influenza viruses to reassort gene segments is one potential way for new viruses to emerge with different virulence characteristics. To evaluate the role of other gene segments in virulence, we used reverse genetics to generate two H5N1 recombinant viruses with differing pathogenicity in chickens. Single-gene reassortants were used to determine which viral genes contribute to the altered virulence. Exchange of the PB1, PB2, and NP genes impacted replication of the reassortant viruses while also affecting the expression of specific host genes. Disruption of the parental virus' functional polymerase complexes by exchanging PB1 or PB2 genes decreased viral replication in tissues and consequently the pathogenicity of the viruses. In contrast, exchanging the NP gene greatly increased viral replication and expanded tissue tropism, thus resulting in decreased mean death times. Infection with the NP reassortant virus also resulted in the upregulation of gamma interferon and inducible nitric oxide synthase gene expression. In addition to the impact of PB1, PB2, and NP on viral replication, the HA, NS, and M genes also contributed to the pathogenesis of the reassortant viruses. While the pathogenesis of AIVs in chickens is clearly dependent on the interaction of multiple gene products, we have shown that single-gene reassortment events are sufficient to alter the virulence of AIVs in chickens.     

Reassortment between Avian H5N1 and Human Influenza Viruses Is Mainly Restricted to the Matrix and Neuraminidase Gene Segments

Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses have devastated the poultry industry in many countries of the eastern hemisphere. Occasionally H5N1 viruses cross the species barrier and infect humans, sometimes with a severe clinical outcome. When this happens, there is a chance of reassortment between H5N1 and human influenza viruses. To assess the potential of H5N1 viruses to reassort with contemporary human influenza viruses (H1N1, H3N2 and pandemic H1N1), we used an in vitro selection method to generate reassortant viruses, that contained the H5 hemagglutinin gene, and that have a replication advantage in vitro. We found that the neuraminidase and matrix gene segments of human influenza viruses were preferentially selected by H5 viruses. However, these H5 reassortant viruses did not show a marked increase in replication in MDCK cells and human bronchial epithelial cells. In ferrets, inoculation with a mixture of H5N1-pandemic H1N1 reassortant viruses resulted in outgrowth of reassortant H5 viruses that had incorporated the neuraminidase and matrix gene segment of pandemic 2009 H1N1. This virus was not transmitted via aerosols or respiratory droplets to naïve recipient ferrets. Altogether, these data emphasize the potential of avian H5N1 viruses to reassort with contemporary human influenza viruses. The neuraminidase and matrix gene segments of human influenza viruses showed the highest genetic compatibility with HPAI H5N1 virus.     

The PDZ-binding motif of the avian NS1 protein affects transmission of the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) virus

By nature of their segmented RNA genome, influenza A viruses (IAVs) have the potential to generate variants through a reassortment process. The influenza nonstructural (NS) gene is critical for a virus to counteract the antiviral responses of the host. Therefore, a newly acquired NS segment potentially determines the replication efficiency of the reassortant virus in a range of different hosts. In addition, the C-terminal PDZ-binding motif (PBM) has been suggested as a pathogenic determinant of IAVs. To gauge the pandemic potential from human and avian IAV reassortment, we assessed the replication properties of NS-reassorted viruses in cultured cells and in the lungs of mice and determined their transmissibility in guinea pigs. Compared with the recombinant A/Korea/01/2009 virus (rK09; 2009 pandemic H1N1 strain), the rK09/VN:NS virus, in which the NS gene was adopted from the A/Vietnam/1203/2004 virus (a human isolate of the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus strains), exhibited attenuated virulence and reduced transmissibility. However, the rK09/VN:NS-PBM virus, harboring the PBM in the C-terminus of the NS1 protein, recovered the attenuated virulence of the rK09/VN:NS virus. In a guinea pig model, the rK09/VN:NS-PBM virus showed even greater transmission efficiency than the rK/09 virus. These results suggest that the PBM in the NS1 protein may determine viral persistence in the human and avian IAV interface.     

