Threshold assessment,categorical perception,and the evolution of reliable signaling

Animals often use assessment signals to communicate information about their quality to a variety of receivers, including potential mates, competitors, and predators. But what maintains reliable signaling and prevents signalers from signaling a better quality than they actually have? Previous work has shown that reliable signaling can be maintained if signalers pay fitness costs for signaling at different intensities and these costs are greater for lower quality individuals than higher quality ones. Models supporting this idea typically assume that continuous variation in signal intensity is perceived as such by receivers. In many organisms, however, receivers have threshold responses to signals, in which they respond to a signal if it is above a threshold value and do not respond if the signal is below the threshold value. Here, we use both analytical and individual-based models to investigate how such threshold responses affect the reliability of assessment signals. We show that reliable signaling systems can break down when receivers have an invariant threshold response, but reliable signaling can be rescued if there is variation among receivers in the location of their threshold boundary. Our models provide an important step toward understanding signal evolution when receivers have threshold responses to continuous signal variation.     

When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?

Sir Philip Sidney games are a widely used model of simple signaling. Johnstone and Grafen [Johnstone, R.A., Grafen, A., 1993. Dishonesty and the handicap principle. Animal Behaviour 46, 759–764] present a version in which the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is for most signalers to “honestly” signal, with a small minority of signalers who “cheat”. This model is among the most frequently cited papers on the topic of “dishonest” signaling and supports the view that signals may be “dishonest” as long as they are “honest on average”. Using genetic algorithms, we demonstrate that another solution exists to the game, an evolutionarily stable set of Nash equilibria in which members of the set never signal and all donors give their resource. Payoffs to players using this set of strategies is greater those when playing the “dishonest” signaling ESS. We demonstrate that a random population is far more likely to evolve to this non-communicating strategy set than the “dishonest” signaling ESS. We also discuss the dynamics of biological game theory models and the advances of genetic algorithms as a heuristic solution method for these models.     

Some mistakes go unpunished: the evolution of "all or nothing" signalling

Many models of honest signaling, based on Zahavi's handicap principle, predict that if receivers are interested in a quality that shows continuous variation across the population of signalers, then the distribution of signal intensities will also be continuous. However, it has previously been noted that this prediction does not agree with empirical observation in many signaling systems, where signals are limited to a small number of levels despite continuous variation in the trait being signaled. Typically, there is a critical value of the trait, with all individuals with trait values on one side of the threshold using the same cheap signal, and all those with trait values on the other side of the threshold using the same expensive signal. It has already been demonstrated that these classical models naturally predict such "all-or-nothing signaling" if it is additionally assumed that receivers suffer from perceptual error in evaluating signal strength. We show that such all-or-nothing signaling is also predicted if receivers are limited to responding to the signals in one of two ways. We suggest that many ecological situations (such as the decision to attack the signaler or not, or mate with the signaler or not) involve such binary choices.     

The influence of postreliance detection on the deceptive efficacy of dishonest signals of intent: Understanding facial clues to deceit as the outcome of signaling tradeoffs

Evolutionary communication theory posits that signalers and receivers are in a coevolutionary arms race. Receivers attempt to predict the behavior of signalers, and signalers attempt to manipulate the behavior of receivers (often through the use of dishonest signals of intent). This has led to the perception that deceitful signalers prefer perfectly deceptive signals. However, it is often easy for receivers to determine that a signal of intent was dishonest after relying on it to their detriment. Even the best deceivers may then acquire a reputation for being dishonest. For instance, in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)-like social situations, predictable defectors make better social partners than unpredictable defectors. When opportunities to engage in social interaction depend on one's reputation for predictability, those who are better at concealing their defecting intentions may suffer the most from the reputations they acquire. Deceivers then face a tradeoff between the short-term benefits of successful deception and the long-term costs to their reputations. A mathematical model is developed and it is shown that the tradeoff often favors signalers who produce imperfectly deceptive signals over perfectly honest or perfectly deceptive ones. Implications for understanding human facial expressions and sociopathy are drawn.     

