The establishment of evolutionary biology as a discrete biological discipline

This is the second of two ‘Roots’ articles from Dr Ernst Mayr; the first appeared in the February issue. The article that follows is Dr Mayr's address on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Society for the Study of Evolution, St Louis, USA, June 19, 1996.     

More on how and why: cause and effect in biology revisited

In 1961, Ernst Mayr published a highly influential article on the nature of causation in biology, in which he distinguished between proximate and ultimate causes. Mayr argued that proximate causes (e.g. physiological factors) and ultimate causes (e.g. natural selection) addressed distinct ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and were not competing alternatives. That distinction retains explanatory value today. However, the adoption of Mayr’s heuristic led to the widespread belief that ontogenetic processes are irrelevant to evolutionary questions, a belief that has (1) hindered progress within evolutionary biology, (2) forged divisions between evolutionary biology and adjacent disciplines and (3) obstructed several contemporary debates in biology. Here we expand on our earlier (Laland et al. in Science 334:1512–1516, 2011) argument that Mayr’s dichotomous formulation has now run its useful course, and that evolutionary biology would be better served by a concept of reciprocal causation, in which causation is perceived to cycle through biological systems recursively. We further suggest that a newer evolutionary synthesis is unlikely to emerge without this change in thinking about causation.     

Ring species as demonstrations of the continuum of species formation

In the mid‐20th century, Ernst Mayr (1942) and Theodosius Dobzhansky (1958) championed the significance of ‘circular overlaps’ or ‘ring species’ as the perfect demonstration of the gradual nature of species formation. As an ancestral species expands its range, wrapping around a geographic barrier, derived taxa within the ring display interactions typical of populations, such as genetic and morphological intergradation, while overlapping taxa at the terminus of the ring behave largely as sympatric, reproductively isolated species. Are ring species extremely rare or are they just difficult to detect? What conditions favour their formation? Modelling studies have attempted to address these knowledge gaps by estimating the biological parameters that result in stable ring species (Martins et al. 2013), and determining the necessary topographic parameters of the barriers encircled (Monahan et al. 2012). However, any generalization is undermined by a major limitation: only a handful of ring species are known to exist in nature. In addition, many of them have been broken into multiple species presumed to be evolving independently, usually obscuring the evolutionary dynamics that generate diversity. A paper in this issue of Molecular Ecology by Fuchs et al. (2015), focused on the entire genealogy of a bulbul (Alophoixus) species complex, offers key insights into the evolutionary processes underlying diversification of this Indo‐Malayan bird. Their findings fulfil most of the criteria that can be expected for ring species (Fig.  1 ): an ancestor has colonized the mainland from Sundaland, expanded along the forested habitat wrapping around Thailand's lowlands, adjacent taxa intergrade around the ring distribution, and terminal taxa overlap at the ring closure. Although it remains unclear whether ring divergence has resulted in restrictive gene flow relative to that observed around the ring, their results suggest that circular overlaps might be more common in nature than currently recognized in the literature. Most importantly, this work shows that the continuum of species formation that Mayr and Dobzhansky praised in circular overlaps is found in biological systems currently described as ‘rings of species’, in addition to the idealized ‘ring species’.     

Unpacking the species conundrum: philosophy,practice and a way forward

The history of ecology and evolutionary biology is rife with attempts to define and delimit species. However, there has been confusion between concepts and criteria, which has led to discussion, debate, and conflict, eventually leading to lack of consistency in delimitation. Here, we provide a broad review of species concepts, a clarification of category versus concept, an account of the general lineage concept (GLC), and finally a way forward for species discovery and delimitation. Historically, species were considered as varieties bound together by reproduction. After over 200 years of uncertainty, Mayr attempted to bring coherence to the definition of species through the biological species concept (BSC). This has, however, received much criticism, and the last half century has spawned at least 20 other concepts. A central philosophical problem is that concepts treat species as ‘individuals’ while the criteria for categorization treats them as ‘classes’. While not getting away from this problem entirely, the GLC attempts to provide a framework where lineage divergence is influenced by a number of different factors (and correlated to different traits) which relate to the different species concepts. We also introduce an ‘inclusive’ probabilistic approach for understanding and delimiting species. Finally, we provide a Wallacean (geography related) approach to the Linnaean problem of identifying and delimiting species, particularly for cases of allopatric divergence, and map this to the GLC. Going one step further, we take a morphometric terrain approach to visualizing and understanding differences between lineages. In summary, we argue that while generalized frameworks may work well for concepts of what species are, plurality and ‘inclusive’ probabilistic approaches may work best for delimitation.     