Genetic compatibility and virulence of reassortants derived from contemporary avian H5N1 and human H3N2 influenza A viruses

The segmented structure of the influenza virus genome plays a pivotal role in its adaptation to new hosts and the emergence of pandemics. Despite concerns about the pandemic threat posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses, little is known about the biological properties of H5N1 viruses that may emerge following reassortment with contemporary human influenza viruses. In this study, we used reverse genetics to generate the 63 possible virus reassortants derived from H5N1 and H3N2 viruses, containing the H5N1 surface protein genes, and analyzed their viability, replication efficiency, and mouse virulence. Specific constellations of avian-human viral genes proved deleterious for viral replication in cell culture, possibly due to disruption of molecular interaction networks. In particular, striking phenotypes were noted with heterologous polymerase subunits, as well as NP and M, or NS. However, nearly one-half of the reassortants replicated with high efficiency in vitro, revealing a high degree of compatibility between avian and human virus genes. Thirteen reassortants displayed virulent phenotypes in mice and may pose the greatest threat for mammalian hosts. Interestingly, one of the most pathogenic reassortants contained avian PB1, resembling the 1957 and 1968 pandemic viruses. Our results reveal the broad spectrum of phenotypes associated with H5N1/H3N2 reassortment and a possible role for the avian PB1 in the emergence of pandemic influenza. These observations have important implications for risk assessment of H5N1 reassortant viruses detected in surveillance programs.     

Growth and Pathogenic Potential of Naturally Selected Reassortants after Coinfection with Pandemic H1N1 and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses

Coinfection of ferrets with H5N1 and pH1N1 viruses resulted in two predominate genotypes in the lungs containing surface genes of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus in the backbone of pandemic H1N1 2009 (pH1N1). Compared to parental strains, these reassortants exhibited increased growth and virulence in vitro and in mice but failed to be transmitted indirectly to naive contact ferrets. Thus, this demonstrates a possible natural reassortment following coinfection as well as the pathogenicity of the potential reassortants.     

The Short Stalk Length of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Virus Neuraminidase Limits Transmission of Pandemic H1N1 Virus in Ferrets

H5N1 influenza viruses pose a pandemic threat but have not acquired the ability to support sustained transmission between mammals in nature. The restrictions to transmissibility of avian influenza viruses in mammals are multigenic, and overcoming them requires adaptations in hemagglutinin (HA) and PB2 genes. Here we propose that a further restriction to mammalian transmission of the majority of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses may be the short stalk length of the neuraminidase (NA) protein. This genetic feature is selected for when influenza viruses adapt to chickens. In our study, a recombinant virus with seven gene segments from a human isolate of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic combined with the NA gene from a typical chicken-adapted H5N1 virus with a short stalk did not support transmission by respiratory droplet between ferrets. This virus was also compromised in multicycle replication in cultures of human airway epithelial cells at 32°C. These defects correlated with a reduction in the ability of virus with a short-stalk NA to penetrate mucus and deaggregate virions. The deficiency in transmission and in cleavage of tethered substrates was overcome by increasing the stalk length of the NA protein. These observations suggest that H5N1 viruses that acquire a long-stalk NA through reassortment might be more likely to support transmission between humans. Phylogenetic analysis showed that reassortment with long-stalk NA occurred sporadically and as recently as 2011. However, all identified H5N1 viruses with a long-stalk NA lacked other mammalian adapting features and were thus several genetic steps away from becoming transmissible between humans.     

Characterization of an artificial swine-origin influenza virus with the same gene combination as H1N1/2009 virus: a genesis clue of pandemic strain

Pandemic H1N1/2009 influenza virus, derived from a reassortment of avian, human, and swine influenza viruses, possesses a unique gene segment combination that had not been detected previously in animal and human populations. Whether such a gene combination could result in the pathogenicity and transmission as H1N1/2009 virus remains unclear. In the present study, we used reverse genetics to construct a reassortant virus (rH1N1) with the same gene combination as H1N1/2009 virus (NA and M genes from a Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine virus and another six genes from a North American triple-reassortant H1N2 swine virus). Characterization of rH1N1 in mice showed that this virus had higher replicability and pathogenicity than those of the seasonal human H1N1 and Eurasian avian-like swine H1N1 viruses, but was similar to the H1N1/2009 and triple-reassortant H1N2 viruses. Experiments performed on guinea pigs showed that rH1N1 was not transmissible, whereas pandemic H1N1/2009 displayed efficient transmissibility. To further determine which gene segment played a key role in transmissibility, we constructed a series of reassortants derived from rH1N1 and H1N1/2009 viruses. Direct contact transmission studies demonstrated that the HA and NS genes contributed to the transmission of H1N1/2009 virus. Second, the HA gene of H1N1/2009 virus, when combined with the H1N1/2009 NA gene, conferred efficient contact transmission among guinea pigs. The present results reveal that not only gene segment reassortment but also amino acid mutation were needed for the generation of the pandemic influenza virus.     