Efficacy and honesty in communication between relatives

Abstract The evolution of honest communication has recently become the focus of intense theoretical attention. However, strategic models dealing with honesty have largely ignored the implications of noise and perceptual error for signal evolution (just as models dealing with signal detection in the presence of noise ignore strategic issues). Here, I analyze an extended version of Maynard Smith's strategic model of signaling of need between relatives, the Philip Sidney game, that incorporates the possibility of perceptual error. I show that even in the presence of noise, there exists over a wide range of parameter values a unique, continuously stable signaling equilibrium, at which the signaler employs a costly display when needy but refrains from doing so when healthy. For a subset of this range, there also exists a second, lower cost signaling equilibrium that is not continuously stable. At the former equilibrium, predicted signal cost is inversely related to the coefficient of relatedness (r) between signaler and receiver. Cost is not, however, predicted to drop to zero even when r = 1 and there is no conflict of interest between the two (as is the case in errofree models), because it serves to enhance the efficacy of communication as well as to discourage deceit. Equilibrium signal cost is inversely related to the probability that the signaler is needy, and tends to increase with the level of noise. If noise becomes too great (i.e., if a detectable signal is too costly to produce), signaling is no longer stable; surprisingly, it is also unstable if the level of noise is too low (i.e., if a detectable signal is too cheap to produce).     

Resource value and the context dependence of receiver behaviour

Many animals use signals of fighting ability to minimize the costs of competition. Theory predicts that signals must be costly to remain reliable indicators of their bearer's abilities, but many signals of fighting ability lack obvious developmental costs. Instead, receivers are thought to maintain signal accuracy by behaving aggressively towards individuals with inaccurate signals (i.e. social costs). Models predict that the evolutionary stability of social cost signals depends on receivers trusting signals in certain contexts and testing signal accuracy in other contexts. Here, I use the signals of agonistic ability in Polistes dominulus wasps to provide the first experimental evidence that receiver responses to social cost signals are context dependent. During contests over low-value resources, wasps trust signals; they avoid patches of food guarded by rivals with elaborate signals. As the value of the resource increases, wasps become more likely to test signal accuracy. In fact, receivers challenge guards regardless of their signal phenotype when the resource is sufficiently valuable. Context-dependent receiver responses are likely to be an important behavioural mechanism underlying the evolution of social costs, as context-dependent responses allow receivers to minimize the costs of conflict while also ensuring signal accuracy.     

Digest: The interplay between imprinting,mimicry, and multimodal signaling can lead to sympatric speciation†

Mimicry can directly affect the evolutionary history of models, mimics, and signal receivers. Mimics often use multimodal signaling to deceive receivers. Jamie et al. showed that brood parasitic birds display multimodal signaling of mimetic traits triggered by sexual and filial imprinting on host species. These resulting adaptations can interact with premating isolation barriers to strengthen reproductive isolation and potentially drive sympatric speciation.     

Context-dependent discrimination and the evolution of mimicry

Many mimetic organisms have evolved a close resemblance to their models, making it difficult to discriminate between them on the basis of appearance alone. However, if mimics and models differ slightly in their activity patterns, behavior, or use of microhabitats, the exact circumstances under which a signaler is encountered may provide additional clues to its identity. We employ an optimality model of mimetic discrimination in which signal receivers obtain information about the relative risk of encountering mimics and models by observing an external background cue and flexibly adjust their response thresholds. Although such flexibility on the part of signal receivers has been predicted by theory and is supported by empirical evidence in a range of biological settings, little is known about the effects it has on signalers. We show that the presence of external cues that partly reveal signaler identity may benefit models and harm mimics, harm both, or even benefit both, depending on ecological circumstances. Moreover, if mimetic traits are costly to express, or mimics are related to their neighbors, context-dependent discrimination can dramatically alter the outcome of mimetic evolution. We discuss context-dependent discrimination among signal receivers in relation to small-scale synchrony in model and mimic activity patterns.     