Proximate and ultimate causes: how come? and what for?

Proximate and ultimate causes in evolutionary biology have come to conflate two distinctions. The first is a distinction between immediate and historical causes. The second is between explanations of mechanism and adaptive function. Mayr emphasized the first distinction but many evolutionary biologists use proximate and ultimate causes to refer to the second. I recommend that ‘ultimate cause’ be abandoned as ambiguous.     

On the origin of the typological/population distinction in Ernst Mayr’s changing views of species, 1942–1959

Ernst Mayr’s typological/population distinction is a conceptual thread that runs throughout much of his work in systematics, evolutionary biology, and the history and philosophy of biology. Mayr himself claims that typological thinking originated in the philosophy of Plato and that population thinking was first introduced by Charles Darwin and field naturalists. A more proximate origin of the typological/population thinking, however, is found in Mayr’s own work on species. This paper traces the antecedents of the typological/population distinction by detailing Mayr’s changing views of species between 1942 and 1955. During this period, Mayr struggles to refine the biological species concept in the face of tensions that exist between studying species locally and studying them as geographically distributed collections of variable populations. The typological/population distinction is first formulated in 1955, when Mayr generalizes from the type concept versus the population concept in taxonomy to typological versus population thinking in biology more generally. Mayr’s appeal to the more general distinction between typological and population thinking coincides with the waning status of natural history and evolutionary biology that occurs in the early 1950s and the distinction plays an important role in Mayr’s efforts to legitimate the natural historical sciences.     

Ernst Mayr,naturalist: His contributions to systematics and evolution

Ernst Mayr's scientific career continues strongly 70 years after he published his first scientific paper in 1923. He is primarily a naturalist and ornithologist which has influenced his basic approach in science and later in philosophy and history of science. Mayr studied at the Natural History Museum in Berlin with Professor E. Stresemann, a leader in the most progressive school of avian systematics of the time. The contracts gained through Stresemann were central to Mayr's participation in a three year expedition to New Guinea and The Solomons, and the offer of a position in the Department of Ornithology, American Museum of Natural History, beginning in 1931. At the AMNH, Mayr was able to blend the best of the academic traditions of Europe with those of North America in developing a unified research program in biodiversity embracing systematics, biogeography and nomenclature. His tasks at the AMNH were to curate and study the huge collections amassed by the Whitney South Sea Expedition plus the just purchased Rothschild collection of birds. These studies provided Mayr with the empirical foundation essential for his 1942Systematics and the Origin of Species and his subsequent theoretical work in evolutionary biology as well as all his later work in the philosophy and history of science. Without a detailed understanding of Mayr's empirical systematic and biogeographic work, one cannot possibly comprehend fully his immense contributions to evolutionary biology and his later analyses in the philosophy and history of science.     

Bergmann’s Rule,Adaptation, and Thermoregulation in Arctic Animals: Conflicting Perspectives from Physiology,Evolutionary Biology,and Physical Anthropology After World War II

Bergmann’s rule and Allen’s rule played important roles in mid-twentieth century discussions of adaptation, variation, and geographical distribution. Although inherited from the nineteenth-century natural history tradition these rules gained significance during the consolidation of the modern synthesis as evolutionary theorists focused attention on populations as units of evolution. For systematists, the rules provided a compelling rationale for identifying geographical races or subspecies, a function that was also picked up by some physical anthropologists. More generally, the rules provided strong evidence for adaptation by natural selection. Supporters of the rules tacitly, or often explicitly, assumed that the clines described by the rules reflected adaptations for thermoregulation. This assumption was challenged by the physiologists Laurence Irving and Per Scholander based on their arctic research conducted after World War II. Their critique spurred a controversy played out in a series of articles in Evolution, in Ernst Mayr’s Animal Species and Evolution, and in the writings of other prominent evolutionary biologists and physical anthropologists. Considering this episode highlights the complexity and ambiguity of important biological concepts such as adaptation, homeostasis, and self-regulation. It also demonstrates how different disciplinary orientations and styles of scientific research influenced evolutionary explanations, and the consequent difficulties of constructing a truly synthetic evolutionary biology in the decades immediately following World War II.     