Continued circulation in China of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses encoding the hemagglutinin gene associated with the 1997 H5N1 outbreak in poultry and humans

Since the outbreak in humans of an H5N1 avian influenza virus in Hong Kong in 1997, poultry entering the live-bird markets of Hong Kong have been closely monitored for infection with avian influenza. In March 1999, this monitoring system detected geese that were serologically positive for H5N1 avian influenza virus, but the birds were marketed before they could be sampled for virus. However, viral isolates were obtained by swabbing the cages that housed the geese. These samples, known collectively as A/Environment/Hong Kong/437/99 (A/Env/HK/437/99), contained four viral isolates, which were compared to the 1997 H5N1 Hong Kong isolates. Analysis of A/Env/HK/437/99 viruses revealed that the four isolates are nearly identical genetically and are most closely related to A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96. These isolates and the 1997 H5N1 Hong Kong viruses encode common hemagglutinin (H5) genes that have identical hemagglutinin cleavage sites. Thus, the pathogenicity of the A/Env/HK/437/99 viruses was compared in chickens and in mice to evaluate the potential for disease outbreaks in poultry and humans. The A/Env/HK/437/99 isolates were highly pathogenic in chickens but caused a longer mean death time and had altered cell tropism compared to A/Hong Kong/156/97 (A/HK/156/97). Like A/HK/156/97, the A/Env/HK/437/99 viruses replicated in mice and remained localized to the respiratory tract. However, the A/Env/HK/437/99 isolates caused only mild pathological lesions in these tissues and no clinical signs of disease or death. As a measure of the immune response to these viruses, transforming growth factor beta levels were determined in the serum of infected mice and showed elevated levels for the A/Env/HK/437/99 viruses compared to the A/HK/156/97 viruses. This study is the first to characterize the A/Env/HK/437/99 viruses in both avian and mammalian species, evaluating the H5 gene from the 1997 Hong Kong H5N1 isolates in a different genetic background. Our findings reveal that at least one of the avian influenza virus genes encoded by the 1997 H5N1 Hong Kong viruses continues to circulate in mainland China and that this gene is important for pathogenesis in chickens but is not the sole determinant of pathogenicity in mice. There is evidence that H9N2 viruses, which have internal genes in common with the 1997 H5N1 Hong Kong isolates, are still circulating in Hong Kong and China as well, providing a heterogeneous gene pool for viral reassortment. The implications of these findings for the potential for human disease are discussed.     

Genome Sequence of a Natural Reassortant H5N2 Avian Influenza Virus from Domestic Mallard Ducks in Eastern China

Here, we report the genomic sequence of a Chinese reassortant H5N2 avian influenza virus which possessed the polybasic motif PLREKRRK-R/GL at the hemagglutinin cleavage site. Phylogenetic analysis showed that all eight genes were of the Eurasian lineage, five of which were highly homologous to the endemic clade 2.3.4 H5N1 viruses and their H5N5 reassortant descendants. These data suggested that novel multisubtypic NA reassortants bearing the H5N1 backbone could be generated through genetic reassortment in H5N1 circulating regions, which will help in understanding the evolution and segment reassortment mechanism of H5 subtype avian influenza viruses.     

Polymerase Discordance in Novel Swine Influenza H3N2v Constellations Is Tolerated in Swine but Not Human Respiratory Epithelial Cells

Swine-origin H3N2v, a variant of H3N2 influenza virus, is a concern for novel reassortment with circulating pandemic H1N1 influenza virus (H1N1pdm09) in swine because this can lead to the emergence of a novel pandemic virus. In this study, the reassortment prevalence of H3N2v with H1N1pdm09 was determined in swine cells. Reassortants evaluated showed that the H1N1pdm09 polymerase (PA) segment occurred within swine H3N2 with ∼80% frequency. The swine H3N2-human H1N1pdm09 PA reassortant (swH3N2-huPA) showed enhanced replication in swine cells, and was the dominant gene constellation. Ferrets infected with swH3N2-huPA had increased lung pathogenicity compared to parent viruses; however, swH3N2-huPA replication in normal human bronchoepithelial cells was attenuated - a feature linked to expression of IFN-β and IFN-λ genes in human but not swine cells. These findings indicate that emergence of novel H3N2v influenza constellations require more than changes in the viral polymerase complex to overcome barriers to cross-species transmission. Additionally, these findings reveal that while the ferret model is highly informative for influenza studies, slight differences in pathogenicity may not necessarily be indicative of human outcomes after infection.     