Signaling health versus parasites

The Hamilton-Zuk hypothesis, that parasite-host coevolution can maintain heritable variation in fitness, has inspired a very successful research program on sexual selection on signals of health. The immunocompetence handicap hypothesis was developed to provide a handicapping mechanism to stabilize the correlation between signals and health. In earlier articles, I showed that handicap signaling is a special case, not a general law that we can rely on to deduce relative costs across signalers of different quality at equilibrium. The essential requirement for reliable signaling is that higher-quality signalers are more efficient; they get greater marginal fitness returns from an incremental increase in the signal. This does not undermine the Hamilton-Zuk hypothesis or the immunocompetence mechanism, but it does raise doubts about a widespread assumption that is commonly used to test these hypotheses: that sexual selection on signals of health implies the choice of mates with the fewest parasites. Immunity and parasites might play a fundamental role in many biological signaling systems, but viability-indicating traits are not necessarily parasite-load-indicating traits. Theory allows for the possibility that high-quality big signalers have greater health and more parasites than low-quality small signalers (and the data suggest that in many systems they do). This means that we cannot test the Hamilton-Zuk hypothesis or the immunocompetence handicap hypothesis by counting parasites. More generally, we cannot understand sexual selection on signals of health by focusing on the viability costs of signals.     

Deception with honest signals: signal residuals and signal function in snapping shrimp

Animals in competitive interactions often assess the competitiveability of opponents using signals. Signals used in competitiveinteractions are generally predicted to be honest, but opento low levels of deceit. Such "incomplete honesty" in signalscan be studied by using signal residuals, the residuals fromthe regression of a measure of signal structure on competitiveability. Specifically, individuals with positive signal residualsproduce signals that exaggerate their competitive ability; deceptive use of these signals may occur if signalers for whom the signalexaggerates their apparent competitive ability use the signalmore frequently. I used this framework to examine the use ofthe open chela display by big-clawed snapping shrimp (Alpheusheterochaelis). Competitive interactions between snapping shrimpare resolved primarily on the basis of body size, and the open chela display is used by males to assess body size. I foundthat the production of the open chela display by males respondingto superior competitors depends on chela residuals, such thatindividuals for whom the display exaggerates their apparentsize produce the display more often. This effect can be seenboth in response to isolated chelae and in staged competitiveinteractions. Interactions involving shrimp with larger chela residuals are long and highly escalated, suggesting that chelaresiduals affect assessment of competitive ability. Thus, theincreased use of the open chela display by males for whichthe display exaggerates apparent body size is an example ofdeceptive use of an otherwise honest signal.     

Economic models of animal communication

Many models of animal signal evolution fail to incorporate an explicit strategy for receivers prior to the evolution of signals. When reasonable assumptions are made for such strategies, we have shown that there is a minimal accuracy of signal coding that is required before receivers should attend to signals (Bradbury & Vehrencamp 1998, Principles of Animal Communication). Depending upon the relative payoffs of correct and incorrect decisions by receivers, this minimal accuracy can be quite high. Here we use this result to explain why so many signals appear to be traits that provided useful information to receivers before becoming ritualized into signals. Our model also supports one prediction of sensory drive models: that latent preferences may selectively favour some signal precursors over others. However, it imposes a serious constraint on sensory drive by requiring that there be sufficient benefits to a receiver to compensate for the costs of disrupting the optimal receiver strategy used before exploitation. Finally, we discuss the overlap between signal honesty and accuracy and show how senders that completely disagree with receivers about appropriate receiver decisions may still benefit by providing moderately honest and accurate signals. Copyright 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.     

Do Singing Rock Hyraxes Exploit Conspecific Calls to Gain Attention?

Signal detection theory predicts that signals directed at distant or busy receivers in noisy backgrounds will begin with an alert component, in order to draw attention. Instead of an alert component, however, animals could get the same effect by using an external stimulus. Here we combined observations of free-living rock hyraxes (Procavia capensis) with playback experiments to elucidate the circumstances under which males begin singing. We show that males sing following hyrax pup screams, which elicit a strong response from hyraxes within hearing distance, which are potential receivers. We hypothesize that singers enhance their singing display by exploiting the rarely emitted pup screams. To our knowledge, our findings are the first indication that animals may enhance signal reception by exploiting conspecifics' signals and the differential attention to these signals. We suggest that the utilization of external stimuli by signalers may be widespread, as an adaptive strategy for communication in complex environments.     