The proximate/ultimate distinction in the multiple careers of Ernst Mayr

Ernst Mayr's distinction between “ultimate” and “proximate” causes is justly considered a major contribution to philosophy of biology. But how did Mayr come to this “philosophical” distinction, and what role did it play in his earlier “scientific” work? I address these issues by dividing Mayr's work into three careers or phases: 1) Mayr the naturalist/researcher, 2) Mayr the representative of and spokesman for evolutionary biology and systematics, and more recently 3) Mayr the historian and philosopher of biology. If we want to understand the role of the proximate/ultimate distinction in Mayr's more recent career as a philosopher and historian, then it helps to consider hisearlier use of the distinction, in the course of his research, and in his promotion of the professions of evolutionary biology and systematics. I believe that this approach would also shed light on some other important “philosophical” positions that Mayr has defended, including the distinction between “essentialism: and “population thinking.”     

Epistemic and community transition in American evolutionary studies: the ‘Committee on Common Problems of Genetics,Paleontology, and Systematics’ (1942–1949)

The Committee on Common Problems of Genetics, Paleontology, and Systematics (United States National Research Council) marks part of a critical transition in American evolutionary studies. Launched in 1942 to facilitate cross-training between genetics and paleontology, the Committee was also designed to amplify paleontologist voices in modern studies of evolutionary processes. During coincidental absences of founders George Gaylord Simpson and Theodosius Dobzhansky, an opportunistic Ernst Mayr moved into the project’s leadership. Mayr used the opportunity for programmatic reforms he had been pursuing elsewhere for more than a decade. These are evident in the Bulletins he distributed under Committee auspices. In his brief tenure as Committee leader, Mayr gained his first substantial foothold within the coalescing community infrastructure of evolutionary studies. Carrying this momentum forward led Mayr directly into the project to launch the journal Evolution. The sociology of interdisciplinary activity provides useful tools for understanding the Committee’s value in the broad sweep of change in evolutionary studies during the synthesis period.     

Georges Teissier (1900–1972) and the Modern Synthesis in France

This Perspectives is devoted to the ideas of the French zoologist Georges Teissier about the mechanisms of evolution and the relations between micro- and macroevolution. Working in an almost universally neo-Lamarckian context in France, Teissier was one of the very few Darwinians there at the time of the evolutionary synthesis. The general atmosphere of French zoology during the 1920s and the 1930s will first be recalled, to understand the specific conditions in which Teissier became a zoologist. After a brief overview of his joint work with Philippe L’Héritier on the experimental genetics of Drosophila, this article describes the ways Teissier, during the 1950s, conceptualized the mechanisms that could allow for macroevolutionary transitions.IT is usually acknowledged that France did not significantly participate in the elaboration of 20th century evolutionary theory, often designated The Modern Synthesis. In their classical book on the history of the synthesis, Ernst Mayr and William B. Provine devoted a whole—nonetheless small—chapter to this specific issue (Mayr and Provine 1998, pp. 309–328). Mayr clearly stated that “France is the only major scientific nation that did not contribute significantly to the evolutionary synthesis” (Mayr 1998, p. 309). In the absence of a French architect of the synthesis, Mayr and Provine asked Ernest Boesiger, a Swiss population geneticist and a former student of Georges Teissier, to tell the story of what had happened in French biology at the time of the evolutionary synthesis. Boesiger, who died in 1975, wrote a paper in 1974 that provided the firm basis of the chapter. In very strong terms, he depicted French biology as “a kind of living fossil in the rejection of modern evolutionary theories” (Boesiger 1998, p. 309). He insisted on the fact that, even in 1974, most French biologists and philosophers were still reluctant to accept Darwinism. As regards the period of the 1930s, Boesiger was able to think of only two exceptions: Georges Teissier and Philippe L’Héritier. He then referred to their joint research in population genetics, which was based on the new technique of the population cages with the species Drosophila melanogaster, and listed their contributions to this new discipline.If Teissier and L’Héritier’s works on Drosophila are nowadays more widely recognized than in 1974, due in particular to the efforts of Jean Gayon and Michel Veuille (Gayon and Veuille 2001), this recognition could have as an unintended consequence the reduction of both Teissier and L’Héritier to being simply the inventors of a useful technique, namely the population cages (see especially how Mayr presented their work in his other classical book, Mayr 1982, p. 574), or as the founders of a French school of population geneticists (Gayon and Veuille 2001). The aim of this article is to reevaluate the way Georges Teissier (1900–1972) conceived Darwinian natural selection not only as an important mechanism for evolution at the population level but more fundamentally as a general key for the unification of biology, exactly as Julian Huxley or Ernst Mayr did during the same period (1930–1970). However, starting in the early 1950s, Teissier went on to conceive a very specific understanding of the evolutionary synthesis.In this article, I will first describe the general atmosphere of evolutionary issues in French biology at the time when Teissier started working as a zoologist, to understand against what he developed his joint research program with L’Héritier and afterward his general conceptions about evolution. During the 1930s and the 1940s, only a very few scientists in France could be seen as Darwinians. In addition to Teissier and L’Héritier, one may also consider Marcel Prenant, Boris Ephrussi, and the mathematician Gustave Malécot. Building on Jean Gayon and Michel Veuille’s work, I will then give a quick overview of L’Héritier and Teissier’s most important achievements in the field of population genetics. In the third part, I will discuss the discovery made by Teissier and L’Héritier of a case of cytoplasmic inheritance in Drosophila. This unexpected finding led them into the field of non-Mendelian heredity. I will then develop in detail the way Teissier finally went on to conceive the relation between microevolution and macroevolution, in light of the general context of French biology and of the development of the field of cytoplasmic inheritance.     