Distinct pathogenesis of hong kong-origin H5N1 viruses in mice compared to that of other highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza viruses

In 1997, an outbreak of virulent H5N1 avian influenza virus occurred in poultry in Hong Kong (HK) and was linked to a direct transmission to humans. The factors associated with transmission of avian influenza virus to mammals are not fully understood, and the potential risk of other highly virulent avian influenza A viruses infecting and causing disease in mammals is not known. In this study, two avian and one human HK-origin H5N1 virus along with four additional highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza viruses were analyzed for their pathogenicity in 6- to 8-week-old BALB/c mice. Both the avian and human HK H5 influenza virus isolates caused severe disease in mice, characterized by induced hypothermia, clinical signs, rapid weight loss, and 75 to 100% mortality by 6 to 8 days postinfection. Three of the non-HK-origin isolates caused no detectable clinical signs. One isolate, A/tk/England/91 (H5N1), induced measurable disease, and all but one of the animals recovered. Infections resulted in mild to severe lesions in both the upper and lower respiratory tracts. Most consistently, the viruses caused necrosis in respiratory epithelium of the nasal cavity, trachea, bronchi, and bronchioles with accompanying inflammation. The most severe and widespread lesions were observed in the lungs of HK avian influenza virus-infected mice, while no lesions or only mild lesions were evident with A/ck/Scotland/59 (H5N1) and A/ck/Queretaro/95 (H5N2). The A/ck/Italy/97 (H5N2) and the A/tk/England/91 (H5N1) viruses exhibited intermediate pathogenicity, producing mild to moderate respiratory tract lesions. In addition, infection by the different isolates could be further distinguished by the mouse immune response. The non-HK-origin isolates all induced production of increased levels of active transforming growth factor beta following infection, while the HK-origin isolates did not.     

Acid stability of the hemagglutinin protein regulates H5N1 influenza virus pathogenicity

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5N1 subtype continue to threaten agriculture and human health. Here, we use biochemistry and x-ray crystallography to reveal how amino-acid variations in the hemagglutinin (HA) protein contribute to the pathogenicity of H5N1 influenza virus in chickens. HA proteins from highly pathogenic (HP) A/chicken/Hong Kong/YU562/2001 and moderately pathogenic (MP) A/goose/Hong Kong/437-10/1999 isolates of H5N1 were found to be expressed and cleaved in similar amounts, and both proteins had similar receptor-binding properties. However, amino-acid variations at positions 104 and 115 in the vestigial esterase sub-domain of the HA1 receptor-binding domain (RBD) were found to modulate the pH of HA activation such that the HP and MP HA proteins are activated for membrane fusion at pH 5.7 and 5.3, respectively. In general, an increase in H5N1 pathogenicity in chickens was found to correlate with an increase in the pH of HA activation for mutant and chimeric HA proteins in the observed range of pH 5.2 to 6.0. We determined a crystal structure of the MP HA protein at 2.50 Å resolution and two structures of HP HA at 2.95 and 3.10 Å resolution. Residues 104 and 115 that modulate the acid stability of the HA protein are situated at the N- and C-termini of the 110-helix in the vestigial esterase sub-domain, which interacts with the B loop of the HA2 stalk domain. Interactions between the 110-helix and the stalk domain appear to be important in regulating HA protein acid stability, which in turn modulates influenza virus replication and pathogenesis. Overall, an optimal activation pH of the HA protein is found to be necessary for high pathogenicity by H5N1 influenza virus in avian species.     

H9N2 influenza viruses possessing H5N1-like internal genomes continue to circulate in poultry in southeastern China

The transmission of H9N2 influenza viruses to humans and the realization that the A/Hong Kong/156/97-like (H5N1) (abbreviated HK/156/97) genome complex may be present in H9N2 viruses in southeastern China necessitated a study of the distribution and characterization of H9N2 viruses in poultry in the Hong Kong SAR in 1999. Serological studies indicated that H9N2 influenza viruses had infected a high proportion of chickens and other land-based birds (pigeon, pheasant, quail, guinea fowl, and chukka) from southeastern China. Two lineages of H9N2 influenza viruses present in the live-poultry markets were represented by A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 (Qa/HK/G1/97)-like and A/Duck/Hong Kong/Y280/97 (Dk/HK/Y280/97)-like viruses. Up to 16% of cages of quail in the poultry markets contained Qa/HK/G1/97-like viruses, while about 5% of cages of other land-based birds were infected with Dk/HK/Y280/97-like viruses. No reassortant between the two H9N2 virus lineages was detected despite their cocirculation in the poultry markets. Reassortant viruses represented by A/Chicken/Hong Kong/G9/97 (H9N2) were the major H9N2 influenza viruses circulating in the Hong Kong markets in 1997 but have not been detected since the chicken slaughter in 1997. The Qa/HK/G1/97-like viruses were frequently isolated from quail, while Dk/HK/Y280/97-like viruses were predominately associated with chickens. The Qa/HK/G1/97-like viruses were evolving relatively rapidly, especially in their PB2, HA, NP, and NA genes, suggesting that they are in the process of adapting to a new host. Experimental studies showed that both H9N2 lineages were primarily spread by the aerosol route and that neither quail nor chickens showed evidence of disease. The high prevalence of quail infected with Qa/HK/G1/97-like virus that contains six gene segments genetically highly related to HK/156/97 (H5N1) virus emphasizes the need for surveillance of mammals including humans.     