Eavesdropping on visual secrets

Private communication may benefit signalers by reducing the costs imposed by potential eavesdroppers such as parasites, predators, prey, or rivals. It is likely that private communication channels are influenced by the evolution of signalers, intended receivers, and potential eavesdroppers, but most studies only examine how private communication benefits signalers. Here, we address this shortcoming by examining visual private communication from a potential eavesdropper’s perspective. Specifically, we ask if a signaler would face fitness consequences if a potential eavesdropper could detect its signal more clearly. By integrating studies on private communication with those on the evolution of vision, we suggest that published studies find few taxon-based constraints that could keep potential eavesdroppers from detecting most hypothesized forms of visual private communication. However, we find that private signals may persist over evolutionary time if the benefits of detecting a particular signal do not outweigh the functional costs a potential eavesdropper would suffer from evolving the ability to detect it. We also suggest that all undetectable signals are not necessarily private signals: potential eavesdroppers may not benefit from detecting a signal if it co-occurs with signals in other more detectable sensory modalities. In future work, we suggest that researchers consider how the evolution of potential eavesdroppers’ sensory systems influences private communication. Specifically, we suggest that examining the fitness correlates and evolution of potential eavesdroppers can help (1) determine the likelihood that private communication channels are stable over evolutionary time, and (2) demonstrate that undetectable signals are private signals by showing that signalers benefit from a reduction in detection by potential eavesdroppers.     

Error-proneness as a handicap signal

This paper describes two discrete signalling models in which the error-proneness of signals can serve as a handicap signal. In the first model, the direct handicap of sending a high-quality signal is not large enough to assure that a low-quality signaller will not send it. However, if the receiver sometimes mistakes a high-quality signal for a low-quality one, then there is an indirect handicap to sending a high-quality signal. The total handicap of sending such a signal may then still be such that a low-quality signaller would not want to send it. In the second model, there is no direct handicap of sending signals, so that nothing would seem to stop a signaller from always sending a high-quality signal. However, the receiver sometimes fails to detect signals, and this causes an indirect handicap of sending a high-quality signal that still stops the low-quality signaller of sending such a signal. The conditions for honesty are that the probability of an error of detection is higher for a high-quality than for a low-quality signal, and that the signaller who does not detect a signal adopts a response that is bad to the signaller. In both our models, we thus obtain the result that signal accuracy should not lie above a certain level in order for honest signalling to be possible. Moreover, we show that the maximal accuracy that can be achieved is higher the lower the degree of conflict between signaller and receiver. As well, we show that it is the conditions for honest signalling that may be constraining signal accuracy, rather than the signaller trying to make honest signals as effective as possible given receiver psychology, or the signaller adapting the accuracy of honest signals depending on his interests.     

The leaf-clipping display: A newly-discovered expressive gesture in wild chimpanzees

Chimpanzees of the Mahale Mountains, Tanzania were discovered to show an expressive gesture using leaves, termed as “leaf-clipping display”. This behavioural signal is directed by an adult male to an estrous female as a possessive behaviour, or by an adolescent male as a courtship display, or by an estrous female to an adolescent male also as a solicitation of copulation. The signal also is used toward human observers as a signal of food-demanding. This behaviour pattern might originate in a displacement tool-making behaviour in conflict situations. The leaf-clipping display has not been observed in any other chimpanzee populations studied, and may probably be one example of the tradition drift in wild chimpanzees.     

OPTIMAL INVESTMENT IN SOCIAL SIGNALS

This study is an attempt to determine how much individuals should invest in social communication, depending on the type of relationships they may form. Two simple models of social relationships are considered. In both models, individuals emit costly signals to advertise their “quality” as potential friends. Relationships are asymmetrical or symmetrical. In the asymmetrical condition (first model), we observe that low‐quality individuals are discouraged from signaling. In the symmetrical condition (second model), all individuals invest in communication. In both models, high‐quality individuals (elite) do not compete and signal uniformly. The level of this uniform signal and the size of the “elite” turn out to be controlled by the accuracy of signals. The two models may be relevant to several aspects of animal and human social communication.     