J. B. S. Haldane,Ernst Mayr and the Beanbag Genetics Dispute

Starting from the early decades of the twentieth century, evolutionary biology began to acquire mathematical overtones. This took place via the development of a set of models in which the Darwinian picture of evolution was shown to be consistent with the laws of heredity discovered by Mendel. The models, which came to be elaborated over the years, define a field of study known as population genetics. Population genetics is generally looked upon as an essential component of modern evolutionary theory. This article deals with a famous dispute between J. B. S. Haldane, one of the founders of population genetics, and Ernst Mayr, a major contributor to the way we understand evolution. The philosophical undercurrents of the dispute remain relevant today. Mayr and Haldane agreed that genetics provided a broad explanatory framework for explaining how evolution took place but differed over the relevance of the mathematical models that sought to underpin that framework. The dispute began with a fundamental issue raised by Mayr in 1959: in terms of understanding evolution, did population genetics contribute anything beyond the obvious? Haldane’s response came just before his death in 1964. It contained a spirited defense, not just of population genetics, but also of the motivations that lie behind mathematical modelling in biology. While the difference of opinion persisted and was not glossed over, the two continued to maintain cordial personal relations.     

Managing the boundaries between maverick cloners and mainstream scientists: the life cycle of a news event in a contested field

Abstract

In January 2004, the ‘maverick cloner’, Dr Panos Zavos called a press conference in London to announce that he had implanted a freshly cloned human embryo in the womb of an infertile woman. Reports of this press conference gained prominent coverage in the national newspapers the following day and led television bulletins that evening. This article discusses the ways in which expertise was claimed by or attributed to Dr Zavos and other key media sources. It argues that three key boundaries were demarcated in the coverage as journalists framed the stories in terms provided by Zavos's antagonists, ‘mainstream scientists’. It also discusses the engagement in tactics of news management by an organised grouping of UK scientists who attempted to shape the terrain of news coverage on the subject of cloning. The question of the extent to which interested scientists should be able to set the terms of media debate is explored.     

Dual Causality and the Autonomy of Biology

Ernst Mayr’s concept of dual causality in biology with the two forms of causes (proximate and ultimate) continues to provide an essential foundation for the philosophy of biology. They are equivalent to functional (=proximate) and evolutionary (=ultimate) causes with both required for full biological explanations. The natural sciences can be classified into nomological, historical nomological and historical dual causality, the last including only biology. Because evolutionary causality is unique to biology and must be included for all complete biological explanations, biology is autonomous from the physical sciences.     