Cold-adapted pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus live vaccine elicits cross-reactive immune responses against seasonal and H5 influenza A viruses

The rapid transmission of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus (pH1N1) among humans has raised the concern of a potential emergence of reassortment between pH1N1 and highly pathogenic influenza strains, especially the avian H5N1 influenza virus. Here, we report that the cold-adapted pH1N1 live attenuated vaccine (CApH1N1) elicits cross-reactive immunity to seasonal and H5 influenza A viruses in the mouse model. Immunization with CApH1N1 induced both systemic and mucosal antibodies with broad reactivity to seasonal and H5 strains, including HAPI H5N1 and the avian H5N2 virus, providing complete protection against heterologous and heterosubtypic lethal challenges. Our results not only accentuate the merit of using live attenuated influenza virus vaccines in view of cross-reactivity but also represent the potential of CApH1N1 live vaccine for mitigating the clinical severity of infections that arise from reassortments between pH1N1 and highly pathogenic H5 subtype viruses.     

DNA Vaccine Encoding Hemagglutinin Provides Protective Immunity against H5N1 Influenza Virus Infection in Mice

In Hong Kong in 1997, a highly lethal H5N1 avian influenza virus was apparently transmitted directly from chickens to humans with no intermediate mammalian host and caused 18 confirmed infections and six deaths. Strategies must be developed to deal with this virus if it should reappear, and prospective vaccines must be developed to anticipate a future pandemic. We have determined that unadapted H5N1 viruses are pathogenic in mice, which provides a well-defined mammalian system for immunological studies of lethal avian influenza virus infection. We report that a DNA vaccine encoding hemagglutinin from the index human influenza isolate A/HK/156/97 provides immunity against H5N1 infection of mice. This immunity was induced against both the homologous A/HK/156/97 (H5N1) virus, which has no glycosylation site at residue 154, and chicken isolate A/Ck/HK/258/97 (H5N1), which does have a glycosylation site at residue 154. The mouse model system should allow rapid evaluation of the vaccine’s protective efficacy in a mammalian host. In our previous study using an avian model, DNA encoding hemagglutinin conferred protection against challenge with antigenic variants that differed from the primary antigen by 11 to 13% in the HA1 region. However, in our current study we found that a DNA vaccine encoding the hemagglutinin from A/Ty/Ir/1/83 (H5N8), which differs from A/HK/156/97 (H5N1) by 12% in HA1, prevented death but not H5N1 infection in mice. Therefore, a DNA vaccine made with a heterologous H5 strain did not prevent infection by H5N1 avian influenza viruses in mice but was useful in preventing death.     

Origin and molecular characterization of the human-infecting H6N1 influenza virus in Taiwan

In June 2013, the first human H6N1 influenza virus infection was confirmed in Taiwan. However, the origin and molecular characterization of this virus, A/Taiwan/2/2013 (H6N1), have not been well studied thus far. In the present report, we performed phylogenetic and coalescent analyses of this virus and compared its molecular profile/characteristics with other closely related strains. Molecular characterization of H6N1 revealed that it is a typical avian influenza virus of low pathogenicity, which might not replicate and propagate well in the upper airway in mammals. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that the virus clusters with A/chicken/Taiwan/A2837/2013 (H6N1) in seven genes, except PB1. For the PB1 gene, A/Taiwan/2/2013 was clustered with a different H6N1 lineage from A/chicken/Taiwan/A2837/2013. Although a previous study demonstrated that the PB2, PA, and M genes of A/Taiwan/2/2013 might be derived from the H5N2 viruses, coalescent analyses revealed that these H5N2 viruses were derived from more recent strains than that of the ancestor of A/Taiwan/2/2013. Therefore, we propose that A/Taiwan/2/2013 is a reassortant from different H6N1 lineages circulating in chickens in Taiwan. Furthermore, compared to avian isolates, a single P186L (H3 numbering) substitution in the hemagglutinin H6 of the human isolate might increase the mammalian receptor binding and, hence, this strain’s pathogenicity in humans. Overall, human infection with this virus seems an accidental event and is unlikely to cause an influenza pandemic. However, its co-circulation and potential reassortment with other influenza subtypes are still worthy of attention.