THE COST OF SEXUAL SIGNALING IN YEAST

The handicap principle holds that costly sexual signals can reliably indicate mate quality. Only individuals of high quality can afford a strong signal—the cost of signaling is relatively lower for high‐quality signalers than for low‐quality signalers. This critical property is difficult to test experimentally because the benefit of signaling on mating success, and cost of signaling on other components of fitness, cannot easily be separated in obligate sexual organisms. We therefore studied the facultatively sexual yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, which produces pheromones to attract potential mates. To precisely measure the cost of signaling, the signal was reduced or removed by deleting one or both copies of the pheromone‐encoding genes and measuring asexual growth rate in competition with a wild‐type signaler. We manipulated signaler quality either by changing the quality of the assay environment or by changing the number of deleterious mutations carried. For both types of treatment, we found that the cost of signaling decreased as the quality of the signaler increased, demonstrating that the yeast pheromone signal has the key property required for selection under the handicap principle. We found that cells of high genetic quality produce stronger signals than low‐quality cells, verifying that the signal is indeed honest.     

Beyond illness: Variation in haemosporidian load explains differences in vocal performance in a songbird

In animal communication, signals are expected to evolve to be honest, so that receivers avoid being manipulated by signalers. One way that signals can evolve to be honest is for them to be costly, with only high‐quality individuals being able to bear the costs of signal expression. It has been proposed that parasites can introduce costs that affect the expression of sexually selected traits, and there is evidence to support the role of parasitism in modulating animal behavior. If host infection status or intensity is found to relate to differences in signal expression, it may indicate a fitness cost that mediates honesty of signals. Birdsong is a good model for testing this, and physically challenging songs representing complex motor patterns provide a good example of sexually selected traits indicating individual condition. We performed a field study to evaluate the relationship between song performance and avian malaria infection in a common songbird. Previous work on this subject has almost always evaluated avian malaria in terms of binary infection status; however, parasitemia—infection intensity—is rarely assessed, even though differences in parasite load may have profound physiological consequences. We estimated parasitemia levels by using real‐time PCR. We found that birds with higher parasitemia displayed lower vocal performance, providing evidence that this song trait is an honest signal of parasitic load of haemosporidian parasites. To our knowledge, this study links parasite load and the expression of a sexually selected trait in a way that has not been addressed in the past. Studies using song performance traits and parasitemia offer an important perspective for understanding evolution of characters via sexual selection.     

Why not lie? Costs enforce honesty in an experimental signalling game

Communication depends on reliability. Yet, the existence of stable honest signalling presents an evolutionary puzzle. Why should animals signal honestly in the face of a conflict of interest? While students of animal signalling have offered several theoretical answers to this puzzle, the most widely studied model, commonly called the ‘handicap principle’, postulates that the costs of signals stabilize honesty. This model is the motivating force behind an enormous research enterprise that explores signal costs—whether they are physiological, immunological, neural, developmental or caloric. While there can be no question that many signals are costly, we lack definitive experimental evidence demonstrating that costs stabilize honesty. This study presents a laboratory signalling game using blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) that provides, to our knowledge, the first experimental evidence showing honesty persists when costs are high and disappears when costs are low.     

The accommodation index measures the perturbation associated with insertions and deletions in coiled‐coils: Application to understand signaling in histidine kinases

Coiled‐coils are essential components of many protein complexes. First discovered in structural proteins such as keratins, they have since been found to figure largely in the assembly and dynamics required for diverse functions, including membrane fusion, signal transduction and motors. Coiled‐coils have a characteristic repeating seven‐residue geometric and sequence motif, which is sometimes interrupted by the insertion of one or more residues. Such insertions are often highly conserved and critical to interdomain communication in signaling proteins such as bacterial histidine kinases. Here we develop the “accommodation index” as a parameter that allows automatic detection and classification of insertions based on the three dimensional structure of a protein. This method allows precise identification of the type of insertion and the “accommodation length” over which the insertion is structurally accommodated. A simple theory is presented that predicts the structural perturbations of 1, 3, 4 residue insertions as a function of the length over which the insertion is accommodated. Analysis of experimental structures is in good agreement with theory, and shows that short accommodation lengths give rise to greater perturbation of helix packing angles, changes in local helical phase, and increased structural asymmetry relative to long accommodation lengths. Cytoplasmic domains of histidine kinases in different signaling states display large changes in their accommodation lengths, which can now be seen to underlie diverse structural transitions including symmetry/asymmetry and local variations in helical phase that accompany signal transduction.