Kowalevsky, comparative evolutionary embryology, and the intellectual lineage of evo-devo

Alexander Kowalevsky was one of the most significant 19th century biologists working at the intersection of evolution and embryology. The reinstatement of the Alexander Kowalevsky Medal by the St. Petersburg Society of Naturalists for outstanding contributions to understanding evolutionary relationships in the animal kingdom, evolutionary developmental biology, and comparative zoology is timely now that Evo-devo has emerged as a major research discipline in contemporary biology. Consideration of the intellectual lineage of comparative evolutionary embryology explicitly forces a reconsideration of some current conceptions of the modern emergence of Evo-devo, which has tended to exist in the shadow of experimental embryology throughout the 20th century, especially with respect to the recent success of developmental biology and developmental genetics. In particular we advocate a sharper distinction between the heritage of problems and the heritage of tools for contemporary Evo-devo. We provide brief overviews of the work of N. J. Berrill and D. T. Anderson to illustrate comparative evolutionary embryology in the 20th century, which provides an appropriate contextualization for a conceptual review of our research on the sea urchin genus Heliocidaris over the past two decades. We conclude that keeping research questions rather than experimental capabilities at the forefront of Evo-devo may be an antidote to any repeat of the stagnation experienced by the first group of evolutionary developmental biologists over one hundred years ago and acknowledges Kowalevsky's legacy in evolutionary embryology.     

INVITED SPECIAL PAPER: History of the botanical teaching laboratory in the United States

The establishment of teaching laboratories for botany in the United States was strongly influenced in the early part of the 19th century by the founding of a laboratory of natural history at the Rensselaer School by Amos Eaton who inspired numerous educators, particularly women. By midcentury and later, botany programs were established at land-grant colleges and the so-called “new Botany” movement spread from them. In the latter part of the century additional changes were brought about by the influence of German laboratory activity and botanists’ reactions to the introduction of the Huxley-Martin biology programs to America. During these times, Americans were improving their own manufactured microscopes, laboratory supplies, and equipment capabilities. By the beginning of the 20th century, laboratory teaching of botanical subjects was widely accepted as normal in universities and colleges, as well as in some high schools.     

How was teleology eliminated in early molecular biology?

This paper approaches the issue of the status of teleological reasoning in contemporary biology through a historical examination of events of the 1930s that surrounded Niels Bohr’s efforts to introduce ‘complementarity’ into biological discussions. The paper examines responses of three theoretical physicists who engaged boundary questions between the biological and physical sciences in this period in response to Bohr—Ernst Pascual Jordan (1902–80), Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961), and Max Delbrück (1906–81). It is claimed that none of these physicists sufficiently understood Bohr’s ‘critical’ teleological arguments, which are traced to the lineage of Kant and Harald Høffding and their respective resolutions of the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment. The positions of these four historical actors are discussed in terms of Ernst Mayr’s distinction of ‘teleological,’ ‘teleomatic,’ and ‘teleonomic’ explanations. A return to some of the views articulated by Bohr, and behind him, to Høffding and Kant, is claimed to provide a framework for reintroducing a ‘critical’ teleology into biological discussions.     

Optimism regarding the use of RNA/DNA hybrids to repair genes at high efficiency

R. Michael Blaese obtained his MD degree from the University of Minnesota in 1964. In 1966 he moved to Bethesda, for what eventually became 32 years at the National Institutes of Health where he developed his career long interest in the investigation and treatment of patients with primary immunodeficiency disease. In 1990, he was the Principal Investigator of the initial human gene therapy trial which used retroviral vectors to transfer a normal ADA cDNA into the peripheral blood T cells of two girls with Severe Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID). His laboratory has developed gene therapies for AIDS and cancer including the first clinical trial testing the strategy of inserting the herpes thymidine kinase (HSV‒tk) ‘suicide gene’ into recurrent brain tumors. In 1998, Dr. Blaese was appointed Chief Scientific Officer of Kimeragen, where he is pursuing his work on the correction of genetic disorders using a gene repair system based on the use of chimeric DNA/RNA oligonucleotides. In his own words he has been ‘totally seduced by this technology’. Dr. Blaese talked to The Journal of Gene Medicine, about the early results achieved using this approach and its prospects for the future. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.